Soviet-Anglo/American Air War in the ruins of Europe

Well the thing that has always bothered me is the "Germany First" plan. Where the foremost effort, and resources would be allocated to the defeat of Germany while a sustainable defense was established in the Pacific until Germany could be defeated. Wouldn't that "foremost effort" carry through to the development and ultimate deployment of the atomic bomb?

There were 3 atomic weapons detonated between 16 July and 9 August, 1945. The first was a test and the other two were operational. That leads me to believe that there were either more than those three weapons or the ability to manufacture the bombs was such that they could be created and delivered in a very short time. 10 months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki there were 3 more bombs that were either available for testing or detonated in the "Crossroads" project.

I am thinking that the "Atomic Pipeline" was very streamlined.

Europe first - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
HyperWar: US Army in WWII: Washington Command Post: The Operations Division [Chapter 9]
1942-1950: Nuclear Testing Before Nevada

I think that the Chinese were already moving towards communism/marxism/stalinism and would have backed what ever move Russia would have made. I do not think Jiang or Mao either one would have welcomed another army trapsing through their country.

If you look at the way the Korean War escalated it seems that the seeds of allegiance had been sewn long before Chesty Pullar crossed the 38th paralell.

China After World War II by Frank Glass ("Li Fu-Jen")
Korean War - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I don't think China was on the fence as much as you, or others, might think.

Just my opinion though

 

Not at all. It's pretty clear when one looks at the logistics of the situation in particular the food supply that the looser would be most/all of continetal Europe. That leaves the US and Britain as the only real winners (possibly you could count in Spain and Portugal)

I have read that after Nagasaki the US had all the componets of another bomb they just hadn't assembled them. By January of 46 the US would have had 10-12 more bombs with the production rate increasing after that. Or maybe more if the war clouds were gathering as some of the Hanneford plants were taken off line right after the war ended.

The nationalist were fighting a communist insurgency that wasn't doing particularly well in 45 and 46. The US had been supplying aid for some time. I just can't see the nationalist aiding the Soviet Union now the Chinese Comunist (Mao and his people) may have but that might have increased the chance that the Chinese would side with the Western allies. Particularly if the US had already invaded Siberia and offered it up to the Chinese and the Soviet advance had been stopped in the West the odds of them jumping in on the side of the west becomes pretty good.

 

Leaving aside the issue of a ground war and just looking at an air campaign, the Soviets are hit. They are essentially doomed.

Logistically, they lose all replacement parts not already in their possession for lend-lease aircraft. Their best medium to high altitude fighter at this point is the Bell P-63A of which they possess relatively few. They have no operational jet and no strategic bomber force. They also lose all petroleum additives and their major source of aviation fuel, the US in such a war. They will be quickly (within weeks at most) forced to resort to using much lower octane gasolines than the 100 octane + avgas they were using. This will have a noticable effect on aircraft performance.

The Soviets have no useful nightfighter force whatsoever. Their air defense and early warning systems are extremely crude and riddled with holes. They are in 1945 worse off than Britain was in 1940 in this aspect. This means many Western strikes will go unintercepted and Soviet losses will increase. Nighttime strikes will go unopposed except by whatever random barrage AA fire the Soviets can throw up. Their few radar gunfire control systems for this purpose in 1945 are direct copies of the now obsolete British GL Mk II set of 1940 and easily jammed, especially considering Bomber Command is the world expert in jamming systems.
Their largest AA gun at this point is an 85mm. It is completely inadequite for handling high altitude bomber strikes by B-17, 24, 29s etc. Against the B-29 it is virtually worthless having a maximum altitude of just 34,000 feet. This would give it just a couple of minutes firing time at most with nearly zero slant range if it were perfectly positioned.
This means Soviet cities are completely vulnerable to strategic bombing and almost completely defenseless.
The Soviets, like the Germans, are heavily dependent on their rail system. The Western Nations would quickly and severely disrupt rail operations. Worse, the Soviet rail system is far less robust than the German one was so it will fail much more quickly.
Soviet air doctrine is also very inflexible. Their typical offensive tactical strike stacks several squadrons of bombers above a formation of attack aircraft (like the Pe 2 or Il 2m) which attack their targets in formation. Against the heavier and better controlled air defense systems Britain and the US possess the Soviets could expect alot more casualties among strike aircraft from AA fire.

With the loss of rail connection to Siberia and the loss of Sakalin Island oil (25% of the national total), the Soviets would also face a serious problem reinforcing and just containing Western forces that could invade from the Middle East (Iran), Asia, the Black Sea, Artic Ocean, and elsewhere.

