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Operation Mars controversy - Zhukov´s greaterst defeat ??

Discussion in 'Eastern Europe October 1939 to February 1943' started by Bundesluftwaffe, Jan 13, 2015.

  1. green slime

    green slime Member

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    I'm with Glantz. IMO, the plan wasn't to immobilize AGC.

    But a non-success is not the same as a defeat, so I'm not sure I'd go as far as calling it a defeat. I prefer a multifaceted world.
     
  2. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    I don't see what else to call it. At least on the tactical level. Now it may have helped win a strategic battle but as designed it failed to even come close to its goals from what I can see. Not the first time something like that occured. Indeed my favorite General (Greene from the Rev war) never won a battle under his direct command but the campaign he generaled ended at Yorktown.
     
  3. green slime

    green slime Member

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    Well, I dunno. A learning experience? Did they lose territory?

    In a game of chess, does the black player declare victory when he achieves a stalemate?
     
  4. lwd

    lwd Ace

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    Chess is in essence a meeting engagement not a game where one player usually starts with the idea of simply holding and the other player is trying to win. The goal of the Germans in this case was to hold and they did. The goal of the Soviets was to destroy AGC. They didn't achieve their goal. So at least as far as the initial plans are concerned they Soviets lost.
     
  5. Kai-Petri

    Kai-Petri Kenraali

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    If you read the Glantz book you notice how Model had to move his troops around to stop the Red Army in Rzhev pocket area. He was busy doing it, the troops in one place alone were not enough. For instance Grossdeutschland men and officers considered Model a ba***** because he was putting them into the fire all the time first.
     
  6. Bundesluftwaffe

    Bundesluftwaffe New Member

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    Certainly he was from the troops view. However he had no choice, there were not enough reserves. I only wonder that Grossdtl. was still existing after that fire brigade role. It was split in severall Kampfgruppes as the book tells. Also cooks, supply and arty men had to fight as infantry. This examples show this battle could have gone the other way (eg. reserves were moved south, not as capable commanders on German side or Hitler had interfered). Certainly Model was better front commander than his unlucky counterpart of the 6th army (wrong man at the wrong place). Model would be unlucky in 45 tho, he commited suicide in the Ruhr pocket.

    BTW: I read an interesting view, why the defense was so good. Hitler was distracted by severall other events (of course Stalingrad, Caucasus and Allied landings). So he hardly had time to interfere at AG center. This was the reason commanders were relativly free in their decissions. Some of ém just employed common sense and eg. made retreats in order to avoid encirclements. The decissions at the front were than later authorized at army level cause they understodd they were right. However had Hitler be asked for every decissions the situation would be surely more serious for the 9th army. Or both Model / Kluge had a relative freedom as I understand Model was a fave of Hitler and a Nazi. While he would not trust the more "Prussian" generals like VON Rundstedt, VON Manstein, VON Paulus.... Hitler disliked so called aristocrats as well he might have had not much love for Prussians (he was Austrian). Rommel eg. was southern German and also a fave of Hitler (at least up to 43 or so)
     
  7. Tamino

    Tamino Doc - The Deplorable

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    Your assessment is correct: Operation Mars has failed to achieve it’s objectives. It was a defeat. But the German victory wasn’t lasting either -– the salient had to be abandoned in March 1943 anyways. More importantly, losses during the operation Mars drained the best 9th Army units. Hence the Operation Mars has indirectly influenced the outcome of the battle of Kursk; at least at it’s northern sector.
     
  8. arca

    arca Member

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    IMO operation Mars was a genuine soviet effort to eliminate a menacing bulge projecting toward Moscow and held by the german 9th army. The magnitude of this multi front operation and commanders chosen to execute it (among them Zhukov and Konev) suggests that this wasn't mere diversion. Even so it did fulfill diversional role as it tied down substantial armored and infantry operational reserves already earmarked for the unblocking of the besieged 6th army in Stalingrad.
    I wouldn't go as far though as Glantz to claim that it was THE principal soviet operation even superior to Uranus. There are some direct evidence for this, involving number of troops and equipment involved, amount of time, preparations and heavy ammunition allocation for each operations that suggest Uranus had higher priority. Also IMO there are some other indirect indicators. Uranus simply had batter chances for success because pincers were supposed to slice through romanian units with little armor or anti tank units, holding positions in open steppe. On the other hand in Rzhev salient awaited one of the toughest german units with a superb commander. The terrain on which 9th army was already preparing for defense for ten months was riddled with rivers,marshes and forests and relatively densely populated with it's settlements turned into fortresses.Next, deep flanks of the 9th army were covered by battle hardened german veteran units,while in the south, flank of the romanian 3rd army was covered by Italians(need I say more? :) ,who, jokes aside, carried themselves much better in SU than they usually did) and flank of the 4th romanian army to the south in the Kalmuk steppe was virtually nonexistent. Furthermore Uranus demonstrated great operational ambition and sophistication previously unheard of in the Red army as it sought to strike in deep rear and encircle vast area of enemy held territory, with northern pincer starting point being some 160 km in straight line from Stalingrad and southern about 100 km.Such huge buffer zone between trapped enemy forces and their new main battle line meant small chances for escape of surrounded forces. In contrast Mars was much more shallow, confined on eliminating the bulge, with northern and southern pincers being distanced from the tip of the salient about 100 and 50 km respectively, thus theoretically giving encircled forces much better chances to break through or being saved from outside.And last but crucial reason was operational surprise in the south,while an attack on bulge projecting toward Moscow was an open book to read .In that light IMO the operation that had significantly greater chance of success(Uranus) probably also held superior position in high command's plans.

