lesser known details of WW2 part two

Winston Churchill and whisky:

Looks like he was in the habbit of drinking whiskey all day long but not possibly without diluting it with water.

http://www.winstonchurchill.org/fh111myths.htm

The story of what his daughter calls the "Papa Cocktail" (a smidgen of Johnnie Walker covering the bottom of a tumbler, which was then filled with water and sipped throughout the morning ).

He learned this habit as a young man in India and South Africa (in My Early Life) appears to be literally true: the water being unfit to drink, one had to add whisky and, "by dint of careful application I learned to like it." The concoction he grew to like was, Jock Colville said, more akin to mouthwash than a highball. It barely qualifies as "scotch and water."

Where he did put away copious amounts of alcohol was at meals.

Judging the degree of his "dependence" is obfuscated by his own contradictory remarks. On the one hand he amused himself by allowing people to think he had a bottomless capacity.
At the same time in his writings you catch indications that he knew his limit: the drinking stories with the Russians were exaggerated, he wrote in The Second World War ("I was properly brought up"). Elsewhere he remarked, "my father taught me to have the utmost contempt for people who get drunk." He remarked that a glass of Champagne lifts the spirits, sharpens the wits, but "a bottle produces the opposite effect."

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http://www.winstonchurchill.org/ITJ81.htm

Winston Churchill was undoubtedly a film fan, but unfortunately he did not keep a list of the films he saw. Fortunately, Dr. Gilbert, himself a film fan, is attracted by Churchill’s interest in movies.

He may have watched his last film in a commercial cinema on 6 June 1940, when John Colville noted, "The PM went to a cinema to see the Dunkirk film and returned in rather a bad temper."

The most detailed record of Churchill’s film viewing comes from H.V. Morton’s account of the Atlantic Charter voyage in late summer 1941. He records that Churchill viewed the following films, among others: "Pimpernel Smith" (Leslie Howard), "Lady Hamilton" (Laurence Olivier and Vivian Leigh), "Ghost Breakers" (Paulette Goddard and Bob Hope), "Caught in the Draft" (Hope and Dorothy Lamour), "Love Crazy" (William Powell and Myrna Loy), "The Fox Hunt" (Donald Duck and Goofy), "Saps at Sea" (Laurel and Hardy), "Comrade X" (Clark Gable and Hedy Lamarr), "High Sierra" (Humphrey Bogart and Ida Lupino), "The Devil and Miss Jones" (Jean Arthur, Robert Cummings, Charles Cobum).

Morton comments on Churchill’s reactions to some of the films. "High Sierra" — at the end, when the gangster had rolled dead from rock to rock down a mountain side, Churchill remarked, "And a good time was had by all!" During the reel changes for "Pimpernel Smith," Churchill said "Jolly good," and settled down with his cigar for the next reel. During "Lady Hamilton," Churchill was completely absorbed in the story and for the first time did not speak to those near him, but seemed to retreat into himself as if he were sitting alone in the dark, his face, his body even, expressing an attention so complete that it seemed one might look and find him no longer there, but taken up, merged and absorbed by the screen. At the end of the film, Churchill wiped the tears from his eyes, turned to the audience and said, "I thought this would interest you gentlemen; many of you have been recently engaged with the enemy in matters of equal historical importance. Good night!"

On the evening of 14 December 1940, at Ditchley, Churchill watched an exciting double bill: "Gone with the Wind" and Chaplin’s "The Great Dictator." He said he was "pulverized" by their emotions.

His favourite film may have been "Lady Hamilton" but that was probably influenced by his admiration and affection for Vivian Leigh. After a birthday party the Churchills gave for Laurence Olivier, Churchill commented on the actor’s wife: "By Jove, she’s a clinker." He especially enjoyed her as Cleopatra against Claude Rains’ Julius Caesar in Shaw’s "Caesar and Cleopatra." He also admired Merle Oberon, but after seeing her in "Wuthering Heights" .his only comment was, "What terrible weather they have in Yorkshire."

Some films Churchill clearly disliked. He walked out of a showing of "Citizen Kane" and his dislike for "The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp" is well-known.

In his later years, Churchill viewed "The Bridge on the River Kwai," "The Wages of Fear," "The Ten Commandments," and "The Snows of Kilimanjaro." Dr. Sneddon made the following comment after watching Churchill view "Sink the Bismarck" in 1962: "He never took his eyes off it, and they lit up. He sat up and his usually pale face flushed. His cigar went out: he just held it; his mouth opened in rapt attention. Winston was fighting the battle over again."

 

Ha! He fortunately didn't watch any of his biographies...

 

Keitel!

On 17th April 1945, Heinrici was made responsible for the defence of Berlin, but Generalfeldmarschall Wilhelm Keitel, the Chief of the Armed forces High Command, personally relieved him of his command on 29th April because he ordered a withdrawal despite Hitler´s wishes to the contrary. Keitel later recalled in his memoirs:

" ...Colonel-General Heinrici telephoned me ..announcing that in view of the continued worsening of the situation..he had ordered his Army Group to resume its retreat. I told him that his attitude-for which there was no valid justification whatsoever-was flagrant disobedience. He countered that in that case he would no longer accept responsibility for the command of his troops, was no longer suitable to command an Army Group, and that he was to consider himself dismissed.He was to relinquish his command to the senior army commander, General Kurt von Tippelskirch."

