John T. Flynn blames Pearl Harbor catastrophe on FDR

The only ones who should be blamed for ph should be the commanders they just sat thier and watched the Japanese go all willy nilly and knew that they were hostile towards us especially after the oil embargo and the sinking of the American gun boat in china. They should have knew the Japanese had us next on thier list and should have been read not have are heads in lala land thinking have a gray status in the war was going to make things better. I also blame the ones who seriously under estimated the strengh of the IJN and army they didnt have a clue that they had had the ability to reach ph and had fighters and pilots that were better than are own.

 

I didn't know I was given the boot. Looks like I can still post. I guess I will find out for sure, when I click, Post Quick Reply.

 

I have not posted in while. But I have visited the forum many time since February. I have not started any new treads, that's
true. But I have been reading posts and stuff like that.

 

What was the big surprise to the US about the PH Task Force re-fueling at sea? Was it that we didn't think they had the fuel to go that far? Technological know how? Did we think they had a shortage of tankers? I admit I had never heard of that.

 

Im just saying that the attack should have a big as a shock as it was considering the circumstances of the time altho no one would have thought of a carrier strike on ph.

 

Welcome back, Dogfather...er I think. Would you like a blindfold and a last cigarette?

 

Their DDs couldn't come close to making it without refueling and I think the CV's needed it or would have been on the very edge of their range (not good if intercepted on the way home).

 

I think the most significant reasons we got caught with our pants down were due to the culture of the Navy in 1941. The Navy brass was still dominated with Black Shoes, members of the Gun Club, who believed that the Main Naval Units were Battleships. Brown Shoe Admirals had known better for some time (Harry Yarnell successfully "bombed" PH during wargames back in '32 with Lexington and Saratoga in what is known as Fleet Problem 13.), but they were not running the show and all the war planning still evolved around the BBs. Naval Doctrine at the time had it that a Fleet lost a large percentage of it's Battle effectiveness for every thousand miles it operated away from it's base-and this was probably still somewhat true for Battleships operating in their originally intended roles.

So anyway, you had a situation in the Navy where the Brass didn't think we could really pull it off ourselves, and due to their low estimation of the IJN, they certainly didn't think they could pull it off. We made a lot of blunders that were due to our not understanding the Japanese. Our brass couldn't fathom how the Japanese could be so audacious to risk all of their best carriers on such a raid, not understanding that the Japanese brass, principally Yamamoto realized the only chance they had against us was to have a crushing decisive victory at the onset of hostilities.

 

I have taken so many hits from "Battleship Opana", that I was listing to Port and only making 12 nts. But
after repairs, I'm back in the fight . I would like to know, who wrote the material on this web site. I question the following (on pg 43):

Despite the inadequacies at Pearl Harbor it is correct to say that during the year or so before the Japanese attack many of the handicaps were partially overcome through persistent and hard work. In retrospect, it appears that even though Pearl Harbor was in many ways an unsatisfactory fleet base, the fact that the Fleet was there prevented the Japanese from initially occupying Hawaii and Midway, thereby using them later as bases to intercept our naval forces.

Wasn't air power at PH, the biggest deterrent to invasion by the Japanese? Yamamoto and the IJN,
thought they might lose, up to 2-3 carriers in the PH attack. But that would be to US air attack, not the battleships that were sunk or damaged. Also, those older battleships, were slow and could not keep up with carriers like Enterprize.

I don't see what good those older battleships, being based at PH did.

The whole point of this thread, was to suggest, that there was a cover-up, after the PH catastrophe
took place. This info was leaked, because of the cover-up. Flynn and the Chicago Tribune printed it.
Just like Nixon and Watergate....same kind of thing.

 

Well, when a sailboat tries to sink a battleship, there is only one outcome.

And you wonder why you take so many hits from Opana? How about the author, Vice Admiral Momer N. Wallin, USN (Retired). It might be a wild guess by me, but I'd have to say that he is the one who wrote that.

That would depend on what qualifies as "air power at PH". Is the air power at PH, the Japanese intelligence estimate or the actual aircraft at PH. Japanese estimates grossly exaggerated American air power at Pearl. They thought there were 40 4-engine bombers, in reality there were only 12. They also estimated that there were 100 2-engine bombers at Pearl, when there were only about half that number. The Japanese also estimated the number of fighter at about twice the number that were actually on hand. Realistically, the American land-based bombers at Pearl would likely have proved to be only a very minor threat to any Japanese fleet, invasion or otherwise.

As to the carriers, it was first estimated that there were 4 carriers that could be at Pearl Harbor, later the was revised to 3. It was the Japanese inability to track the American carriers that caused them the greatest amount of worry. Especially, if the Kido Butai encountered an American carrier on their way to attack Pearl Harbor.

As to the US battle line, IIRC, the Japanese were not flying air recon until they got close to Pearl Harbor, so an American "trap" is not entirely out of the question. The there is the fact that the "slow" battleships will likely be faster than any Japanese cripples trying to make good an escape from Pearl.

It wasn't just the battleships, but the entire Pacific fleet. They are a good 2,600 miles closer to their target, thus saving several days of sailing and fuel consumed. Moving the Fleet to Pearl was intended as a "show of force" in an effort to get the Japanese to back down. However, the Japanese made other plans...