    Unrelated to this, 9th army was fortunate to be commanded by Generaloberst Walter Model, one of the finest soldiers of the Reich and nazi scum through and through. Rzhev salient itself, as it defiantly jutted through soviet lines was a monument to his deeds in previous winter, while all other positions and units around it were overrun or routed back away from Moscow. During those chaotic times of January 1942, as entire army group center was on the run and general Strauss declared that he can do nothing more with the 9th, Model stepped in and managed to turn the table on the Soviets. He achieved this with his innovative tactical methods and great organizational abilities, but also with his energetic and charismatic leadership. He was famous for nearly cheating death on several occasions while leading always near the front. He sometimes personally led the attacks, inspected front line positions while having to run through artillery fire to get there and spent more time on the front than in HQ. All this made him very popular among ordinary troops. On one occasion in January 1942 Hitler ordered operational reserves mustered with extreme difficulty by Model for his planned counter stroke to be used to check uncontrollingly advancing soviet 33rd army that almost reached Vyazma, a crucial transport hub in deep rear of the german positions. Freshly appointed commander of ninth army declared: 'This must not happen.' He sat on the plane, and went to see Hitler. When Hitler repeated his attentions,Model bluntly asked him : 'My Fuhrer, who is commanding 9th army? You or I?' Miraculously Hitler backed down before his determination and gave him free hands. In his turn Model not only checked seemingly unstoppable soviet advance but eventually encircled the armies pursuing him(29th and 39th), defeated all attempts to relieve them and later crushed them. Such a rear beast was a real menace for soviet effort next autumn.

    I will raise another point here. If we analyze soviet operational or strategic victories (through offensive, not just holding out somewhere) until 1943 we can conclude that almost none of them were completely result of soviet competence over Wermacht, but accomplished with substantial help - mistakes done by the Germans. In Barbarossa all soviet attacks failed miserably. Great Moscow counter offensive worked only because Germans allowed themselves into position where they were overstretched, exposed, ill supplied and exhausted. Even though inherent superiority of the Wermacht prevented complete disaster. Through out first half of 1942 numerous soviet offensives hit german lines on various places and usually with superior numbers. All of them were a disaster. Kharkiv offensive,offensive in the Crimea, attempts to relieve Leningrad all failed and resulted in enormous manpower and equipment losses. This permitted Germans to grab initiative again - in form of Fall Blau. Defeat followed after defeat once again and again something extraordinary was needed to stop the Germans as Wermacht was still unbeatable in open battle. Extraordinary happened in form of massive Caucasus mountains in the south and immovable force that were heroic defenders of Stalingrad in the east. While Chuikov and his man were writing military history with their bravery, sacrifices and masterful and innovative concepts of urban warfare, this was still a defensive success. During the battle immediately to the north, between Volga and Don rivers a massive undertaking was taking place in form of four full blooded offensives orchestrated by Zhukov and Rokossovskiy to relieve 62nd army in Stalingrad( Kotluban offensives from 3rd September to 26th October). Defending these approaches to Stalingrad were forces of german 14th panzer and 8th army corp and even though greatly outnumbered and attacked with multiple soviet armies they held their ground and inflicted grievous losses to the Red army. Despite 62nd army's glory, Stalingrad would've been another defeat if there wasn't for another blunder of the Germans this time in form of over extension and consequently flanks being secured by their much weeker allies,where soviet counter offensive eventually struck. It wasn't until mid '43 that the Red army was capable of attacking prepared german defenses, penetrating them, defeating operational reserves and exploiting in depth. Even in second half of 1943 AGC defeated many attempts to drive them back and formidable defenses of AGN strangling Leningrad also gave way only in January 1944 in spite of numerous attempts many times before.
    Reason for this defensive superiority in early years of war are very complex and beyond this sketch but in main lines it had to do with often poorly trained soviet soldiers, poor means of command and control, complicating rapid decision making during the battle, poor logistics and rear services,defective tactics(due to high loses and inexperience of junior officers,result of the purges and prewar discouragement of thinking and individual initiative etc) required to fulfill adept planing on operational and strategic level,inferior air force (until at least mid 1943) and many other reasons on soviet side. On the other hand German army was superbly trained war machine with their vaunted 'Ausfragtaktik' flexibility and initiative doctrine.Principles such as utilization of concentrated firepower, concentration on holding transport routs and junctions, mobility of forces, and gruesomely efficient air force (at least on eastern front) and still many more factors all contributed in making them such dangerous and frustrating opponent.
    In this context it's no great wonder that operation Mars failed even though overseen by general Zhukov who I wouldn't blame to much and for whom I have great respect. He just didn't yet have such fine instruments to perform with as did Genraloberst on the other side. Much like great Formula 1 driver in a inferior machine. In spite of all this Red army found strength to learn and develop amid incessant painful and nearly mortal blows, to became itself sophisticated and efficient device that crushed once world's best army before which entire world was trembling.
     
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  9. Victor Preuninger

    Victor Preuninger New Member

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    It needs to be remembered that Stalin was a big fan of the "general offensive." In June/July 41 his orders were to "attack," everywhere! In December/January the Soviets launched their first great "offensive," with amphibious landings in Crimea, the Moscow offensive, and attacks in the north, from Velikyi Luki and Demyansk to the Volkhov and Leningrad. The '42 Winter Offensive also followed this pattern. While Stavka often viewed these as essentially probing attacks, requiring reinforcement of success, it really seems Stalin wanted and expected that ALL of the attacks would succeed. Involving almost 1 million men, "Mars" cannot be viewed as "diversionary". What's more, Zhukov was clearly Stalin's "best" general, at least in Stalin's view. In late '42, he would hardly be personally involved in a "diversion." Further, destruction of Army Group Center would have directly cost Germany the war, as Army Groups North and South would have found themselves essentially cut off and in an untenable position.
     

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