LENINGRAD

OK. I have been researching and I have come to the conclussion that taking this very important city was very probable. It would give the German an astonishing strategic military, psychological victory and would realease the entire Army Group 'North' for other pourpouses.

Now, let's suposse that the German Naval Fleet in the Baltic Sea included some of the most powerful ships there were, such as the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen, Admiral Hipper, Admiral Scheer, etcetera. Let's not waste those ships in the Atlantic in riskful merchant raids...

And most important, after the city is surrounded on September 8th 1941 all available troops of marshal Von Leeb's Army Group 'North' (including all the Finnish divisions) are thrown onto the city. These troops, supported by the enormous guns of the Baltic fleet and the Luftwaffe. Even if Hoeppner's IV Panzer Group would have been already on its way to Moscow, Von Leeb's infantry divisions were strong enough to take the ill-defended city. Without Hitler's order to "starve the city", the infantry divisions, perfectly supported by heavy artillery and aircraft could have attacked the city before general Zhúkov would have been sent there to fortify the city. The troops under marshal Voroshilov were poor quality troops and were very few and bad supplied. They surely could not have been able to face Von Leeb's 30 divisions and the funs of the German fleet. (It's like another Sevastopol without forts and with several 'Doras')...

 

I think one of the main reasons why Hitler didn't go for the city was the rep the Russians were building of defending their city. Kiev was taken more or less by surprise had still offered an effective resistence, remote controlled bombs taking a toll on the german's as well as Hitler's conscience.

But, the main reason was that after taking the city at an undoubtly high cost, even with your suggestion, was that the citizens would need proper policing and feeding. A city of such size and pro-Soviet levels would need alot of troops. There was logic in Hitler's planning, if they had only sealed that small lake (which they couldn't) then Leningrad would of fallen.

My suggestion is they shouldn of bothered with it altogether, just place the troops in army group center and south before the invasion.

cheers,

 

Well, I don't think that leaving the city was a good idea. It needed to be taken to secure all the northern flank and the whole Baltic coast. Besides, do not forget about the psychological importance of the city since it was were the Soviet Union was borned. And of course, there were many troops deployed there, many industries... No, you couldn't leave it there.

 

As the Soviet Baltic fleet was pretty well dismantled by this time, I agree that this use of Army group North has great promise. This said however, what would the prospects have been if this plan had succeeded? I am not too familiar with Von Leeb and his thinking, wouuld he then strike south for Moscow?

The Blue Max

 

Field marshal Wilhelm von Leeb (1876-1956) was one of the best field commanders, strategists, tacticians and 'brains' of the German Army. He was one of the best (if not the best) artillery theorist within the Wehrmacht as well as the main defensive theorist. He was the defence master. His theories were brought to practice by men like Model, Keßelring and Heinrici during the war and ironically, the creator of these tactics only performed incredible and successful attacks during the war. Von Leeb was an expert in the use of heavy and siege artillery, defensive positions and elastic defence as well as Blitzkrieg advances. I think Von Leeb would have first totally encircle Leningrad with his mobile forces, then harrass it with heavy artillery and air bombardments and then take it by a bloody but effective stree-fighting.

 

And what about the vast amount of German troops deployed there, wouldn't they have been better of in Army Group North?

 

The amount of civilians in Leningrad was probably the factor why Hitler wanted to surround the city and let it suffocate. Yet the propaganda value of taking the city as well as freeing the troops for other fronts would have been invaluable.

I say take the city of Leningrad!!!

 

Didn't the Germans try that at Sevastopol to no avail???

 

Actually von Manstein conquered Sevastopol!



On July 1st of 1942, he captured the city of Sevastopol, and on the same day received the promotion to the rank of Field Marshal.

http://www.achtungpanzer.com/gen8.htm

 

Which Army Group do you think we are talking about?

Of course he did! With many casualties but he did. And Sebastopol was harder to conquer than Leningrad, because the Germans did not have naval supperiority in the Black Sea, the city was not isolated, totally encircled, was extremely fortified, had many experienced troops there...

