Poles at WW2

Yes, they were calling Poles to start Uprising, using radio. I have found only the fragment of one of these calls:

"We are sure that Warsaw hear today the artillery thunder of the battle, which - in the nearest time - will bring Warsaw the liberation. (...) But for Warsaw, the hour of act has came today. (...) People of Warsaw - to fight!"

This is the call of ZPP's radio (ZPP is Zwiazek Patriotow Polskich, Polish Patriot's Association, the Soviet organization, which members were the Soviets puppets, and which the "Polish government" was formed of). This call was emited at July 29, 1944. Aha, and I have translated it into English myself, so don't be surprised it is a little bit strange, I think.

In my opinion, there was no possibility of Polish government to return to Poland after liberating Warsaw by Home Army. They (Home Army commanders) knew that and tried to take control of the city purposing not to allow Soviets to place their "Polish" government in the city.

The Home Army commanders wanted also to show - by starting the big action against Germans - the Western countries that Poland was still fighting, didn't want to fall under Soviet control. They desperately wanted to turn the Western Allies' attention to the problem of Poland...

[ 30. January 2004, 12:45 PM: Message edited by: Falcon ]

 

The Polish WWII success in breaking the code of the German Enigma machine

1. Synopsis

After WW1 Poland found itself squeezed between nationalistic Germany and communist Russia. The Treaty of Versailles, a mere slap on Germany's wrist, offered little security. Political, economic and social unrest gave rise to fascism and to rapid rearmament. Russia, after a bloody revolution, continued its imperialism by engaging in war with Poland and by annexing its Asian neighbours.

The adoption of an encrypting machine called Enigma for the German army's high level communications created a problem for Polish intelligence in decoding intercepted messages. Consequently, in 1932, Poland established a modern cryptology department at the University of Poznan. After a few months the three young Polish mathematicians (shown below) derived very smart methods and succeeded in breaking the Enigma cipher.
(Marian Rejewski, Jerzy Rozycki, Henryk Zygalski)

For the next few years, before and during the war, Poland had the ability to decrypt intercepted coded German messages. As Enigma evolved into a more complex and sophisticated machine, so too did the Polish methods and techniques. Just before the beginning of WW2 the Poles transferred all their know-how and equipment to the French and British Allies for their use in the coming war. When war started on September 1st, 1939, the Polish cryptologists were quickly evacuated through Romania to France. By October 1939 the reorganised cryptology unit started to decrypt Enigma messages again. Until the fall of France on June 17th, 1940 the Polish unit operated officially in France. After that they went underground in "Vichy" France, where they operated until November 1942 when the Germans occupied southern France. Their escape to neutral, but friendly with Germany, Spain was a disaster as they were apprehended and imprisoned in cruel interment camps. Two key cryptologists and three radio operators managed to escape and reach England but most fared much worse. Two senior intelligence officers and three engineers were caught by the Gestapo and were sent to German concentration camps. The two officers were liberated by the US Army but the three engineers perished.

The British, using the Polish decrypting methods amongst others, established a secret organisation of about 10,000 people at Bletchley Park to intercept, decrypt and disseminate German Enigma messages and intelligence. Selected Allied high-ranking commanders received these decrypted German, rephrased for extra security and protected by the explicit Ultra regulations, starting with the Battle of Britain, through the Battle of the Atlantic, the landing in Africa, the invasion of the Continent and the bombing of the V1 and V2 weapon sites.

The Polish effort in breaking Enigma's code shortened World War 2 in Europe by six to twelve months, sparing hundreds of thousands of casualties and saving Western Europe from occupation by the Red Army...

More informations at: http://www.avoca.ision.co.uk/enigma/index.html

[ 31. January 2004, 08:49 AM: Message edited by: Wojtix ]

 

"The Polish effort in breaking Enigma's code shortened World War 2 in Europe by six to twelve months, sparing hundreds of thousands of casualties and saving Western Europe from occupation by the Red Army."

Wow, gee, amazing, and who says this? 'Andrzej Dabrowa, Ph.D.'.......ah, of course he wouldn't be Polish or bias would he?

And he also says, "This, however, did little to help Poland which was abandoned to the mercy of communism by its allies.". Hmmm......so he's obviously not bias?

Right, so 3 Polish uni maths bods did all the work it took 10'000 academics to do at Bletchly, oh yes, and the Colossus computer - which no doubt the Poles had already built in 1472 and gave to their children to play Bingo with.

Just think of all those wasted raids and lives of the British to capture machines, cogs and code books, when all they needed to do was ask 3 Poles!

No.9

 

Do you read all chapters on that webpage? I think no...

