Myths of the Eastern Front

The chances to die facing a T 34 /KV with a Panzerfaust are exponentially higher than using a PAK.And a dead man can not destroy an enemy tank .

 

6.7 million Panzerfaust were supplied to the fronts.

For the first 4 months of 1944,the East front received 656300 Panzerfaust,during that period the Soviets lost 12541 tanks,of which 262 by Panzerfaust = 2 % of the total .Even if only 10 % of the Panzerfaust were used (65000) that means that the efficiency of the Panzerfaust was abysmal low : O.4 % .

 

That is a pointless statistic without wider context, nor reference. IOW useless, and without value.

 

In june 1941 the Soviets had 500 heavy tanks,900 medium (T 34) and 21200 light tanks : Total :22600 (of which 14800 in the operational units)

They received 1000 heavy,2200 medium and 2400 tanks in the second half of 1941.They lost 900 heavy,2300 medium and 17300 light tanks in the second half of 1941 (the % of the medium tanks that was lost was higher than the % of the lost light tanks).

On 31 december 1941 remained 600 heavy tanks ,800 medium tanks and 6300 light tanks,of which 212 heavy ,322 medium and 1393 light on the front .This means that 87 % of the Soviet tanks were lost . This means that the PAK 37 was not powerless against the Soviet tanks . This means that there was no need for using the Panzerfaust in 1941 .This means that the PAK of 1941 was as efficient against medium tanks as it was against light tanks .

 

That's not the option though was it. The average infantry man didn't have and couldn't have a PAK. He could carry a Panzerfaust. The choice was between a panzerfaust or a Kar98 or possibly grenade. I know I'd much rather have the faust in that situation.

Meaningless statistics manipulated in ways that are irrelevant to the topic at hand don't help you make your case.

You really think that argument justifies those conclusions? To any logical mind it clearly doesn't. That doesn't address yours though.

 

Using your dim, flawed logic again I see.

You have a real perpacity for reaching inherently flawed, incorrect conclusions. It's sort of admirable, really. Or at least, almost cute.

 

I agree with your assessment. A modification (thus a probable what-if) would be the increase of the mobility and strength of the army of Karelia so that it pushed north faster from the river Svir to reach Belomorsk/Sorokka, instead of Poventsa and Rukajärvi. Dietl and Siilasvuo would lead their respective German and Finnish forces to harass and hold the Soviet from counterattacking German/Finnish positions, and look for chances of penetration. Siilasvuo had defeated the Red Army in the the Battle of Raate Road in less 2 years ago so his forces could be counted on for a possible repeat using similar tactics. In the bigger picture, Dietl and Siilasvuo's forces were to act like anvil in fixing Red Army positions; the Army of Karelia after capturing Belomorsk/Sorokka would command the Murmansk railway and attack northward along it like an hammer. With airforce support, The hammer would either destroy the Red Army in front or push them aside onto the White Sea coast, on which the Soviet remnants could be destoryed by follow-up troops (like Italian ski troops and ground attack aircrafts). As the hammer reached near Kantalahti, the batte became a joint attack by Siilasvuo's forces and the army of Karelia on the Red Army. Obviously the climax would be the army of Karelia and Dietl forces jointly attacked on Murmansk and capturing it.

I believe the bulk of Italian troops would have been better used in the south, say in taking the Crimea including the battle of Sevastopol, Kurch peninsula and the push for the Caucasus. Axis powers did not have much resources to begin combat with; why increasing the strain on resources to send troops to the arctic ? Given my reponse to Triton, the ski trained Italian personnel could help the push of the Army of Karelia.

 

Dietl´s biggest problem was the route and as well the Red Army attacks behind the enemy line with marines.Then again he did not have the manpower and the sufficient equipment to fulfill the plan. No blitzkrieg in Lapland.

 

It's just not feasible. Trackless swamps, marshes and bogs. Lakes and endless forests, Mosquito-infested during summer, with tens of miles if not more, between settlements, and no one has any maps that are worth a damn. It is disorienting trying to navigate normally by yourself. Imagine trying to co-ordinate a division across such terrain.The Finns did amazingly well as it was. It was hardly surprising that the Germans fared slightly less well.

There's a reason why the Arctic front stood basically still throughout almost the entire war. If it were so easy, it would've been at least just as easy for the Soviets to knock Finland out of the war, and free their Baltic fleet.

 

I would like to add to both Kai-Petri's and green slime's assessment but with a different perspectives.