 

Bah! What did he know?!



He never commanded anything in the field!

 

Ok computer is working better, let's see if this types out ok.....

The Me 262 painting reminded me of something.

When British troops captured the DWM plant at Lübeck in May of 45 they found that the R4M missile was being produced at a rate of 25,000 missiles per month !

E

 

let me go back with some background history...

Intial trials with the R4M folding fin air to air missile had begun in late October 1944 at the Strelna firing range near Brünn. The weapon proved extremely promising, although its realibility at this time was suspect. following trials by E-Stelle Tarnewitz and Abteilung E6 at Rechlin in November, the latter issued the following report.
"Maunufacturing defects were discoverd on delivery; out of true tubes with unequal thicknesses, nozzles installed incorrectly with poor interior finish. the poor ballistics of the rockets test fired from the ten metre rail were traceable to these defects. Several of the rockets wieth folding fins demonstrate inadequate fin strength and some were lost on the rails due to faulty spot welding."
By the end of January 45 most of these technical problems had been overcome by the manufacturer, Deutsche Waffen and Munitions Fabrik (DWM) at Läbeck, but difficulties were still being experienced with uneven ignition and burning of the propellant. Early February a number of rockets were delivered to jagdgruppe 10 for testing. based at Redlin, this unit was charged with evaluating various types of fighter weapons......similar to NJGr 10 with the nf's / One of the major probelms discovered by the unit was the designe of a suitable launcher.
Karl Kiefer, JGr 10's Technical Offizier reported:
"As we had been notified that the first live rockets would be arriving in march 45, there was nothing left to do but to improvise with what we had. Acting largely on the concept that this weapon was supposed to achieve a large caliber shotgun effect, we decided on a wooden rack with 12 rockets mounted side by side. We completed the necessary drawings and had the first example built by a small joinery firm in Schwerin, using simple curtain rods for the guiding mechanism. After wiring up a rack, we mounted it beneath the wing of an Fw 190, took cover as a precaution and ignited the rockets electrically. As we hoped rounds slid smoothly from their rails. Our improvisation worked perfectly, but not the rockets. they smoked in wild curves around the entire area. We thought at first the guide rails had been installed incorrectly, but soon found that igniting all the rockets simultaneously produced strong vortices during the firing phase which changed the flight paths of the rockets. We finally solved this problem by using two relays, launching two groups of 6 rockets at a time."
Following this successful test, major Georg Christl, commanding JGr 10, suggested that the two racks each carrying 12 R4M's be mounted beneath each wing of one of III./JG 7's Me 262's. The modification was carried out on Leutnant Karl Schnörrer's machine, and to flight rest the new combination, Fritz Wendel appeared from Augsburg at the instigation of the Gruppen Kommanduer Major Sinner who reported :
"Without further ado, Wendel tested the converted machine. No adverse changes in flying qualities were discovered, except for perhaps a minor loss of airspeed in the climb. On 8 march, Lt. Schnörrer carried out the first firing test. This did not go quite as planned as several rockets failed to leave their rails or burned out on the rack, fortunately without exploding. A second attempt by Schnörrer went smoothly that his 9th staffel immediately began to convert the other a/c and steps were taken to convert the other Staffel ( 10th and 11th staffels) plus I. gruppe/JG 7."

Classic Pubs, Me 262, volume 3

E

 

Thanx Erich! Very interesting! Now I know why they didn´t fire all the rockets at the same time!!

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Some Finnish Air Force WW2 interesting facts:

In spring of 1944 the Soviets decided to take Finland before beginning their advance towards Berlin. They amassed a tenfold superiority in troops and aircraft on the Karelian Isthmus and began their strategic offensive on 9th June 1944. Their advance achieved initial success, forcing the withdrawal of Finnish forces along the Isthmus, but in July 1944 the Finns were able to stabilize the front at the Vuoksi River and further attempts by the Soviet forces to advance beyond this line were repelled. The process seen in the Winter War was repeated.

Despite the Soviet superiority in numbers of aircraft, the FAF was able to concentrate its air forces and continue to achieve good results. The Brewsters, along with the Morane, Fiat and Curtiss fighters, although continuing their operations, became obsolete in terms of performance from 1943 on, and new fighters, Messerschmitt 109 G (MT)s, were received, although once again only in small numbers. When the Soviet offensive began, the units had about 40 Messerschmitts. Fortunately, the FAF was able to get 74 more fighters from Germany during the campaign, so that despite the fierce battles, the number of Messerschmitt fighters actually increased during the summer of 1944. The number of bombers in the flying units at the beginning of June 1944 was 66.

