Questions about France in 1940

The speed of the German advance was amazing and I dont think the Allies had any idea that the Germans had this sort of agressive attack with the combination of Armour, Motorised infantry and Stukas all working together, as soon as you got your troops inplace they would be out flanked and left for later to be defeated.

 

I found this a few years ago:

On the Allied command structure 1940

The French command structure within France “was a peculiar one” (Major-General R Barry). The Chief of Staff Armed Forces was General Gamelin. He was responsible for the defence of France on all fronts – including overseas territories. The so-called “North-East Front”, bordering Belgium and Germany was under the command of General Georges. This front, understandably, contained a great deal of the French army in the months leading up to May 10th. Gamelin had his headquarters just outside of Paris at Vincennes. Georges had his headquarters at La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, about 40 miles east of Paris. In the spring of 1940, both of these highly important military centres were linked by a single staff located at Montry, about 20 miles from Vincennes and about the same distance from Georges’ headquarters. The Chief-of-Staff, General Doumenc tried to spend an equal amount of time at both centres.

The commander of the French Air Force, General Vuillemin, had his headquarters elsewhere. The air force divided France up into ‘zones of operations’ but the pilots within each could receive instructions from Vuillemin or from the Air Observation Groups which were attached to the army. There is evidence that the air force received contradictory instructions from both once the Germans had attacked.

The most senior military figure in Belgium was the king, Leopold. He was commander-in-chief of the Belgium Army. However, he took advice from his military advisor, General van Overstraeten rather than from his General Staff. Belgium put its defensive trust in the Albert Canal, running north-west from Liège to Antwerp. Liège as a city was heavily fortified; Fort Eben-Emael was considered to be the strongest fort in the whole of Europe and the city was considered to be the linchpin of the whole defence plan of Belgium. However, such planning also meant that if Liège fell, then Belgium would also fall.

 

Did the Germans manage to capture the bridges over the Albert canal, I would have thought that the Belgians would have done there home work and placed heavy weapons plus there best troops to guard these crossing points and maybe had charges set to blow them, as far as I know the Germans had no proper bridging equipment that could be assembled quickly, like the Allies used in Normandy, I thought they only had pontoons which under heavy fire would have been a dangerous task.
Regards Yan.

 

"Gamelin appointed General Georges, first as his "deputy" for the Northeastern front, and then on 6 January 1940 made him officially Supreme Commander Northeast. With this step he relieved himself of direct responsibility and whenever someone spoke to him about "your battle" he immediately replied: " You mean the battle of General Georges." From that day, Gamelin simply became short-circuited and received only few reports from the front.

The parameters of Georges´command were never defined.At first, there were two Army Groups, North under General Billotte,with 7th Army under General Giraud, 1st Army commanded by General Blanchard,9th Army ( General Corap ), 2nd Army ( General Huntziger ) and the BEF ( General Gort ).Even the most capable Army Group commander would have found it difficult to lead five armies, and Billotte was far from capable.Moreover Georges and Billotte had no direct authority over BEF which was subordinated directly to Gamelin.Its commander had the right to appeal to British government, if he was dissatisfied with an order given to him.

Army Group Centre, commanded by General Prételat, consisted of three armies.South of Army Group Centre was the 6th Army, and an Army Group staff, headed by General Besson.

Confusion was increased when Gamelin set up an additional General Staff under General Doumenc,since he was unable to find a common language with Georges.Doumenc´s task was to prepare combat orders and put them in final shape, but in reality he became a liaison officer between Gamelin and Georges.Gamelin then saw fit to create yet a fourth General Staff of the Army under General Colson,which,in spite of its lofty name, functioned basically as a quarter-master department in the rear. "

From " Field Marshal Manstein, a portrait" by Marcel Stein

 

" During the battle, language problems would at times create havoc. On 21 May 1940, General Sir Edmund Ironside, British Chief of the General Staff, requested a joint British French counter-attack.The French interpreter at Blanchard 1st Army translated "on" with "as of " (á partir de). The French Corps under General Altmayer that was to lead the French attack was not yet ready for action on 21 May. The British attacked alone and were easily beaten back. On that day, General Altmayer joined the French Generals,who wept.The liaison officer of 1st Army to the BEF, Major Vautrin,recalls: " General Altmayer looked tired and depressed. He sat on my campbed and wept silently. He told me that we have to look at things how they are and that his troops were finished."

From " Field Marshal Manstein, a portrait" by Marcel Stein

 

hehe, that's what happens when you take two peoples who are both terrible in foreign languages .

