Rommel's reputation - deserved or political ploy?

Personally I thought my answer was:" it was a hit-and run, just to show that the operation could take control of an area, even if it was a small area just in the perimeter of Dieppe, but this did not take place and was considered a failure."

Interesting if Neilland is correct and the losses actually took place during retreat...

I will try to find find the book about where the tanks were meant to go and the area they were to hold, but this was mostly considered a mission by Churchill to show Stalin there was no chance in **** to start a second front in the west. Quite pricey show....

 

For the short term, the Allies could do without a deep-water harbor by shuttling their supplies and forces over from England in small craft. However once they landed all their forces and were operating well beyond the beach head, the deep water ports became a necessity. I doubt the Allies could have re-supplied all their forces in late '44, early '45 without Antwerp and Cherbourg. Which makes me think that if the Germans had some way to sink a considerable number of LSTs and LSIs early on, the invasion might have run into significant trouble.

 

Hitler had ordered all his subs etc to attack the invasion convoy... The RN did its job then...

 

Using snorkels, some U-boats got shots at Allied ships and sank a few of these smaller ships. Most of them got sunk in return. The impression I got from my reading is that air-dropped mines did more damage. I remember reading one horror story where a troop ship hit a mine and sank slowly but the troops were LOCKED in the ship when the crew abandoned it, and IIRC, something like 1200 died.

 

Dönitz was in shock because Hitler practically asked the Krigsmarine do a suicide mission....After that he would have nothing left...

 

Mines would have been the weapon of (my) choice against an invasion force or better against the supporting ships. I guess they were too expensive when effective (there were intelligent mines in 1944, very difficult to find with regular methods). But less expensive than U-Boats, that's for sure.

There were some S-Boat-attacks too, the coast commanders at the french coast wished they had PT-Boats: small, fast, 2 Torpedoes, crew of a few men. They considered them to be the ideal weapon in this circumstances.

 

@Kai: I believe Donitz pushed his boats into the channel after the invasion. He felt that since this was one of the pivotal battles of the war, the KM had to do everything it could to help the German cause. Even if a boat only sunk a couple of LSIs or whatever, it would help the German Army in their struggle.

Also understand that Donitz was very much a Hitler fan. Even at the end of the war he thought well of Hitler. He wouldn't go along with Hitler's ideas of machine-gunning ship crews but he thought Hitler was great. Didn't have too much respect for most of the others around Hitler though.

 

I think Rommel would have been better off posted to Russia.

His from the front command style al'a Guderian and Hoth would have paid big dividends.

Rommels entire problem in Africa was that he wasn't really there to conquer Egypt. He was there to KEEP Libya and Tunisia as part of the Italian Empire, and therefore keep the British away from a jump off point for Sicily and the mainland boot of Italy.

Rommel was amply supplied by the strenuous efforts of the Regia Marina, but never quite learnt how to stockpile supplies or how to keep sufficient reserves for a rainy day. In this aspect of logistics he had no one else to blame but himself.

I state again, Rommel was not in Africa to conquer Egypt and bounce into the Arabian Peninsula or Syria, Jordan and Iraq. He was there too keep the Italians in the war.

His continued offensives with Egypt as a mirage in the distance were against the advice of the Italians, and he definitely did not listen to his German advisors either. Rommel was famous for quarreling with anyone who did not agree with his ideas, and he ran to Hitler many times to go over their heads like a spoilt favourite child.

It's well known that post Gazala/ Tobruk he went too far again and cost Axis any chance of taking advantage of the upcoming C3/ Herkules operation that would definitely have solved his so called supply problem. But his constant attacks on the Regia Marina for "failing to deliver supplies" bore bitter fruit as Rommels anti-Italianism came to the fore with Hitler once again listening to Rommel's gossip and cancelling the operation virtually on Erwin's say so. Then without clearing his rear, he plunged headlong into Egypt on a logistical shoestring.

I say that Rommel should have been given command of the Sixth Army instead of Paulus.

 

Rommel was given personally a camera by Göbbels. No wonder there were so many photos of him, and naturally Göbbels used them.

 

Hitler and Goebbels chose exactly two generals to publicize and make into public figures for propaganda purposes.

One of them was General Dietl, of Norwegian campaign fame.

The other was Erwin Rommel.

But the irony of these decisions is that both of these generals achieved fame in what we're essentially sideshows and backwaters of the war.

Plenty of propaganda came out of the Eastern front, but propaganda heroes whose names were known to the German people generally were not from OST Front, even though it sucked in the greater majority of German resources and the war itself was only capable of being won by Final Victory on OST Front, to use the terminology of the day.

 

In the Ost front Model was a quite a hero. At one point he commanded two Army Groups even. Also von Manstein who slapped the Soviets on both cheeks a couple of times. The funniest commander must be Himmler who was in change of army Group Vistula and his adjutant did the work.

 

What are your thoughts here? 6th Army under Paulus did take part in the offensive phase of the 1942 campaign, but it was mainly an infantry force, and of course it got bogged down in the slugfest of Stalingrad. Are you thinking Rommel might have done better there? The one thing that occurs to me is that he might have been willing to disobey orders and break out before it was too late.