One good example of the ability to achieve local and temporal air superiority was the fact that the FAF bombers and a German support unit known as Kuhlmey were able to continue their effective air raids, which were vital contributions to the war effort, as the bombings could be concentrated on Soviet massed troops just before their preplanned attack times. Warnings of impending troop movements were usually captured by radio intelligence. It is also significant that no bombers in the formations escorted by the Messerschmitts were lost to enemy fighters during this period. The Messerschmitt fighters achieved an exchange ratio of 25:1.

Again the Finnish fighter force was stronger in the end of the war than it had been in the beginning of that. Also, during the wars the number of Finnish fighter aces had become a world record in relation to population. And almost all the Finnish top aces were fighting at the end of the war just as they had been at the beginning.

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When the Soviet attack started on 9th June 1944 the enemy concentrated on the Karelian Isthmus about 1500 aircraft. Their mission was to bomb the Finnish front line troops and transportations, to reconnoiter the defence positions and to maintain the air superiority. The main idea was to break the defensive line with a heavy bombardment. The Soviet air task lacked the strategic elements and being more tactical directed the Soviet air resources to a very small operation area. This made the Finnish fighter units` task much easier because now the limited fighter force could be concentrated effectively on that same small area. Only the MT fighters had good enough performance to fight successfully against the manyfold superior numbers of the attacker. Other fighter types were transferred to secure the rear and side sectors.

The intercept sorties were flown with as many fighters as was available at any certain moment, usually 8 - 20 fighters. The basic idea was that the top section or division attacked on the Soviet escort fighters while the lower division or flight attacked on the bombers. However, often, due to the great numbers of the Soviet escort fighters, all of the Finnish fighters had to commit themselves to the fighter combats. Anyhow, the Finnish principle was always to attack even as a section regardless of the numbers of the enemy. The limited fighter force was not able to repulse the bomb raids, but it caused continuous losses which were eating the enemy pilot cadre. The attacks scattered the Soviet formations and spread the combat over a larger area where the enemy could not get the direct benefit from the big numbers. The duels were solved by the combat skill and shooting accuracy of the individual pilots and the Finns proved to be the winners almost always. There were several occasions in which the Soviet formation turned back after seeing the Finnish fighters in the interception position (22).

One very important mission for the Finnish fighters was to escort own bomber formations. These played a decisive role in the defence because the bombings could be concentrated on attacking massed troops just before preplanned attack times. Warnings of impending troop movements were continually being captured by radio intelligence. The bomber formations included usually 30 - 40 aircraft and they were escorted by 12 - 18 fighters divided in three groups. The first group escorted the lower bombers, mainly Blenheims, the second group escorted the higher bombers, mainly Junkers Ju 88s and the third group flew as a top cover. The fighters escorted the bombers also during the return flight to 30 - 60 miles over own side, and then returned over the front line to patrol.

http://www.sci.fi/~fta/fintac-5.htm

 

The stats for the first BIG bombing ops ( 1,000 planes )by Bomber Command

30/31 May 1942
The Thousand Bomber Raid, Cologne

1,047 aircraft were dispatched, this number being made up as follows:

1 Group - 156 Wellingtons
3 Group - 134 Wellingtons, 88 Stirlings = 222 aircraft
4 Group - 131 Halifaxes, 9 Wellingtons, 7 Whitleys = 147 aircraft
5 Group - 73 Lancasters, 46 Manchesters, 34 Hampdens = 153 aircraft
91 (OTU) Group - 236 Wellingtons, 21 Whitleys = 257 aircraft
92 (OTU) Group - 63 Wellingtons, 45 Hampdens = 108 aircraft
Flying Training Command - 4 Wellingtons.

Aircraft totals: 602 Wellingtons, 131 Halifaxes, 88 Stirlings, 79 Hampdens, 73 Lancasters, 46 Manchesters, 28 Whitleys = 1,047 aircraft

The exact number of aircraft claiming to have bombed Cologne is in doubt; the Official History says 898 aircraft bombed but Bomber Command's Night Bombing Sheets indicate that 868 aircraft bombed the main target with 15 aircraft bombing other targets. The total tonnage of bombs was 1,455, two-thirds of this tonnage being incendiaries.
German records show that 2,500 separate fires were started, of which the local fire brigade classed 1,700 as large. Property damage in the raid totalled 3,330 buildings destroyed, 2,090 seriously damaged and 7,420 lightly damaged. More than 90 per cent of this damage was caused by fire rather than high-explosive bombs. Among the above total of 12,840 buildings were 2,560 industrial and commercial buildings, though many of these were small ones. However, 36 large firms suffered complete loss of production, 70 suffered 50-80 per cent loss and 222 up to 50 per cent.
The estimates of casualties in Cologne are, unusually, quite precise. Figures quoted for deaths vary only between 469 and 486. The 469 figure comprises 411 civilians and 58 military casualties, mostly members of Flak units. 5,027 people were listed as injured and 45,132 as bombed out.
The RAF lost 41 aircraft which were: 29 Wellingtons, 4 Manchesters, 3 Halifaxes, 2 Stirlings, 1 Hampden, 1 Lancaster, 1 Whitley, 3.9 per cent of the bombing force.
Bomber Command later estimated that 22 aircraft were lost over or near Cologne - 16 shot down by Flak, 4 by night fighters and 2 in a collision; most of the other losses were due to night-fighter action in the radar boxes between the coast and Cologne.