 

It would have been funny, if the results hadn't been so sad.

Regards,

 

Its all crazy, you send an army over to a foreign country to help fight for what is right and both countries cant organise a counter attack because a mix up in languages, no wonder they were defeated, by a more asute foe.

 

At long, long last I've got around to reading Alistair Horne's classic 'To Lose A Battle - France 1940'. This is the first time I've read anything in-depth about the Battle of France, partly inspired by recently getting hold of a secondhand copy of Pallud's 'Blitzkrieg In The West - Then & Now'.

 

Brilliant isn't it Martin...The Gamelin bit above is quoted in there too.

 

I feel I must protest against the idea that has been repeated earlier in this thread, that blamed the French collapse, and lack of preparations on lazy "unionized" workers and socialism. That is just blatant propaganda.

Apparently socialism (Finland was governed by Social Democrats in 1939) and the unionised workers of Finland managed to make a decent enough showing of themselves. Enough to earn the respect of the world.

So can that left wing - right wing garbage.

 

Certainly, the Fall of France had nothing to do with the social political movements of the time...Influence in defence spending is always an issue though....But to blame anything on the Left of the time misses out the equal subserviant, and at times almost defeatist attitudes of the right wing Inteligencia and educated folk who should have known better than to entertain far right views in their dealings with facism and France's survivability.

Over here we heard once...better red than dead...I'd say in 30's France that cry could equally have been, better Hitler than Stalin in some quarters.

Neither left or right was responsible for the ultimate fall of France...Better still the Germans were up to it..the Allies were not.

 

I agree with that as a summary. Military reasons for Fall of France are all explained in this thread. French High Command were stuck in WWI Western Front military mentality thinking and tactics. VERDUN was the shinning example for them ( irony hero of Verdun Phillipe Petain would be the main face and leader of Vichy Regime later) "Fortresses , fortifications would be more efficient to stop Boche and defeat them just like the last time" was popular idea. Hence the Maginot Line. Mechanized/motorized warfare and tactics , maneuvers were ignored and neglected due to lack of funding , horse cavalry deemed more valauble than armored divisions. French officers defending mass armored formation concepts were demoted and isolated , ousted (De Gaulle) French military aviation was overwhelmed by Luftwaffe both in numbers , quality of machines and experience plus doctrine and technology. (Remakable French had no early warning radar system like Chain Home System ) And a ruinous and predictable strategy by a bad high command and commander was implemented. French actually gave whole initiative of battle to Germans right at the beginning when invasion started on 10th May hoping it would pass just like it happened in 1914 , waiting another Marne Miracle. When that did not happen everything was over. I am sure there are a few more factors I have overlooked in military reasons about Fall of France.

Socially and political sense there are other reasons. This was not the first time France and Germany clashed. 1871 Franco-Prussia War was a defeat for France but French losses were hardly a disaster in that war except some territory. Bismark and other German leaders of the time were seeking to have a glory against ancient enemy of Germans for a symbol of national unification to create a Reich not to humble France as a whole. So it was not so bad for society after war just a bitter pill in history. In 1918 France with help of Allies won but the price was horrific. Hundreds of thousands dead ( %15 of male population were killed in Great War ) , trauma of war and devastation it caused plus post war economic crisis , Great Depression , echoes in passifism among veterans and general population and turmoil in Third Republic politics (French communists were scoffing towards renewed war as a capitalist venture like last time due to Russian-German Pact 1939 lines of Moscow , French right was unwilling to fight for Third Republic due to socialist Blum goverment , socialist and liberals , democrats were alone , Catholic conservative French Army officer corps was also bitter towards Third Rebuplic due to socialist goverment of 1930'ies and cuts in military budget. ) all of French society was too fragmanted , too unwilling to shed blood against Germans like 1918 when so called won glory was too unbalanced with losses. The price to fight seemed too steep too high for society and politicians in 1940 when they looked 22 years back and considered the sacrifices they made. There was no unity of symbol either as an idea or as a person. Petain was the wrong man to resist since he was old , unwilling and prone to collaborate. Unfortunetely myth of VERDUN and its hero was intact even during 1940 disaster and he was put forward the face and symbol to represent France not Andre Reynaud (Prime Minister could be persuaded to resist in a national bastion easier to defend like Brittany or French North Africa ) Petain , nationalist politicians and conservative army corps who were beginning to admire New Order of Germany more than they should took over instead since they had all the power in last stages of Third Republic anyway and defeatism and collaboration deemed prefferable and more profitable rather than fight to the death mentality like Russians did in 1941. Both politicians and society of France couldn't grasp Hitler intended to humble France as a nation and state and make it Reich's vassal. Or rather they got it too late. Or they assumed French could profit in this New Order ccording to their own version. They assumed or continued to hope it would be like endings of Napoleonic Coalition wars or end of 1871 Franco-Prussia War. Britain-who was portrayed unjustly as perfidous Albion who deserted and betrayed France by apolatic French politicians and military leaders- would be invaded in a few weeks (Marshall Weygands words "Britain's neck would be wrung like a chicken in a few weeks" ) , some territory like Alsace would be given up , reperations would be paid then eveyone would be happy.

