John T. Flynn blames Pearl Harbor catastrophe on FDR

Yes, this was done to hide the knowledge that the Americans were reading Japanese codes. This is not anything "new."

Why on earth would the do that when they knew that the Japanese could pick up the radio-telephone transmissions emanating from, IIRC, San Francisco. As for using Plain Language, why don't you just broadcast it directly to Tokyo!!!

Some people just don't think!!!!

 

When I started to read about Adm Richardson and how Adm Nimitz, at first turned down the Pacific Fleet command, I
did start to think and form a different opinion, than the one I was taught in college. The phone call and plain language,
is a conclusion, from the Naval Court. It is a different opinion, than the Roberts Comm, that is for sure. As I read the
Naval Court, I first thought it was a group protecting one of its own. But more study and with some of the same
conclusions, being made by the Minority Opinion, of the JCC. I realized the Navy Court, had done a good job, of
analysing the event.

I don't see that a phone call would betray our code breaking, even if the call was intercepted in Japan. War with Japan had been a possiblity for some time. Adm Stark knew about, the lack of Pursuit aircraft and lack of anti-aircraft guns and other problems, with the fleet being based at PH. Along with how many alerts had been given and the difficulty, that can cause over a long period of time. Stark also failed to keep Adm Kimmel, abreast of the changing diplomatic situation. Like
he was supposed to do.


It is true there was a lack of funding, due in part to the Great Depression. But that is a reason, you don't try and project
power, too far away from the US West Coast. From what I have read, other Navalists of the time also knew this.

The other issue is that we had carriers based at PH. Had we lost a couple of them, it would really have been a longer war.
Stark was replaced, by Adm King, a little while latter. I think Marshall would have been replaced too, except he had other
skills that would be needed. He did win the Noble Peace Prize, for rebuilding Europe. So FDR and his admin, got that one right.

 

Oh God, he’s back to the phones again!

DF, how quickly and conveniently you forget.

Here, let me help you . . .

Go to

http://www.ww2f.com/pearl-harbor/42710-senate-vote-pearl-harbor-fdr-kimmel-short-marshall-4.html

and see messages, 95, 96, 97, 98, & 100. Then on to the next page in the thread:

http://www.ww2f.com/pearl-harbor/42710-senate-vote-pearl-harbor-fdr-kimmel-short-marshall-5.html

and see messages 102, 103, 104, & 105.

You were there . . . were you not paying attention? Or are the facts which dash your fantasies just so inconvenient that you simply pretend they do not exist?

You have never, ever, answered the critical questions posed to you. Let me remind you:

Who in the US government, or the US Navy, or the US Army, knew the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor? Names and your proof, please.

When did this individual or these individuals in the US government, or the US Navy, or the US Army, know the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor? Dates and your proof, please.

How did this individual or these individuals in the US government, or the US Navy, or the US Army, find out the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor? Methods and your proof, please.

Why did this individual or these individuals in the US government, or the US Navy, or the US Army, after finding out the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor do nothing? Reasons and your proof, please.

 

With all due respect, R Leonard, I think you are "barking up the wrong tree" with these

Any one capable of looking at a map would realize that Pearl Harbor presented a threat, in time of war, to the Japanese and their holdings in the Pacific. Thus, there existed the possibility that Japan would conduct an attack against the port. As a point of fact, Japan was the only nation that presented a threat to Pearl Harbor, and vice versa. Since, several of the pre-war Fleet Problems focused on both attacking and defending not only Pearl, but the Panama Canal, and the US west coast, the possibility of such an attack was viewed as possible.

As to individuals, we can start with US Ambassador Grew, who passed along, on January 27, 1941, his famous message warning that the Japanese, in the event of trouble with the US, planned to attack Pearl Harbor with a surprise mass attack. Then you have General Martin and Admiral Bellinger, who submitted this, Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41 on March 31, 1941, it can be found here: 348
There are likely many more...

The most pressing matter, is not mentioned. That would be "When did these individuals say the attack was to take place." While several saw or heard that an attack was possible, no one had a firm time-line as to when it would occur - 1 month, 2 months, 6 months, 1 year, etc.