Sources of that webpage:

The following list consists of books containing information relating to specific topics and detailed information
Report (in Polish) by Maj. M. Ciezki, Paris 29th April 1940, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, 20 Princes Gate, London SW7 1PT
Report (in Polish) by Col. G. Langer, London April 1946 Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, 20 Princes Gate, London SW7 1PT
They Saved London, by Bernard Newman, Printed in Great Britain, Northumberland Press Ltd., Gateshead on Thames, for T. Werner Laurie Limited, 1 Doughty Street, WC1 England, 1952
The Ultra Secret, by W. Winterbotham, Harper and Row Publishers, London, 1974
Ultra Goes to War, by R. Lewin, Hutchinson and Co. Ltd. London, 1978
Intercept-Secret of the Enigma War, by J. Garlinski, J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd. London, 1979
How the Polish Mathematicians Decrypted Enigma (in Polish), by Marian Rejewski, Annales Societatis Mathematicae Polonae, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa, 1981
The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes, by Gordon Welchman, McGraw-Hill, New-York, 1982
Enigma: How the German Cipher Machine Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War 2 , by Wladyslaw Kozaczuk, University Publications of America, Frederick, Maryland, 1984
In the Secret Service, by Major General Rygor Slowikowski, The Windrush Press, 50 Edithna Street, London SW9 9JP, 1988
Ultra at Sea, by John Winton William Morrow and Company, Inc. 105 Madison Ave. New York, NY 10016, 1988
Seizing the Enigma - The Race to Break the German U-Boat Codes 1939-1943, by D. Kahn, Arrow, Cox and Wyman Ltd., Reading, Berkshire, 1991
Code Breakers - The Inside Story of Bletchley Park, by F. H. Hinsley and A. Stripp, Oxford University Press, 1993
Enigma - The battle for the Code, by Hugh Sebag-Montefiore, Weidenfeld and Son, 2000
Battle of Wits - the complete story of codebreaking in World War 2, by Stephen Budiansky. Penguin Books Limited, 80 Strand, London, WC2 0RL, 2001
Visit to Bletchley Park
The following list consists of books containing information relating to specific topics or detailed information.

Action V-1, V-2 (in Polish), by Michal Wojewodzki, Institut Wydawniczy PAX, 1975
Hitler's Last Weapon (in Polish), by Josef Garlinski, Odnowa, London, 1977
Most Secret War, by R. V. Jones, Hamish Hamilton Limited, Great Britain, 1978
The Secret War, by Brian Johnson, Methuen Inc. 777 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017, 1978
Alan Turing: The Enigma, by Andrew Hodges, Walker and Company, New York, 1983
Station X The Codebreakers of Bletchley Park, by Michael Smith, Channel 4 Books, Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 25 Eccleston Place, London SW1 9NF, 1989
Capturing Enigma, by Stephen Harper, Sutton Publishing Limited, Phoenix Mill Thrupp, Stroud, Gloucestershire, GL5 2BU, 1999
The Code Book, by Simon Singh, Anchor Books, A Division of Random House Inc., 2000
Very Special Intelligence, by Patrick Beesly, Stackpole Books, 5067 Ritter Road, Mechanisburg, PA 17005, 2000
Code Breakers, by Rudolf Kippenhahn, The Overlook Press, Peter Mayer Publishers Inc., Lewis Hollow Road, Woodstock, New York 12498, 2000

 

Oooh yeeees every Polish historican biased Poland

Is that not true?!?!

Hahah haha hehe huhuhu you are sooo funny..

No.9 </font>[/QUOTE]3 Poles? Many more.. At first read all chapters on that page... And then start to comment...

 

This page is created by Tony Sale the original curator of the Bletchley Park Museum

The Polish code breakers
Here is how the young Polish mathematicians broke the unbreakable Enigma and gave the Allies a priceless gift..
(Tony Sale)

http://www.codesandciphers.org.uk/virtualbp/poles/poles.htm

But i guess he is a liar like Andrzej Dabrowa

[ 31. January 2004, 06:36 PM: Message edited by: Wojtix ]

 

"The Polish effort in breaking Enigma's code shortened World War 2 in Europe by six to twelve months, sparing hundreds of thousands of casualties and saving Western Europe from occupation by the Red Army."

>>>Is that not true?

If you have all these books, it appears strange your versions chose to ignore or accurately access history?

Everyone knows Poland had a part in breaking Enigma, but no one exaggerates the contribution like you do.

Britain, France and Poland were all working on cracking German codes before W.W.II. In 1931 German Hans-Thilo Schmidt passed Enigma operating instructions and 4 diagrams to French Intelligence. They later passed these to Poland on the understanding that they should pass on any results they achieved with them. They never did.

Poland went on to break the simple code used at the time and make copies of the military machines when they made quick plans of the machine destined for the German embassy in Warsaw which they intercepted and kept till the next day. However, before the invasion of Poland the Germans increased the complexity of Enigma which the Poles couldn’t break. Then, just before the invasion, they met with the British and French cryptographers and showed them for the first time what they had so far.

In August they sent 2 mock-ups to France and Britain’s friend Gustav Bertrand (French Intelligence) and Tom Greene (British SIS) brought one over to London. The Poles themselves went to Bucharest where the British Embassy told them to clear off. They went to the French who got them to France and their code-breaker section ‘Bruno’. There the French broke the German Army key for 28 October from the sheets the British provided them. Thereafter Britain and France worked ever closer on the code till the fall of France where all work was transferred to and carried on at Bletchley. There in 1940 the British cracked the Luftwaffe code and in the spring of 1941 the Naval code. The Army code was broken in 1942.