 

Most people talk about the second battle of Sevastopol in 1942 where Manstein finally suceeded under huge losses, but tend to forget the first battle, where Manstein got a bloody nose, by second to third rate Red Army units...

(repost from the "Sevastopol"-thread):

"THE FIRST BATTLE OF SEVASTOPOL (DEC. 13, 1941 - DEC. 31, 1941)

On Nov. 8, 1941, Mansteins "Western Group" of his 11th Army (LIVth Korps and XXXth Korps) advanced to Sevastopol, but the advance was stopped due to the resistance of the withdrawing Soviet Coastal Army. In the following days, Sevastopol (9 Soviet Divisions under Command of Vice Admiral Oktjarbrskij) was encircled and sieged.

Heavy Artillery was brought forward and on Dec. 13, 1941 the bombardment of Sevastopol began. On Dec. 17, 1941 the attack on Sevastopol started with focus on on the north and north-east sector(LIVth Korps with 22nd, 132nd, 50th,the new 24th Division and 73rd Division as Reserve) and from the south (with 72nd, 170th Divion and Romanian Mountain-Brigade).

The German advance was slow and heavy losses occured.

On Dec. 26, 1941, Soviet amphibious landings at Kerc forced Mantein to stop the attack (which, at this time, could have been considered as failed anyway) and to re-locate troops away from Sevatopol to Kerc.

On Dec. 27, 1941 the LIVth Korps tried it again, but failed.

The first battle of Sevastopol was canceled by the Germans on Dec. 31, 1941"


It's a rather academic discussion if Leningrad 1941 would have been completely different than Sevastopol 1941, but I think one key isse was the Finns not pushing forward to really encircle the town from the north/northeast.

Cheers,
Cheers,

 

Indeed, Andy! By attacking from the north the Red Army would have been forced to move troops there from other fronts and Wehrmacht could have pushed through (?) even without the 4th Panzer army ( Hoepner ). The Germans did have Hitler´s order but seems like the Finns were thinking " You first we´ll follow to the city battles-maybe ".I cannot say how much the US policy would have meant to Mannerheim if Germans had started entering the city? But without attacking the city Mannerheim kept his troops behind, didn´t attack any further and the Finns didn´t bomb the city either by artillery or bombers.

If the Finns had kept going it seems that the lifeline to Leningrad ( supplies ) could have been cut. And soon Leningrad would have fallen winter 1941-1942(?).

 

If I remember correctly, Rudel's first exploits in the Flak armed Stuka were made in/around the Black Sea. Anywhere around Sevastopol?

 

from http://www.achtungpanzer.com/gen9.htm

Bio on Rudel has some info... Belgorod is more or less in between Kursk and Kharkov- so it's pretty far north of Sevastopol.

The massive Karl-Geraet self-propelled mortars were used at Sevastopol, though!

 

Indeed the 1st battle of Sevastopol was a bloody one in which the Germans miserably failed to take the city and the Kerch peninsula. However, by the time when Von Manstein arrived, his infantry divisions were too weakened, he did not have enough infantry, tanks nor artillery to take the city. And of course, winter was not helping much...

 

If the forces are too weak or not sufficient enough to attack, a clever Field Marshal would leave it before trying without having a chance of success. Crimean / South Ukrainian winters are relatively warm. And von Leeb's Divisions were weakened and exhausted, too.

 

Even if 'exausted' (which was not the case in all the forces in either, Army Group 'North' nor XI Army), marshal Von Leeb had over 20 infantry divisions to take a city (maybe larger) but with a more favourable geographic and strategic situation and of course, not prepared at all for sieges.

Let's compare Von Leeb's and Von Manstein's situation, during the first days of September 1941 for the first one and during December 1941 for the latter.

Von Leeb:

-20+ infantry divisions
-Naval superiority in the Baltic Sea
-A city with three flanks
-A city with more than 3 million inhabitants
-Not more than 5 Soviet divisions inside the city. Divisions of 10.000 men and three of them consisted of volunteer workers
-More than 500 improvised wood and concrete small defensive positions
-Complete air superiority.