Past examples can be dangerous for predictions of future.....

And armistice was although humiliating did not seem devastating at first. French gave out a huge breath. After all it wouldn't be like 1914-18 catastrophe or 1918 November in reverse-France victimized this time. Hitler seemed to be playing a benign victor and conqeurer, leaving French Navy , colonies , a functional friendly state structure intact in Compiegne armistice. Plus Germany promised a role for France in New Order , an oppurtunity to reverse past chaotic misfortunes of Rebuplic. French POWs , occupied territory was promised to be given back after conflict with Britain was resolved which seemed to happen in a few weeks. Pierre Laval or Maxime Weygand probably thought they were getting better conditions from victorious Germans who seemed to be at top of world rather than British who seemed to be sinking in a blaze of glory and soon would get a worse deal. Holding bargaining chips like French Navy and French North Africa seemed enough for Vichy French leaders like Darlan. That's why they never thought to move on to Algiers with an exile goverment and continued to fight , fearing German reprisals against la Patrie itself. Continuos fighting against virulant and radiantly strong Germany for last seventy years consumed French national will to fight against invader. How much worse than this it could get they thought. Let's play it down for a while , give this new regime a chance , be good with occupiers and see how it works ! And initial "korrekt" German occupation behavior (no looting , respectful attitude of German soldiers towards French etc ) seemed to confirmed that. The door to collaboration opened and it started its downward spiral an accelarating speed.

There was no symbol of unity in 1940 like De Gaulle and De Gaulle himself calling to resist against Germany was considered a an outlaw and traitor by only official French regime , Vichy goverment. The so called Resistance in first small and wide steps started after resistance of Britain , invasion of Russia (there goes the French communist support for Germans and Vichy ) invicibilty myth of Wehrmacht was shattered in Eastern Front , US entering the war against Axis , failures of Vichy in everything it promised to people from economy to social and internal policy and its inabilty to resist growing unbearable German demands like requistaning French economic resources , slave labour programme etc as German war efforts grew more desperate and "korrekt" behavior was abandoned. After that stock of De Gaulle began to rise among French as a saviour and symbol of resistance. Before that Petain was the rising symbol in France , symbol of Vichy and collaboration. And prior to 1940 France did not have a strong symbol at all like these two. Third Republic had already lost its appeal and legitimacy for many sections of France before German invasion.

Wheq ! That was long. Slow day at work folks. I wrote whatever I remembered about To Lose a Battle , France : Ordeal of Occupation , Strange Victory , and Fall of Third Republic and my own conclusions about them. Hope did not bore you.

 

No salutes left. Certainly did not bore me.

 

I'm finding Horne's book excellent to read, and I've also got hold of a copy of Karl-Heinz Frieser's 'The Blitzkrieg Legend' which is in the waiting-to-read pile.

The role of morale, perception and leadership is interesting ; the French could have easily been better than they were, and the Germans weren't actually quite as good as they thought they were......ie they got just as clogged-up in the Ardennes as they were to do in 1944. I fthe defence had been a little more adroit, things could have turned out very differently.

 

Yeah that was one the reasons of French defeat. Failure of communication or slow communication vs fast German wireless communication. While regional unit commanders got considerable freedom ( like Rommel with his 7th Panzer or Guderian with his panzer corps ) and initiative , improvision they were also constantly in radio contact with their sub units subordinates and superiors and constantly updating picture. German panzers had radios which makes them to contact with other ground units or Luftwaffe to call fo help or to report. French tanks had none of that.and their communications , reaction time of French commanders were quite slow and cumbersome

 

Is there proof that the Allied did not keep their troops alert during the sitzkrieg? I have read that the Germans kept continuous strict order and the troops were practicing hard wheras the Allied, perhaps, were listening to music and were getting bored??? One of the myths I have read about?