Given green slime's assessment, whichever forces controlling the lines of communication could win the combats. The Finns had an edge over the Soviet or the German regardless of the control. In my humble opinion, the most important lines of communication in Karelia and the Kola Peninsula that links Murmansk to Karelian Isthumus has been the Murmansk railway. With Murmansk in hand, some Axis forces in Norway could be ferried to Murmansk, down the railway to join the fight at Leningrad. In other words, was Murmansk railway crucial to the fight in Karelia and Kola ? For Finnish war's aim, pushing further into USSR mainland (c.f. Archangelsk) would be folly as the Finns lacked manpower for that offense and holding there after conquest. In other words, would the swamps, marshes, bogs, lakes and endless forests from the Gulf of Finland, banks of Ladoga, Onega and other lakes, to the White Sea coast a good natural border between Finland and Russia ?

Given Dietl's position as Kai-Petri's assessment, the push towards Murmansk would be very hard. The German forces at Petsamo would be better used as garrison and build an airstrip (cf. Henderson field at Guadalcanal)

 

The fins were not willing o risk American wrath, by actually hurting the Soviets. They refused to support any effort beyond the line they reached. A Finish commander given or order he didn't like, simply withdrew his men, leaving the Germans stranded without transport. The German commander was forced to withdraw the order to get the Finn to come back and he was not punished for his action.

 

From purely military PoV it might have been possible to push towards the Murmansk railroad at the Rukajärvi front, by 14th ID. Their attack was halted by Mannerheim, not (really) stopped by the enemy.

However, the political reasons for not to advance to the Murmansk railroad were clear. The USA was not to be confronted.

Also Finland was pushing it to the limit. The mobilization rate was so high in 1941 (and in summer 1944, the highest of all countries in the WW2), that there was not enough manpower to e.g. harvest the crop. Thus there was a near famine in the winter/spring 1941-42. The size of the army had to be reduced - which was done at the end of 1941. No major offences possible after that.

 

From purely military PoV, Germany was good for leadership against the SU while co-belligerents shall have more coopeation. So a more possible "what-if" is to mobilize co-belligerents of Germany to fight in Finland, most likely Italy which fought in the east on ideological basis. Could the CSIR (Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia) help Finland, at least its aviation attachment of SM.81 and Ca.311 could serve as transport aircraft to reduce casualties and bring in supplies ? How can Finland and the SU settle their dispute to each of their advantage without letting the American and British to interfere ?

More than 62000 fighting bodies should boost Finnish lack of manpower significantly. German initial success did not need much Italian help when Finnish forces need much. As the terrain for combat was punishing for heavy armored vehicles like tanks, mobile forces with tactical close air and artillery support would have better fighting performance than spearheaded by tanks. Did the Finns have more than enough winter equipment to help Italian if the Italian did arrive to help ?

Regardless, Finnish forces IMO shall not push beyond the Isthmuses between the Gulf of FInland and the White Sea, north of the Syväri. Could Finno-Ugric peoples, mostly from Finland, live there for long ? Beyond there, probable settlement did not bring meaning to the F-U peoples. Estonians, Finns, Samis, Karelians are all neighbors so any expansion shall keep their territorial coherence.

IMO, my questions were actually not intended to be answered but to suggest some ideas that how co-belligerents could better cooperate. The Allies of the US, GB, SU and the rest were better coordinated.

 

Fighting in Finland/Karelia was not easy - as even the Germans found out in the hard way. Of course eventually they learned, but it took couple of years.

It's very hard to believe that the Italians would have coped either, when they clearly couldn't pull their weight in Yugoslavia, Greece nor in North Africa. They did not have any troops available to be sent to Finland, while they had their hands full on with the existing fronts. Neither did they have any spare supplies - or planes - to be spread around.

The CSIR was in Russia for political reasons - to show co-operation to the Germans. Sending them to Finland wouldn't have served that purpose. Also logistically it would have been much more difficult.

"Dispute"? The USSR's long term goal with Finland was to annex her. That's pretty difficult to settle.

See above. Don't think the Italians would have been for much use for at least a year.

Finland was also not supposed to need any assistance (in addition to the Germans) in 1941, since according to the Germans the war was supposed to be a very short one and the Germans were supposed to do the actual fighting. Finnish troops were basically supposed to only follow after the retreating soviets. Of course the reality turned out to be something quite different.

Are we talking about the Continuation War of 1941 onwards? For the Finns it started on 25th (26th) of June 1941 and was not supposed to last long. So no winter gear needed.

