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Operation Bagration Discussion

Discussion in 'Eastern Europe February 1943 to End of War' started by O.M.A., Jul 17, 2013.

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  1. Tamino

    Tamino Doc - The Deplorable

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    Indeed. I have never thought about this that way but behind the Overlord there was a huge scale deception campaign including Pattons' Ghost Army and all that rubber tanks etc and everything was happening in highly populated area. Indeed, an impressive achievement. Abwehr was indeed a lousy intelligence - they just supported their bosses' wishful thinking.
     
  2. LJAd

    LJAd Well-Known Member

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    No : the Pz divisions were almost immediately released : 2 pz was going to Normandy and left the Pas de Calais, 9 and 10 SS were arriving from the east and 2 SS was arriving from the south of France .

    Hitler told the Japanese ambassador that the landing would happen in Normandy or Britanny .

    But that was not the reason why the Pz were going to Normandy : as with Bagration, Germany was not in the position to distribute its forces following what it presumed the Allies would do : this was a luxury Germany did not have .Germany reacted on what its opponents did . There was a landing in Normandy and everything that was available was going to Normandy;there was in may 1944 a big Soviet offensive against AGNU and everything that was available was sent to AGNU .

    The fire brigade was going where was the fire, not where there could be a fire .
     
  3. steverodgers801

    steverodgers801 Member

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    German ob in June.2,21,116 pz div. 12ss, 21 pz div and pz lehr. so a total of 6 PZ div
     
  4. LJAd

    LJAd Well-Known Member

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    No : there were more than 6 PzD (1 SS, 9,10 ) but only 5 were operational :

    2SS :partly and far away from Toulouse

    PzL : south of Normandy

    12 SS

    21


    2 : north of the Seine
     
  5. RichTO90

    RichTO90 Well-Known Member

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    Indeed, it is considerably more complicated a situation than the conventional historical narrative would have us believe. You are partly correct, over half (57%) of the effective Panzer divisions were almost immediately released and to a large extent it was a product of their readiness, but also of the organizational scheme, which was complicated to say the least.

    Heeresgruppe B had under command XXXXVII Panzerkorps, with 2., 21. and 116. Panzer Division. 2. Panzer was operationally subordinated to 15. Armee for commitment in the army zone - on release from reserve by HG B. 21. Panzer was the same for 7. Armee, and 116. Panzer was the operational reserve for HG B...except it was still organizing, equipping, and training, so was only provisionally ready for commitment. Allied deception led to the decision to use 116. Panzer to replace 2. Panzer in the 15. Armee zone when the decision was made on 9 June to commit 2. Panzer in the 7. Armee zone for the proposed Panzergruppe West counterattack. So in the end, 116. Panzer was not committed to Normandy until 19 July.

    Under direct control of OKW was Panzergruppe West, which was the reserve for Ob.West as a whole, as well as the administrative command for Panzer training and organizing in Ob. West. It consisted of I. SS-Panzerkorps and LVIII (Reserve) Panzerkorps. Headquarters I. SS-Panzerkorps and two of its divisions, Lehr and 12. SS, were ordered to Normandy on 6 June when it was released from reserve on orders of OKW. 1. SS-Panzer was ordered to join it on 8 June, but the order was cancelled on 9 June and so it was not until 17 June it began actually moving. Worries about a follow-up invasion in the Pas de Calais and the still weak condition of the division factored into the decision. The last division, 17. SS-Panzergrenadier, was only under the administrative control of I. SS-Panzerkorps. It had been operationally subordinated in the event of invasion of LXXX Armeekorps of 1. Armee, but on 6 June was ordered to Normandy.

    Armeegruppe G similarly had LVIII (Reserve) Panzerkorps operationally subordinated to it in the event of invasion. However, its units were mostly not operational. 2. SS-Panzer was very weak and was not ordered to Normandy until 12 June, partly because after 17. SS-Panzergrenadier went to Normandy it was the only mobile reserve of any effectiveness for both 1. and 19. Armee, but that was at best a minor consideration. 9. Panzer was still refitting and was not considered operationally ready until mid July. 11. Panzer was only just arriving for refitting when the invasion occurred and was still not operationally ready when the allies invaded Southern France in August, even though it had completely absorbed the personnel and equipment (such as it was) of 273. Reserve-Panzer.

    So in terms of the effect of the Allied deception plan, it can be said it played a part in delaying the movements of 2. Panzer, 116. Panzer, and 1. SS-Panzer, but for the latter two their lack of operational readiness was probably as strong a factor. Otherwise, 21. Panzer, 12. SS-Panzer, Lehr, and 17. SS-Panzergrenadier were all committed on 6 June to the invasion front. The rest simply weren't seriously part of the picture on 6 June.
     
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  6. albanaich

    albanaich New Member

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    At this point in the war Germany was doomed. It was more or less a case of the collapse would occur at whatever part of the line the Germans weakened to strengthen other parts.
     
  7. Jesica

    Jesica New Member

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    Theoretically Heer still had the strength to overcome a soviet offensive if acting accordingly. But Luftwaffe's situation was very different. 'Defense of the Reich' failure in 1944 and the huge strain suffered along four long years, plus the over-extension of Gruppens left Heer with limited or null air cover in the east. Lack of reconnaissance and inability to intercept soviet tactical bombers doomed Heer's battle formations standing their ground.

    I recall reading in Ziemke's books that Manstein told Hitler a week before being sacked, that the Soviet Army could rip open any sector of his front. That they needed to create a reserve to act as 'Fire Brigades'. So it pretty much shows that Heer situation in Bagration in 1944 does not differ much from the situation after Kursk. On the contrary, Luftwaffe strength declined decisively.
     

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