 

Paulus was a General on paper. Just like Rommel was made a leader of the ghost division from being Hitler's bodyguard leader, Paulus was not a leader. He planned attacks and played war games in the Hitler HQ. Von Reichenau, the original leader, was a go-getter and ardent nazi. He died during early 1942 due to heart attack and Hitler named Paulus to replace him. Reichenau would have made the difference. And Stalingrad was not the Russian main goal, it was the AGC where Zhukov was also present. Stalingrad was not Zhukov's Victory, he was not there.

 

Such were my thoughts exactly.

Willingness to disobey in a crisis might well have saved the Sixth Army.

Also, Rommel as an infantry specialist may well have bypassed taking Stalingrad by storm and simply cut it off from reinforcement with a river crossing either side of the city itself.

And would Rommel have made the mistake of commitment of armour into the Rattenkrieg that the Stalingrad fighting developed into?

I think not. Von Richenau might not have made the same error either.

Bypassing the city itself and linking up with the German force to the north that had taken Voronezh might well have busted the front wide open, allowing Von Weichs Armee Gruppe B to waltz into Baku and Astrakhan without much effort at all. From there, a solidified southern front would most likely have been achieved, with Soviet rail lines unable to deliver supplies and men southward from Moscow or the interior of the country.

Someone has already mentioned the silly deployment of Mansteins 11th Army to Leningrad, instead of assisting Operation Blue after Operation Bastard Hunt in the Crimea was brought to a successful conclusion.

All in all, it was a dispersion of fighting power that was made worse by Hitler's insistence that Stalingrad be taken block by block, pinning down the best elements in wasteful street fighting and moving the initiative to the flanks where the absence of quality units brought about a quick collapse and a Kessel fight with the trapped units unable to extract themselves due to pigheaded arrogance and farcical insistence on staying right where they were, sacrificing mobility at the precise point where it was needed the most.

Never forget that in addition to the losses of people, the entire fiasco cost enough equipment to furnish a quarter of the German army.

No wonder the Army refered to the entire episode as " VERDUN ON THE VOLGA"

And it wasn't any German officer that had done it either....

An Austrian politician had put them there

 

Adolf Hitler speaking at the Lowenbraukeller, 8 November, 1942

" So if Mr Stalin expected that we would attack in the centre, I did not want to attack in the center, not only because Stalin believed I would, but because I didn't care about it any longer.
But I want to come to the Volga, to a definite place, to a definite city. It accidentally bears the name of Stalin himself, but I do not think I went after it on that account."

"Now the others say: " Why are you fighting there?". Because I don't want to make a second Verdun but would rather do it with very small shock units. Time plays no part here."

Then they suddenly turn around and say; "It is absolutely a mistake for the Germans to have gone to Kirkenes, or to have gone to Narvik, or now perhaps Stalingrad....what do you expect to do in Stalingrad?
For Stalingrad is a capital mistake.
We will just wait and see whether it was a strategic mistake"


And Hitler speaking at the Burgerbraukeller on the same night of November 8 , 1942

"I wanted to come to the Volga at a specific location at a specific city. By chance it carries the name of Stalin himself. So don't think I marched there for that reason- it could have carried another name- but because there is a very important goal... this goal I wanted to take- and you know, we are very modest...we have it already.

There are only some very small places remaining. Now the others say "Why aren't they fighting faster?"- because I don't want to have a second Verdun there, I'd rather take it with small assault groups".

OPERATION HUBERTUS, the Sixth Army's last attempt to capture the last 10 percent of Stalingrad was already underway.

It failed.

11 days later the Soviets launched Operation URANUS and encircled the city.

 

Underestimaing the Red Army was Hitler's mistake. During summer 1942 the Soviets started retreating from German Army pincers, and Adolf thought the USSR had run out of reserves. " Der Russe ist tot".

 

v. Paulus was a sniveling moral and physical coward! Just after the Soviet pinchers close around Stalingrad there was an opportunity to break out to the west.

A little additional info here: Guderian and Paulus were friends and I believe Paulus worked on Guderian's staff. . Guderian thought that Paulus was a creative and talented staff officer but lacked the decisiveness needed in a good commander. Before taking command of 6th Armee, the largest formation Paulus had commanded was a battalion!

 

I remember reading that when the 6th Army had reached the Volga North of Stalingrad he was short of fuel and soldiers. At least he comments " to have one more fresh division and I would take Stalingrad". Who knows. However, Paulus was forced to stop and wait for fuel before advancing again.

 

Indeed.

A "thruster" like Rommel or Guderian would have forced marched them into the city, or scrounged fuel from other units, anything to achieve their stated objective.

I mean, wasn't Zietzler supposed to be the logistics "genius" that could make all things possible? Hitler appointed him to do exactly that, to make his ideas of manuever management a reality in a practical sense

 

Zeitzler btw recommended the 6th Army to break out from Stalingrad in November 1942 so Hitler did not like him for long...