Ulrich. If the Salerno date does not suit, I am taking a group to Monte Cassino 14-17 Jun 13 to look at the four battles and how they were fought at Battalion, Brigade, Division, Corps and Army level. You are welcome to join that event if you wish. Regards Frank
Thanks Frank, i think one of the dates should fit for me. And to be true if i could i would take both!
Ulrich. You have the choice of a third date if you are not able to make the first two. I will be looking at the X (British) Corps attack over the Garigliano on 17 Jan 44 and then pushing up to Anzio after that. It is a group of 15 at the moment but I would be happy to fit one more in. That study runs from 22-25 Mar 13. You can link up with me through my website at www.cassinobattlefields.co.uk - cassinobattlefields - Home I look forward to hearing from you. Regards Frank
Ulrich. Have you given any more thought to joining my study to Cassino in Jun 13 or Salerno in Sep 13? Regards Frank
Hi Frank, yes i have but i have to wait for some decisions at my company. We have a a bigger motor show at Frankfurt nad it depends when our show cars will come to us and when i can start prepairing them. Regards, Ulrich
I'm not to familiar with the war in Italy, but wasn't part of the allied predicament at Salerno due to the slow plodding advance of Montgomery from the south? If he had been a bit faster, his corps would have been very near the beachhead the morning of the invasion?
Chaps. More than happy for you to join the trip to Salerno. Check out the details and how to get hold of me at www.cassinobattlefields.co.uk - cassinobattlefields - Home. At the moment, the group is six strong and I can cope with nine max - the largest hire vehicle takes nine. The programme is sorted and includes a detailed look at how the Commando Force, 46 British Infantry Division, 56 British Infantry Division, 36 US Infantry Division and 45 US Infantry Division got on. We will be looking at specific unit actions within those Divisions. The ground over which these formations operated is really impressive and some of the views are spectacular. As you would expect, the landings are full of controversies, mistakes and utter brilliance. I look forward to hearing from you. Regards FdeP
Syscom3. The speed of Montgomery's advance up from Calabria after Op BAYTOWN on 3 Sep 43 only marginally influenced the Salerno operation. Despite Alexander urging Montgomery to accelerate his push north, the terrain over which the British had to advance prevented him from getting to the new beachhead any quicker. The appalling road network, which the Germans had comprehensively destroyed as they had withdrawn, meant that Montgomery's troops had absolutely no room for operational manoeuvre. As a result, at each blown and defended bridg, they had to mount a deliberate operation to clear out the few Germans and then spend time erecting Bailey bridging before they could move on. The Bailey bridging was critical to ensuring that Montgomery could supply his forward troops. Alexander could urge as much as he liked, Montgomery could not have got there any faster. There has been a lot of hot air from military historians who believe that the British could have done more to reach Salerno and help out the Fifth Army landings. They often cite the example of a bunch of War Correspondents who managed to get through. A cursory examination of the ground between Calabria and Salerno will show that a modern, motorised force, if it is be properly supplied with water, rations, ammunition and fuel, could not have done anything else except take the approach that Montgomery adopted. It was slow and methodical but the ground dictated this approach. In effect, Montgomery got there as quick as he could. To have sent small groups of troops forward without proper resupply would have been madness - as Arnhem showed so well. The key period that Fifth Army was most at risk at Salerno was 13 Sep 43. At that time, even a Montgomery moving at breakneck speed could not reached the Salerno beachhead to influence the outcome. Fifth Army had to do that all by itself and it did so. Fifth Army's problem was that most mistakes in the first four days were entirely of their own making and for that Mark Clark, as the Army Commander, must be held responsible. Fortunately, Fifth Army was able to beat off the counter attacks from 16 Pz Div and elements of others and then go on the offensive themselves. Regards FdeP
Ulrich. How is your planning coming on for Cassino on 14-17 Jun 13 or Salerno on 26-30 Sep 13 - note Salerno has been extended by one day so that we can visit Pompeii? Regards FdeP
I've just found out, for sure, that my dad (No.4 Commando) volunteered and was attached to No.2 for the Sicily and Salerno Landings. He fought alongside the Duke of Wellington on the Pimple. I didn't think it was possible to be prouder of dad than I already was. Thank you - all who were there or thereabouts.