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July 1944 --- Italy or Anvil?

Discussion in 'What If - Mediterranean & North Africa' started by SirSwindon, Oct 18, 2008.

  1. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    4th wilts likes this.
  2. 4th wilts

    4th wilts Member

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    thanks for that info carl,most informative and useful,as usual.
    if we assume overlord was launched in may 44,as planned,with the imo crucial extra months campaigning weather,does anyone think that dragoon would then be necessary?.cheers.:)
     
  3. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    Securing the use of Marsaliles in a timely manner revolves around a Allied army reaching that location in time. The fastest way to do that is by using the forces available in the Med. If Marsailles is not to be used then suffcient ports in NW Europe must be captured and fully operational by mid August, or when the Allies have two Army Groups operational on the continent. Refering back to the US Army green book summary for Logisitcs and Overlord; the logistics planners estimated that either the Brittiany group of ports including a artifical harbor in Quiberon Bay would be suffcient for the 30 to 40 divsions of two army group. A second group of ports, of the Cotiten Penensula and the Calais area would be suffcient for a slightly smaller pair of Army Groups. Antwerp or Rotterdam would be suffcient alone but it was not expected either would be operational before October and possibly not until December of January.

    As it was the Brittany ports were not captured in July as expected. In fact none were effectively in use before the end of the year. This had little to do with the date for Neptune. The Germans had learned the necessity to defend these places strongly and to sabatoge them throughly. The proper defense of the ports had been largely accomplished by late 1943 and the preperations for destruction not long after. Similarly the Calais group were well defended and sabatoged. Allied armys arriving on the continent could change nothing there. The US Army lucked out in capturing Cherbourg, taking it far ahead of expectations. In Brittiany the luck ran consistely the other way. Even discounting German good fortune the Brittiany ports will not be invested before mid July, and then they must be besiged, cleared, and resored to operational condition. In the case of Cherbourg it took over six weeks to restore it to the original planned capacity. Assuming the same for the Breton ports that places their earliest possible use in very late Spetember or more likely October given ordinary luck.

    By the end of September the Allies had approx 50 divsions or the equivalent in tank and armored cavalry brigades in France or available in Britian. That far exceeds the anticipated capacity of either port group and further exceeds the capacity of what the Allies actually had available for ports in mid September in NW Europe. Setting the schedule ahead three to four weeks is not remotely enough to resolve the problem of port capacity available.

    Securing the Marsailles group or ports not only places a thrid Army Group in France without the need to draw off the overstressed port and beach supply of NW Europe, but it also provides a surpluss capacity for making up the shortage of the NW coast.
     

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