Myths of the Eastern Front

Yes and no.

- there are more and better roads now
- the forests are still there
- the lakes and swamps are still there too, although for modern armies not such big obstacles
- there are more houses and people now, although in many areas still not many. For modern armies the survival skills are not THAT crucial, although still important
- the snow is still there in the winter, alhough the modern armies are much more mobile in the snow too

The USSR/Russia was/is a backward country, where only in the bigger cities one can see development. The countryside is mostly in worse condition than it was 25 years ago. East Karelia is especially backward.

If you don't understand it, don't worry - nobody else does. The normal rules of logics do not apply in Russia...

In Russia they love talking of great plans. Not much is ever going to actually happen though...

Finland never held Murmansk - nor especially wanted to. Murmansk does not have any special meaning to the Finns, unlike Petsamo and it's port Liinahamari. Of course the few remaining Samis in Koala peninsula might think differently. There was a handful of Finns living in that area 100 years ago, but they are long gone.

There already is the World Congress of the Finno-Ugric peoples and the Arctic Council.

http://www.fennougria.ee/index.php?id=10973
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arctic_Council

Nobody in Finland would like to have Murmansk, with 300.000 Russians and piles of problems - the nuclear ones included. Forget Murmansk, it has NO value or purpose what so ever to the Finns. But - once again - Petsamo/Liinahamari would be totally different things.

Finnish borders in 1939, Petsamo by the Arctic Ocean.

 

Thanks for info as more Finnish perspectives have been expressed. To me, Murmansk or Petsamo/Liinahamari serve similar purpose: a possible Finnish port to Arctic waters; and the nation would not rely totally on Baltic maritime lines of communications.

About malaria, you mentioned it and it happens that a previous discussion exists. So I create a link to it; please overlook.

 

Yes, you are right - the Actic Sea port would be an important asset. For the communication only no port is important anymore, but for commercial purposes Petsamo/Liinahamari surely would be.

No, you mentioned malaria first in this thread. It's no big deal, but I was a bit puzzled.

 

Is Finland becoming too dependent on Russia?

Off topic, Finland and Russia now share the longest border of all EU nations with Russia. Imagine this border could be the border of Isthmuses. Besides roads across them, ony ferries accross Laatokka, Ääninen and other large lakes on the border would help securities for commoner. Any other travelers who can sustain navigation across lakes for long period of time are probably related to any military.

 

To answer that question in your link: yes, we are - or at least were. Now the number of Russian tourists have collapsed and the trade to Russia too - causing enourmous amounts of problems in Finland.

Normally I would have enjoyed to be able to say "I told you so (not to trust Russian trade/economy/politics)", but this stupidity makes me only angry. Now the Finnish government just decided to order a nuclear power plant from Rosatom - the maker of Russian nuclear weapons! It seems that we never learn...

 

Well, about the trade. "You´re damned if you do, you´re damned if you don´t"...

 

Finland’s War Of Choice
http://thinkprogress.org/yglesias/2011/09/12/317015/finlands-war-of-choice/

This book review raises three interesting points, besides the review on the book contents:
1) the [Finland-Germany] alliance really was quite strange and in ways that mattered. [...] The Finns blundered into what they meant to be a limited war for limited territorial objectives without recognizing that by signing up for Hitler’s war of aggression, they’d committed themselves to a situation in which only the complete destruction of the Soviet Union could produce a Finnish victory.
2) The Germans, meanwhile, likewise blundered by ignoring the Finnish front. Initially Hitler was far too conservative about defending Norway from the phantom menace of a British amphibious assault, and then the Germans simply failed to nail down real Finnish commitment to the war effort.
1+2) Consequently, Finland achieved its limited territorial ambitions and then just kind of stopped rather than pushing east to seize and cut the railroad to Murmansk during Operation Barbarossa.
3) It’s actually difficult to see how a German victory would have served Finnish interests better than the actual outcome. Finland could have attempted to stay neutral, but a great many neutral countries found themselves invaded anyway so there’s no guarantee here. There was a lost opportunity for Finland to (re-)enter into a political union with Sweden, but this would clearly have done a worse job of preserving Finnish independence than their actual policy. Between Finland’s smaller population and its large Swedish-speaking minority, this would basically be Swedish conquest of Finland.

My points:
So a stronger German or Axis commitment to Finland would have help take the whole Karelia and Kola Peninsula. Consequently Finland would have held the border of Isthmuses since 1942 while beginning talk with the Soviet Union for a ceasefire to preserve neutrality and territory. Obviously Germany would target the SU; the enormous work of supportng Finland would have laid onto the nation whose interest was not linked geographically to the SU. It should be Italy with Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Karelian, Estonian support as Romania, Germany, Hungary, Slovakia, Spain and other nations were preoccupied elsewhere. If Italy would have a harder time in Karelia than Ukraine, Germany would play no better. I think for Finland that lacked numbers from soldiers to ordnance, just below 50000 military personnels from aforementioned nations would be significant help.