However, with your last query

Gordon Prange's "At Dawn We Slept" and the Pearl Harbor investigations are replete with the answer to this question. Put succinctly, "Because they did not believe that the Japanese would attempt such an attack." Their reasons for this conclusion vary greatly, but all boil down to this single point, they simply did not believe. However, a few, Grew, Martin, Bellinger, etc. did what they could to "get the word out", but their warnings fell on deaf ears.

 

That's rich. AKA Cookie. I think Mr. Wu or Al Swearingen know.

 

I thought it was the Peruvian ambassador, and if I remember my Prange, McCollum in the late '60s wrote that the Peruvian ambassador's translator was the likely or, at least possible, source.

 

You only have to think of how the 1905 war started to know a surprise attack on PH was a strong possibility, assuming the IJN had the capability to do it. IMO the "disbelief", by professionals that should have known better, was more due to underestimating Japanese capabilities than anything else. I never found the subjact of PH particularly fascinating, the only book I still have is Prange and I don't feel tempted to open it again, unless someone comes up with proof that someone knew the details of the attack and deliberately witheld them, the CT are just that. This doesn't mean there's no blame, the US Pacific fleet was based at PH specifically to counter/deter a move by Japan, there were no other credible threats at the time in the Pacific, and failing to anticipate the attack is ... a HUGE failure. IMO the responsability for that failure does not reside on a single individual,
- FDR: he was the ultimate boss so he can't escape some blame.
- The diplomats and intelligence: they failed to provide accurate info on times and means of the attack, let's not forget that Japan simultaneously attacked in the Plilippines and Malaya, that kind of build up is hard to hide.
- The military leaders: they didn't anticipate the actual attack plan and so had no counterplans for it, on the other hand the level of general preparedness and training at PH was good, the forces that were not cought flat footed reacted admirably.
- The politicians: but for once they are nearly blameless, the military always complain they don't have enough money but from what I see they had ample means to stop Nagumo had they anticipated the attack.

So there are no criminals there buy quite a number of people that, with 20/20 hindsight, one can say didn't do their job well enough.

 

You disappoint me dog father. I was really hoping you would be bringing something new to the table. I don't see how any of what you provided can be considered proof of a cover up.

 

IMO it was the military's job to predict it, that nobody did is ... surprising to say the least.

So do we but we also have a saying "a dead fish's head always stinks first", with power comes responsability

It was their job to get that information, maybe an impossible one but to to provide early warning of an attack is military intelligence's first priority in peacetime.

Obviously they had no duty to plan for something they didn't believe was possible, it would be a waste of effort to say the least. So we go back to point one, I would expect professionals to know an attack was technically possible and that a surprise attack was in the Japanese mindset.

My comment was limited to "not giving the military the means to fight with", not that they were blameless, there obviously was enough firepower at PH to give Nagumo a bloody nose in a head to head fight.

I agree but the team did perform badly and it was essential to clear the field and get down to the serious business of fighting, risking command paralisys with an in depth investigation was not ot a good idea.

 

My understanding is that they did indeed expect the Japanese to start the war with a surprise attack, but on the Philippines. They also expected attacks on PH but those were expected to be sabotage and submarine based.

 

It would have been surprising if that were true, but actually there were those that did see it coming but they were in the minority and in some cases (like Kelly Turner) they did not alert those that they should have of their suspicions. But the fact is, the top brass didn't think it was possible, and to them made little sense. I'll repeat what I posted upthread, because it is key to the whole mess:

Also, I think you have to remember that the top brass were thinking strategically-all focus was on the Japanese attack to the south, which they knew was imminent. To the top brass, an attack on PH made no strategic sense; to risk your entire carrier fleet on a raid which they deemed had little chance for success.

Of course, as you said, with 20-20 hindsight they were wrong, but this was really a lesson learned early in WWII-the number one lesson of the war-that the preeminent weapon in all theaters of war was the airplane. The Japanese top brass understood it more than we did at the outset, however their application of Bushido tradition to their aviators was a huge blunder.

 

Sorry I couldn't do any better. I'm reading a new book, called Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy. It's by Percy L Greaves Jr, who served as Chief of Minority Staff, for the Joint Congressional Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

Greaves spent many years researching the PH Attack. He passed in 1984, before he could organize all his material. So, his wife Ettina B. Greaves, finished the book for her late husband. Editor's Preface is dated May 2007, with the Copyright
dated 2010. The book is almost a 1000 pgs, sounds like it took her while.