Umm, your thinking of the Washington Post.
The Chicago Daily Tribune is probably best remembered for this

http://onlineorganizing.com/admin/my_documents/my_pictures/E868A_dewey_defeats_truman.jpg
DEWEY DEFEATS TRUMAN! That is a far cry from Watergate.


Also, have we not already covered the rather rabid anti-Roosevelt bias of Flynn and the Chicago Tribune.


DogFather, looks like it is back to drydock for you.

 

It is clear, Flynn & the Trib were "anti-Roosevelt". But that is free speech and there was a lot of legimate criticim, about
FDRs failure to listen, to very able people like Adm Richardson and taking unnecessary risks, with the battleships. Not only
did FDR, put them at risk, deploying them to PH. These ships needed maintenance, repair and up-dating of their anti-aircraft weapons. In other words, there were not battle ready.

FDR was Saber-rattling, with weapons, that were not ready for war. From a base, that had many deficiencies, besides
being difficult to defend. Some of these factors, that made the PH disaster much worse. Instead of admitting his mistakes, FDR & his admin & others officials in Washington (like Marshall)chose to try and cover them up. This is why,
there is a lot of questionable testimony, in all those PH hearings and investigations and why there were so many of
them.

 

Those weapons not ready for war won it for us. They fought their way up Tue Solomons when it counted most. Those obsolete battleships crossed the t and sunk the enemy forever. Why don't you try blaming the money hoarding congress for allowing the fleet to be in the state it was. What specificly was covered up? I assume with such a statement you have proof in the form of original source material.

 

Here is one example, of the cover-up:

Roberts Commission: (ibiblio.org/pha/pha/roberts/roberts.html)

XI
At about noon, eastern standard time (6:30 a.m. Honolulu time), December
7, an additional warning message, indicating an almost immediate break
in relations between the United States and Japan, was its dispatched by
the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief Naval Operations, for
the information of responsible Army and Navy commanders. Every effort
was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time,
but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the
delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.



Naval Court of Inquiry: (ibiblio.org/pha/pha/navy/navy_0.html)

Page 318
In the early forenoon of 7 December, Washington time, the War and Navy
Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in
diplomatic relations was imminent and, by inference and deduction that
an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon. This information
was embodied in a dispatch by the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, who, after
consulting with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone, had it
encoded and sent to the Commanding Generals in Panama, Manila, and
Hawaii, with instructions that the naval authorities in those areas be
informed of its contents.
[1200] The dispatch to Hawaii left Washington at 12:17 p. m. Washington
time (6:47 a. m., Honolulu time) and arrived in Honolulu's RCA office at
7:33 a. m. (Honolulu time) . Thus there remained but 22 minutes before
the attack began for delivery, decoding, dissemination, and action.
Lieut. General Short did not receive the decoded dispatch until the
afternoon of 7 December, several hour after the attacking force had
departed.
Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could
have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began.
Even in this event, however, there was no action open, nor means
available, to Admiral Kimmel which could have stopped the attack, or
which could have had other than negligible bearing upon its outcome.
There was already in effect the condition of readiness best suited to
the circumstances attending vessels within the limits of the Pearl
Harbor Naval Base, and the Fleet planes at their air bases on Oahu.

A dawn strike from carrier aircraft, was the "deduction" that this part of the
naval court is taking about. The tactic of using dark of night, to steam to an
objective, then attack at dawn, so pilots could see their targets, was well
known at the time.

Had a phone call be made, it may well have led Gen Short, to get out ammo and
warm-up aircraft. All this could have made a big difference. I don't see why such
a phone call would have, caused the Japanese to realize their codes have been
broken. Orders could have been given to Short, to get ready for immediate attack.
The reason why, or how we knew, was not info Short necessary had to have. At
that particular time.

 

Admiral Richardson was only one of a great many people that Roosevelt listened to, his opinions were in the minority. Further, despite you high opinion of Admiral Richardson, he did not have a "crystal ball" to foretell the future. Admiral Richardson did not believe the Japanese capable of launching an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and said so many times.

This is a very subjective statement, given that no one, including as I said before, Admiral Richardson, believed that the Japanese were capable of mounting an attack on Pearl Harbor. They further believed that Japan would not commit an act, war with the US, that was tantamount to "national suicide".

Again highly debatable for the same reasons I spoke of earlier.

You do realize that Pearl Harbor was a major naval base fully capable of maintaining and repairing warships. Were not the USS Pennsylvania, USS Cassin, and USS Downes, all undergoing maintenance and repair at the time of the Japanese attack?

As to up-dating the anti-aircraft guns, with what? The 5inch/38 was still in short supply and priority was given to new construction. The 40mm would not appear until January, 1942, and would not be fitted to a combat vessel until July, 1942. The 1.1inch/75 quadruple mount was very problematic, having been rushed into production, and also was in very short supply. The 20mm/70 was also in short supply, with only some 379 mounts having been produced. Of course, that is just the weapons themselves, and not the other necessary equipment that is needed. Further, the battleships were equipped with the roughly the same number and type of AA guns that were fitted to most other battleships of the world. So, the battleships were as battle-ready as they would ever be.

Pearl Harbor was easy to defend, however the cost-cutting measures implemented by Congress in the 1930's, left the base well short of weapons. Still, given the fact that Pearl Harbor was caught flat-footed, even had the weapons been available, the outcome would li