Intruder Operations

In a major effort to help the bomber force attacking Cologne, 34 Blenheims of 2 Group, 15 Blenheims of Army Co-Operation Command and 7 Havocs of Fighter Command attempted to attack German night-fighter airfields alongside the bomber route. No particular success was gained by these Intruders and 2 of the Blenheims were lost.

Total effort for the night: 1,103 sorties, 43 aircraft (3.9 per cent) lost.

------------------

1/2 June 1942
Essen

This was the second raid carried out by the 'Thousand Force' although the full 1,000 aircraft could not be provided on this night. 956 aircraft were dispatched: 545 Wellingtons, 127 Halifaxes, 77 Stirlings, 74 Lancasters, 71 Hampdens, 33 Manchesters and 29 Whitleys.
The plan was similar to the recent raid on Cologne except that many more flares were dropped by the raid leaders, Wellingtons of 3 Group. Crews experienced great difficulty in finding the target; the ground was covered either by haze or a layer of low cloud. Bombing was very scattered.
Essen reports only 11 houses destroyed and 184 damaged, mostly in the south of the city, and one prisoner of war working camp burnt out. Casualties were 15 people killed and 91 injured. Bombs also fell on at least 11 other towns in or near the Ruhr. Particularly heavy bombing occurred in Oberhausen with 83 people killed, Duisburg with 52 killed, and Mülheim with 15 killed.
31 bombers were lost: 15 Wellingtons, 8 Halifaxes, 4 Lancasters, 1 Hampden, 1 Manchester, 1 Stirling, 1 Whitley. This was 3.2 per cent of the force dispatched.

Intruders: 48 Blenheims to German airfields. 10 aircraft made attacks; 3 were lost. Fighter and Army Co-Operation Command aircraft were also operating.
-----------------------

25/26 June 1942
Bremen

The 'Thousand Force' was reassembled for this raid, although only 960 aircraft became available for Bomber Command use. Every type of aircraft in Bomber command was included, even the Bostons and Mosquitos of 2 Group which, so far, had only been used for day operations. The force was composed as follows: 472 Wellingtons, 124 Halifaxes, 96 Lancasters, 69 Stirlings, 51 Blenheims, 50 Hampdens, 50 Whitleys, 24 Bostons, 20 Manchesters and 4 Mosquitos.
A further 102 Hudsons and Wellingtons of Coastal Command were sent to Bremen. 5 further aircraft provided by Army Co-Operation Command were also added to the force. The final numbers dispatched, 1,067 aircraft.
Parts of the force were allocated to specific targets in Bremen. The entire 5 Group effort - 142 aircraft - was ordered to bomb the Focke-Wulf factory; 20 Blenheims were allocated to the A.G. Weser shipyard; the Coastal Command aircraft were to bomb the Deschimag shipyard; all other aircraft were to carry out an area attack on the town and docks.
The tactics were basically similar to the earlier 'Thousand' raids except that the bombing period was now cut to 65 minutes. Bremen, on the wide River Weser, should have been an easy target to find and the inland penetration of the German night-fighter belt was only a shallow one. There were doubts about a band of cloud which lay across the Bremen area during the day, but this was being pushed steadily eastwards by a strong wind. Unfortunately the wind dropped in the evening and the bomber crews found the target completely covered for the whole period of the raid. The limited success which was gained was entirely due to the use of Gee, which enabled the leading crews to start fires, on to the glow of which many aircraft of later waves bombed. 696 Bomber Command aircraft were able to claim attacks on Bremen.
572 houses were completely destroyed and 6,108 damaged. 85 people were killed, 497 injured and 2,378 bombed out.
On the industrial side, an assembly shop at the Focke-Wulf factory was completely flattened, a further 6 buildings at this factory were seriously damaged and 11 buildings lightly so. Damage was also experienced by 4 important industrial firms - the Atlas Werke, the Vulkan shipyard, the Norddeutsche Hütte and the Korff refinery - and by 2 large dockside warehouses.
The actual losses of the Bomber Command aircraft involved in the raid were 48 aircraft, including 4 which came down in the sea near England from which all but 2 crew members were rescued. This was a new record loss. It represented exactly 5 per cent of the Bomber Command aircraft dispatched. This time, heaviest casualties were suffered by the OTUs of 91 Group, which lost 23 of the 198 Whitleys and Wellingtons provided by that group, a loss of 11.6 per cent. 5 of the 102 Coastal Command aircraft were also lost.

Intruder Operations: 56 aircraft of 2 Group - 31 Blenheims, 21 Bostons, 4 Mosquitos - were dispatched to attack and harass 13 German airfields. 15 of the Blenheims were lent by Army Co-Operation Command and were operating under Bomber Command orders. The Boston and Mosquito sorties were the first Intruder flights by those aircraft types. 2 of the Army Co-Operation Blenheims, attacking St Trond and Venlo airfields, were lost.

