Most Overrated aircraft of WWII?

You said the above then this...

Rather answered your own question, even did it before you even asked it.

 

Well it also had a problem with integrating a radio and was very sensitive to extra weight to the point that Japanese pilots sometimes didn't wear parachutes in order to save weight. The former interfered with them developing a good CAP direction system.

 

Most overrated aircraft.
The Hurricaine to me that was overrated.

Most underrated aircraft.
The Mustang to me was underated,i thought she was a great aircraft.

 

Thank you all for very informative posts all arround.

As to the operational performance of the Me 262, I am under the impression that they shot down very few allied bombers due to the rarity of finding 262s in flying condition.

IMHO, there wasn't much use for it after the Germans lost control of the air so throughly. The Germans could not provide 262s with adequate air cover during take-off and land when it was particularly vulnerable.

 

Hard to answer before we agree on how high were rated planes. It also depends on the time when the plane was rated - for example, I don't think that the Stuka was overated until the Battle of Britain.

I don't really agree with TAG about the 262 or zero, because the factors he gives, which are very true and correct, are for the most part external to the plane.

Basicaly the same reasoning would be true for most brand new German jet fighter program or any Japanese carrier based fighter. So I think TAG is right, but I find it more fun to stick to plane intrinsic criterias.

Anyways I would say the zero was the most over rated plane, because once allied pilots learnt to fight it out of its very limited flight enveloppe - high speed / energy conservation to counter its low speed maneuverability and stellar climb rate that is - the zero barely could regain intitiative or tactical advantage to lead the fight.

The zero upgrades during the war didn't changed much. The zero was desperately slow,even in dives, and very hard to maneuver as soon as it built some speed.

 

Chocapic,

No, TA's argument is that the inherent deficiencies of the Zero's design precluded it from performing in ways that made it an efficient fighter, especially a fleet defense fighter which was it's rationale.

The problems with the Zero stemmed from the inability of the Japanese aviation industry to build reliable, high-power-to-weight ratio aircraft engines. because of this, it was necessary to make the Zero's airframe as light as possible to meet the specifications of the Japanese Navy for an interceptor for fleet defense. That meant that heavy items, such as armament had to be kept to a minimum and, to enable the Zero to maneuver quickly, had to be kept near the center of gravity in the middle of the fuselage. Thus, there was only weight and space for two 7.7 MM machine guns in the engine cowling, and two 20 MM cannon in the wings.

Twenty millimeter ammunition is heavy, so only 60 RPG could be carried; any more and the weight penalty in the wings would begin to stress the airframe unacceptably. This in turn meant that the pilot had only a few seconds of firepower before he was out of 20 MM ammo. Since Allied planes were armored and extremely robust, the trwo 7.7 MG were practically useless againt them. All of this meant frequent rotation of CAP aircraft to makes sure their 20 MM guns were topped off. To make things even worse, the Japanese had modified the 20 MM cannons with shorter barrels to restrict bulk and weight, which meant poorer ballistics.

During WW II, reliable radios also meant bulk and weight, and Japanese radios were no different. That meant that most Zero's did not have radios in the interest of keeping the overall aircraft weight down. Thus, there was no possibility of coordinating or vectoring the fighters onto incoming raids. As TA pointed out, that meant the IJN's CAP circled OVER the fleet rather than meeting incoming enemy raids 50-60 miles out, where they could be worked over before getting in range to launch their weapons. BIG disadvantage.

Since the Zero could only fight effectively at slow speed where dogfighting was possible, it had very large control surfaces. This handicapped the plane at high speed and high altitudes which meant it could not maneuver effectively against targets at high altitude. Once, the USN pilots realized this, it became obvious that the way to fight Zero's was to get above them and use energy tactics. During the first year of the war, against the US Navy's F4F, the Zero achieved no better than a one-to-one kill ratio despite early numerical advantage. This was nowhere near enough to counter the US forces with their potential for larger manufacturing output.

Even the much vaunted long range of the Zero was a double-edged sword. It may have given the Zero a wider operational radius, but it also meant that the pilot of the single seat Zero was more apt to become disoriented during combat, and face a longer overwater flight back to base with only rudimentary navigational devices; the weight restrictions imposed by the design of the aircraft did not allow for radios or homing devices. Many Japanese pilots simply got lost and flew around until they vanished, never having been touched by the enemy.

All of these shortcomings were inherent to the plane's design which stressed an extremely light-weight airframe. Moreover, the Zero's deficiencies played to the strengths of Allied aircraft. The fundamental problem with the Zero was an underpowered engine which militated against strengthening the airframe, or adding equipment to remedy the weaknesses. The plane itself was much overrated because, early in the war, it was opposed by Allied pilots who were poorly trained and with little experience in aerial combat. Once the Zero began facing well trained US Navy pilots, flying planes in which they had confidence, it's failings were manifest.

