Questions about France in 1940

The early 11-12 May attacks of the LeO45 I refered to were on the mechnized columns in the Ardennes. Not enough of them to make a differences, and to many of the 47 bombers lost were downed in those attacks. I've occasionally looked for the German PoV of those air attacks, but not found anything of much use.

Interesting vehical. They were designed for indirect as well as direct fire. Each battalion or 'groupe' of 12 was to have a couple CP models. Lacking guns the command vehicals were to have protected observation equipment, extra radios, and provisions for telephone cables. They were to be equipped with sterio optic rangefinders and as I understand built in thedolites & gionmeters in Brit, or aiming circles & pantels in US terms.

 

Every post about Politics, about Verdun, about The Maginot Line mentality, about Gamelin, about French indifference, every one of those posts are right. If you add them all up, France gets her butt kicked! And she did!

Maybe we should go down the road and postulate that this defeat was the best thing that could have happened! Of all the defeated nations that Germany conquered, France had the best terms, no doubt.

Their indifference, almost to the point of, "Let's just get this war over with" most likely saved the country from the ravages of war. France remined relatively intact after it fell, and no other German war-conquered territory could even come close to saying that.

So, in my opinion, hats off to the French people. They saved many lives, they saved their economy, they saved their cities, and they had one heck of a resistance movement to boot!

Was getting their butts whipped, bad? Certainly in the short run it was, but in the long run, it was the best thing that could have happened. ~~~Hetzer~~~

 

This is only almost correct because Britain survived after the BOB. If not ...Who knows? There wouldn't had been a D-Day in Normandy.

In july 1940 GB needed more skilled pilots, more destroyers, the defeated France had both.

Just remeber the No. 303 (Polish) Squadron.

 

Brilliant summary, do you have any sources on the pervitin usage, it's something I always suspected had a significant role in the German early sucesses but reliable info on drug usage in combat is hard to find.

IMO the final plan was more Hitler's than Manstein's masterpiece, though Halder and the general staff ironed out the details, and it marked the benning of the end for the Germans, from then on Hitler was convinced he was better than his generals and that sheer willpower and fanaticism could overcome limitations like the lack of a modern supply echelon, the results became apparent in the USSR a year later.

 

Hi TOS, It's in Adam Tooze's book ''Wages of Destruction, The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy'' he quotes Hamburg historian Wolf Kemper in his report ''Nazis on Speed - Drugs in the Third Reich''

By all accounts there are many references in WW2 German reports to the issue of Pervitin (benzedrine / l-amphetamine) tablets to help stave off tiredness. Incidentally I believe amphetamines were also used by the Brits and Americans.

Gerd Schmuckle, 7th Panzer Division, at Kursk 1943 [quoted in Citadel: The Battle of Kursk by Robin Cross]:

"I could not sleep. During the attack I had taken too much Pervitin. We had all been dependent on it for a long time. Everyone swallowed the stuff, more frequently and in greater doses. The pills seemed to remove the sense of agitation. I slid into a world of bright indifference. Danger lost its edge. One's own power seemed to increase. After the battle one hovered in a strange state of intoxication in which a deep need for sleep fought with a clear alertness."

I've seen reports of huge amounts used on the Eastern front.

This might be helpful.......

Wonderdrugs and the Wehrmacht : methamphetamine and the German war machine

The way I read it Hitler was disappointed with Halder's original plan, & wanted added weight to the forces in the Ardennes, but he wasn't confident enough at the time to push it too far until he got wind of Manstein's detailed "Sichelschnitt" plan.

Hitler more or less took it on as his own plan & Manstein's part was downplayed.

 

I have to agree with Kipoyph

It's an open secret that the French blamed the British for not committing enough troops to the battle of France.

I've heard stories from veterans of the british expeditionary force (BEF) that they were spat at and in some cases physically attacked by french citizens during their retreat to Dunkirk.

The breakthrough by the Germans at Sedan could have been quickly contained and cut off with better leadership and communication by the French

But the easy option was to blame the British.

Maria

 

How many french were sent off to work for the germans?
How long were they held in Germany?
How did France April 1940 look compared to France September 1944?
How many french died during the war?

Compare this to the Danes, the Norwegians the Belgians the Dutch the people of Luxenbourg and tell me they got the better deal.

 

What might have been on tactics efestos....

It's ironic that it was the German commanders like Guderian, who put into practice the tank tactics and theories that the British were experimenting with in the late 1920's and early 30's, & the writings of the foremost theorist on combined tank tactics, Captain Basil Liddel Hart, and others like General Fuller, and General Hobart.