 

The red army didn't have unlimited resources, despite German propaganda, and very little to gain from pushing in Finland once the threat to Leningrad was removed. Had they cut the line in 1941 or 1942 it's unlikely they would have committed major forces against Finland to get it back. But an offensive without outside help was probably beyond the capability of the Finns due to manpower limitations, Italian help may have carried a lower political cost than Germans, though I'm not sure of that, the Italians were the original "Fascists". The ARMIR had a rather small blackshirt contingent compared to other Italian armies and the Italian blackshirts were less prone to atrocities than the SS.

Hard to say what Finland could have done, they needed allies to survive and the Western allies had proved to be "all talk and no troops" in 1939, so turning to the Germans was possibly the only option. Once they had gotten into the war making a separate peace would be impossible unless they were ready to counter a German sponsored putsch, and conditions for that didn't come until 1944 when the Germans had no reserves left.

 

The conclusions and views of this author are controversial and many - myself included - do not agree with him. See e.g. this thread about some of the aspects of the Finnish-German co-operation - starting with the alleged "alliance" - which never was:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=59&t=210849&start=30

1. Finland did not "sign" into anything. Finland was attacked by the soviets from 22nd to 25th June 1941, while Finland was declaring her neutrality. Only on 25th did Finland acknowledge the state of war and declared war on the USSR on 26th. Although the new war was ok for Finland at that time, it was still chosen by the soviets, not by the Finns.

Germany had won all her enemies with ease - even those, which on paper appeared to be much stronger. "Nobody" expected the soviets to cope.

2. True. In a war one should try one's best to beat the enemy. On the other hand Finland had already been exceeding her limits. The war, which was supposed to be short and "easy", had in reality already been too long and bloody. The Finnish army was proportionally the largest of all countries in the WW2 - and actually too large. There was a severe shortage of manpower in Finland, which was one reason for a near famine in 1941-42, when part of the crop was not totally harvested.

Finland also did not want war with the Western allies, which certainly would have happened, had Finland attacked the Murmansk railroad.

3. Finland wished for a similar outcome as in the WW2 - Germany wins Russia/the soviets, the West wins Germany. Political union with Sweden was not possible, because both the soviets and Germany prohibited it.

The Swedish-speaking Finns (= not Swedish!) minority in Finland is rather small (today 5,5 %). There wouldn't have been any Swedish "conquest".

It wouldn't have mattered, where the soviets had been beaten. Germans committing more in Karelia / Kola (where they didn't perform that well) wouldn't have made any difference, when they couldn't win the soviets (=the Allies) elsewhere. The war against the USSR was not decided in the North.

The outcome of the Finnish Continuation war was dependant on the outcome of the German-soviet war. Finland could not win her war if the Germans didn't win theirs.

Finland was seeking for peace already in 1943, but at (already) that time the USSR was insisting on the borders of 1940 - then totally inacceptable for the Finns. The other major point was, that making a peace with the soviets would have meant war with Germany - also totally impossible for Finland before summer 1944.

Norway and Denmark were occupied by Germany and the vast majority of the people did not want to do anything which might have helped the occupier - helping Finland included. There was a small (max 700 men) volunteer battalion (SS Schijägerbattalion "Norwegen") though fighting in Lapland in the German army.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SS_Ski_J%C3%A4ger_Battalion_%22Norwegen%22

East Karelia had been almost emptied of the young men of suitable age by the USSR. There were three battalions of the ethnic Finnic people in the Finnish army.

http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=5408

The Estonians were already either in German army, the Red army or in the Finnish army (some 3.400).

http://www.ww2f.com/topic/12497-estonian-volunteers-in-finland-during-ww-ii-1939-1944/

Sweden was "neutral" (just making a lot of money...) and was not going to send her men anywhere - not counting 1.600 volunteers in the Finnish army.

"As in the Winter War, Swedish volunteers were recruited. Until December 1941, these formed the Swedish Volunteer Battalion, which was tasked with guarding the Soviet naval base at Hanko. When it was evacuated by sea in December 1941, the Swedish unit was officially disbanded. During the Continuation War, the volunteers signed up for three to six months of service. In all, over 1,600 Swedish volunteers fought for Finland, although only about 60 remained by the summer of 1944. About a third of the volunteers had previously participated in the Winter War. Another significant group—about a quarter of the men—were Swedish officers on leave."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Continuation_War#International_volunteers_and_support

There was never going to be even close to 50.000 men coming to Finland from anywhere, no matter what - except from Germany of course.

