Russian View of the Air War

Hello Erich,

Thank you for responding, now I get it.
Yes, you're right in your conclusions I think. Now you explained them to me I think our thoughts weren't too far away from each other to begin with. Btw the VVS victory -claims are notoriously misleading ( overclaiming ).
Thank you for your time and trouble!

 

This is true, and I think no one disputes that, but isn't also true the fact that the Luftwaffe used in 'Barbarossa' was the same one fatally bled over the skies of Great Britain?

I've read that the Luftwaffe took most casualties due to ground fire. It seems the Iváns didn't panicked with the Stukas' sirens, but rather shot at them… Though, I mean, who would have be afraid of a plane after Uncle Joe's purgues!

That's a good subject for discussion! I'm actually very curious about finding out of the reasons why German pilots shot so many planes in the east? Certainly lack of radios and appropriate tactics (as with tanks) must be important to that? But we must also be aware of men like Iván Kozhiédub and his 68 kills, or Lidia Lítviak and her 12 2/3s!

I mean… we can't be so comparative:

IF Erich Hartmann had 352 kills AND 'Johnie' Johnson had 38 kills THEN Erich Hartmann = good pilot AND 'Johnie' Johnson = bad pilot…

But I think it's a good idea to discuss the subject! Gentlemen?

 

Some of it has to do with the tour of duty. In the US you rotated out after a while. Don't know the exact time for each branch of service. Richard Bong did not want to leave but was ordered to. For Japan and Germany and perhaps Russia you were in for the duration, wheather killed, wounded, captured or combat fatigue. I am sure they got leave but then you returned to the front. The UK fighter pilots I am not sure about. The bombers did approx. 30 missions and if they survived they would sometimes do more. ie Guy Gibson. The Italians and French not sure. I think some Italians had high scores too but I don't have the names in front of me.
That only explains some of it, it does not explain all of it, as there were ALOT of very high scoring German fighter pilots compared to other armed forces. The Germans had higher standards for claiming their kills also.

 

I feel like I'm poised with a can-opener, ready to expose the worms....

Well, another assumption disappears. I'd assumed that Hartmann's list of victories would include numbers of inferior aircraft, maybe transport types, bombers....

Apparently not so ! His victory list for 1943 includes 5 x IL-2s, 7 x La-7s, 22 x Airacobras - and a staggering 81 x La-5s !

Now, by all accounts, the Lavochkin La-5 wasn't totally outclassed by the Bf109 - or was it ?

 

the comparison of training between the Luftwaffe and the Soviets needs to be compared but unfortunately there is nothing in print to indicate.

clearly the mode of tactics used by the Soviets was diferent than the Luftwaffe. soviet bombers would consistantly reamin in a tight packed formation without escort while the Bf 109's would plunk them, also noted that noe vasive action was carried out until all the Russian craft were shot down. this happened innumerable times during the war. And being that the Soviets learned early on that the Rata was a senseless peice of machinery during 41-43 the small little bugger was still used up until 1945.

 

Hello Erich,

The I-16 wasn't a senseless peace of machinery in my opinion ! It was obsolescent in 1941, but still could give a good account of itself ( Black Cross - Red Star ,vol 1 ). And yes they used it until 1945, as a trainer, unit-hack etc. As a first-line fighter it was fased out from spring 1942 onwards.
I agree with you that leadership ( both on the ground and in the air ) left much to be desired, was rigid, was unimaginative ! In these aspects of airwarfare the Luftwaffe remained superior throughout the war in my opinion.
That leaves us the training aspect; the I-16 was a good airplane, but it was difficult to handle,
meaning that to be competitive with it you had to be an accomplished pilot. It had a tendency to stall ( both in high- and low speed turns ) and a nasty habit of flipping into a spin without warning ( vibration ). On the other hand Soviet fighter pilots joked you could fly around a telephone pole with it.
In 1941, there was a big disadvantage for the Ishaks, they had become slow, meaning they had to fight it out, couldn't disengage at will. They had to stick it out, they couldn't B&Z like the Bf 109's because their climbing wasn't too good,they had to T&B.
Just one name: Boris Safonov ( a VVS legend )

 

After reading data on some (!) German high-scoring aces they did not start shooting enemy planes down like that immediately. It took 1-2 months to get the hang of it or more, after which it seems they could master the tactics to shoot down the enemy plane. Some of these pilots, like E HArtman, were rather poor examples to begin with really.