So, if Poland had shared what it discovered in the early 30’s, like the others were doing, the meaningful codes may have been broken before the outbreak of war. To say Poland’s code-breakers are responsible for saving thousands of lives during the war is rubbish. They contributed to the overall project, but, as usually found, acted in their own selfish interest, then afterwards claimed all the credit.


"This, however, did little to help Poland which was abandoned to the mercy of communism by its allies.". Hmmm......so he's obviously not bias?

>>> Is that not true?!?! “

No that is not true. Poland was never an ally of Britain. The only pact of support Chamberlain made was when he (Britain) feared Germany making an early move on Rumania, re the oil. This had nothing to do with any concern for Poland. And, the French made an alliance with Poland when Britain and America refused to guarantee France against future German invasion. France knew it could not protect itself at that time and sought alliances with anyone. Italy was out because that would upset the French communists and the Soviets were out because that would upset the French far right. The alliances France set up at that time might have made her feel better but they were worthless in reality.

As I said before, Poland should have been very grateful it was given an entity after W.W.I and should have gone overboard to be nice to its neighbours German and Russia because these were the countries they had to live with. Yes, in my opinion, give them some bits of land where their ethnics were in the majority, and work out a deal with Germany to let her access Danzig and Prussia. It may not have stopped Hitler’s invasion but Poland may have got off more lightly.

No.9

 

You are still not able to accept the fact, that Enigma was not breaking by the British (heros)...

When i reading such arrogant and ignorant opinion - i can imagine why the British desert Poland at 1939, and sell Poland to Stalin after the war. Its a shame in your history, and you try to hide it..

[ 01. February 2004, 05:56 AM: Message edited by: Wojtix ]

 

No.9, don't be silly. If Germany had asked Britain to give them - for example - the area of Dover or Southampton and if Hitler have said that he would start war if the UK didn't accept his demands, and the UK hadn't done that, would you say the same - that UK should gave Germany their lands to stop the war??? I think you wouldn't. This is the way how Chamberlain had though in Munchen - the stupid appeacement doctrine, which had embolden Germany.

And as for your opinion about British-Polish "allignment", it seems from your post that Britain was so selfish, arrogant and treacherous as Germany was. They hadn't objections from sacrificing the weak Eastern-Europe country for they own purpose.

Happily, not everyone in British government had though the same as you. If they had though in the same way, they wouldn't declare war on Germany, because they would want to be "nice" to the Germany and accept the situation which they were in, without the objections...

[ 01. February 2004, 06:04 AM: Message edited by: Falcon ]

 

This is interesting. A close reading of the Andrzej Dabrowa and Tony Sale quoted texts above seems to reveal a small but significant difference.

The Poles ( who, all are agreed, did a superlative job of 'cracking' Enigma ) were deciphering 75% of intercepted material until September 1938 . At this time, the Germans introduced two further wheels to the Enigma machine, and, to quote Ronald Lewin in 'Ultra Goes To War ' , 'the Poles ( were) suddenly incapable of reading the German signal traffic' and remained so. They passed a complete five-rotor Enigma, via a French diplomatic bag, to London on 16th August 1939. The team at Bletchley Park carried on the work which had been started by the French, the Poles, the British and even included some American intelligence.

The rest of the story is well-known.

So for Mr Dabrowa to state that 'for the next few years ( from 1932 ) before and during the War the Poles had the ability to decrypt intercepted German messages'....surely, he appears to be overlooking some inconvenient passages in his own sources.

[ 01. February 2004, 07:02 AM: Message edited by: Martin Bull ]

 

4. Polish Decrypting Effort 1930-1939
http://www.avoca.ision.co.uk/enigma/enigma4.htm

Early in the decrypting effort, Polish cryptologists devised a simple method to solve the patch panel interconnect consisting of two paper strips. One strip had six holes representing the six panel interconnect the Germans used initially. This paper strip was overlaid on another paper strip that had Enigma machine rotor encrypting series. When the top overlay and the bottom paper strip aligned with the same letters, this became the solution for the patch panel interconnect. This method worked well for a time until the Germans started changing the number of patch panel interconnects and the method lost its value. When the top overlay and the bottom paper strip aligned with the same letters, this became the solution for the patch panel interconnect. This method worked well for a time until the Germans started changing the number of patch panel interconnects and the method lost its value.

Fortunately, the Polish cryptologists came up with much better method that consisted of an assembly of two Enigma machines, that was able to go quickly through the many combinations generated by the three rotors and patch panel of the Enigma machine. There were six patch panel combinations and 26 (one for each letter of the alphabet) times 26 times 26 rotor combinations, giving a total of 105,456 combinations. In less than 20 minutes they were able to find a solution for the Enigma set up and to decrypt messages.

They called this machine "Cyclometer", i.e. a machine that measured the Enigma machine cycles. In a few years they were able to set up a library of more than 80,000 typical set ups for Enigma. Unfortunately, in November 1937 the Germans changed Enigma again. Within less than a year the Poles were again able to break the code and by mid-1938 they reached the peak of their operation.

Suddenly, in mid-September 1938, a number of German messages could not be decrypted! Polish intelligence agents in Germany found that the Germans were changing the initial rotor positions not once a day but with every message so the existing methods were no longer adequate.