Total Bomber Command effort for the night: 1,016 sorties, 50 aircraft (4.9 per cent) lost. Total including Coastal Command: 1,123 sorties, 55 aircraft (4.9 per cent) lost.
--------------------------

31 July/1 August 1942
Düsseldorf

630 aircraft - 308 Wellingtons, 113 Lancasters, 70 Halifaxes, 61 Stirlings, 54 Hampdens, 24 Whitleys. This was another raid in which Bomber Command's training units provided aircraft, though it was not an attempt to reach the 1,000-aircraft figure. It was the first occasion when more than 100 Lancasters took part in a raid. 484 aircraft claimed successful bombing although their photographs showed that part of the force bombed open country. More than 900 tons of bombs were dropped.
453 buildings in Düsseldorf and Neuss, the suburb town over the Rhine, were destroyed and more than 15,000 damaged (12,192 only lightly). 954 fires were started, of which 67 were classed as large. 279 people were killed - 245 in Düsseldorf and 34 in Neuss; 1,018 people were injured and 12,053 were bombed out. (The British Official History, p. 487, gives 379 deaths but this is believed to be an error.)
The casualties of the bomber force were again heavy. 29 aircraft - 16 Wellingtons, 5 Hampdens, 4 Halifaxes, 2 Lancasters, 2 Whitleys - were lost; this was 4.6 per cent of those dispatched. 92 (OTU) Group lost 11 of its 105 aircraft on the raid, a casualty rate of 10.5 per cent.

6 Blenheim Intruder sorties were flown; 1 Blenheim lost.


http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/diary/sep42.html

 

The story is often told of one of the pre-'Millennium' briefings. The CO states that Bomber Command planners have calculated that only two aircraft will be lost over the target due to collision.

The inevitable 'voice from the back' pipes up :-

'Excuse me, Sir - but can they tell us which two ?'

( Actually, as it turned out - they were absolutely right )

 

Started as a joke ...

In February 1940 a Luftwaffe bomber flying off the coast of Borkum, sighted two destroyers. In a sustained bout of aggression, it strafed, bombed and cornered the vessels. Rarely has one aircraft caused so much damage. The destroyers, the Lebrecht Maass and the Max Schultz both belonged to the German navy.

http://www.rodge.clara.net/trivia.htm



Feb 22, 1940: Operation Wikinger began (capture/destruction of British fishing vessels in the North Sea). Z1, Z4, Z16, Z6, Z13 and Z3 left Wilhelmshaven. Z1 was sunk northwest of Borkum, at 19.58hr, in the Heligoland Bight. Z1 was attacked in error and hit three times by He 111s of 4/KG26. While taking evasive action, she ran into a newly laid British minefield and was sunk. 282 crew drown and only 60 were rescued.

Feb 22, 1940: 1st DD FLOT conducts Operation Wikinger - to destroy British fishing vessels in the North Sea. The force is attacked in error by German He 111s in the Heligoland Bight, While taking evasive action, Z3 runs into a newly laid British minefield. Her entire complement of 308 men are lost. Rescue efforts are confused and called off early by submarine scares.

http://www.feldgrau.com/kmsdd.html

 

Williamson Murray:
The Luftwaffe 1933-1945

What happened to Bf 110 as the 8th got escort fighters ( i.e. day bombings ):

The experiences of Zerstörergeschwader "Horst Wessel", a Bf 110 fighter squadron, indicates what happened to twin-engine fighters in the new combat enviroment.The unit worked up over January and early February to operational ready status. At 1213, on Feb 20, 13 Bf 110´s scrambled after approaching bomber formations. Six minutes later, thre more aircraft took off to join the first group. When they arrived at a designated contact point, there was nothing left to meet.American fighters had jumped the 13 Bf 110´s from the sun and shot down 11.Meanwhile, two enemy fighters strafed the airfield and damaged nine more aircraft.Subsequent operations into March followed the same pattern. On the 22nd, "Horst Wessel" Bf 110´s shot down two "Fortresses" but had six aircraft written off and two crews killed.On March 6, from nine aircraft scrambled, two returned with mechanical difficulties, one received damage in air-to-air combat, five were shot down ( four pilots wounded and one killed ), and the commander landed his damaged aircraft at another airfield.

 

Some Luftwaffe figures:

http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/970907.shtml

Of Erhard Milch, State Secretary for Aviation, it was said "When Milch pisses, ice comes out." His father was Jewish, but Goering arranged falsified papers "proving" he was in reality the son of his mother's Aryan lover. Ruthless, shrewd, and ambitious, Milch clashed with everyone but was sufficiently competent to seize and retain power over many departments in both civil and military aviation. He eventually ran afoul of Goering, surreptitiously working for the Reichsmarschall's dismissal. In May 1944, with his influence waning, he took the brunt of Hitler's abuse over the Me-262's inability to carry bombs; now out of Hitler's favor, Goering began to strip Milch of all responsibilities. He was seriously injured in an auto accident in October 1944 and finally dismissed in January 1945.

