Rommel's views on Italy defense

I don't think you're right, because Rommel in his diary (or in the letters for his wife) used often words of praise for italian troops and I dont' think he would done that if he didn't thought really those things.
Actually the Rommel's opinions about Italy was very complex, because on one hand he saw how much badly Italy dealt with the war, but on the other hand he saw very well how much valiant were the italian troops. Also with the italian Generals his relationship was very complex: Rommel was very friendly and collaborative with the Generals who showed to be able leaders and who agreed with the Rommel's strategy. But he was also very hostile with the Generals who showed not to be able leaders or (to note the change of conjunction) who didn't agreed whit his strategy.

I report some extracts of his diary and his letter to his wife, because I think it is very explanatory about the Rommel's opinions of italian troops, high italian commands, Kesselring, Malta and his strategic vision of the Africa Campaign.

DIARY; FEBRUARY 16, 1941
Rommel wrote a long close examination about the lack ot italian preparation for the war, about how great part of the italian politician (also personality the King's Court) were secretly hostile to Hitler, the Germany and the war and about how great part of the population was antifascist. Then talking about his meeting with von Ribbentrop, he wrote:
«I have also insisted so that hasten the preparation of the attack to Malta, the possession of which is essential for the success of the operation in Libia. He said to me that he didn't think it is an important matter: the Supreme Command said him that it is enough neutralize the isle with the aviation.»

DIARY; MARCH 2, 1941
«The italians here in Africa are excellent comrade, good and valorous soldiers. If they would have our same vehicle and our same discipline, they might compete with our better troops. The episode of Giarabub reveals the italians' qualities of courage.
[…]
The anti-aircraft artillery is constituted of oldest 75 mm. Skoda of the War of 1914/'18; I have seen also antiquated bronze mortars, already of the austrian-hungarian army.
The planes are wear out and they aren't reciprocated; the italian pilots make miracles. […] The only alive thing is the valour and the courage of pilot; an aviators of us would refuse to take off with an aircraft tha here is called with reason coffin.»

DIARY; MARCH 14, 1941
«The italian rifles are called model '91, because they date back to 1891. The italians don't have sub-machine guns and their 6 tons tanks are ridiculous.»

DIARY; APRIL 3, 1941
«Since March 31 we attack with notable success. At Tripoli they have to notice that, also at Rome and probably even at Berlin. I dared move forward, in spite of the opposite directive, because the occasion was propitious. Later they will bear good fruit.»

DIARY; APRIL 29, 1941
«It is indispensable have complete air superiority. The German aviation is insufficient, not only in order to have the control of the central Mediterranean, but also for just the cooperation with Afrika Korps. […] It is indispensable that Kesselring put in revision his criteria of use of the air corps, for which it is indispensable (also vital) that I have autonomy about the use of the planes.
On other hand I am increasingly convinced that don't exist a real team spirit and cooperation between the German Air Corps of the Mediterranean and the Supreme Command of the Italian Navy and also the Supreme Command of the Italian Air Force.
[…]
The relationship with the italians are good. The italians are excellent, patient, tough, courageous, but badly commanded and worst armed. Anyway it is needed that the Supreme Command of the Italian Army give his contribution; expecially with the bersaglieri.
[…]
I have well-founded reason to think that in Italy it is an illusion suppose to maintain confidentially about the aims more confidential. […] It is due to the Machiavellian manoeuvre of the italian Admirals and of the Commanders of the escorts if the losses aren't bigger. In fact they refer to me the italian commanders to contravenes to their orders because they are sure to find on their route English planes and submarines.»
Rommel didn't know that Enigma was deciphered.

If you want later I will traslate some other parts of the Rommel's diary, because i think it is useful to understand the thinking of Rommel and his decisions.

 

the personal diaries are always very interesting, especially about how the court felt about Germany......thanks for these quotes....his feelings about the Itlaians' attitudes and their poor weapons would play a part in his strategical thinking, no?...

 

I don't think we can say still that. Reading his diary I think he understood very well that the germans wouldn't only have to fight against the Allies, but also against the population, who was tired of the war, who was never been really fascist and above all who has always been unfavourable with the alliance with Germany.

