Myths and facts about M4 Sherman and T-34

Videos are a very poor way to learn history.

 

Did the American army ever used British Tanks under some other sort of lend-lease deal? I know the British gave the Russians tanks and planes and equipment from their version of lend-lease.

 

To the best of my knowledge the only foreign tanks used by the US were those sent for testing and evaluation purposes. Save for those captured from the enemy in the field.

 

The only possible exception I can think of off the top of my head are "Hobart Funnies" and the like. Did the US operate any of these that were not based on the M3 or M4 chassis?

 

The US used the DD shermans the british developed but refused the offered Churchill designs to prevent bloating their logistics train.

 

No. A few mine clearing Crabs were lent to 12th Army Group for use by the 738th and 739th Tank Battalion (MX), but only the flail equipement was British - the tanks were Medium Tanks M4.

 

They refused no such thing for no such reason.

 

I know we were developing and designing heavy tanks throughout the war, but never completed and approved one until the M26. Was this simply because of logistics and transportation, that the M4 was easier to ship in numbers because of its size, or because of the M10, M18, and later the M36 with bigger canons that we used made up for the 75mm canon on the standard M4 before the upgrades and the military felt we didn't need a heavy tank?

 

The M-26 was developed designed as a medium tank then redesigned redesignated as a heavy then back to a medium again. The logistics of heavy tanks made them rather questionable for the US, not to mention some of the force compatibility issues.

*** edit for corrections above ***

 

Its a highly complex problem, which usually gets boiled down to you could transport 2 or 3 Medium Tanks for 1 Heavy Tank. Which isn't quite true, but it gets to the gist.

The first problem was ports and ships. They were not what we have today. The TORCH landing for example, was done by light tanks, because at the time a port was needed to unload the medium tanks, which were carried on a converted rail seatrain. The second problem was bridging, which was an Army Corps of Engineers responsibility with the limiting sizes for vehicles and equipment set by army regulations.

The following are excerpts from my manuscript of For Purpose of Service Test.

[SIZE=12pt]Worse, it was already apparent the design of the T25 and T26 would likely exceed the bridging limits set by AR 850-15 on 28 August. It established the maximum vehicle width at 124 inches the maximum weight limit as 35 tons.[1][/SIZE] The Medium Tank T25E1, when completed was 127 inches wide and combat-loaded weighed almost 38 tons. The Medium-heavy Tank T26E1 was138.3 inches wide and weighed almost 44 tons.[SIZE=12pt][2][/SIZE]


[SIZE=10pt][1][/SIZE] AR 850-15, dated 28 August 1943, Para. 13-19.


[SIZE=10pt][2][/SIZE] Hunnicutt, Pershing, “Vehicle Data Sheets”.

[SIZE=12pt]Unfortunately, the situation was no better with regards to landing ships and craft. For example, the initial British “Tank Landing Craft” (T.L.C.) – the designation was later changed to LCT “Landing Craft Tank (LCT) – design loading assumed 40-ton heavy tanks, 25-ton medium tanks, and 16-ton light tanks. The same size assumptions were used in the initial designs for the Landing Ship Tank (LST). Later design versions of the LCT and LST assumed 30-ton medium tanks, but the rapid growth in tank size meant that standard was quickly obsolete as well. [1][/SIZE]
[SIZE=12pt] By 1943, the workhorse Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) Mark 3 was just capable of transporting the early version of the Medium Tank M4, but it was incapable of accepting a tank as large as the proposed T26. An enlarged version, the LCM-6 was designed to accept a larger load, which was probably fortunate since in January 1945, just before the planned invasion of Iwo Jima in the Pacific, the Navy discovered that the weight of the newly issued improved M4 Medium tanks exceeded the safe load limit of the LCM-3.[2][/SIZE] The LCM-6 couldn’t accommodate the anticipated 51-ton weight of the T26 either, which led to the development of the postwar LCM-8.[SIZE=12pt][3][/SIZE] Width was also a problem. The same Army Regulation, AR 850-15, which had doomed the T23E4, regulated the widths of the exit doors and ramps of the LST, LCT, and LCM.


[SIZE=10pt][1][/SIZE] U.S. Navy, Allied Landing Craft of World War II [originally published in 1944 with a subsequent supplement as ON1226-Allied Landing Craft and Ships], (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, reprint 1985).


[SIZE=10pt][2][/SIZE] Normand Friedman, U.S. Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated Design History, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), p. 212.