In 1936 Goering appointed his old flying buddy Ernst Udet to head the Luftwaffe Technical Office. Udet was utterly unsuited for the job and spent his days and nights, like his friend and mentor, with "wild parties, drunken sprees, drug abuse, and womanizing." Eventually he too became rivals with Milch. Development of new aircraft and technology was completely mismanaged. In November 1941, abandoned by his old chum Goering and acutely aware of the deficiencies of the air arm, Udet shot himself after scrawling on his wall "Iron Man [meaning Goering], you deserted me."

Hans Jeschonnek, appointed chief of OKL in 1938, opposed four-engine bombers and endorsed dive-bombing as the true calling of Luftwaffe aircraft. He feuded with Milch and, blindly obedient to the Fuehrer, failed to comprehend the growing dominance of Allied airpower and the need for increased production of German fighters. In August 1943 the Eighth Air Force penetrated deep into Germany and delivered a daylight blow at Schweinfurt and Regensburg. After a furious row with Goering, Jeschonnek shot himself, leaving a note saying "I can no longer work with the Reichsmarschall."

The first commander of the German Condor Legion in Spain during the Civil War was Hugo Sperrle. It is he who is credited with inventing terror bombing with his air attack on the Basque town of Guernica in 1937. This earned him promotion to command the 3rd Air Fleet, with which he remained for the rest of his career. Headquartered in France, he grew increasingly fond of fine food, gambling, and high living and at the same time increasingly disillusioned with his Luftwaffe superiors. With his dwindling air assets totally overwhelmed by the Allies, Sperrle was dismissed and disgraced in August 1944.

Sperrle's chief of staff in Spain was Wolfram von Richthofen, cousin of the Red Baron of WWI fame. With Sperrle he was largely responsible for developing the Luftwaffe's emphasis on tactical support of the army at the expense of strategic bombing, although it was his indiscriminate fire bombing of Warsaw in 1939 ( in which incendiaries were scooped out of Ju-52s with potato shovels ) that incurred the wrath of General Blaskowitz. He went on to command an air fleet and become a field marshal and one of Hitler's favorites. But as Germany's fortunes declined, so his star declined as it became more and more critical to divert aircraft production from ground support machines to fighters. Late in 1944, with his air command in Italy melted away, he was diagnosed with an inoperable brain tumor and retired, dying in July 1945.

 

http://www.kwanah.com/txmilmus/36division/archives/443/443112.htm

As the 36th Division continued its drive to the south and east, picking up German stragglers heading for Alpine hideouts, it captured a number of Nazi bigwigs. One of the first of these was Field Marshall Gerd Von Runstedt, taken at Bad Tolz.

Pressing deeper into Germany, Berchtesgaden was taken and the Division roared into the Inn River Valley. By the time that German Army Group G surrendered at 12:00 noon 6 May 1945, the 36th Division had bagged more Nazi leaders and had freed a number of high ranking French prisoners.

On 7 May General Von Brauchitsch came to 36th Division Headquarters on behalf of Reichsmarshall Herman Goering. Assistant Division Commander Stack then intercepted Goering on a road near Radstadt, 35 miles south of Salzburg. His wife and daughter and a few military aides were with him.

Reichsminister Dr. Hans Frank, Gauleiter of Poland and infamous perpetrator of Jewish extermination pits was trapped in his office by a major of the 36th Division AMG team.

Admiral Nicholas Hoarthy, Hungarian ruler and associate of Hitler, who set up one of Europe‘s first dictatorships, was taken into custody in the palatial Schloss Waldbichl near Wielheim.

Max Amann, Nazi publicist and third man to enter the National Socialist Party, publisher of Mein Kampf, was captured in his summer home near Tegernsee.

Twenty-two additional high Nazi officials were captured by the Division including: Air Marshalls Ritter Von Greim, who succeeded Goering in command of the Luftwaffe, Hugo Sperrle who invented dive-bombing techniques, planned the London Blitz and defended the Normandy coastline in 1944, plus SS General Sepp Dietrich, the defender of Vienna against the Russians and one of Von Runstedt’s cruel fledglings in the Ardennes and nineteen lesser generals.

French leaders freed were: General Maurice Gamelin, former French Army Commander, Edouard Daladier and Paul Reynaud, former French Prime Ministers, General Maxine Weyand, Army Commander at the time of the French defeat, and his wife; Mme. Alfred Cailiau, who was sister of General Charles DeGaulle, and her husband; Michel Clemenceau, son of the French statesman; Jean Borotra, internationally known tennis star; Leon Jouhaux, Secretary of the Confederation General Du Travail; and several secretaries.

The 36th Division patrolled the towns of St. Johann, Kitzbuhl and Mittersill in Austria, enforcing the unconditional surrender.

 

Megargee, Geoffrey P. Inside Hitler's High Command. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000.

Hitler's style of command, and especially the so-called Fuehrerprinzip, or leader principle, was beginning to have insidious effects on the command system. According to the Fuehrerprinzip, every commander held sole responsibility for decisions within his command, and he was also duty-bound to obey every order he received from his superior commander. The Fuehrer himself stood, of course, at the top of this hierarchy; his will was quite literally law. Every senior commander (and more junior commanders, too, as the war went on) knew that Hitler had the power to issue or change any order. More and more often they began to appeal to him directly , as Guderian did on December 20, and his personal style was such that he allowed such behavior, even though it clearly violated the chain of command.