 

I didn't understand what you mean saying: «His feeling about the Italians' attitudes» because Rommel himself wrote that Italian soldiers could compete with our better troops, if they would have better officers, better equipment and better training.
Even Sir Compton McKenzie confirmed that impression in his report about the Battle of Keren: «[…] The unfortunate propaganda of war of that time promised to the Britannic press to depict the Italian like little soldiers of fortune. But if we exclude the German paratrooper division active in Italy and the Japaneses active in Birmania, no one enemy army with which the British and Indians troops had to clash, has been able to engage a battle more stubborn and effective of that od the Savoia battallions at Keren.»
I think for a German like Rommel the Italians were strange soldiers, because they need to be "triggered". In fact the Italians give the best of themselves when they are put in critical situations or they feel that they fight for a good reason. Instead the Italians saw the Germans after the September 8 like invaders. Invaders that they must to be fight with every means and in my opinion Rommel understood very well that. In fact he had to arrested 400,000 Italian soldiers who refused to fight with the Italian Social Republic and he has also to promulgate some special laws, which punished the Italian population who didn't support the Germans soldier. This for a "noble soldier" like Rommel was, was morally devastanting. Rommel was very proud of his soldier who fought against the British without hating the enemies (he called the Africa Campaign the "war without hate") and he was very scandalized when his men found written order for the British Commando, in where it was wrote that the Commando must cut the throath of all Italians and Germans that they would have found in order not to feed them. Rommel wrote: «This is something to let the world know. To think that we (especially the italians) treat the prisoners with kid gloves. The troops, also of the Africa Korps than the Italians division, have sometimes shared their canteens with the Australian and Southafricans prisioners.»
Here, maybe he wanted only leave in peace the Italians, but I don't think his skepticism was caused only by humanitarian thoughts. I think that for him it was better not wear out the German soldiers in a hopeless fight against the Allies who was coming from south and the italian soldier who had immediately created the Military Front Clandestine, in order to sabote the German troops in every possible way.

 

I was just thinking, if he thought the Italians were untrustworthy in many aspects, it would've been safer and easier to hold in the north...if you had a lot of operational anti German, Italian forces, and the civilians anti-German, he would not want to hold in the areas where many of these forces are

 

Rommel was always fighting to get control of additional assets, whether it's Kesselring's planes or Bastico's troops he was always claiming he would make better use of them than the current commanders. His "the Italians fight better under German command" was mostly part of that ploy, practically "mixed" small units would have insurmountable language issues.

You can as easily find in his writings instances where he blamed his failures on the Italians. He probably never questioned the personal courage of the soldiers, but about everything else he was often fairly critical. "if they had better equipment, better training and better officers" is pretty damning of a military organisation.

Generally his criticism of Italian equipment and leadership is fully justified. On Italian lack of support for the war I have more doubts, I have talked to a few Italian veterans, and none mentioned that, from what I know Fascism was pretty popular.

The quote on Malta is ironic and clearly shows Rommel's mindset, as long as the resources to invade the island came from somewhere else he was all for it, but when they started to compete with his needs he happily "killed" C3/Herkules in favour of "his" invasioin of Egypt.

It's true the Moschetto 91 was called that because of it's service date (1891), but Rommel was well aware most of his troops carried the K98k whose original design dates back to 1898 so there's not a lot of difference there. The real weakness of the Moschetto 91 was not it's service date, it was it's underpowered, compared to the other nations, 6.5mm cartridge. This was not so much an issue for the rifle, actually you could actually make a fairly decent assault rifle around that cartridge, as with the "rifle caliber" machine guns that compared poorly with their contemporaries.

Mention of 6 tonn tanks in 1941 is also strange, relatively few L6/40 were built and only a few sent to North Africa and I believe the first arrived pretty late, most went to the Balkans or the USSR, so they were fairly irrelevant for the NA theater. The problem with Italian armour was the M13 series, that, unfortunately for them, was the best they had. It compared poorly with it's weigh class equivalents, (M3 Stuart, T38, T26, early British cruisers) and was outclassed by anything heavier which means practically everything else.

 

My impression is (and I'm not sure how I got it so it may be totally off base) that while Fascism may have been popular in Italy in the 30's and early 40's the war was less so. If I'm wrong in this I'd appreciate a convincing argument otherwise.