Most important resources of World War 2

So? It was the German "need" for Baku oilfields, which wasn't actually as desperately needed as suggested, as 1) had they been captured, couldn't be exploited 2) their capture wouldn't adequately deprive the Soviets of oil, and 3) they continued without, regardless of their pre-Barbarossa estimates, as synthetic production increased.

Even in the face of declining Romanian output post '43, Germans fought.

Perhaps I should've been more explicit in my statement for your reading leisure, (but I thought it obvious) in that I was responding specifically to the statement regarding the caucasus oil ...

that is, the statement should read "Very peculiar it was, as the Caucasian POL was claimed to be necessary, yet apparently wasn't, as they actually fought for nearly three more years without it...."

 

Brylcreem, think of the devastation to fighter pilot morale if supplies fell low !

And nylons to trade for what ever rear echelon troops traded them for .

Zippo lighters.

You guys are over looking critical stuff.

Gaines

 

I think your on to something Gaines.

 

Steel wasn't so much of a concern for Germany, they were able to triple production in 1943 and then double again in 1944, even as the war situation was getting worse. They had plenty of planes but never enough to fuel them all, especially after the Russians took the oil sector of Romania in August 1944.

 

Well Germany's limitation on oil prevented them from having hundred of four engine heavy bombers, and their dependence on horses can be argued that it limited the mobility of the German army. Horses drink up to 30 gallons of water a day. If they had plenty of oil, they would have put the transportation into all trucks, half tracks and even caterpillar tracks. I say horses weren't that helpful in the Barbarossa campaign where there were unpaved roads which became even worse in the heavy rains of fall 1941 where having a fully mechanized army with no horses would have sped up advances considerably.

 

If the Germans had been able to keep the loss ratio in Barbarossa favorable to them, then human resource wouldn't be that much of a difference. Not to downplay the human resource as the Soviets certainly had used human resource to its full potential when producing military weapons compared to the Germans, but the Germans would probably have been able to destroy the factories in the Urals had they had their huge fleets of heavy bombers(that is if they had enough oil and they did more intelligence to know where many of the soviet factories were).

 

Must be that's why they built more than 200 FW-200's, then...

four engine, long range bombers didn't match the LW's operational doctrine prior to the war, that's why they had so few of them.

Trucks ruined the track worse in the mud. A fully mechanised force doesn't advance in the mud either. Maintenance and care for the vehicles is vastly increased, as mud and water get in everywhere.

 

Well I meant hundreds not just "a hundred", also those Fw 200 Condors were already serving an important role, serving for the Lufthansa and acting as scouts for the German U-Boats, they couldn't just have took them all away from the eastern front. I feel the lack of oil was also a factor into how long they could stretch themselves as an army.

If they had been aware of the fall conditions and the heavy rains then caterpillar trucks would have to do. Of course if this is that they had the oil to fuel the caterpillar trucks.

 

They just didn't see the advantage of long range bombing; the German line of thought was your airforce help your army sustaining movement, crush the enemy's resistence at the point of decision, defeating them. Then there is no need to destroy industry over a period of 6-18 months. Germany couldn't sustain a war of attrition anyway. Every land campaign prior to Barbarossa was over in months, if not weeks.

They must've been well aware of the muddy conditions; the High Command will have studied Napolean's campaign but the confident Germans believed the Red Army would be defeated before then.

They couldn't produce enough of anything, they basically stripped Europe bare of trucks, and they still used millions of horses. They pressed into service any Red army vehicle they captured intact. It was less an issue of oil, than of production capacity.

 

Its hard to believe that an Army with such a modern approach had such a backwards build-up when it came to logistics, using horses and marching when they could have done what the US did and mechanized everything.

 

Well I guess there were some missing parts in thinking ahead. If they had better intelligence inside Russia, knowing the conditions of how the citizens hated it and also where the factories had moved to, then the heavy bombers would have been able to have significantly hamper Russia's factories.