 

Yes - the offensive period of summer/autumn/early winter 1941 was already pushing Finland to her (tolerable) limits - and then some. One should remember, that Finland was/is a democracy and the will of the people was decisive. Taking East Karelia had already stretched the Finnish endurance. Attacking to Russia proper was not felt worth for the lives of the Finnish soldiers.

I don't think the Italians could have been able to send any significant number of men to Finland, keeping in mind that they were already in trouble in their own fronts. Also I don't think they had been of much use in Finland/Karelia/Kola. The Finnish/Karelian conditions and terrain were so much different than what they have been used to.

Yes, you got it right!

 

I do absolutely agree with that. The "Russkies" were pragmatic in that case; for them it wasn't important what the Fins did - it was more important what the Finns did not do or what they refused to do for Germans - to Attack Leningrad from the back. I guess that Russians have appreciated and recongnized that. And, by the way, as you said, the Russian unlimited resources ("numerical superiority") was just an illusion. The Russians have concentrated large units at narrow line of attack whilst pretending that they are located elsewhere. But why I am telling you the obvious, what you yourself already know very well. I'm might today in mood to talk rubbish.

Saluti mio StancoVecchioSoldato!

 

Well, perhaps they "appreciated and recognized" that - AFTER ALL their attacks in summer 1944 against Finland had been successfully prevented and they had lost their ability to continue attacking with the allocated forces. Before that they did try their best to occupy ALL of Finland!

 

While I agree with all these viewpoints, the Italian troops would be the most feasible troops to help Finland among all anti-Soviet co-belligerents. In comparison, Rommel and his DAK went on the offensive despite not enough resources. Italian troops, CSIR, ARMIR and whatsnot, could land on the north side of Leningrad but south of Finnish advancement in the Isthmus and push south to Leningrad. Instead of the 900 days siege, could Italian troops CSIR help capture the city in 1941 or 1942? Thus the main combatants of the German Army Group North could attack elsewhere, especially the anticipated reinforced attack on Moscow which has been much discussed online. While understanding Finnish political difficulties in not to provoke the GB and the US in actively participating the war with the SU, occupying only part of East Karelia would only be undone after the Germany-SU war would have finished. Even if the SU sued for peace, the SU could still take East Karelia away. The victorious Germany would have been very much exhausted in her national capabilities after the peace.

Access from the White Sea coast onto the Atlantic Ocean could be incentive for port construction. Karjala had delineated that Liinakhamari could have good economic value to Finland if it was Finnish. The access to the Atlantic Ocean means more to Finland than to Russia/SU; Archangelsk is one such port.

Source showed scant ideas but insufficient evidence that the Stalin government approached herself or via the Bulgarian the Finnish for a separate ceasefire in the Red Army's darkest days in 1941 (Dan Reiter; How Wars End Chapter 6 and 7)

 

A separate peace with Finland in 1941 is a very interesting concept, and the Bulgarians as middlemen (they were not actively at war with the USSR) is not absurd, does anyone have more info about this?

No way the 10 divisions the Italians had in the USSR in 1942 could take Leningrad by themselves, and no way Hitler would entrust such a highly visible task to an ally even if it where possible. Italian units were lightly equipped by East Front standards and light troops work best in very difficult terrain, where they have better mobility than troops with more heavy equipment. In urban combat the Italians would be at a significant disadvantage against red army infantry that had more and better automatic weapons and there was more than 10 divisions worth of troops in Leningrad. BTW it makes no sense to land the Italians North of Leningrad, the soviets could easily shift troops there and supplying them would be a nightmare, the logical way to use them in an attack was from the South where they would be easier to support and supply though you would need to add a couple of German infantry corps to the mix and plenty of German air and Heavy artillery assets to have any chance of success.
The 3 division 1941 CSIR is a non starter for such a large undertaking as taking such a huge city.

 

Obviously Finland's success againt the SU would hinge on the Germany's but at those years which co-belligerent on the Eastern front did not ?

My idea was to integrate Italian units into the fray east of Finland because other German co-belligerents are either preoccupied with their own objectives like Romania or staying neutral like Spain. Even with the vigorous combat in North Africa, Italian can still contribute the mobile CSIR in Karelia where very difficult terrian and weather give advantages. Like the Finnish troops, the Italian in N.Africa lacked adequate supplies and equipment whereas the Soviet had many but ineffective by deployment in 1941. By participating in the Eastern front within their capabilities, Italian troops learnt firsthand experience against the largest landforces in WW2, like they had in the Spanish Civil War.