I do think the problem with the Russians was the short practice time they got for flying. Just like it was in 1944-45 for Germans themselves when new pilots were lost due to the short flying times. (Of course there were good Russian pilots as well.) Actually I´m wondering that due to the German losses rate during the last phase of war there are no higher scoring aces by the allied side.

 

Hello Kai-Petri,

I think the combat-tour system comes into plaý here for US-fighters-pilots. I'm not acquainted with the system the RAF used. As for the VVS fighter-pilots, they were in for the duration, but training level of the VVS remained poor( compared to western standards ) throughout the war and I don't think the VVS knew such a thing as operational flight-training.

 

Hello Jack!

I do believe the combat-tour system is one factor like you said.

The Russians also seemed to favor at least in the early phase of the Barbarossa the politics of "Take one with you" (with the one meaning = German soldier/pilot etc ) in their propaganda. This is rather uncommon thinking in the western military world, but for the Russian army tactics it somehow "fitted". In the long run Germans would not have soldiers to fight with according to this method. It would mean huge losses for the Red Army naturally but at the time it was total war.

I think there were even propaganda stories of pilots who had crashed against German planes and these were distributed among soldiers and thus they were encouraged to do the same.

 

Hello Kai-Petri,

You're absolutely correct, the 'Taran' ( the crashing of a russian fighter into a (flying) german aircraft, can be viewed in the context of 'take one with you'.Especially in the first year of the war, they happened often, and most pilots got decorated for it afterwards ( posthumously or not). And yes, these actions were heavily publicised for propaganda purposes. But on the other hand, they happened throughout the war, there were 570 registered cases ( reports ) of Tarans being made in the entire period 1941-1945, so they are not merely propaganda-heroics !
In the bomber- and fighter-bomber formations the so called 'Fire-Taran' was known, meaning the deliberate crashing of an aircraft on a tank- or troop column. Unfortunately I have no numbers on these.

 

I think that every army sees this tactic to a certain extent, though not every army publicizes it as a encouraged tactic. You can seldom know the mind of a soldier who decides that since their fate is sealed they might as well go out with a "bang", or "take as many with me as I can", since few live to relate their mindset. I have seen it in films and although I know they romanticize things there, it makes sense to a certain degree.

I am fighting my enemy. I believe I am going to die, despite my best efforts. I can crash into the ground and die alone or I can crash into something(troop formation, plane, train etc.) and do more damage and hopefully save some of the troops on my side.

I can also see the revenge motivation. You may have shot down my plane but now I am going to use it in one final act of desperate defiance to take you with me.

Most Western forces leave this kind of decision to the individual rather than encouraging this particular type of behavior like it is some kind of military strategy or tactic.

 

Back to the high-scoring Luftwafe aces and VVF 'cannon fodder'.....

Here are some of my thoughts ( ie very open to argument ! ) as I'm coming to the end of reading Lipfert's memoir of fighting with JG52.

From his descriptions ( which are post-Barbarossa ) I would think that Soviet training - with so many pilots being put into the sky - may have been lacking in terms of combat expertise.

Many of Lipfert's kills are flying at low altitude and seem to be lacking in observation : ie Lipfert swoops and destroys his target from close range, without having been seen. Sometimes he brings down three per day.

By contrast, when the VVF pilot is alert and a real fight ensues, Lipfert gives full credit for skill and tenacity - and the later Yaks and La's were obviously very competent designs when pitted against the Me109.

Another thought, with no basis in statistics - just looking through the photos in 'Black Cross/Red Star' and Held's 'German Fighter Units Over Russia', I am struck by the high number of pictures of highly-decorated, high-scoring aces where the caption ends by saying :

'Fell in the West...' or ' Fell defending the Reich..' or 'Killed during combat with Thunderbolts.....'