[SIZE=10pt][3][/SIZE] Friedman, p. 213.

[SIZE=12pt]However, a major sticking point remained with the new designs – the heavier tanks were also larger than earlier tanks, which meant they took up more shipping space and the decks of the vessels they were shipped in had to be sturdy enough to accept the additional weight. The standard “Liberty” cargo ship design in theory accommodated as many as 260 25-ton medium tanks,[1][/SIZE] but the ship’s cargo handling capacity was limited to a 50-ton boom for the number two hold, 15 or 30-tons for the number four hold, and 5-tons for the other holds. [SIZE=12pt][2][/SIZE] Harbor cranes of course could augment that capability, but were only a partial solution for hauling tanks from friendly shore to friendly shore. Given the Allied need to execute amphibious assaults against hostile shores that meant the tanks would ultimately have to be delivered by landing ships and craft.


[SIZE=10pt][1][/SIZE] Control and Reports Division, Boston Port of Embarkation, “Capacity of One Liberty Ship” [brochure] (NP: 1943).


[SIZE=10pt][2][/SIZE] James Davies, “’Liberty’ Cargo Ship”, WW2Ships.com, May 2004, p. 8.

 

Actually, it was always "designed" as a medium tank. It was it's designation which changed.

 

I don't know how I messed up the wording so bad. Thanks for the correction.

 

Can you elaborate on this?

The US Army ETOUSA had been briefed about engineering tanks by Hobart himself in the amphibious landings conference in May-June 1943. The conference papers refer to the session but the content was classified above secret, but presumably would have been the details of the 79th Armoured Division menagerie.

After the landings the US Army borrowed RE funnies for all sorts of operations, including crocodile Flamethrowers at the Breton ports and Crab flails in the Rhineland.

So what did the US Army think about armoured engineers and why did they ignore them for Op Overlord?

 

I have many times and did so in print in my book, Richard C. Anderson Jr, Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2009).


Yes, Hobart delivered a brief at the conference in May-June 1943. At that time there were exactly two prototype AVRE conversions, hand-built by Denovan and his Canadians, available, neither armed...and plans for 475 more to be built. The first production prototypes were completed on 20 November and 9 December 1943. The first production AVRE with armament began delivery in April, until then there was only a small group of perhaps a dozen demonstration models available. They were used in the January demonstration for Ike, which sparked ETOUSA/First Army interest and a REQUEST from them for such vehicles. It was a REQUEST and not a REFUSAL. Nor was there a REFUSAL from British sources, but simply an inability to supply them. Nor did anyone IGNORE any such thing for OVERLORD. Army Ordnance was interested enough to do its own version of an engineer assault tank, which went through a number of iterations, but was also completed too late for use in NEPTUNE.

Cheers!

1. [SIZE=12pt]Equipments as shown in the attached Appendix are required by First US Army for operation OVERLORD. They will be operated by US personnel. In the event of the US Army being equipped with similar equipment from US sources, or suitable substitutes, the equipments will be returned to the British.[/SIZE]
2. [SIZE=12pt]“DD tanks” and “Porpoises” dealt with separately.[/SIZE]

[SIZE=12pt]What is intriguing is that the requirements list included twelve items, four of which were specifically mounted on Sherman-based chassis; Crab, Sherman Bullshorn Plough, Sherman OAC Mark III Plough,[1][/SIZE] and Sherman Crocodile. Two others, Harrow and Centipede, were mine clearing devices that were designed to be adaptable for towing or mounting on either American or British vehicles. Of the remainder, four were strictly British-based vehicles, A.V.R.E., ARK, and SBG Mark II, all based on the Churchill, “Bridgelayers”, which in this context were probably the Valentine bridge-laying tank that was then being distributed to Commonwealth armored units, and two were “devices”, “Special Charges (Gen Wade etc)” and “Snakes.”


[SIZE=10pt][1][/SIZE] OAC was the Obstacle Assault Centre, created by the Royal Engineers at Hankley Common, near Farnborough, and was where many of the devices were invented and tested.

 

So I guess that leads me to this... The landing bridges couldn't have been altered to accommodate heavier tanks, especially when the Germans were putting out Panthers, Tigers, and SP guns with huge canons they had to go up against? Or does it boil down to they didn't want to make the landing bridges wider, etc., because of shipping and they could put more in the theater if they were the medium variety.

 

What is a "landing bridge"?

No, you can't simply "alter" vessels, cranes. and the like to go from accommodating 50 ton dead loads instead of 30 ton dead loads.