M.Rejewski started working on the problem at once and came up with a new, faster and more powerful approach. It consisted of six Enigma machines connected together and driven by a single motor. They called it "Bomba", a term that was used by the French and later by the British at Bletchley Park. Using "Bomba", all combinations could now be examined in two hours. Since fast decryption was of utmost importance a system consisting of six "Bombas" was designed and production given to AVA, the company previously used. By November 1938 the system was operating and German messages were again being decrypted.

In addition to the "Bomba", H. Zygalski developed a completely new method using perforated paper sheets. Each sheet had 51 by 51 squares and about 1000 holes arranged in a pattern. Twenty-six sheets, one for each rotor position, were required. As the sheets were superimposed and adjusted on each other, holes shone through giving possible solutions. Six sets of these were required for finding possible Enigma settings. This substantially reduced demand on the "Bomba". The advantage of the perforated sheets was that they were not affected by the patch panel setting.

By December 1938 the Germans had introduced new changes which lengthened the encryption sequence and the existing system, though still capable, took a long time to obtain a solution. The Polish team was now reaching the limit of their resources. In July 1939, the Germans added rotors four and five to their machines. This information was gained through Polish intelligence in Germany and cryptologists soon confirmed this by analysis of the new messages. On the basis of new messages and errors committed by German operators, the Polish cryptologists were able to deduce the interconnections in the new rotors. This was possible because for some time the Germans did not use the new encryption methods and consequently some messages were still decryptable although taking about 10 times longer! The only solution was to build a more powerful machine consisting of 60 "Bombas" or 60 sets of perforated sheets. This change of pace, shortage of resources and the imminence of war made the Polish Chief of Staff, Gen. W. Stachewicz, to decide to pass all the information gained by the cryptologists to the French and British.

This had to be done under the greatest security as German spies were everywhere. A conference was set for 25-27 July 1939 to which the French and the British crypto specialists were invited. The conference participants representing France, Britain and Poland were as follows -

From France, Colonel G. Bertrand (radio intelligence) and Captain H. Braquenie (intelligence)

From Britain, Colonel S. Menzies (Chief of British Intelligence), A. Denniston (Chief of G.C.C.S.) and A.D. Knox (cryptologist from G.C.C.S.)

From Poland, Colonel G. Langer (Chief of Cryptology), Major M. Ciezki (Chief of the German section, BS4), M. Rejewski, J. Rozycki and H. Zygalski (cryptologists), A. Palluth (mechanical engineer from AVA) and C. Betlewski (mechanical engineer from AVA). [...]

5. Polish decrypting effort 1939-1945
http://www.avoca.ision.co.uk/enigma/enigma5.htm

Germany invaded Poland on September 1st, 1939 and on September 3rd, 1939 France and Britain declared war on Germany. Neither France nor Britain followed up with any military action to help Poland against Germany. By September 6th the German army was moving steadily into Poland and the Polish cryptology unit was ordered to evacuate from their Pyry Forest location to Romania. Due to continuous bombing the evacuation was very slow. However, the massive influx of military and civilians into Romania helped the Polish cryptologists to slip past Romanian intelligence and reach Bucharest quickly. Since no prior arrangements were made, their contacts with the French and British intelligence had to be made in total secrecy. Romania, at that time, was a passive ally of Germany and Bucharest was full of German spies trying to intercept important Polish nationals. Contact with the British did not bring any results but the French contacted Captain G. Bertrand, who made arrangements for their transportation to France. M. Rejewski, J. Rozycki and H. Zygalski arrived in France by the end of September and were quickly followed by Colonel G. Langer and Major M. Ciezki. The rest of the team had to take their turn but most of them arrived in France by May 1940. Following military agreement between the French and Polish (now located in France) governments, an intelligence unit was formed in the small town of Gretz-Armainvillers 40 kilometres southeast of Paris. The unit, housed in the Chateau de Vignoles, was in operation by the end of October 1939 and was fully manned by May 1940. The unit was given the code name of "BRUNO". While the security, administration, logistics and radio interception were provided by the French, message decryption was wholly provided by the Poles.

As of 12 May 1940, the Bruno Organization consisted of the following

Commanding Officer Cmdr G. Bertrand
(French)

Deputy CO Col G. Langer
(Polish)

Capt K. MacFarlane UK Liaison Officer
(British)

GERMAN SECTION
In charge Commandant Renard (F)
Deputy Captain Ciezki (P),

Radio Interception
E.Fokczynski (P)
Lieutenant Annequin (F)
L. Siedenmeyer (F)

Mechanical Decryption
M. Rejewski (P)
Lieutenant Palluth (P)
J. Rozycki (P)
H. Zygalski (P)
K. Graca (P)
S. Palluth (P)
T. Paszkowski (P)
U. Krajewski (P)
Captain Larcher (F)
Captain Braquenie (F)

RUSSIAN SECTION
In charge Captain Couey (F)
Deputy Major M. Chasles (F)

Radio Interception
Lieutenant Palluth (P)
Captain Mariele (F)
Captain Chadapaux (F)
Sargent Eclancher (F)

Mechanical Decryption
Captain J. Gralinski (P)
Lieutenant Szachno (P)
Smolenski (P)

(F=French P=Polish)

The composition of "Bruno" changed continuously as more Polish intelligence personnel reached France and more French personnel were allocated. During the "Funny War" before Germany attacked France, the French dug in at the Maginot Line and waited. This did not apply to the "Bruno" operation, which was gathering information on German Army strength and locations.

