Sicily

If he had served there, it might have had some impact on his thinking. We are after all the sum of our expierence's , good and bad. Was he given direct orders to 'close the straits' at any cost?

 

Part of the problem too was the lack of experience in coordinating higher command. The British were right in that the allies were not ready for France, its just too bad that they kept arguing the point.

 

Good point Belasar.! Was he given orders to close the straits.? I don't know but is this the same admiral who fought Matapan,and ordered the navy to sink and destroy anything trying to escape or reinforce Tunis and Bizerte.?If he wasn't ordered to close those straits,both he and the U.S. C.O.to the north of sicily,(Hewitt)should have ,using their own initiative.Cheers,Lee.

 

Steve, Anything about Capo D' Orlando in your book? My Great Grandparents worked on a Villa there circa 1899.

 

rkline56,

No there is no mention about this beautiful city in Atkinson's book, but I did find a piece from the 443rd AAA Bn.

443rd AAA Bn - World War II - Drive to Messina

This is a place I wish I could visit. Looks like heaven on earth !!

 

I think the biggest problem with this stage of the Med Campaign was that Operation 'Huskey', whilst cleverly executed, was a strategic cul-de-sac.

Intelligence had given Sicily to the Allies, with some hard fighting. But, the second guessing essentially ended with the closure of the Sicilian Operation. It was plainly obvious from a strategic point of view exactly what was coming next. It is this factor that caused the evacuation of Sicily to be enacted. The best course to prevent this had already been chosen out by the very operation to liberate the island itself. Bypassing Sicily to land elsewhere, then mining the Straits, plus an umbrella of air cover, may well have trapped the Italo/German forces on the island for the duration of the campaign.

Sicily was a good choice, but it wasn't the only one. Sicily also had the largest and nastiest Axis forces defending it. It was a frontal assault, and it worked. But, it left the Germans with a clear picture of what was coming next. Sicily has been a stepping stone by military forces going both ways since the First Punic War.

By invading it, the Allies rendered German intelligence a gift, for it narrowed Allied choices for the next move....

And THAT was why the Axis evacuated. They had a clear picture of exactly where to send the survivors of 'Huskey'. That fact, and the appointment of "Smiling" Albert Kesselring, turned a promising campaign to open up Europe's 'soft underbelly' into a dead thrust for Rome, with Mark Clark desperately elbowing everyone aside to grab for glory.

 

I have posted elsewhere on Atkinson's book and am amazed readers find this an authentic reference to the invasion of Sicily and Italy. It seems to me this book misrepresents the American input and disregards that at the Canadians and British\Allied forces who just seem to have been there for the ride.

As a relative newcomer to this forum it is disappointing those with knowledge of this subject have not been able to raise acknowledgement of the 70th anniversary of Operation Husky on 10 July.

To make up for this omission it would be interesting to here from members willing to share any information of this Operation.

Regards Brian

 

You seem to mis-understand the focus of Atkinson's trilogy. The subject is the American Army in the MTO and
ETO. "Day of Battle" is not, therefore, the definitive history of Husky or the Battle for Italy but is nonetheless a solid
account of America's 7th and 5th Armies in the MTO.


Dave

 

• Bitter Victory: The Battle for Sicily, 1943, Dutton (New York, NY), 1988. ISBN 9780525244714

If you are looking for an excellent and well balanced book on this campaign, I think Carlo D'Este is the best and whilst he is an American writer, he does fall in to the trap of Atkinson (Ambrose is worse) in giving such a one sided account that you can't appreciate the totality of the campaign. But then again, he probably did not make as much money as the other two who I class as "popular" historians.

 

Like Brian, you seem unable to grasp that Atkinson is writing about the American Army experience in Sicily.


Dave

 

Stand by what I said - Of course I should have written CarloD'Est does NOT etc.

How can you present history of any Unit (or Army) without talking about the environment in which they are operating ie the Opposition and the other Units fighting alongside?

At least, Atkinson is not as bad as Ambrose - one of whose books goes through the whole of the DDay Campaign without mentioning Montgomery - amazing!

 

Kerrd

Having started to read this book its focus is not in question - it is the misrepresentation of history that annoys. If as you say this is about the American Army involvement this needs to be more clearly stated as from the publisher's outline of this trilogy that is far from clear. A couple of exerts as an example;

Outline of Part 1, An Army at Dawn provided by the publisher says "An Army at Dawn follows the British and American armies as they fight .........."
Outline of Part 2, The Day of Battle, provided by the publisher says, " this time following the strengthening Allied armies as they invade Sicily..."
Outline of Part 3, The Guns At Last Light provided by the publisher says ".. the brutal fight in Normandy, the liberation of Paris, the disaster that was Market Garden, the horrific Battle of the Bulge, and finally the thrust to the heart of the Third Reich......" (surely an Allied campaign?)

Brian

 

Scipio


Thank you for the advice I will take a look. I agree fully you cannot provide an accurate picture of history (or anything else) without having regard to the whole - in this case isolating the American Army involvement does not work.

Brian

 

The thing was just like in Normandy during planning session of HUSKY Allies thought too much about landing , defending and enlarging beachhead against Axis counter attacks and not enough about how to conclude it and prevent enemy evacuation. Initial plan for landings in Sicily was landing 8th Army to south close to Augusta like actually happened and landing 7th US Army to north shore of Sicily close to Palermo. From there Patton would be ideally suited to march on Messina capture the city and cut Axis communications between Sicily and Italy. But Montgomery objected this version. Concentration of main landing force and strong linked front was essential he thought. Two landings in widely different sectors (north and south shore) would divide Allied armies unnecessarily and would enable Axis counter attacks to roll them over one by one. (just like in Tunisia when Rommel stroke to 1st Army then turned and attack 8th Army from a central position-a basic Napoleonic strategy ) Every time different landing sites were picked by Allies Germans were quick to exploit gaps between landing beaches to strike them from their vulnerable flanks. ( It happened so in Salerno and Normandy ) Besides Allied planners still were not sure about quality of their forces especially in amphibious operations. (Remember this was the first large scale sea landing operation to an enemy held shore where resistance would be expected fierce and counter attacks would be sure to come ) 7th US Army would be especially vulnerable close to Italian mainland and out of Allied air cover if it landed to northern shore of Sicily. To play safe and a strongly linked beachead was decided. So due to Monty's insistance Alexander commander of 15th Army Group who did not trust to quality of US troops yet (they proved him wrong during the campaign even he admitted it ) due to Kasserine Pass debacle decided to change the plan and instead 7th US Army landed south on Gela to cover left flank of 8th Army. With that chance to capture Messina and sever links between Sicilty and Italy in short time was lost. Though considering of Hermann Goering Panzer Divisions counter attack in initial days and how it came close to success against 7th US Army I think it was a sound choice.

 

And Royal Navy intervention was impossible once Axis evacuation started. Messina main evacuation port was too close to mainland and any Allied vessel would be vulnerable against Axis air attacks. Besides Messina Straits were full of uncharted minefields and covered by naval battaries plus a huge AA gun concentration was placed on that narrow area. Cunningham knew better than risking his ships in these waters. Gallipoli and Crete Campaigns showed perils of operating navy close to shore out of air cover.