Operation Saar: A Lost Opportunity

This offensive was very badly organized and even without an enormous german resistance , the french army progressed very slowly...

 

I was glad to find the rest of the article. Totally by accident too

 

It's interesting to specualate on what might have happened had the French continued to push into German territory in the days following Sept 7. It could very well have caused Hitler to mark time in Poland, while he sent sizeable armored units back into France to deal with the French armor and infantry incursion.

 

Yes , the French lost their opportunity there. With superior tanks like the Somua they could have given some serious trouble to the Germans. This is however a wet dream: Blitz had still to be "invented" and the tanks were scattered all around the front instead of being used as a spearhead. With a tank here and there, with infantery only (almost) and a lack of leadership and no serious lust to invade Germany to the core, this attempt was nothing but a bluff.

 

There seems to have been a few lost opportunities during that period.Hitler was winning more by luck and the actions of his enemies. His enemies seem to be doing the job for him .

 

No matter how better the French tanks were, without a fundamental change in doctrine (which should have been changed back in 1935 to be effective by 1939), there was no hope of any success in the Saar operation. I think it's folly to believe the French could have made any difference given the many bad circumstances which were present at the time. I remain of the opinion that the best thing they did was put a halt to the operation and withdraw. The only thing the Saar offensive accomplished was to shine a harsh light onto the French high command as to how badly flawed their tactics were and seeing how ill-equipped their troops were.

 

As I stated before there seems to have been a few lost opportunities during that period.Hitler was winning more by luck and the actions of his enemies. His enemies seem to be doing the job for him . It was not as such the better tactics or what else but the conditions and actions of his enemies that contributed to his success.

 

This is a fascinating thread, but I would just like to draw your attention to several dates in September 1939.

The Germans did not achieve decisive advantage over the Poles until Phase three of the Bzura battle (between September 16th. and 19th.)

The Russians advanced into Poland on September 17th.

The Anglo-French Supreme War Council decided at their first meeting at Abbeville to halt all offensive operations, with no troops going closer than 1km from the German positions on the Siegfried Line. At that meeting were Chamberlain, Lord Chatfield, Daladier and Gamelin.

The point being that that meeting was held on September 12th.

Gamelin informed Rydz-Smigly that half the French units were "in contact with the enemy". It was not until September 17th. that the Poles were informed that the offensive was delayed (allegedly from the 17th. to the 20th.), at the same time as French troops had actually been given the order to withdraw.

 

Thanks Ricky, this is quite important. So imagine the Anglo-French had decided to accelerate offensves instead of stopping them, things could have been different . I have an idea that with people like Chamberlain and Daladier attending that meeting, the offensive was doomded befroe it started. If only they were given the boot in 1939 and replaced.....

Ricky, if you feel like it, you can introduce yourself in our new member section.

 

I read many Times the French had poorly trained Generals all the way down the chain of command. Still using WWI tactics, Yes the French had Good Tanks++++ but weren't effective or motivated in properly using the modern technology and War tactics that had evolved.

 

unfortunately what the dates given indicate is that the Saar offensive may have been undertaken solely to give the impression of fulfilling treaty obligations with the Poles - and that there was no real offensive at all.

there was an advance which was then forbidden from making any real contact with the enemy and then withdrawn.

at the same time the Poles - in an increasingly disasterous situation - were deliberately deceived. Of that it appears that there can be no doubt: Gamelin lied to the Poles to indicate that there was a second front, or at least the beginnings of a second front, when in reality there was nothing of the sort.

the real question is why.

was there still hope of making a peace arrangement with Germany ? It seems unlikely since France and Britain declared war on Germany - not the other way round.

were the French (and British) playing for time to build up their forces ? Again that seems unlikely since their ideal opportunity had to be while German forces were committed heavily in Poland.

perhaps the Allies thought that Germany would not attack in the west - that seems to be the kindest interpretation, and in that case maybe they did not want to start a major land-war.

however to have deceived the Poles was a disgrace for both Britain and France, and its result was that when an attack in the west did come, it meant that France had to take the full force of Germany's main armed forces.

 

the defenders of the thesis that operation Saar was a lost opportunity ,will have to produce more evidence to convince me.
I am limiting myself to the French side only:
At the beginning of september,there were on the Nord Eastern front:
23 Active ID
17 Reserve ID
16 Reserve ID that would be operational only on 22 september .
The 5 Ligth and Cavalry divisions were in a phase of transformation .
About the tanks:France had a lot of tanks(a lot of them were aged),but they were spread over the country;the question is:how many were available on the NE front ? And:how many of those were operational ?
About the artillery(always overlooked,but indispensable:without artillery:no offensive):how much artillery was available and operational on the NE front,especialy the Saar sector ?
Ditto for the ammunition.

 

It seems to me a little odd to suggest that a French military incapable of defending its own country in the spring of 1940 would have been able to conquer large parts of Germany in the fall of 1939.

 

They could have reached the Rhine, which would have been quite something. The Wehrmacht was short of ammunition in autumn 1939.
But it is evident that they didn't wanted to.

World War 1 was a great victory for France and to them, it was clear, that in modern warfare attack means defeat. So leaving the Maginot Line was no option. The french army was a trench-war-army, a lot of artillery, all their tanks were slow, but well armoured, not many tactical bombers, the soldiers still had their old Lebels (what was good enough back then would be good enough now) and so on.

After the german Panzers rushed through the Ardennes and it became obvious that the Maginot Line was useless, they simply refused to fight a long war again.