Occupation of the Rheinland

I also will ask the same questions about Munich
1)Why should F +B taking the side of the Czechs in the quarrel with Germany?
2)What should be the aim of their intervention ?
3)Had they the means to achieve their purpose
4)Would the result be better for F +B?

 

because it was too strict on Germany and sure to insure hard feelings.

A58. Precicely my point mate. That was the attitude you think the USA would have had...So noting that, what do you think the attitude of the USA would have been if the French had gone ahead.

As to it being a European squabble and not wanting anything to do with it, the USA involvement in ww1 doe not allow the USA a clean exit it may have wanted.

The second world war squabble came along precicesly because of this mess mate.

And my own folk? Europe before ww1 mattered little to us and our empire. It was as far away from us in mind as it was to you in distance. We too can use the same excuse.

France was in a no win situation. Damned if it did and most certainly damned that it did not.

 

Yes, you are correct. My POV is resting on hindsight, but then again, isn't just about all discussion on historical matter treated the same way? Yes it is a conventional POV, and it is mine. I will look into the matter some more to see if I missed something. Hopefully something will be presented here so I can learn more about it.

Why should France intervene you ask. I guess the quick answer would be to confront aggression early and avoid a protracted struggle later. If France would have opposed the German move into the Rhineland, German aggression would have been stopped at that point, and for quite some time in the near future. Of course once the historical timeline was broken, only God knows what would have happened later down the line. We can only speculate. The aim of France's intervention would obviously to stop German aggression of course. They had much more at stake in the matter since they shared a common border with Germany. In other words, it behooved them to stand up the aggression and act accordingly. Did France have the means to achieve the purpose? Of course they were weakened heavily by WW1, as were all the European participants. The French army was stronger than the 19 infantry battalions of the Wehrmacht sent in, of which only a handful of German battalions crossed the Rhine to test the waters (French resolve). When no opposition was faced, it was an open door for full German re-militarization, not to mention a psychological victory over the French as well.

This only served to embolden Hitler to push some more, and he did.

 

If France and Great Britain would have been a bit more helpful to the Czech's during the dismemberment of their country, maybe an important and strong ally could have been saved. They were the two biggest players from the victorious side in WW1, and currently world powers as well. The US was isolating itself in isolationalism, and had no intent to get involved in European squabbles. Had the British and French the means of intervening? I'm not exactly sure of the OOB of each country at the time, but they were probably as strong as Germany collectively. If they got into mobilizing a little earlier instead of sabre-rattling, maybe they could have a little more bite to go with the bark. But of course this is based on historical hindsight as you pointed out earlier. Hitler was re-arming, that should have represented a red flag or two to them. Of course France was putting everything into the Maginot Line, and trying to avoid conflict at all costs, but this approach never works when dealing with someone like Hitler who is bent on aggression and land acquisition. The result might have been putting off WW2 a bit while they mobilized for the conflict that was sure to come. Maybe not, who knows. Doesn't really matter that much. We have the historical timeline to debate after all.

 

As I recall, there was a telephone call by a French diplomat to Winston Churchhill saying something like "We are finished". It was this type of pre-mature panic, a few weeks after the German invasion of France in 1940, that made the British nervous and seriously contemplate evacuation and resulted in half-hearted fighting (rather than a "clench your teeth and dig in" mentality they are capable of). History often provides many reasons why a situation collapses, but I think this one phone call may have altered the course of the French campaign. When youre ally conceeds defeat prematurely, it makes the other ally very nervous indeed that they would be the only ones resisting. This event is metioned in the Book "Cross of Iron", and I will cite specifics shortly if anyone is interested.

 

A58, Britain and a continental army? Did you see what we managed to raise for the
BEF in first few months of the actual war starting off? Britains army was minute. Just as yours was. We were still struggling when we moved forward into Belgium when the Germans made their move. We may have been imperial but we had few of our own troops even in the empire outposts. We managed rather than ruled.

vonkonigsberg...Off topic a bit, but by time Churchill was getting his French mass of manouvre messages or lack of them from the French. it was too late anyway..Gort had already made his move and there would be no going back on it.

 

Sure thing urqh, I understand the British Army was weak and under strength, and the French Army was probably a little better off at the same time. Until someone posts an OOB for them both for us to see, I still think that together they were both stronger that the German Army at the the time. There was little to no artillery for the Germans to rely on and maybe only a few Lufthansa planes available to use in transporting supplies. If the French had crossed into the Rhineland in force and with heart, a good punch in the nose would have sent the Germans skiddadaling back across the Rhine at the double-quick. The French were defeated mentally already and hunkered down behind the Maginot. Nothing was going to stop the historical timeline, and we all saw how that worked out for everyone.

 

Well,the OOB of both the British and the French Army are irrelevant for the decision not to reply at the reoccupation of the Rhineland.
1)I would be very surprised if Britain could commit more than a few batallions
2)I would be very surprised if France could (in the critical period,thus not after 3 months) could commit even ONE division .
But,even if Britain and France had available troops,the decision would still be the same,because,what would happen,if France had crossed the Rhine?The Germans would retire,and,then ?Would the French remain ?And,if so,what would happen ?If there were guerilla activities by fanatical nazis (as in 1923)?How would the French react ?With a secret police,tortures,special camps,burning villages,shooting hostages ?The economic results,and for France,and for Germany,would be catastrophic,and this,in a period of recession .
And,saying"we all saw how that worked out for every one" is irrelevant,because,the French could not see ,how that would work out for every one,because that was hided and concealed by ...future .

 

You are right. No need to discuss the theory any longer. Let it go and just discuss the historical timeline then. It really doesn't matter. Nothing will change.

 

A58, I'm struggling with my time at the moment. Sheep, and proper work. I could put
up a few pages from the British army between the wars section in Collins or Oxford epic works, but I hope someone will address the numbers for you before I get round to it. Suffice to say, the argument between the war office and Downing st, in the thirtees on just this subject of what could be raised for a European expiditionary force was pitiful. Not ever a corps size. 2 divisions were still being spoken of just 2 or 3 years before the war started if my memory serves me right. And that was for what we thought was a full off fully fledged bang bang...all or nothing war or at least our commitment to it at that time...We had no means, financial or traiining or manpower to even think of doing what you think was necessary...Deterrence then like now was a bluff.

 

I have found on Wiki 2 (of course different) figures about the strength of the regular army
1)a parliamentary question in the commons on 10 march 1936:208000 (including the British troops in India)(but not referring to a specific date)
2)the same PQ on 21 may 1936:strength of the regular army on 1 january 1936:191000 and in july 1914:233000,of course,these would be increased in time of war by the territorial army,but,even after the DOW in september 1939,it took a month for the first British units to arrive at the frontline in France .