The carrier fighter squadrons at Midway had only just been reequipped with the folding-wing F4F-4; previously the squadron complement had been 18 aircraft which neatly formed three 6-plane divisions. Still not sure why Hornet and Enterprise launched 10 fighters with each of their attack groups - anyone? IIRC their initial CAP launches of the day were eight F4Fs for Hornet and ten for the Big E. They may simply have been trying to divide their ~27 fighters roughly in thirds, while maintaining two-plane elements.
VF-6 and VF-8 got their F4F-4s upon return from the Doolittle raid. LCDR Thach’s VF-3, ashore at Kaneohe, slowly came up to strength. By the end of May he had a full complement of aircraft. What he did not have was enough pilots, which was the rationale from ComCarPac to augment his squadron with pilots from VF-42. (Except the VF-42 skipper, LCDR Fenton, who was senior to Thach, and the exec, LT McCormack, who already had orders for elsewhere, the senior VF-42 pilot of those going to VF-3 was a LTJG.) VF 6 and VF 8 both had 27 F4F 4s at Midway. VF 6 was organized into 3 divisions of seven planes each and 1 division of 6 planes. My guess, from looking at the rank distribution, is that the division leaders section in the 7 plane divisions consisted of a three planes and the other sections, two. VF 8 was organized into the more standard six plane (3 section) division, with four divisions and three spare planes. Division and nominal plane assignments for these squadrons were: VF 6 squadron oganization: 1st Division: Sec 1 F 1 LT JS Gray, Jr. (CO) F 2 ENS JR Daly F 27 ENS MC Roach Sec 2 F 3 ENS WG Hiebert F 4 MACH JA Achten Sec 3 F 5 ENS RM Rich F 6 ENS WC Presley 2nd Division: Sec 1 F 7 LTJG JC Kelley F 8 ENS ND Hodson F 25 ENS MV Kleinmann, Jr. Sec 2 F 9 LTJG HN Heisel F 10 MACH C Allard Sec 3 F 11 MACH HM Sumrall F 12 MACH WH Warden 3rd Division: Sec 1 F 13 LT RW Mehle (XO) F 14 ENS HL Grimmell, Jr. F 19 ENS WW Wileman Sec 2 F 15 LTJG FB Quady F 16 ENS RM Gunsolus Sec 3 F 17 ENS TC Provost III F 18 RE TW Rhodes 4th Division: Sec 1 F 26 LTJG RJ Hoyle F 20 AP1c HS Packard Sec 2 F 21 LTJG WE Rawie F 22 ENS WM Holt Sec 3 F 23 RE EH Bayers F 24 MACH BW Reid spare: ENS JA Halford, Jr. VF 8 squadron organization (aircraft assignments unknown, but one could presume it to be similar as above): 1st Division: Sec 1 LT Cdr SG Mitchell (CO) ENS JA Talbot Sec 2 LTJG R Gray ENS CM Kelly, Jr. Sec 3 ENS J Magda ENS JE McInerny, Jr. 2nd Division: Sec 1 LT SE Ruehlow ENS GR Hill, Jr. Sec 2 LTJG MF Jennings ENS HL Tallman Sec 3 ENS G Formancek, Jr. ENS SW Groves 3rd Division: Sec 1 LT EJ O'Neill (XO) ENS CB Starkes Sec 2 LT WW Ford ENS MI Cook, Jr. Sec 3 LTJG LC French ENS JC. Smith 4th Division: Sec 1 LT BL Harwood ENS HA Fairbanks Sec 2 LTJG JF Sutherland ENS HA Carey, Jr. Sec 3 ENS ET Stover ENS DB Freeman spares: ENS RZ Hughes ENS RS Merritt ENS AE Dietrich And, yes, the VF‑8 and VF‑6 strike groups escorts each consisted of ten fighters. The VF‑6 escort was led by LT J S Gray, Jr. Organization was: 1st Division ‑ Sec 1 ‑ LT Gray & ENS J Daly Sec 2 ‑ ENS W Hiebert & MACH J Achten Sec 3 ‑ ENS R Rich & ENS W Presley 2d Division ‑ Sec 1 ‑ LTJG J Kelley & ENS N Hodson Sec 2 ‑ LTJG H Heisel & MACH C Allard So, right off the bat we can see that the 7th plane noted in the overall squadron organization (above), ENS Roach ‑ assigned to Sec 1, was left out of the 1st Division line up for the escort mission. We can also see that not only is the 2d Division short an entire section (Sec 3 ‑ Mach H Sumrall & Mach W Warden), but also not part of the task organization is ENS Kleinmann, the third wheel of 2d Division's Sec 1. Thus Gray's 1st division assumes the more standard six airplane configuration and Kelley's 2d Division ends up short a section, but maintains the integrity of the two remaining. I got a little curious and did a quick check of when each of the 13 ensigns in VF-6 earned their wings . . . mildly interesting results, but not particularly earth shattering. The spare pilot, ENS Halford, was 13th on the list, the newest naval aviator, receiving his wings on 27 Nov 1941; # 12 was ENS Kleinmann on 10 Oct 1941; # 11 was ENS Wileman on 2 Oct 1941; # 10 was ENS Roach on 25 Sep 1941; all of which seems to cover the third wheels in the three plane sections and the spare, all the most junior aviators in the squadron. One might say, “hmmmm,” but then next most junior, #9, ENS Gunsolus was not far away, winged on 5 Sep 1941. The remainder followed along, ENS Daly on 26 Aug 1941; ENS Grimmell, 25 Jul 1941; ENS Presley, 18 Jul 1941; ENS Hodson, 8 Jul 1941; then a big jump to ENS Holt, 16 Jan 1941, ENS Hiebert, 23 Dec 1940; ENS Rich, 26 Jul 1940 and, the earliest, the “bull ensign,” ENS Provost, 16 May 1940. Still, one can easily draw the conclusion that in his squadron organization Gray placed his most junior pilots in places where they might be in a position to learn more in the routine, and, in his escort assignments, where they would stay out of trouble or