Round the clock operation was wearing both on the three existing Enigma machines and the cryptologists. To speed up the decryption and to reduce the enormous load on the cryptologists, 40 Enigma machines were ordered from a French company. A full set of drawings and one Enigma machine were supplied to facilitate a quick response but, up to May 1940 and the fall of France, very few machines were delivered. It was much later, in Vichy France, that the Poles were able to fabricate and assemble four additional machines.

To make the Enigma code more unbreakable, the Germans made several changes and improvements which slowed the decryption process. "Bruno" worked on three shifts with the cryptologists being called at any time of day or night. The "Funny War" ended when, on May 10th, 1940, Germany attacked Belgium, Holland and the Netherlands. In the ensuing thrust, which bypassed the Maginot Line, French resistance collapsed after several weeks of fighting. From the very beginning the Poles had wanted to cooperate with the British who had enormous resources and, being removed from contact with the enemy, could make better use of Enigma generated intelligence information. However, Capt. G. Bertrand insisted that the operation be under his control and that all outside communication be only through him, forbidding the Poles to communicate directly with authorities in London. This antagonistic attitude of the French towards the British was detrimental to successful operation as the British were providing H. Zygalski perforated sheets and the Enigma keys. The worst Polish misgivings were realised when the French resistance collapsed and they found themselves helpless in occupied France. Worst of all, the French in their incompetence bungled the only chance of evacuation in a British ship by failing to provide transportation to the rendezvous point on the Mediterranean coast. This was against all the rules of intelligence operation that you never allow intelligence personnel to be exposed to the enemy since it puts the whole operation in jeopardy. The resulting capture of the key personnel threatened the security of the Enigma secret and it was only luck and the superhuman determination of the captured personnel that kept the secret intact.

On June 17th, 1940 Marshal H. Petain signed the capitulation which effectively terminated the official operation of Bruno. Facing the threat of being captured the British liaison officer, Captain MacFarland, hastily departed to Britain. The Polish contingent of the "Bruno" unit was to be transported by the French on June 22nd, 1940 to a port for evacuation on a British naval vessel. However, in the ensuing chaos and collapse of the government structure, the French failed to transport them and the ship sailed without them! After the French capitulation, "Bruno" was evacuated first to La Ferte-Saint Aubin and then to Vensat and they were able to continue their work at each place. On June 23rd, 1940, in the resulting general chaos, Capt. G. Bertrand managed to transport 22 key personnel by air to Algeria and by June 28th, 1940 they had established radio contact with London. The magnitude of the defeat roused many patriotic French officers and on July 8th, 1940 Capt. G. Bertrand proposed an underground operation in Vichy France. The plan was accepted by the French Gen. M. Weygand and the Polish Gen. W. Sikorski in London. The decrypted messages were now to be sent directly to London.

The selection of location was very important because it had to meet various technical requirements. The place chosen was Uzes, a small town near Marseilles and close to the Mediterranean coast. A small villa, the Chateau de Foozes, was purchased by Capt. G. Bertrand in his new role as Monsieur Barsac, a businessman. In small groups of two or three, the members of "Bruno", masquerading as businessmen, technicians etc, arrived in Uzes with papers identifying them as naturalised French citizens. The unit now had the cover name of "Cadix" and consisted of French, Poles and Spaniards - 32 men in all.

Polish & Spanish members of Cadix Jan Gralinski, Jerzy Rozycki and Piotr Smolenski who drowned in the ship Lamonciere in January 1942 Chateau de Foozes

On October 1st, 1940 "Cadix" started clandestine operation. Security was of utmost importance and to that end each group worked separately, any sharing of information being strictly forbidden. The responsibility of German radio interception was, of course, given to the French team. Also, Capt. G. Bertrand had secret contact with "Vichy" controlled radio intercept units which supplied them with a large number of intercepted messages. In addition, the Poles had installed four of their own receivers to intercept German short wave transmissions. A very important part of Bruno activity was the detection of German spy radio networks in France. Over a period of several months they were able to intercept and decrypt 387 messages, resulting in the elimination of several intelligence and fifth column networks.

The intercepted traffic consisted of messages from:

a) German high command
b) Police in occupied territories
c) German agents in France and North Africa
d) German occupation units in France and North Africa.
To facilitate the movement of couriers between other radio listening posts, as well as French underground units, a fictitious company was formed with subsidiaries in various parts of France and north Africa. Apart from regular Enigma related decryptions, the Polish team managed to break the codes of other German agencies:

a) Messages directing SS and Wehrmacht units in action against French resistance, which enabled Capt. G. Bertrand to warn French Resistance about impending German actions.

b) Intercepts of messages between German spies located in French Mediterranean ports and headquarters. By correlating messages with the ports, French resistance was able to detect transmission locations and apprehend the spies.

