John T. Flynn blames Pearl Harbor catastrophe on FDR

I have seen this Pearl Harbor Attack made no strategic sense, argument before. I'm not sure that is accurate. If the
Japanese were able to catch our carriers, in port and also destory them. Then it made a lot of sence. It would eliminate
our major strike force. A force that could stop the Japanese move toward the raw materials in the SW Pacific.

 

It is very accurate to the Western/American way of thinking.

1. Does it make strategic sense to start a war you can't possible win. The American thought if it is a short war, they'd win, and if it was a protracted war, they KNEW they'd win.
2. Does it make strategic sense to sink a fleet in it's harbor, where there is the greatest chance that the ships will be refloated & repaired, and the least chance of heavy casualties, or does it make sense to attack and sink the fleet at sea, where the ships will be lost forever, and there is a much greater chance of heavy casualties.
3. Does it make strategic sense to conduct an overwhelming attack, when you are not sure if your priority targets will be there. The battleships maintained a fairly routine schedule, while the carriers did not.
4. Does it make strategic sense to risk your most important warships, knowing that if they are sunk, they will not be replaced.

What are you talking about?????

The Japanese did not sink any American carriers at Pearl Harbor! Yet, where was this "major strike force" early in the war, that according to you "could stop the Japanese move toward the raw materials in the SW Pacific." The answer is, that they were not a "major strike force" at all(at the time the Americans did not operate that way) and spent the early war months operating, more or less individually, hitting small, relatively undefended, outlying Japanese holdings. The carriers did this because they lacked the experience and supplies to do anything else.

Even the US battleships, had the Japanese not sunk or severely damaged them at Pearl, could not have done much to the Japanese invasion plans until the Pacific Fleet had been greatly reinforced. The fleet train and supplies were not there for the Pacific Fleet to conduct extended operations against the Japanese, nor could Cavite have been used as a major base without a lot of work put into it.

 

OP, thx for translating. I guess what I was trying to say, is that it made sence to Isoroku Yamamoto. After Japan had
decided they were going to go to war with the United States. But no, overall it did not make sence. Japan had a different
culture and a different why of looking at things.

 

There is nothing incorrect about calling the American carriers based at Pearl Harbor, a major strike force. They stopped
the Japanese advance toward Australia, at the Battle of the Coral Sea. I think it is clear, it took a major force to do that.

There were problems of supply, to the Pearl Harbor base. Along with other problems, with the fleet being based at Pearl.
But the fleet was at PH for a restraining influence on the actions of Japan. If it was really doing that, is a different question.

 

DogFather, the Battle of the Coral Sea is irrelevant to your previous statement.

Your mention of "A force that could stop the Japanese move toward the raw materials in the SW Pacific.", implies that the American carriers should have stopped the Japanese move into the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, etc. The Battle of the Coral Sea took place 6 MONTHS after Pearl Harbor, by this time Japan had already captured those "raw materials" a few months earlier - With no interference from American carriers what so ever.

 

Thanks! It is an interesting bit of historical revisionism that get´s almost everything wrong. It starts by attributing FDR´s actions to a sinister plan, gives misleading info about PH´s defences, ignores Japanese strategy and worst of all tries to acquit the responsible parties(Kimmel and Short) in order to blame the president. I´m wondering if the author was a political opponent of FDR.

 

I'm not sure we had a good way to stop Japanese expansion. But wouldn't have been better, to move the US Battleships
around? They would be at PH, for a while, then back on the US West Coast, then down to the Panama Canel. Keep the Japanese guessing, as to their location. That would also reduce, Japanese ability to gather intel, about our fleet. Since
we knew from Magic, that there was a lot of spying taking place at Pearl Harbor.

 

I'm not sure moving the fleet, from base to base, would be considered "retreating" by the Japanese. My understanding is
that, keeping a battlefleet on the move, to prevent predictablity, of its location, at any given time. Is a part of defence
strategy in naval doctrine. Also, intel gathering was easier at PH, for the Japanese, than it was on the west coast. They
had much more manpower, in Hawaii, than they did on the US Mainland.

At any given time, those US BBs, might be only a short distance from PH. No way for the Japanese to know. The hills
around PH, also made observation, of approaching enemy aircraft more difficult. Those hills around PH, also made
observation by Japanese spys easier. That was not the case in San Diego.

 

A couple of quibbles:

The battleships were viewed as the priority targets.

The Japanese viewed, at least for the most part, battleships as their most important warships at this time.

 

I would say they were bitter politic enemies. But other newsapapers, in the Fall of 1944, were also getting wind, of some
of the mistakes made by FDR and his admin and how the Roberts Commission, differed from the Naval Court of Inquiry and
the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Journalist Arthur Krock of the New York Times, also wrote:

"a fundamental conflict offinding between the reports on Pearl
Harbor of the commission headed by Justice Roberts and of
those composed of admirals and generals as reviewed by their
departmental superiors. If Admiral Kimmel and General Short
. . . were guilty of “dereliction of duty,” as the Roberts commission
concluded, then it cannot equally be true, as the Secretaries
of Navy and War appraised their officers’ inquiries, that on the
basis of available evidence no grounds exist for the courts-martial
of the area commanders or any others in the service".

Also, newspaperman Drew Pearson wrote “an unpleasant account” of the discrepancies, which appeared on the front page of the Miami Herald.

It was starting to leak out, the Roberts Commission had been a cover-up and the Navy and Army investigations, had
come to very different conclusions.

WarSec Stimson, warned FDR that "that the thing was sure to leak and here Drew Pearson had gotten hold of so many facts that it looked as if all of the rest would probably come out.

(source, Stimson Diary,vol 49,pp 68–69,December 1–10-1944)

 

Of course I do. I did not mean to give the impression I was refering to DogFather for posting this.

As far as stopping the Japanese expansion goes, how about a mix of an earlier built-up and a delay of further embargos until that built-up has been completed? IOTL reinforcements were rushed to the PI after the Japanese occupied the south of Indochina. Doing so after they occupied the north makes you gain more than six months.

Considering what would have been on the PI by mid-42, this could have made the difference. Emphasis on could.