Rommel's views on Italy defense

really interesting point here.....for another thread.....?

 

I didn't read what Rommel said, but like you have already said, Italy is a peninsula and so it was necessary deploy the troops also long all the coast. In fact the Monterosa Division (the mountain division of the National Republican Army) was deployed in defense of the LIguria (see the image below). But in my opinion could be also another reason about the Rommel's skepticism: Italy is the worst case scenario in order to put into practice the blitzkrieg, because there's only a large plain and it is locate in the nord-east. Almost all the rest of the italian ground is mountains and hills with a lot of rivers and maybe this scenario could had adversely affected Rommel, because he was a general of panzer division. Instead Kesselring, who was a general of the Luftwaffe with a past of artillery officer, would have understood better that the italian geography could have slow down the Allies troops and reduce the effectiveness of the Allies close air support. Give him more possibility to struck the enemy in a war of position, instead in a war of movement.
I repeat, these are only hypothesis because I didn't read what Rommel wrote about the defense of Italy.

 

very interesting opinion, of Rommel and Kesselring's background as generals! I like it and have to say, it should've/could've made a difference in their stategies.....great point....

 

Good comments, Lanciere, and welcome to the forum! Rommel had done considerable mountain fighting in WWI, but on the offensive and usually successful, so he may not have appreciated the value of mountainous terrain to a capable defender.

Although he was leading infantry, many of the ideas he employed were ones he put to use as an armored commander in WWII - probing for weak spots, concentration at the selected point, rapid exploitation of a breakthrough, relentless pursuit, etc.

 

I think instead my point was wrong, Rommel was a great general and so he had to understand how would been difficult for the Allies to liberate Italy; above all if he fought in the Alps during the First World War. So on second thought I think that the reasons of his skepticism could be different. Maybe he didn't repute Kesselring a great general (if I remember well there were some frictions between Rommel and Kesselring during the African Campaign) or Rommel was convinced that defend all the italian peninsula was useless, because all the industries was in the north.
I don't know. It difficult talk about something that I didn't still read.

 

There is at least one good thread on Rommel on this forum. My impression is that he was an aggressive ground commander. Perhaps overly so. That aggressiveness got him in trouble on occasion and he didn't pay enough attention to logistics at times. Kesselring was more cautious and perhaps more influence by the German high command. Hitler wasn't big on giving up anything and unless you were in a very favoreable position with him personally withdrawing even when warrented wasn't the safest thing to do.

 

By 1943 Rommel had established a reputation for aggressiveness. However, his actions after the fall of Tunisia do not support this view. Rommel was also a very political general in that he knew how to please Hitler, the source of his career successes.

His appointment to command an armoured division was the result of personal; favour. As a mountain warfare specialist he was an unlikely choice as commander 7th Panzer Division. . His actions in North Africa pleased the crowds more than delivered strategic advantage. Indeed his success in getting his pet project, the invasion of Egypt ahead of the capture of Malta may have doomed the Axis in North Africa. In late 1943, Rommel's argument for a forward defence of the channel coast he was saying what Hitler wanted to hear.

His attitude to Italy ought to be considered in this in mind. Kesselring was for defending South - so it Made sense for Rommel to champion an alterative strategy. There was a good chance Hitler would have agreed with him and Rommel would have been in pole position to command the defences of the Alps, terrain he knew well.

On balance Rommel was a very competent instinctive tactician but with a weak grasp of strategy, He was however brilliant sat promoting himself.

 

Sheldrake, Great point regarding Malta. Force K and the submarines were pivotal.

 

Yes, if I remember well, those are exactly the reason of the frictions between Rommel and Kesselring.

 

Strategy was not the business of Rommel,it was the business of the OKW/OKH;in Africa Rommel commanded only a strong (German) AC and stronger Italian units but his force was smaller than all German armies in the SU in 1941(12)

 

was Rome a factor?? I looked through the thread again and did not see it mentioned..Takao gave me an excellent link for the Rapido battle thread, and it tells of how Rome was a great psychological objective.....of course hilter-I never caps his name--never wanted to give up ground and was not Rome a great psychological objective he did not want to give up?? so he and Kesselring would want to defend south of it at all costs
where as Rommel did not think of the objectives psychologically, but tactically??