 

Agreed Martin, things could have been much different...I though put it down to the role of decision making...i.e. the speed down the line of command...And the reaction times...Germans seemed to give a lot more line to their commanders at the time than the allied did. Which actually is evidenced in Gorts final up yours London actions in saving the BEF.

Strange Victory as our Friend M points out, should be read in conjunction with Horne...to give a very unfamiliar view on matters.

 

The biggest Allied failing was doctrine and leadership. Forces were roughly equal, Allies had more guns Germans more bombers (fighters numbers were roughly equal with Allies having a slight advantage if you counted British reserves).

What doomed france was inability of the command to react effectively, the counterattacks took days to plan and by the time they got off the situation had drastically changed.
Despite the initial mistake (commitment of the main reserve army to the Dyle-Breda plan) sufficient forces to regain the initiative existed, but they were frittered away in a sequence of "too little too late" attacks that failed to go beyond tactical success. The German command . especially Hitler, was not invulnerable to panic as the halt order clearly shows, but the very aggressive lower level commander managed to keep the pace of the offensive too fast for the ponderous decision cycle of the Allied command to be effective.

Not even in Northern Belgium where the Germans were outnumbered and only two Panzer divisions were committed, did the Allies manage to go beyond local success, looking at how this happened will better show the relative strengths rather than concentrating on Sedan where the bulk of the elite Panzer divisions overwhelmed second line troops. His focus on the key events at Sedan is the reason why I think Horne's otherwise great book is not the denitive one on the French campaign.

IMO the German infantry tactics and small unit command doctrine was just as important as the panzers, while the Allied leadership didn't grasp the operational capabilities of a mechanized force, that was after all an untested theory, a bigger failing was not understanding the implications of the WW1 stosstruppen that were a well proven concept if only they had bothered to look at it.

Blum's left wing coalition was no longer in power in 1940, while 1940 French politics were a far cry from WW1's union sacrée I would not overestimate it's effects, without the worker strikes the French would have had a few more last generation weapons, but the basic problem was not lack of weapons, but of good leadrship.

 

Alert is the wrong word - did the Allies improve during the Phoney War. The answer is no.

However listening to music and getting bored is a bit insulting.

Here is a little first hand information from my father a machine gunner at Dunkirk.

Conscripted in July 1939. He received excellent weapons training becoming a Number One (ie the guy firing the gun).
Posted to a TA regiment in September which was converting from a pure infantry to a machine gun regiment.
Conscripts made up a third of the regiment, one third was the original infantry TA the remaining third were reservists ex-regulars but all with machine gun experience.

In January 1940 they sailed to France.

1940 was bitterly cold, barracks was the stables of an old French Cavalry Regiment. The training was WW1 style, route marches, throwing grenades and digging - totally inappropriate for a machine gunner who needed upper body strength to carry over 100 pounds of equipment but the worst problem was that firing practice took place in an old coal mine and after 10 minutes they kicked up so much dust nothing was visible.

There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that this experience was not unusual - Guards Regiments unable to practice for fear of trampling on French fields etc etc. First Class Regiments on digging and construction work. Their skills atrophied.

Were the French better prepared - I give you this little piece:

In April they took over from a French regiment in front of the Maginot Line (British Regiments were circulated through this area to give them active patrol experience and experience of being under fire).

Neatly lined up, the regiment was ordered to jump into the French gun pits - they promptly sank to their waist in mud and slime with the French Soldiers rolling around in gales of laughter.

With the exception of Polish Miners of which seemed to be many in the Auby la Bac area, French civilians just wanted the British soldier to go home and keep the war away from them.

Messed with he French regiment they received the same food - red wine and bread

Like most British soldiers, he was appalled at seeing a French army on the move .

He was pleased to when the Phoney War (although there plenty of German bombs on the Maginot) finished and they moved up to the Border on 1st May and then into Belgium to the Dyle.

They were certainly not as well trained or experienced as the German soldier, nevertheless at Waterloo, and then each of the river lines, Sense, Dendre and Escaut the thin line of the machine gunners, anti-tank gunners and armoured cars were the last to pull out, protecting the marching infantry and never did the retreat disintegrate into a rout. In fact like most British soldiers, he thought they were giving the Germans a bloody nose and could not understand why they were constantly ordered to retreat.

After taking up position on the Dunkirk perimeter they were sent to plug the gap on the South West from Wormhout to Cassel, falling back next day to Wylder\Bambecque they kept Guderian's advance down to just two miles in the course of days fighting.

Half the battalion was lost in these actions and attrition in Lieutenants so severe that only two escaped