 

The statements given are strictly accurate, not an exaggeration. It only becomes overrated when you assume more about it than was true. The only overrating of the Me-262 was by Hitler as a fast bomber. It was completely unsuited to the role. As an interceptor and fighter, it was by no means overrated. It has always been presented as precisely what it was, along with the difficulties of German industry and infrastructure at the time it finally appeared in limited service.

It might be worthwhile to watch some interview footage with pilots and aircrews which either flew or encountered the Me-262, for its historical impact. Then NACA/NASA appreciation of the design, airframe and achieved performance figures for its relative significance.

I mean, do you have a foundation for this opinion, or just hand-waving?

I'm sure only sensationalists would assert something like the Me-262 could have won the war for Germany. Getting rid of the Nazis, early on was the only thing which could've achieved that.

 

Your points appear correct but reasoning is off.
The design specification was for extreme range, for land based and ship based operations. The A6M2 (retrospective designation model 1, 1) had no carrier equipment (fitted to the model 2, 1, the first digit which signifies airframe modifications, after about 30 of the first type were built and operationally tested in China).

Yes the Sakae was slightly underpowered and subject to further development but speed was a secondary design requirement. The primaries were manoeuvrability, range and land/sea based operational capability, which included extreme engine reliability. This was the reason for its lightweight, advanced, duralumin design and poor speed capabilities. Its poor dive speed was indeed simply a consequence of design, probably not something anybody thought about until it was in action (it was addressed on the model 3, 2).

Its lack of protective equipment was quite reflective of the period. The Hawker Hurricane and P-36/P-40 had no such equipment at this time. The Me-109 first featured self sealing tanks, then increasing pilot armour both of which were mirrored by England. British requests led to the appearance of this equipment in the P-40. The US Navy however had its philosophy on pilot equipment and their own specifications for aircraft companies. This included quite a degree of survival equipment, fuel tank location and other general guidelines relating to handling and pilot survivability. This did in some aspect limit performance from what were in fact very powerful engines in their day.

The relatively light alloy protective plate and lack of other safety features of the Zero wasn't relatively significant at its introduction, though the robustness of US Navy and RAF specifications by 1941 is. The failure of the Japanese Navy to incorporate these features into production until the very end of the war is also significant, probably of a philosophy which might be considered strategically inferior.

The Japanese Army air service incorporated self sealing fuel tanks and increasing pilot protection from 1942 (Ki-61 and Ki-43-II).

As far as an ability to build high powered engines, the Japanese aircraft industry did not lack for it, however suffered from a severe handicap of extreme conservatism in the service implementation of new designs. Engine development was contemporary with around 1600hp in the 1942 Ha-109 and 1900hp for the 1943 Ha-45 but ridiculously protracted development was enforced on new engines and airframes whilst conservatives preferred to modestly update Zeros and Oscars. For the Ki-84 Hayate, for example, the aircraft was ready for full scale production and service entry by 1943. How differently the Pacific war might've gone.

 

This is wrong. The original IJN specification of October 1937 called for a replacement of the Type 96 carrier figher (eg., the Mitsubishi A5M) with the following requirements:

1. 270 kts at 4000 meters (311 mph at 13,125 ft)
2. Initial climb of 3000 m in 9 minutes 30 sec or less
3. Endurance of 1.5 to 2 hrs or 6 to 8 hrs with drop tanks
4. 2 x 20mm cannon 2 x 7.7mm mg.
5. Provision to carry 2 60 kg bombs.
6. Full radio and direction finding equipment
7. Maneuverability equal to the A5M
8. Take off run not to exceed 70 meters (230 feet) in a 27kt headwind

It is clear from the start that the A6M was intended as a carrier fighter. That the first few were used as land based fighters in China has no bearing on the intended use as designed.

 

It was not just that the engine chosen for the Zero was underpowered, all available Japanese engines were either underpowered or very unreliable. And fiurther development was not possible until Japanese aviation engine technology had advanced significantly. A supercharger was never fitted, for example, to improve high altitude performance which was sorely lacking. Speed was not the only thing that suffered as a result in the Zero design; the air frame HAD to be kept as light as possible, it wasn't a matter of choice, and only the absolute minimum of equipment could be fitted in the interest of keeping the design as light as possible in order to meet the specifications.. It's poor dive speed resulted from a combination of three things; an underpowered engine, an extremely fragile air frame which tended to come apart if the very modest speed limit was exceeded, and a loss of control ability at higher speeds due to large unpowered control surfaces. And it's almost certain that the designer did think about it's limited dive speed because energy tactics were not unknown to the Japanese in the 1930's.