During the war time there was a shortage of everything in Finland - the clothing included.

They did not push beyond the Isthmuses, but that was irrelevant, since Finland lacked the military strength needed to keep those borders.

"Could they live there?" I'm not quite sure of your question, since the Baltic Finns (of the Finnic people, the Ugrics live in Siberia and Hungary) and their ancesters have always lived there, since the ice-age. The slavic new-comers in Karelia started to arrive to East Karelia only from the reign of Peter I (c. 1700) onwards and mostly only during the soviet time.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finnic_languages

The Baltic Finnic languages, situation in the early 1900's.

1. Finnish
2. Izhorian
3.-5. Karelian
6. Vepsian
7. Votian
8. Estonian
9. Livonian

 

Thank Karjala for much information.

A personal note: one would ask why I am interested in Finland in general. From the perspective of understanding histories of distinctive or independent identities in peoples and nations, groups in Eastern europe shared a similar course (destiny if you want that word but I believe it is too strong) of their living spaces that were squeezed from west and east by politicial forces and its subordinate influences like military, economic, racial, lingual. Romania and Moldova plus Transnistria; Finland and Karelia plus Ingria(?); Hungary and Transylvania plus Carpatho-Ukraine/Carpathian Ruthenia; Poland and Lithuania plus some parts of Ukraine. Among these territorial problems to say a minimum, the Finland one is one the easiest in understanding in terms of influences: Peoples who speaks Baltic Finnic and Urgic languages versus Russian plus influences from Swedish, Norwegian and German; the British and American were mostly political influences.

Given all the above and that Karjala's population map by lingual distribution, it is easy to see a border of Isthumuses and the Syväri would just be a quick northwest-southeast border between Peoples who speaks Baltic Finnic and Urgic languages versus Russian. Adding the living space of the Sami people, that whole picture would be a territory for a Finland that include most peoples speaking Finno-Ugric languages in that part of Europe. Thus lingual issue is a political.

The CSIR was indeed in Russia for political reasons - to show co-operation to the Germans but sending them to Finland would have served that purpose. Dietl's and other German forces were in Petsamo and other places to thrust towards Murmansk and neighborhood. A CSIR thrust with the army of Karelia along the Murmansk railway northward would also show co-operation to the German Dietl's forces, as well as the Finnish. If the Finnish were basically supposed to only follow after the retreating soviets, why not let Italian who were eager to participate in the chase. Obviously they had their problems to solve as Karjala mentioned but they were not Finnish or Soviet problems. The CSIR participcated in combat in Ukrainian flatlands on foot or on muscle power and so they could in Karelia.

Logistically, was Karelia much worse than Ukraine, with the factor of winter weather taken off ? Any co-belligerent forces joining the German umbrella would not begin its combat with much heavy armor which would have held great advantage with aerial close support on roads on the Ukrainian flatlands, and thus no advantage or even disadvantage on the swamps, lakes, forests, isthumuses in Karelia. Mobile infantry, cavalry, light armor in light tanks and tankette, and small numbers of ski troops in the CSIR would be better in Karelian woodlands and wetlands than on Ukrainian flatlands, not to mention any manual or automatic mechanical maintenances. Long stories short, muscle power performed better in Karelia. Finnish forces proved that in Winter War. Malaria would indeed be one problem than multiple ones of machinery.

How about a Soviet/Russian perspective on Finland's territorial increase ?

 

The Italians were not of much use in any other front, so why would Finland be any different

 

You are welcome!

Yes, border of the Isthmuses would have been a natural border - in an ideal world.

I might be splitting hairs here, but there are/were no speakers of Ugric languages around the Baltic Sea. Although the bigger language group is indeed called Finno-Ugric, the Ugrics live either in Siberia or in Hungary. Here I would use terms Baltic Finns/Finnic and Sami people. See the table below the map (showing the situation today, after e.g. the Finnish escape from the territory stolen by the USSR).

I don't think sending Italians to Finland would have served the same purpose.

AFAIK know the Italians were not eager to come to Finland in 1941. As I told earlier, there was not supposed to be any need for any other "followers of the retreating enemy".