c) Telegraph code used by German units that were tracking and vectoring on French underground radio stations.
Early warnings saved many radio stations and lives. This was of the utmost importance because radio was the fastest and most reliable communication with England. By listening to a large number of messages they were able to establish a library of terms used to give special meanings or information to the decoded text. Of special interest, in the fall of 1941, was the breaking of the Swiss "Confederation Helvetica" code. Since the Swiss were using Enigma machines they had to be warned (indirectly in case German spies planted in the Swiss army were listening) that the Germans were decrypting their messages and, again without arousing any suspicions, that the Enigma code could be broken. Life in the villa was very difficult and stressful - cramped quarters, long working hours, hot and humid tropical climate, mosquitoes and scorpions in abundance. Very rare and indirect communications with families in Poland, rare excursions outside the villa and the continuous threat of being discovered had a bad effect on morale. A depressing event occurred on January 9th, 1942 when "Cadix" members J. Rozycki, Capt. J. Gralinski, P. Smolenski and Captain F. Lane went down with the ship Lamoriciere in a storm when returning from Algiers.

By the summer of 1942 the situation was becoming dangerous. The Germans were increasing the number of troops on the border between occupied and "Vichy" France, which was only 250 kilometres from Marseilles. Through a bribed German diplomat, Capt. G. Bertrand discovered a German plan to move two motorised divisions rapidly towards Marseilles in the event of an Allied invasion of North Africa. On the 25th September, 1942 Capt. G. Bertrand, through his contacts, found that German counterintelligence units equipped with direction finding equipment were vectoring on underground transmitters. Having found themselves in the unenviable situation of possibly being captured and tortured by the Germans, the Poles contacted authorities in London for consultation and directives.

Four options were considered:
If the French resisted the German advance, to stay in France
If the French did not resist, to try to evacuate to Africa
If they could not evacuate to a "safe" location in Africa, to try to enter neutral Switzerland.
If they could not enter Switzerland, to try to escape through Spain and Portugal for evacuation to the safety of England
The French did not resist the Germans and evacuation to Africa was not a viable option because of the presence of German and Italian troops and the fluid military situation. Evacuation to neutral Switzerland fell through because the Swiss authorities insisted on them leaving Switzerland. The only option left was the dangerous and uncertain route through Spain and Portugal. In the meantime a message came from London ordering the evacuation of "Cadix". "Cadix" went on an emergency status when mobile vectoring units appeared near Uzes. Within several hours "Cadix" stopped operation and everybody was evacuated to a place on the Mediterranean coast.

In the two years of operation, the Polish "Cadix" unit decrypted 4679 German messages which contained information relating to:
Location of various Wehrmacht units and command posts
Activity of SS and Agents
Operation of the Luftwaffe in Greece and Yugoslavia
Extermination camps in occupied Europe and Russia
German spies
The "Cadix" group was split into small groups of two or three to facilitate movement and to reduce the risk of arrest. M. Rejewski and H. Zygalski were moved from place to place until arrangements could be made for them to be transported across the border to Spain. On the 29h January 1943 they crossed the border with a guide but were arrested, like many others, by the Spanish border patrol. They were taken to an internment camp for interrogation and then to various camps. The living conditions were extremely harsh and it was only after a hunger strike and protests from Polish, British and International Red Cross representatives that they were released. Arrangements were then made to move them to various rented villas around Madrid.
Throughout the war there were underground organizations in occupied Europe that specialised in transporting information and people to England. Priority was given to those with special qualifications and expertise that were in short supply in England. M. Rejewski, H. Zygalski and three radio operators crossed the border into Portugal, from where they were transported to Gibraltar by a clandestine fishing vessel. On July 30th, 1943, they were air lifted from Gibraltar to England. Upon their arrival in England they were thoroughly interrogated and debriefed by a counter intelligence unit. Polish military high command made it quite clear to them that even counter intelligence should not learn about their Enigma work. They were assigned to the Communication Unit of the Polish Supreme Command at Boxmoor. For reasons known only to the British, the British Intelligence Officers who had been briefed by M.Rejewski and H. Zygalski in Warsaw in 1939 and who had received the Polish made Enigma machine never contacted them and they were never allowed to contact the British unit. M. Rejewski, H. Zygalski and three others were the only members of "Cadix" who were able to escape from occupied France to the safety of England. Col. G. Langer, Maj. M. Ciezki, S. Palluth, E. Fokczynski and K. Graca were captured by Gestapo. Col. G. Langer and Mjr. M. Ciezki were sent to a concentration camp at SS Souderkommand Schloss Eisenberg. They were liberated in Karlsbad by the American 1st Division on May 10th, 1945 after two years of internment, just before Soviet troops moved into the town. Palluth, Fokczynski and Graca were sent to a concentration camp in Oranienburg. Graca survived but Palluth died in an air raid and Fokczynski died of malnutrition. Though brutally treated, none of the men divulged their secret and did not compromise the fact that the Enigma code was broken - which would have had a disastrous effect on the Allied war effort. Winston Churchill's famous speech referred to the few who defended Britain but it applied even more to those members of the Polish cryptology team. Col. Bertrand stayed in France and was arrested in Paris in the church of Sacre Coeur while waiting for a courier from London. To save himself he agreed to cooperate with the Germans but he gave only the names of agents who were either in hiding or out of the country and, once released, set up a meeting with a British agent. This could have ended in a real disaster for the Allies.