For a time Hitler simultaneously held four levels of command: head of state, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, commander-in-chief of the Army, and commander of Army Group B, the latter at a distance of some 800 miles.

As Allied material superiority increasingly made itself felt, the lack of German resources caused greater and greater competition between OKH and OKW for their own purposes. Some of these disputes, despite their deadly seriousness, were laughable.


In late February, for instance, the commander in chief west, Rundstedt, complained to the OKW that the General Staff had ordered a division to move out for the east on April 3; he said that the unit was not yet ready for combat in Russia. The Armed Forces Command Staff then reminded the General Staff that, in accordance with the Fuehrer's policy, only the Command Staff could determine departure dates for units in the OKW theaters. Finally the problem went to Hitler, after which the OKW notified the General Staff that the division would be available on April 4-- one day later than the General Staff's original target date. Such were the quarrels that were taking up an increasing amount of the staffs' time.

Command arrangements grew ever more nightmarish. Eventually, an OKW-controlled army group, E, was part of the front line facing the Soviets, but the Armed Forces High Command obstinately refused to transfer control of the force to OKH. Tactical units on the ground, side by side at the theater boundary, had to appeal all the way up to the very top of the chain of command to coordinate with each other.

The next 1a was Lieutenant Colonel Ulrich de Maiziere, whose story sums up the status of the General Staff in the last weeks of the war. He was not quite thirty-three years old when he took up his post, and yet for the last two weeks of his tenure (April 10-24, 1945), he was the de facto chief of the Operations Branch. In an interview in 1996 he emphasized that he would not have been qualified for that post as it had existed earlier; he was not experienced enough to plan major operations. De Maiziere was extremely busy, but his role was almost clerical. The Operations Branch collated the situation reports and updated the maps as always. Hitler reviewed the reports in his briefings and made his decisions, which de Maiziere would record and issue as orders.De Maiziere went so far as to place a quote from a film in his office: "It is not my place to think about the senselessness of the tasks that are assigned to me."

In April 1945 Hitler finally rationalized his command apparatus by officially subordinating OKH to OKW. He was a day late and a dollar short. "When Hitler issued that last order regarding the command structure, Russian artillery shells were already bursting in the Chancellery courtyard above his head."

 

Brewster 239 Buffalo and Finnish Air Force

General Nikunen wrote: "Clearly, the best fighter arriving during the temporary peace [between the Russian invasion of Finland in 1939 and the German invasion of Russia in 1941] was the American designed Brewster 239 Buffalo. These were acquired during the Winter War despite the U.S. law which prohibited the sale of war material to the combatant countries. The loophole which permitted the acquisition of the Brewster 239s was a clause in the law which permitted the sale of 'rejected' equipment. It was 'arranged' that the U.S. Navy rejected 44 Brewster Buffaloes which were then sold to Finland at a 'nominal price.'" (Only 43 F2As were released; Brewster shipped one additional aircraft from parts on hand. - from the prolog by Gen. Nikunen)
"Our Brewsters, contemporary fighters, were fat hustlers, just like bees. They had speed, agility and good weaponry too. In addition to that they also had protective amor behind the pilot's back and under his seat [installed by Finnish mechanics]. We were happy to take them anywhere to take on any opponent."

Finland bought 44 Brewster B-239s on 16th, December 1939, but they were received too late to see any combat during the Winter War. Unit price was 54 000 USD plus packing and delivery costs, also 10 spare engines, 20 propellers and other spare parts were purchased for a total sale price of 3.4 million dollars (168 million Finnish Marks). To the purchasers surprise all US Navy "property" were removed at the factory from the Brewsters bought by Finland: guns, sights, instruments and carrier equipment. Initially separately purchased Aldis-optical (binocular) sights were used, but in the spring of 1941 before reflector sights (Finnish Väisäla T.h.m. 40 sights which were based on Revi 3c) were installed in the Finnish Brewsters. Metric instruments were installed in Finnish Brewsters. The Finnish B-239 "export"- models were equipped with refurbished R-1820 G-5 engines taken from DC-3 airliners. The B-239s were designated from BW-351 to BW-394. During the war the single 0.30" machine gun was replaced with a 0.50" (12.7mm) and in 1943 all except one Finnish B-239s had four 0.50" machine guns. The wing guns had 400 rounds and fuselage guns 200 rounds each (0.30" had 600 rounds). Pilot seat armor was installed to Finnish Brewsters (important difference for pilot safety compared to F2A-1 and dictated by the Winter War experience). There were a lot of other little fixes, changes and improvements to the B-239 that were made locally in Finland during it's career.

http://peacecountry0.tripod.com/brewster.htm

Brewster F2A Buffalo fighter of World War II, which fared so poorly against the Japanese in the Pacific but was a star in the hands of Finnish pilots flying against the Russian air force.