You may also want to look at what the Germans had to do to get their huge "canons" about...with the exception of the two-dozen odd Tiger I transported to Bizerta, none went by sea.

 

I'm not sure what you mean by "landing bridges". Certainly they could have reequipped the Engineers with wider bridges but how long would it take to design, build, and forward the new bridges and then there's the question of what to do with the old ones. These bridges were for crossing rivers rather than landing on beaches though. Then there's the problem that up until Normandy Panthers and Tigers were rare beasts as far as combat in the West was concerned nor did they account for that many Sherman losses even in Normandy. There are places all along the log chain though where a heavier tank would have been more of an issue. For instance I think you could put two Shermans on a flat car get much heavier and you are restricted to one. Then there's the issue of loading and unloading cargo ships. Cranes come in a number of classes but on of the most common on ships was able to lift a Sherman but not much more. The same class was also common at ports and the larger ones might not be present at smaller ports and were in shorter supply at the large ports. Getting a larger tank to "swim" would have been an issue as well. For the US in Normandy it's not clear that even if available in the same numbers a heavy tank would have made that much difference. After Cobra they likely would have been and the Britts probably could have benefitted from a heavy, again if available in the same numbers. My personal opinion is that the US should have pushed a 90mm turret for the Shermans sooner and harder but that's based on a fair amount of 20:20 hindsight.

 

I thought in one of the posts someone wrote the landing bridges on the beach could only accommodate vehicles no wider than 124 inches? And Iwd if they could have altered the Sherman turret to use a 90mm gun, that could have been a good solution. They already modified it to hold the 76mm gun, correct? I always thought that if they made the turrets closed and more armored on the M18 and M36 they would have been descent tanks with good guns as well.

 

The Sherman was restricted in width due to the bridging equipment in the US Army inventory. They didn't use those for beach landings. Swimming or LCTs were the way you got the initial tanks on to the beaches.

The Sherman turret as it stood couldn't take a 90mm gun from what I understand but the turrets being designed for some of the follow on tanks could take 90's (including the one that eventually ended up on the Pershing). Those turrets had the same ring size as the Sherman had so it was possible to fit one of those or at least a modified version on a Sherman. Probably still not in time for D-day though unless the time line was moved up extensively. Rich knows a lot more about this than I do, and I'm pretty sure that apples to others here, so we may get a more definitive answer in the not too distant future.

 

You need to reread what I wrote.

"Bridges", i.e., "a structure carrying a road, path, railroad, or canal across a river, ravine, road, railroad, or other obstacle" width and load-bearing capacity were designed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers according to weights regulated by the Army staff. Think about it for a second. You have to have bridging material portable enough that it can be carried in vehicles and erected in a relatively short period of time. The heavier the loads they carry and the wider those loads are, then the bigger the bridge has to be, the heavier it is, and the longer it takes to emplace.

Now add the simple fact that tank sizes grew radically over a short period of time. Assumptions about future medium tank sizes went from 15 tons in 1922, which was small enough to fit the average highway bridge in the country and to be able to cross the standard engineer bridge, to 25 tons in 1940, after the engineers had redesigned their bridge to accommodate 23 tons...back to the drawing board! Then 27 tons, 30 tons, 33 tons, 38 tons, 40 tons...and then the T26. All in the space of less than five years.

Amphibious ships and craft were even more problematic, since they were much more complicated things to build. Just as the design and building of the LCT-6 caught up to the size and weight of the latest Sherman, they had to rework it again to fit the T26. And there that was a factor of not just the vessels "bridge" to the land, its ramp being wide and strong enough, but the vessels deck had to be able to bear the deadweight as well.

Nor could the M4 be easily modified with the T26 turret. For one thing, the turret still had to be built, and if you're going to do that why not build the rest of the tank to go with it? For another, the only thing that was easy was fitting the turret to the M4 hull, because the turret rings were the same diameter. then you had to rebuild the tank interior to accommodate the larger rounds, which meant fewer rounds, which were in a more constricted space, which meant they had to be reloaded more often and would have a slower rate of fire...and so on.

Nor can you just "add" turret roofs and armor to the M18 and M36. The M10 was actually designed with attachment points for add-on armor, but they were almost never used because? Weight. Armor is heavy. It adds a lot of weight for a small area. The vehicle engine is then under a greater strain and is more prone to breakdown, as is the suspension, the tracks dig more into the ground so its easier to get stuck, and so on.

See? It is never "simple".