not cause trouble in the crunch. Nobody ever said Gray was stupid. VF‑8 strike escort was organized as: 1st Division ‑ Sec 1‑ LCDR S Mitchell & ENS J Talbot Sec 2 ‑ LTJG R Gray & ENS M Kelly Sec 3 ‑ ENS J Magda & ENS J McInerny 2d Division ‑ Sec 1 - LT S Ruehlow and ENS G Hill (escorting the Air Group Commander's SBD section) Sec 2 ‑ LTJG M Jennings & ENS H Tallman 2d Division's Sec 3, ENS G Formancek & ENS SW Groves were not included in the task organization and remained behind. The formation made up of VB‑8 on the left and VS‑8 on the right droned off in their futile search for the Japanese carriers, Mitchell and his seven cohorts formed up on the left side of the formation above VB‑8. Ruehlow and Hill took up their positions with the command section in the center of the formation. So, how did all 10 F4Fs go down if two were formed with the CHAG section? Well, without going into the sad tale of the VF‑8 escort of 4 June 42 here, remember that Mitchell was positioned on the left side of the formation. When he finally decided that it really was time to head back to Hornet, his reverse course turn was to the right, towards the center of the bomber/scouts formation. Evidently in the process, (the record is unclear ... somewhat typical for Hornet reporting on events of the battle) either through being signaled to do so or by his own volition, Ruehlow left the CHAG section and joined on with Mitchell. Wingman, Hill, dutifully tagging along. So all ten off, eventually for a long swim in the Pacific from which only eight returned. Mitchell never held another combat command. I guess that sort of answers the question of how they were divided up. Generally divisions could be, and were, divided to meet mission requirements. Sections were not. A long ago discussion with my on the scene primary source for arcane information on period carrier operation advised that was pretty much the rule of thumb. Another example of dividing a division to meet mission requirements would be the VF‑42 strike escort mission on 8 May 42 at Coral Sea. A division of F4F‑3s went out escorting a strike group of SBDs and TBDs. Squadron CO LCDR C Fenton and wingman ENS H Gibbs escorted the 24 SBDs from VB‑5 and VS‑5 while LTJG W Leonard led LTJG's McCuskey and W Woollen and ENS J Adams escorting 9 TBDs from VT‑5. Part of the reasoning behind the six plane/three section division dated back to biplanes and revolved around the issue of limitations to overhead‑forward visibility. It had been demonstrated as far back as WWI that three sections, properly placed went a long way in mitigating some (not all) of the field of vision problem. With monoplanes, though, the field of vision problem goes away. Old habits seemed to be hard to break. Anyway combine the realization on the practitioners that the vision problem had been solved with the advent of the beam defense and the more practical and familiar four plane‑two section divisions become the logical and obvious answer. Not only does that configuration make the beam defense work, but you also reap the benefit of being able to increase the number of available tactical elements (smaller divisions = more divisions). Regards, Rich
An additional little something else . . . I was moving some files around, which, of course, always entails stopping a reading some of them and found the below penned by my father sometime in the early 1970s as a commentary on some of the scholarship he was reviewing: “When VF-42 sent 16 pilots to join Thach’s VF-3 in late May 42, Thach organized the squadron into 4 6-plane divisions despite as was his prerogative. A day or so after Midway he permitted me to re-organize the squadron, which now included elements of VF-8 - all of us based on USS Hornet. This reorganization was into 6 4-plane divisions. I have the original sheets, names, etc. - must have carried them around in my flight jacket pocket. Dates of the papers: 31 May 1942 and 10 June 1942, respectively.” My father, the senior LTJG in VF-42, was XO of VF-3 during this time, taking over the position after Don Lovelace was killed in a deck crash on 30 May. After spending the night of 4 June aboard Enterprise, the remnants of VF-3 flew the mid-day CAP and then landed aboard Hornet to beef up her much depleted VF. Thach was senior, so he retained command, the VF-8 XO was in sick bay, so Thach retained my father as XO of what was laughingly referred to as VF-3-8-42 until the ship returned to Pearl and the squadron broken up. VF-8 was disestablished. VF-42 was scheduled for a new replacement air group (it shows up as part of RCVG-11 in the July 42 organization returns, but ended being disestablished, though the CO Fenton went straight to VF-11 at NAS San Diego as did my father after his survivors' leave, to be joined by Walt Heibert and Frank Quady from VF-6. VF-3 went on to further glory, eventually exchanging numbers with VF-6 as the Navy tried to straighten out the hodgepodge of squadron to air group assignments necessitated by the Guadalcanal campaign.