In the meantime, in Britain Gen. Menzies realized that if Capt. Bertrand had told the Germans that the Enigma code was broken the invasion of the Continent would be jeopardised and the Germans could use Enigma to deceive the Allies. Arrangements were made to contact him and he was flown to Britain on the 2nd June, just a few days before the invasion. During the interrogation it was concluded that though Capt. Bertrand did not betray the Enigma secret he tried several times to find out when and where the Allies were to land and asked that this information be relayed via radio to France. This was in spite of the fact that the radios in France could have easily been taken over by the Germans. On that basis it was decided that it would be very prudent to keep Capt. Bertrand under house confinement until after the Allied landing on the Normandy beaches. Invasion of the Continent began early in the morning of 6th June 1944.

[ 01. February 2004, 07:38 AM: Message edited by: Wojtix ]

 

Most interesting - if a little long-winded....

So the fourth and fifth rotors were not added until July 1939? How odd then, that the first meeting between the interested parties ( supposedly as a result of the crisis caused by the introduction of the additional rotors ) was arranged by Gustave Bertrand at Drouant's Restaurant in Paris on 10th January, 1939 . This meeting has been documented by Colonel S A Mayer who, I believe, was Head of Polish Intelligence at the time. if the Poles were successfully reading the German codes, why did they need to meet with French and British Intelligence ??

It is slightly hard to believe that the rotors were added in July 1939, and that due to this, a three-nation Intelligence meeting was arranged in Poland for the 25th of the same month . Fast work if it was ...

( It would seem that the Germans did increase the complexity prior to July 1939. For more information, including what seems - to me at least - a reasonably unbiased sharing of credit for the work which was done in this area, see : -

http://en2.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enigma_machine

Not a British website...)

[ 01. February 2004, 08:51 AM: Message edited by: Martin Bull ]

 

I try to find something out about this meeting in Paris.

This documents can help:

Report (in Polish) by Maj. M. Ciezki, Paris 29th April 1940, Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, 20 Princes Gate, London SW7 1PT

Report (in Polish) by Col. G. Langer, London April 1946 Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, 20 Princes Gate, London SW7 1PT

( You are from London, so you can go to the Museum and read them, meaby this documents are now translate in English)

And this Book:

How the Polish Mathematicians Decrypted Enigma (in Polish), by Marian Rejewski, Warsaw 1981
(meaby its already translate in English)

This two books are in English:

Enigma, by Wladyslaw Kozaczuk (about history of Enigma codebreaking effort)

Machine Cryptography, by Cipher Devours and Louis Kruh (has an interview with Rejewski)

And take a look on this webpage:
http://www.spybooks.pl/en/enigma.html

[ 01. February 2004, 10:03 AM: Message edited by: Wojtix ]

 

The website points to the answer, quote : -

'Once Chi-Dienst upgraded German Enigma BS4 lost its possibilities and between November 1938 and Summer 1939 only one in ten Wehrmacht despatches were read. '

Therefore the complete answer to Enigma was not simply handed to Bletchley Park 'on a plate'.

 

I think thats enough to say, that Polish informations was a gif "on a plate"

And enough to breaking Enigma over and over again.

After 1939 the Poles (in France) improve their methods again, and exchanged their methods with Bletchey Park.

"In total Poles decrypted Enigma cypher for ten years from December 1932 until November 1942"

Without the Poles it is possible that the Allys were never able to read German messages in the whole War.

Sorry but i did not find any informations about the meeting in Paris. Some years ago i have read something about that, but i dont remember in detail who was on that meeting, and what they have doing there.

[ 01. February 2004, 02:33 PM: Message edited by: Wojtix ]

 

What a waste of space to say nothing apart form endorse the facts that Poland lost it’s decipher powers before the war started, and that the text you boringly paste ad nauseam is again by Andrzej Dabrowa, Ph.D. who continues to demonstrate he is a very poor source of factual information.

Yawn……in their book Codebreakers: The inside story of Bletchley Park by Prof. F.H. Hinsley (Cambridge University and author of the 4 volumes history of British Intelligent in W.W.II), and Alan Stripp (Director of Cambridge University British Secret Services Studies), Stuart Milner-Barry (of Hut 6, Bletchley) states (P.92) ”When war broke out , however, the Germans made a major change in the machine [Enigma] which put the Poles out of business; And also; ”It was always a mystery to me the Polish contingent was not incorporated at Bletchley during the war……………..I can only assume there were security doubts.”

Enigma was first off a commercial machine openly marketed for businesses to make confidential communications. The Poles simple bought several machines but got nowhere with the military version until the French gave them code sheets supplied by a German for money – that simple.