 

Hello Martin,

Your topics make my brain do some serious overtime !

Reading your post the following came to mind:
-High(-er) altitude operations by the VVS were almost absent ( to my knowledge ). The Luftwaffe was clearly superior on that level, as Erich clearly pointed out in an earlier posting.
-I think there is a danger in taking the fate of the Experten ( meaning the death of many of them on the 'Westfront") as a basis for comparison of the theaters of operations. In my opinion the lots of normal/average pilots tip/ don't tip that balance.
-When training, operational-/tactical control, çombat expertise are lacking (inadequate), you can have the best aircraft in the world with the bravest pilots in them, you will find yourself at a serious disadvantage.

So I'm not disagreeing with you ( necessarily), I think they are somewhat supplemental. I don't have an opinion as to which theater of operations was the hardest. I just think the way of fighting in the air on both fronts differed a lot.

 

As you say, JR, it's an interesting subject for thought. For sure, in Lipfert's case, he is attacking much more often than being attacked....

Also to consider is that the Luftwaffe placed great emphasis on individual scores, with high-scoring aces becoming - as we would say today - 'celebrities'.

 

How much did the Russians bomb German cities especially in 1944-45? I mean it might be just that the German pilots were sent to the western front to fight the bomber formations and that's why so many of the highly awarded German pilots got killed there. Just my guess.

 

I would like to add that good leadership would make some difference in the scores in the early part of the war. The Germans had good mid level officers and were orginized, while the Russians had suffered from the purges. You can't just give people a bunch of airplanes and say go fight. ( I am learning this lession from New Orleans. The leaders on all levels dropped the ball big time!)
That is a good research point KP. I know of no heavy bomber attacks made by the Russians. May have happened but nothing about it in English to my knowledge.

 

I did find this one small raid that was of limited scope.
http://zhukov.mitsi.com/sovietbombers.htm
More of a danger to the Soviet crews than to the Germans.

 

I wil go back to Kai's posting about German Luftw formation in 44-45.....

At the end of Janaury 45 3/4's of the Reich defence were sent to the Ost front for the final battles of Berlin

in fact it was almost JG 300, 301 and the Jet unit JG 7 that took the brunt of US, RAF day light attacks the last months and even faced the Soviets during March 45 till wars end.

yes there was bombing of the Ost Preussian cities and then the line ups of the big 152mm's guns to smash whatever was left although it left nice convenient rock/concrete barriers for defence for the Wehrmacht units

 

Hello Kai-Petri, TA152, Erich,

Point taken guys! I know for certain that in 1941( ! ) there was a 'strategic offensive' by the VVS, small scaled, app. 32 missions were flown on a few cities. This campaign had to be stopped for the losses and results were disastrous.
To my knowlegde there were no more strategic campaign attempts. Yes, there were missions, not many,also small scaled and merely for propaganda-use.

Question: but weren't german fighters supposed to relieve their ground troops from (ground-)attacking VVS aircraft( and fighters ), which, in my opinion, wasn't without risk also ? Meaning that just because there wasn't the 'pressure'of a strategic bombing campaign to fight against ( for Luftwaffe fighters ) there was not much happening.

Erich I'm hoping for your wisdom !

 

Hello Martin,

After reading your posting once more I noticed a remarkable point you made.You wrote; For sure, in Lipfert's case, he's attacking much more often than being attacked....

I think this is a crucial observation you made !

VVS-doctrine wasn't total airsuperiority.Fighter operations were aimed at letting bombers etc do their job as undisturbed as possible, locally.
So VVS-fighters weren't primarily to search and destroy german fighters wherever and whenever they could find them. So basically they had to sweep a portion of the front to let other formations do their job. Unfortunately, (close-)escort techniques weren't very developed either, which isn't strange in the context described above. So in a way you could say their tactical doctrine wasn't particularly offensive, but merely one of patrol, watch and safeguard.

It's not my opinion that they were very succesfull in and with this doctrine !