Even in France General Paul Andre Mais, Colonel Doumemc and De Gaulle were advocating combined tank operations, and Red Army General and theorist Mikhail Tukhachevsky held very advanced ideas on military strategy, particularly on the use of tanks and aircraft. His ideas were opposed by Stalin's military cronies from the Civil War like Voroshilov and Kulik, and all he got for his efforts was a bullet.

Unfortunately Hitler was the only one to give the green light for combined tank operations soon after coming to power.

It was perfect tactics for Hitlers rapid offensive plans, but didn't sit well for the French's defensive mind set.

 

Does anyone have access to the statistics of psychiatric hospitalizations in the Wehrmacht after June 1940?

Amphetamine is a trigger that fires Schizophrenia. (Stanford University ... web: undertandig genetics ...) If what you write is true, there should be some increase in cases of schizophrenia among first-line units who used amphetamines over than non.

On the other hand, the extreme stress also triggers schizophrenia, therefore frontline units should came out, regardless of the use of amphetamine, more cases of schizophrenia.

This disease usually explode in adolescence, between 15 and 20 years.

One caveat: I'm not a medical professional and thus before wasting your time with this should talk to someone in authority to say whether all this is a correct intuition or a stupid idea.

Whith my apologies if so

 

Yep. I reckon France 'got off lightly.....'

 

Le chant which town is this?

 

Hi Skipper. That's St. Lo.

The railway station, to be precise. One of (as I'm sure you're aware) the most devastated cities in the history of WW2.

 

Thanks Le Chant, I wasn't sur eit was St lo. I figured it had to be a smaller place Caen had a much big Marshelling yard

 

No worries, and please - call me Stu.

 

What were their names and details?

German report about killed and missing officers of the German Army (Heer) in the West in period IX 1939 - VI 1940 says that 1 Heer general was KIA:

View attachment 13389

And that would be Generalleutnant Hermann Ritter von Speck (commander of XVIII. Armeekorps during the French campaign) AFAIK:

Hermann Ritter von Speck - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

General der Artillerie Hermann Ritter von Speck - Lexikon der Wehrmacht



So I guess the remaining 15 generals were Allied (probably most of them French) generals?

Unless of course Waffen SS and Kriegsmarine or Luftwaffe lost some general(s) too.

==============================

Unless any German general was killed in Norway, von Speck would probably be the 3rd German general KIA in World War 2 after von Roettig and von Fritsch:

Wilhelm Fritz von Roettig - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Axis History Forum • View topic - General Wilhelm Roettig

Sorry I couldn't find any photos of von Roettig (just photos of his grave and destroyed car - see the link above).

Werner von Fritsch - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



PS:

Strange that wikipedia claims that both von Fritsch and von Speck "deliberately sought death" ???

I guess all German soldiers who died in World War 2 "deliberately sought death" simply by the fact of fighting in that war...

 

Was there a French General who had a paranoia over radios and telephones, he locked himself ina chateaux and relied on mesingers for info, he didnt trust any other forms of comumication in case the enemy was listing in, I am sure I seen this on TV.

 

Gamelin .

 

I don't know if it was Gamelin, the man had a very contrasting personality that is in a way most fascinating. He was both old, old fashioned and relying of the old school strategy and at the same time he said in 1939. "I'm sending my men to a 1939 war front with 1916 uniforms and WWI technology. This shows he was well aware of the situation, yet his education did not allow him to change. It's a bit like having kept Hindenburg in charge in Germany.

 

Thanks Guys, I knew I had seen this but I didnt know if it was a valid point.

 

Yes it was Gamelin, and his rational was that he felt that radios and telephones linked to the command center would "weaken" its position as that would point out where it was, and their messages could be intercepted and even if in code, decoded. This position made either motorcycle or horse mounted messengers the communication link to the front. Not a good plan in a fast moving mobile war that he was going to face in 1940. Might have seemed perfectly rational while the Belgians were still allied openly to the French, but when they declared their "neutrality" the entire norther border between the Ardennes and the coast un-defended for the most part. It was too late to extend the Maginot Line, and the water table would have rendered that rather difficult at any rate. The Belgian forts along the canals and such had been the "first line" of defense and supplementary/complimentary to the Maginot Line. Now the situation was different, and his communication lag was going to be rather telling. I don't know if he could have done much more than he did even if he had been in "quicker" communication with the front, since he already had his response designed and in place if the Germans invaded.

In fact when he first heard of the attacks on the Belgian borders to the north, he is reported to have said something to the effect that; "...They have done as I planned, and now we will swing the gate closed on them at the hinge of the Ardennes." Little did he, or others (in fact) think that the "hinge" would be the weak spot through which the Germans would plunge. I'm not sure how wired and wireless communication would have helped Gamelin at the command center. Perhaps he could have countered it, maybe.