The point, of course, is that Allied aircraft used more powerful and lightweight engines that allowed protective equipment to be added without incurring too much of a performance penalty; the Zero did not and, in fact, the Japanese could not add protective equipment, or any other gear considered necessary by the Allies, without incurring significant performnace penalties. This was a direct consequence of it's underpowered engine technology, so it rather ingenuous to claim that contemporaneous Allied aircraft lacked protective gear when introduced. Yes, the US Navy insisted on survivability from the start, and rightly so, but it's a fact that the F4F, for example, was able to incorporate protective equipment, radios, and a very robust airframe and, due to it's more advanced engine technology, and still remain very competitive with the underpowered Zero.

The half measures initiated to give the KI-43 II some measure of protection came too late, and was too little. It was another underpowered, relatively slow aircraft that had no choice but to rely on a light airframe to confer maneuverability to allow it to survive in the same sky with Allied fighters. Even at that, Allied pilots could choose whether or not to fight and the smart ones choose to fight only on their own terms. The self-sealing tanks were rudimentary and the armor too light and inadequate to protect the pilot from anything but rifle caliber MG's which the US did not, in any case, use.

The KI-65 "Tony" was powered by a license-built Japanese version of the German DB 601 water-cooled engine. This aircraft and engine combination illustrates my point about the inability of the Japanese aviation industry to build reliable, light-weight, high-powered aircraft engines, even when designed by German engineers. The aircraft, when it worked, was a fine fighter, but the Japanese-built engine was unreliable, difficult to maintain, and would not have met the original naval specifications for reliability in the Zero. The fact that the Japanese were able to install some protective equipment in the "Tony" reflects German engineering of the engine, not Japanese technological capability.

This is incorrect, as illustrated by the examples of the Tony and the Zero. The Japanese military pilots may have been a conservative lot, but they weren't crazy. They accepted the need for protective equipment, robustness, and high altitude performance, as readily as Allied pilots did, but not at the expense of making their fighters hopelessly non-competitive with Allied designs. It was the state of Japanese aircraft engine technology, both pre-war and during the war, that forced them to make these unacceptable choices. The lack of experienced aviation engineers, draftsmen, and technicians had more to do with the failure to update existing designs and introduce new designs during the war than "conservatism".

No, it wasn't, at least not for engines the Japanese were capable of mass producing to reliable standards. It's a case of "coulda, shoulda, woulda". The war wouldn't have gone any differently, unless the Japanese aircraft engine industry had been up to western standards of mass producing reliable, light-weight, high-power engines; They simply weren't.

 

Strickly accurate? So it completely outclassed the Meteor and other jets of WWII? Especially when you consider RAM performance....

If you say that you are awfully new to this type board and the internet.

Again a reminder we aren't saying these aircraft were bad. Indeed as I've pointed out before an aircraft has to be quite well regarded to even be in the competition for most overrated. Especially if you are talking about today's perceptions of them.

 

Another problem of the Japanese fighters regarding their engine troubles was the low capacity of ammunition. In Midway, the Japanese fighters had to reload more often than the Americans counterparts which was a severe weakness.


Cheers...

 

I think the most overated aircraft would be A6M Zero. Although most sources talk about how the Wildcat was outclassed, the Wildcat actually have a kill-death ratio of 9:1, which is not bad at all.

 

I still dont see how the sero was overated. It was as good or better than a wildcat. If u took comparable pilots one on one the zero would have a advantage. The wildcat was good because of tatics and ability to take damage. The F4F-4 was sower than the -3 and really did not need the extra 2 guns. All of Japans top aces flew the zero. Even late in the war when hellcat pilots came across a vetern pilot in a late model zero they had there hands full as Saburo Sakei tells in his book when he was able to evade a flight of hellcats. And they didnt wear parachutes because it hampered them moving in the cockpit, not because of weight.

 

Early Zeros don't have radios which prevents them from communicating easily, therefore preventing them from using teamwork effectively.

Most japanese pilots during the early part of WWII are very well trained and experienced, while american pilots at that time are mainly recruits which have no experience at all. However the Wildcat still fared reasonably well in combat. As long as a Wildcat pilot dont try to out-maneuver or out-climb the zero, they are not at any disadvantage when engaging the Zero.

The Zero did well early in WWII because air combat is still WWI-style dogfights. Soon air combat tactics changed, and the Zero is not suitable for the new kind of air combat.

 

That Zero subject has already been discussed in this thread. It would be a good idea to read the previous posts instead of going over the same déja vu all over again.

 

Ops... Then sorry...

 

Personally i think the FW190 was overrated,i cant remember anything significant its done.

I think the criticisims of the stuka are unfair,it was built to do a specific job and it did that job very well.

 

The Fw 190D-9 was the main service version, which joined the Luftwaffe in the autumn of 1944, and was generally regarded as Germany's best wartime piston-engine fighter with a top speed of 426 mph, it was armed with two 20-mm cannons and two machine guns, and was powered by a water-methanol boosted 1670-kW (2,240-hp) Jumo 213A engine.