 

Rommel was an idiot to ask for troops straight from Hitler. Halder etc were furious, or just thought he was crazy. They even sent Paulus to inspect what was happening, not Kesselring. Rommel was upset about the Italian troops and made jokes about them, but under German officer they performed well, and especially the special troops made good work like at El Alamein, Monty was forced to turn north to break the front, and with the help of break-news of the seceret messages, he found out Rommel sent messages he could only hold on in Alamein for 48 hrs or less. Otherwise the Italian troops were under-armed, under-moralized and under-ruled. The officers had Mansions in Tunisia or Benghazi and did not come to the battle scene. Would you go to battle for that officer that sent orders from away?

 

Italian troops under German officers were a rarity below corps level (Italian divisions attached to German Korps or sometimes the reverse), language issues prevented that practice, "the Italians fought well under German leadership" is mostly a political ploy by Rommel to get the overall command. Rommel as a former Alpenkorps officer (he served there in WW1) was probably more familiar with mountain warfare than Kesselring.

The Germans defending further up in the peninsula would have reduced the need for coast defence forces but would also have uncovered the Balkans across the Adriatic and the Germans were sill getting oil from Ploetsi in 1943. Allied airbases further North would also have helped the bomber war as it would have put most of Southern Germany in range though logistics would still have hampered the 5th AF efforts, it was easier to send stuff to England than to Italy.

So strategically defending as far South as possible made sense, operationally any line short of the Alps was equally strong but a fallback across the Po valley was hard. Giving up the Po valley would probably make the Balkans untenable, and that could have huge strategic repercussions.

Operationally defending on like the historical Gustav line would require less troops, but not that many less troops, The alps were probably impassable, given the style of allied leadership, even at Cassino the allies only broke through because French colonial units, that were quite differently trained and led from the average allied unit, outflanked the German position, and Cassino is a hill not a mountain, the high firepower but tail heavy allied units are unlikely to do well above 3000 meters.

 

After the fall of Mussolini, Rommel advised a retreat to the (industrial) north,while Kesselring said that he could hold Rome .The events proved Kesselring to be right and Rommel to be wrong .Rommel (whose presence in Italy caused problems with Kesselring) was fired and,because he had nothing to do,was sent to Western Europe to inspect the Atlantikwall .

 

with Avalanche in September, fall and winter near, that would hamper movement, it seems like such an easy decision to fight in the easily defensible mountainous area with the rivers as a MLR below Rome........

it appears something was wrong with him, as LJAd points out he was wrong, and I added some ideas.....I think they are humans and humans make mistakes, miscalculate, prone to think emotionally, etc and he was defeated in NAfrica.....was he not feeling some dread about the war at this time?? I think so

 

I recall ,again from somewhere, reading that the Germans were planning to retreat north to have a better line of defence, but the invasion of Italian mainland made them change the plan. Sounds good that way because they did not have the forces to protect everything from Italy to Greek islands after Italy was not to be trusted, and also there was the aftermath of the Kursk. Interesting that Hitler was able to take LAH out of Kursk in the battle to Italy.

 

The SS Panzerkorps was never committed to the frontline in Italy but played a key role in assuring the disbandment of the Italian army. A big what if is what would have happened with more planning and risk taking on the allied side, in a couple if places like Sardinia and Corsica where the Germans were not strong enough to disarm local Italian forces they had to pull back. The Italians still had large numbers of troops in September 1943, even if just a small percentage could be persuaded to fight the Germans it could make life very difficult for them, what was completely lacking was leadership.
Rommel may have considered that scenario when counselling to pull back, in Rome the situation was touch and go for a while, and communication lines on the western side of the mountains went through Rome, if the Germans had failed to regain control there the situation for the troops facing the Salerno beachhead would have been desperate.

 

Back to the question about Rome. Wasn´t it that once Clark got hold of Rome it was just two days and the D-day arrived and the psychological effect in the papers was gone? It was not a story anymore. Clark got credit but lost most of it due to Overlord.

 

interesting point...yes Rome taken 4 June?......would not Rome's fall show a lot of Germans, if Rome fell, Berlin's time was coming?? yes all eyes went to DDay...and Clark forgotten....Rome forgotten.....

 

Clark was unlucky there, his greatest (only?) success came at the worst possible time from a propaganda perspective. He had as usual only himself to blame, maybe if he had not sacrificed the chance of cutting of the retreating Germans to get to Rome he would have gotten there a couple of weeks after D-Day and gotten a more lasting media attention.

The was lost for Germany with the US entry, and the writing was on the wall for all to see after Stalingrad, Tunis, and the failure of the Kursk and Salerno offensives, but the unconditional surrender declarations made sure the war would last until Berlin.