Yes, Karelia and Lapland were worse to handle than Ukraine - as the German example showed. Ukraine was pretty cold in the winter too, but the added difficulties in Karelia and Lapland were:

- few, bad or no roads = difficult to move around
- lots of deep forest = difficult to orientate, difficult to see, difficult to move around, scary for many Central-Europeans
- lots of lakes/swamps = difficult to move around
- little or no civilian people and/or houses = one needs survival skills to be able to live in the woods: how to make fire, how to keep warm, how to fish/hunt, how to make shelter etc.
- lots of snow = must be able to ski cross-country in the winter

The performance of the Germans in Karelia and Lapland disappointed the Finns. Can't see how the Italians could have been any better.

Malaria?

?

Don't think the soviets liked/would have liked anybody else increasing territory except themselves. However increasing territory was never Finland's initial goal. Instead it was getting rid of the lethal threat of the constant soviet invasions. Of course Finland would have taken the natural borders of the Isthmuses, if the soviet dictatorship had collapsed. Unfortunately it did not happen.

 

Thanks again for info.

One interesting idea is that during the population transfer during Stalin's reign, could Finland locate about 40,000 Ingrian Finns to the border between Finland and Karelia opposite to Kantalahti instead of them being deported to Siberia and Russian Far East ? During the Great Purge, numerous peoples with skills - Intelligentsia, army officers etc. suffered and could they be expelled from the SU to Finland instead of execution ? AFAIK, Finland in 1920s to 1930s held high number of agrarian population; these "technicians" of sort could have help Finland develop. Recalling the SU tank design used the Christie suspension from America.

The idea is to concentrate populations who use Finnic language to Finland, Karelia or Kola Peninsula. Obviously, the purge would aim to dilute this density against which Finland and Estonia would act diplomatically. The aim was to get Republic of Karelia independence or be part of Finland by political or diplomatic means. Military means would drain the weak manpower base of Finland. In this way, the border of the Isthmuses might not have been in an ideal world.

Malaria ? Malaria and Finnish troops

 

Do these difficulties still exist in Karelia today ? If so, I do not understand why the SU/Russia have not yet developed Karelia for her ownership of about 80 years.

Off topic, Russia is so large where lands could be developed more, especially on borderlands. http://sputniknews.com/russia/20150904/1026557353.html

If Finland had held Murmansk, would there be a forum on developing the Arctic and peoples speaking Finnic language ? Murmansk and Petsamo in similar sense hold more meaning for Finland than Russia who hold more arctic ports. Both outlets to the Arctic relieve Finland somwhat the reliance on Baltic politics. Could Murmansk serve as port for export as it is now, say transport from Murmansk (a Finnish port in imaginery scenario) to ports of the US across the Atlantic ? Its diminishing population make me sad a bit as it holds both economical and political purpose for Finland, instead of mostly economical for Russia. Russian ports like Arkhangelsk Finland would have never taken.

 

You are welcome - again!

Yes, Finland could have - theoreticly - but the USSR was a very secret country. The individuals which were seen as threats and/or of "enemy" nationalities were not to be allowed to leave the country - and reveal all the "secrets". So no population transfer to Finland possible.

The Ingrian Finns were pretty agrarian too. On the other hand many of the Finns from Finland proper/the USA/Canada, who moved to East Karelia during the 30's to build up the communist Utopia, were skilled. Before the Stalin's purges most of them would have preferred to stay in East Karelia. During the purges most of the the males were killed.

?

Most of the Baltic Finnic speakers were already in Estonia, Finland and East Karelia, so not much concentrating left. Only the Ingrians (=the Ingrian Finns, the Votes (almost extinct) and the Izhorians (almost extinct)) lived around Leningrad. In addition to that there were the Veps (south of Lage Ääninen/Onega, not many), the Tver Karelians (between Leningrad and Moscow, russianized) and the Livonians (extinct) in Latvia.

Stalin's plans were to get rid of the border minorities either by killing them, deporting them and/or russifying them, in addition to transferring Russians to their home areas. This has worked "perfectly" in Ingria, where you can not see much of the Ingrian heritage any more and in East Karelia, where the Karelians are now a 10 % minority - in their own country!

Finland and Estonia were/are small countries, whose diplomatic efforts nor opinions do not interest the USSR/Russia.

In the Treaty of Tartu 1920 the (East) Karelians were to have autonomy. Of course the USSR broke the treaty immediately. The East Karelian uprising in 1921-22 was crushed by the soviets.

The soviet/Russian thinking was/is, that all countries/areas once controlled by them is forever Russian. Diplomatic means were only possible, if the USSR/Russia was to gain something by them - not the other way round.

Yes, but I'm not quite sure why you brought it up. It was not THAT big of a problem.