BTW, do you know where Russia had built there factories? I understand they moved some 2,500 to the Urals and some 17 million if I can recall. Did any factories reach Siberia?

 

You are misinformed; While as in any system, there were those that disliked and even hated Communism, there were many more that also were impressed with the changes that had been made in living standards and believed in and shared the common dream. Most of those "welcoming" were doing it out of pure survival instinct (If you see your army fleeing an invader, spitting at the invader is more likely to get your house burned down, than inviting him in for tea and biscuits, and this wasn't the first time peasants in these lands had dealt with foreign troops (Swedes, French, Germans, Czechs, Austrians, Poles)), or national ideology (when you hope you can manipulate their forces and show your value, while retaining enough strength to force independance when the moment arrives, such as many Ukraines).

Many factories and facilities were built during the 30's in anticipation of a European war, intended to remain out of reach of enemy bombers. The Urals was plenty far enough away. You see that distance from Warsaw to Moscow? 1,256 km on today's M1 highway? The distance from Moscow to Yekaterinberg is 1,700 km... Yekaterinburg is on the border between Asia and Europe, on the Urals. Even if the Red Army had utterly collapsed in December '41, the Germans were still not getting to the Urals for many, many, many months. So many, in fact, the Russians would've had yet another Russian Army in the field.

Siberia; not so much, as that was incredibly far away, with a small population, even today, I think it is only 20 million.

 

So are you saying that the oppressed peasants were welcoming the Germans as heroes because of "survival instincts" and not because they believed they found new allies against the Soviet Union? There weren't Red Army officers who despised Stalin because of how well he was known for his purges? From the way I am interpreting you statement, it sounds like the Soviet government would slap a peasants wrist if they failed to meet their quota and nothing more. A vast majority of peasants had suffered because they lived in small isolated villages and were easy to target for the Soviet Union. Many would be labelled as Kulaks if they owned more land or animals and would then be taxed excessively and if they did not meets these goals. I am pretty sure if I was a peasant living in a government that would always take away too much from me, and punish me harshly if I didn't fulfill the requirements then I would certainly welcome an invading army for the hope that this country would be better than the one I'm under. Let me guess, you don't buy into the "if Hitler entered as a liberator" scenario?

 

It seems you forget or are unaware of the Russian civil war and what it was about.... The Tsar was overthrown by the "peasants" who were fed up with their living conditions...

As for "welcoming the Germans", this occurred ONLY in certain places (Blatic States, part of Belarus and Western Ukraine such as Galicia). The love and patriotism for the "motherland" far outweighed any hatred/dislike for Stalin or the Soviet System.

I'm afraid you are far over simplifying. Not everything was as you seem to see it.

As for the "if I was a peasant living in a government that..., I would certainly welcome an invading army..." There is a word for that.. Traitor/Treason. These "peasants" we're in fact labeled as such and paid the price for it (rightfully so).

 

You need a more nuanced picture. Painting everything in black and white does not provide a deeper understanding of what actually happened. Nor does a monochromatic view provide insights to what really motivated people.There was a real fear and suspicion of malingerers and sabouteurs actively resisting the revolution.

The Soviet government didn't "always take too much away". Many people accepted the terrors and sacrifices, because they believed in the ultimate goal. This narrative, which today is difficult for us to understand, is due to the vastly improved living standards in the Soviet Union from the 20's to 1938. The changes in Russian society from 1917 to 1938 were truly enormous.

If Hitler entered as a liberator, he would've failed, because there was not enough food in the whole of Nazi Europe in 1941 to support the areas of Europe dominated by the Nazis, the German Army, and the millions of captured Soviet troops. The Soviets tried to strip bare the land of horses and grain, as they retreated. Much of this was to some extent foreseen, and is why the Germans adopted the policies they did.

 

I thought Germany's population, including Austria and the Sudetenland, was just over 70 million, not 80? Germany also padded their Army by conscription in occupied countries and annexed areas, as well as forces Soviet POWs.