FAF top scorers in the Brewster

Pilot / in Brewsters / in all aircraft

Wind / 39 vics / 75 vics

Juutilainen / 34 / 94

FAF top scorers in other aircraft

Me-109 Juutilainen 58 vics

Curtiss Hawk Tervo 15.75

Fiats Tuominen 23

Fokker D-21 Sarvant 12.83

Moranes Lehtovaara 15

Gladiators Tuominen 6.5

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Oiva Tuominen made ace in three types



Fiats 23 vics

Me-109s 13

Gladiators 6.5

Now try that!!!

http://www.danford.net/bufface.htm

 

Williamson Murray
Luftwaffe 1933-1945

By summer 1943, no less than 89 flak batteries defended Berlin. From a level of 791 heavy batteries in 1940 , to 967 in 1941, to 1,148 in 1942 and 2,132 in 1943, German flak forces represented an enormous investment in equipment and manpower.

The 88 mm Flak 36 weapon seems to have required an average expenditure of 16,000 plus shells to bring down one aircraft at high altitude, and that was the weapon with which most flak batteries were equipped.

 

As well from Williamson Murray:
Luftwaffe 1933-1945

After a fairly respectable showing in 1940, from 1941 through 1944 the Luftwaffe lost between 40 percent and 45 percent of its total losses through noncombatant causes. The surprising element in such an accident rate is the fact that until the spring 1944, few in the general staff seem to have been particularly worried about the implication of such a level of noncombatant losses.At that point, however, a number of authorities awoke and began to examine the problem in detail.

The German safety record, however, deserves no smugness from an American audience.The Army Air Forces managed in 1943 to have no less than 20,389 major accidents in the continental United States with 2,264 pilots and 3,339 other air crew memmers killed.The record for 1944 was not much better with 16,128 major accidents ( 1,936 pilots and 3,037 other aircrew killed ). The ability of crews transitioning into B-26´s to destroy their aircraft and themselves resulted in a couplet still current among flying crews at MacDill AFB, Florida: "One a day in Tamba Bay."

 

Pak 35/36 with 3,7 cm L/45 was nicknamed by the troops Panzeranklopfer (tank door-knocker)




The Pak 35/36 is a direct ancestor of a in 1918 presented 37 mm Pak gun by Rheinmetall .
In the thirties , Rheinmetall developed the WWI model , and the result was the 3,7 cm Pak 35/36 named TAK (TankAbwehrKanone) wich there were 200 build for the Reichswehr .

With more modifications , the Pak 35/36 was introduced in the Wehrmacht in 1934 , as the standard Pak gun in PanzerAbwehr units until 1941 .
This gun was pulled by trucks or special pulling vehicles (Sd.Kfz 10) but it was light enough to be pulled by men .
The Wehrmacht had about 11200 Pak 35/36's at the beginning of WWII .
Because of the low calibre it didn't do much harm to Allied tanks . It got the nick Panzeranklopfer (tank door-knocker)
Production was stopped in 1942 and the still remaining Pak 35/36's were changed by the 5cm Pak 38's .

http://www.geocities.com/herrvermylen2/Pak35.html

Calibre : 3,7 cm
Full name : 3,7 cm L/45 PanzerAbwehrKanone 35/36
Weight in mobile postion : 435 kg
Weight in firing position : 450 kg
Length : 3,4 m (3400 mm)
Height : 1,17 m (1170 mm)
Width : 1,65 m (1650 mm)
Practical Firing range : 400 m
Production years : 1934-1942

 

German reconnaissance and supply flights to Greenland:

http://home6.inet.tele.dk/ron/greenland/flight.htm

 

Hans Baur, Hitler´s personal pilot, Generaloberst in WW2

Baur voluntarily joined the Imperial German air force in 1915 and subsequentely shot down nine enemy aircraft, for which he was awarded the Bavarian Medal for Bravery. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to disband her air force and Baur started flying for commercial airlines like the Bayrische Luftlloyd and Junkers Luftverkehr. In 1926 he became one of Lufthansa's first six pilots. Shortly after having flown his one millionth kilometer, Hitler hired him as his personal pilot. He remained in Hitler's service right up to the end of the war and lived in the Führerbunker during the last days of the war. Hitler's last order to Baur was to fly Martin Bormann out of Berlin, but during their escape attempt on the night of 1 May 1945, Baur lost sight of Bormann (who, as we now know, was killed or committed suicide that same night) and was shot and captured by the Russians. His injuries were so severe that one of his legs had to be amputated. For the next ten years the Russians ruthlessly questioned him, because they suspected that Baur had flown Hitler to safety before the fall of Berlin. After his release in 1955 Baur returned to Germany, where he wrote his memoirs 'Mit Mächtigen zwischen Himmel und Erde' (1971). He is buried in the Westfriedhof in Munich.

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Hitler's Personal Pilot
The Life and Times of Hans Baur

The book details many surprising episodes, such as the time Baur allowed Italian dictator Benito Mussolini to take the controls of the Fuehrer’s plane...

http://www.brasseysinc.com/Books/1574882880.htm


http://www.theaerodrome.com/aces/germany/baur.html


http://www.xs4all.nl/~ejnoomen/baur.html