Betrand records French Intelligence was approached in the summer of 1937 via their Embassy in Berne, Switzerland, who advised; ”German technicians have developed a coding and decoding apparatus of a completely new type”, this was the Enigma the military was using. With plans. Manuals and code sheets provided, the French built Enigmas using precision tooling at a Franco-American cash register factory outside Paris. ”The French had the capacity to read the German’s most secret ciphers – an intelligence coup of majestic importance. But they could do so only as long as ‘Source D’ [the German] continued to supply the keying changes [for the daily codes]”

The British too had an informant, a Jew named Richard Lewinski, who had been a mathematician and engineer at the Enigma factory in Germany before being expelled for being Jewish. He approached MI6 (SIS) in June of 1938 and was taken on board for £10’000, a British passport and a flat in Paris, where he built a working facsimile of the military Enigma.

Wynn-Williams in Britain had built a machine which performed a similar function to the Polish ‘bomba’, ”but at far greater speeds – speeds sufficient to break into the more advanced Enigma procedures that had defeated the Poles.”
(p.206 of 830. ‘C’-The secret life of Sir Stewart Menzies – Anthony Cave-Brown)

”The British realised, unlike the Poles, they could not rely solely upon painstaking and time-consuming mathematical decryption’s of Enigma transmissions……………nor, unlike the French, could they rely upon the services of a traitor to provide the keying schedules.”
(p.21 of 945. Bodyguard of lies – Deception strategy WWII - Anthony Cave-Brown)

>>>” A conference was set for 25-27 July 1939 to which the French and the British crypto specialists were invited. The conference participants representing France, Britain and Poland were as follows -………
From Britain, Colonel S. Menzies (Chief of British Intelligence), A. Denniston (Chief of G.C.C.S.) and A.D. Knox (cryptologist from G.C.C.S.)”<<<

What B/S! Menzies was Churchill’s Spymaster, the head of MI6 – SIS. The above meeting, just one of a series, took place in the decryption station in the Pyry forest near Warsaw. Alexander Dennison and Arthur Knox were there, but not Menzies! For one he was not a cryptographer, and for another, the big chief only goes on piddling little missions in Star Trek.

Public Records Office
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)
HW 25/12
HW 25/15

No.9

 

” don't be silly. If Germany had asked Britain to give them - for example - the area of Dover or Southampton and if Hitler have said that he would start war if the UK didn't “

Is this about W.W.II or am I missing something? When has Britain ever had a common border with Germany, When was any part of Britain taken from Germany? When has any part of Britain consisted of 80% ethnic Germans?

Ever heard of Sealion and the Battle of Britain? Hitler wanted all Britain and got his nuts kicked because of it.

I’ve tried to put matters as clearly and kindly as possible, but you don’t get it do you?

1. Britain didn’t give a toss about Poland, not in 1939 or in 1945. Britain, and France, wanted Germany to stay impotently in its park and the Communists Soviets to do likewise. Setting up Poland after W.W.I had the effect of suppressing Germany, reducing the Soviets Communist domain, and providing a nation everyone was happy to do business with. And, it looked good in the world press re devolution.

2. At Versailles, 13% of Germany's land was taken in which 10% of the German population resided. This land was used to form parts of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Poland and Germany signed a non aggression pack but Poland persisted in regarding Germany in a Master-Slave light, the same with its former Soviet lands. Poland was in fact, arbitrary and impotent, throwing its weight about on the premise that its ‘big buddies’ Britain and France would come and sort anyone out who gave them (Poland) a hard time. No such licence existed and Britain and France had plenty to worry about themselves.

3. In 1939 Britain and France declared war on Germany because of the threat Germany posed to western Europe, having made renewed willingness to war clear with the seizure of Czechoslovakia. It was not done for the sole benefit of Poland – get over it.

4. In 1945 Poland was of no consequence to Britain or France. Their only concern was how far west the Soviets were going to stop. Let’s be clear on this, the only way the Soviets could have been taken on was if America wanted to do it because without America nothing was possible. With the fall of Germany, America wanted to concentrate on Japan and go home. If you believe there should have been a crusade just to ‘save’ Poland, I don’t and I find nothing in the slightest bit strange about American thinking in 1945.

If Chamberlain had resigned after Czechoslovakia and I was in power, I think I may very well have not declared war on Germany after they invaded Poland! I think I may have let Hitler continue with his ambition to war with the Soviets and meanwhile stepped-up rearmament along with western Europe, Scandinavia and Finland, and done my best to haul Italy in with us – which I don’t think would have been too hard. I would have pressed for an ‘Iron Curtain’ of our own on the German front and helped fortify it with British troops and used the Navy to extend it on the sea. Probably move Allied forces up to the Black Sea or so. Then, after the nazis and the Communists had knocked the cr@p out of each other sufficiently, and, we in the west were nicely strengthened, I’d get the boys together and see how they felt about moving our curtain east?

Sorry to say, once again Poland doesn’t figure because realistically, it can’t.

No.9

 

Hitler could wanted bring the Anglo-saxons "Heim ins Reich"

Great Britain have to decide, hand over Hitler the area (white on the map below) that he wants or War

 

Wojtix,
That's a map of Britain in 600AD you've just posted.
And then there's the small matter of the Norman French "diluting" the Anglo-Saxon gene pool after 1066...


Regards,
Gordon

[ 02. February 2004, 01:06 PM: Message edited by: The_Historian ]

 

Hitler would be give a part to Petain

I know, the map is old, im just joking but Hitler was crazy - i would be not suprise if he has this idea