While the combat experience may not transform into developing better ordnance like the Semovente 75/18 from German Stug3, Italian Air forces can in reality be a game changer east of Finland where Italian transport aircrafts can be effective in second line duties. By deploying a unified collection of Italian transport for the Finnish, frontline duties such as close air support or dogfight are left to Finnish individual pilots which then exploit their communication and tactical advantage of their choice of aircraft onto the Soviet forces.

One interesting idea is that could the Italian ordnance development produce an armored fighting vehicle, tank destroyer/assault gun or a light/medium tank, by incorporating the sloping armor design and Christie suspension into Italian tank chases ? Given that Semovente 75/18 grew out of Stug3, the Italian experience in the Spanish Civil War against T-26 and BTs was not incorporated in Italian tank design is surprising. The Italian developers shall know the Soviet tanks outclassed the Italian tankettes.

Frankly, are there more Russian perspectives to the Continuation War ? If a separate peace or ceasefire between Finland and the SU was achieved in 1941/1942 with territorial cession of Karelia and Kola to Finland, Finland would not be locked into the German-Soviet mortal combat.

Mineral assets in those two areas under Finnish authorities are very attractive to Germany without significant commitment of German forces; in exchange, Finland operates Fischer–Tropsch, Bergius, Karrick processes under licence on waste biomass from lumber industries to produce fuel which can satisfy partially Finland's own consumption, not to mention the internal combustion engine opearting on the wood gasifier. "All talks and no troops" does not exclude the allied technological help. Given the agrarian image of Finnish ecomony centered on the primary sector from 1930s onwards, the synthetic fuel and mineral production can help drive industrialization in rural areas. Futhermore, the disintegration of Austria-Hungary after ww1 released the production capabilities of conglomerates like the Škoda Works into non-military sectors of the secondary. Can Finland and nearby Baltic States during the Interwar years attract conglomerates under Italy and the former Austria-Hungary to operate in Finland ? Readers may suprise why linking Italy and Finland in more possible ways, not just military deployment. After ww1, Italian economy was in a poor and weakened condition and the White politcal forces emerged victorious after the Finnish Civil War. Can the Italian industries since 1920s take Finland for investment and resources ? In essence, their coopeation can remove Soviet Union influence somewhat in economy before the Winter War and compensate each other the two national economies.

Off topic, Finland today holds abundance of mineral and lumber resources, for example in the pulp and paper industry whereas Italy imports raw materials for manufacturing and energy sources. Does the development in Industrial biotechnology, biofuels, biorefinery as part of renewable energies invite coopearion between the two nations.

 

And yet, since may 1942 italian units took part in the siege of Leningrad. Naval Detachment K, a Finnish-German-Italian unit consisted of 4 Italian MAS boats, 4 German minelayers and the Finnish motor torpedo boat Sisu. Howeever, Finnish-German-Italian alliance at the North ended during the winter 1942 /43. It would be interestiong to know If the end of Italian collaboeraion with Finns and Germans is a direct consequence of Italian debacle at the Stalingrad front.

 

Note to Tamino, I was creating an alternative scenario in my last post.

More cooperation among co-belligerents on the Eastern front is preferable. A more substantial Finnish-Italian cooperation is helpful; Finland can import ordnance or machinery parts produced in Italy under German licence.

 

I see. But in reality, with hindsight, outcome of the war for the Axis depended almost entirely on Germans. Finland had just limited objectives which depended entirely on success of German forces against the USSR. On the other hand, Italians were somehow dragged into the war that ordinary Italians didn't really want. Fine military parades perhaps but not the war at the East, with all these horrible winters. How can you wage a war with soldiers not prepared to fight for other peoples ideological failures?

 

Why did El Duce drag his own troops into fighting at large on the Eastern front, Stalingrad and other cities ? Why did he previously support Franco in Spain ? Among these three choices, Finland is probably most worthwhile to be helped because Italian participation there wins a reputation against "all talk no troops" one of the Allies. On the other hand, Italians were the most feasible to help in manpower. Romania and other Eastern European nations were all adjacent to the SU and thus preoccupied in frontline warfare. Second line duties including maintenances on lines of communications and transport by air are feasible with Italian aircrafts while Finnish pilots concentrates on dogfights, bombing, reconnaicence and close air support of the Finnish ground forces.

If you were to ask the ideological questions of why, Finnish land forces in East Karelia were also not universally welcomed and thus the answers are better left to discussing the Italian governance, not about the Eastern Front.

 

The men of the 12th MAS squadriglia that were part of the Ladoga Flottilla were repatriated in late spring 1943 so probably more due to the Tunisian collapse, the four boats continued to serve in the Finnish navy as J 1 to J 4 and were scrapped as late as 1961.