Von Manstein:

-7 infantry divisions and 3 Romanian infantry brigades
-Complete air superiority
-Soviet Naval superiority in the Black Sea
-A city with one flank
-A city with less than a million inhabitants
-More than 6 Soviet divisions (including some naval infantry forces) plus militia
-A city with an external 20-kilometres deep defensive belt, an internal belt full of anti-tank ditches, mine-fields, concrete bunkers, mass concrete fortification, subterrain tunnels, fortifications, refugees and factories
-Soviet Reinforcements landing every day on the city and on Von Manstein's flanks and rear

Von Manstein's decision to attack the fortress was the right time at the moment, because he was pressed by Hitler and his inmediate superiors. The actual attacked had already delayed for tow months and a try must be made before the Soviets reinforced the garrison inside the city even more and far worse, to land forces elsewhere and surround Von Manstein's forces. Remember that audacity is a good ally in the battle field. As much time you delay your attack, more Soviet resistance you will find. And certainly, the Soviet precautions that winter and spring was what caused Von Manstein most of his casualties next summer. He had to try, he tried but his forces were two weak to fight that many Russian fresh forces and waiting was not an option. Von Manstein showed everything but ineptitude at the 1st battle of Sevastopol, since he was fighting not only in the city, but the whole Crimea and he managed to bring the Russian superior forces' attack to an halt with his own attacks. Von Manstein's best defensive tactic was attacking.

 

My grandfather fought in battle of Leningrad and has lost numerous close friends to the germans. What you all fail to mention is that the city was defended more vigorously and valiantly then probably any territory in the USSR at the time. It wasnt that there was an effective defense set-up before the war (Stalin left the gates open for Germans all the way up to Moscow and Leningrad), it was the will of the people of the city of Leningrad and and the heroic actions of those that were defenfing it. The germans were effectively held off at Leningrad for 3 years which is one of the most astonishing achievements of WWII as a whole and cannot be compared to practically anything that happened in the west (British had never faced germans on their soil). Civilians and mixed batalions held off 38 (!!!) German and Finish divisions.

The establishment of the supply line through the frozen lake Ladoga showed the determination of with which the people defended the city. American tangerines and canned beef was distributed as well as ammo and fresh arms brought in this raised the moral along with eventual victories at Stalingrad and Kursk made it possible to break the seige.

In the end the german leadership was mired with over-confidence and belief in their inherent superiority which proved to be desicively wrong, the russians over-came the field disadvantage with tactics (especially on the side of partisan warfare) and sheer will which is probably THE most important factor in warfare. Where leadership was weak the will of the people was strong. My grandfather has told me numerous stories of german attacks and always it was the german belief in russian inferiority that got them in most trouble.

I would like to see some replys if anyone has any thoughts or questions.

cheers,

Yevgeniy

 

A warm welcom to these Forums, VityazKnight ! I read your post with much interest and I, as well as many others here I'm sure, would be very interested indeed to hear further reminiscences of your Grandfather.

It is very true that we ( and many authors of books these days ) can tend to 'over-rate' German capabilities at times and this is where open discussion here can be valuable.

 

In my opinion, fighting in the actual streets and houses of Leningrad, which a lot of you guys propose, was not necessary to take Leningrad.

The urban fighting would have been very heavy, as the Soviet citizens were turning their city into a strong fortress with each passing day. Still, even if it is struck early enough, it still is a waste of precious German lives that could be used elsewhere.

In my opinion, a smarter move to take Leningrad would have involved, not a push further north, but a push north east to Volkhov and Tikhvin.

Without those two important cities, Soviet supply to Leningrad halts.

With the knowledge that the Germans are bent on taking Leningrad, the Finns might even push downward onto Leningrad. Then, the Germans can hit Moscow with 2 full army groups.

However, I personally believe just taking Moscow would have been the better option.