 

If air superiority is at challenge here, I believe that no matter how brave and valiant the VVS was, it would be hard pressed to match the western allies in either bombers, ground attack, fighters, or recon. And since it is in 1945+ the atomics simply cannot be ignored. And since Stalin knew full well of our atomic project through the spies Hall, Nunn, Fuchs, and Greenglass he wouldn't have ignored their existence. The speed with which the MED project advanced to an air-dropped weapon was a surprise, and probably why he accelerated his own declaration of war and attack in the east by a couple of weeks.

I have been trying to locate all my old "files" on this stuff, just so you won't think I am blowing smoke up anybody's skirt, or making the "third un-named bomb" up out of whole cloth. This is pertinent because while the "plutonium core" of the next implosion type "Fat man" bomb was complete before Aug. 9th, 1945 it was sitting awaiting shipment at Los Alamos and could have been "air-shipped" in two separate four-engine transports just as "Fat Man's" core had been. The "Little Boy" core was also shipped in two sections, one (the"target") with the case aboard the "USS Indianapolis", and the other (the smaller "projectile") with the initiator were aboard an aircraft (C-54).

Since the Hanford Plant and Oak Ridge Plants were finally "hitting their stride" in late June of '45 (only slowed in production after Japan accepted the full "Potsdam declaration", unconditionally on Aug. 13-14th), the generally pessimistic General Groves had made a prediction of bomb production numbers mentioned in his "memo" to Marshall, and it may not have been too far out of the realm of reality. Here is an excerpt from that "memo" to Gen. Marshall two weeks before the Japanese accepted the Potsdam declaration:

Leslie R. Groves' Memo to the
Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall)
30 July 1945
MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

(a few paragraphs after Groves describes the successful Trinity test)

..." 3. There is a definite possibility, [sensitive information deleted] as we increase our rate of production at the Hanford Engineer Works, with the type of weapon tested that the blast will be smaller due to detonation in advance of the optimum time. But in any event, the explosion should be on the order of thousands of tons. The difficulty arises from an undesirable isotope which is created in greater quantity as the production rate increases.
4. The final components of the first gun type bomb have arrived at Tinian, those of the first implosion type should leave San Francisco by air-plane early on 30 July. I see no reason to change our previous readiness predictions on the first three bombs. In September, we should have three or four [more] bombs. One of these will be made from (U) 235 material and will have a smaller effectiveness, about two-thirds that of the test type, but by November, we should be able to bring this up to full power. There should be either four or five bombs in October, one of the lesser size. In November there should be at least five bombs [more], and the rate will rise to seven in December and increase decidedly in early 1946. By some time in November, we should have the effectiveness of the (U) 235 implosion type bomb equal to that of the tested plutonium implosion type.
5. By mid-October we could increase the number of bombs slightly by changing our design now to one using both materials in the same bomb. I have not made this change because of the ever present possibilities of difficulties in new designs. We could, if it were wise, change our plans and develop the combination bomb. But if this is to be done, it would entail an initial ten-day production setback which would be caught up in about a month's time; unless the decision to change were made before August 1st, in which case it would probably not entail any delay. From what I know of the world situation, it would seem wiser not to make this change until the effects of the present bomb are determined.

L. R. GROVES
Major General, U.S.A.

Source: Manhattan Engineer District -- Top Secret (de-classified), Manhattan Project File, Folder 4, Trinity Test, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Here is another "time-line" set (from Oppenheimer's memos), which in the most important dates agrees with everybody else's memories;

July 16: At 5:29:45 a.m. The "Gadget" is detonated in the first atomic explosion in history. The explosive yield is 20-22 kilotons (initially estimated at 18.9 kt), vaporizing the steel tower.
July 19: Oppenheimer suggest to Groves that the U-235 (target and projectile) from Little Boy be reworked into uranium/plutonium composite cores for making more implosion type bombs (4 implosion bombs could be made from Little Boy's core). Groves rejects the idea since it would delay combat use.
July 23: Secretary Stimson, in Potsdam, receives a new target list. In order of choice it is: Hiroshima, Kokura, and Niigata. He also receives an estimate of atomic bomb availability: The uranium gun-type "Little Boy" will be available for delivery on Aug. 1st. The second plutonium implosion-type "Fat Man" should be ready for use on Aug. 6th , and a third implosion-type would be ready between Aug.17/24th. Additionally, since the production plants were finally approaching reasonable efficiency, three more cores should be available in September. With more being produced each month, topping off, or reaching seven a month or more by December.
July 30; The nuclear components are inserted into "Little Boy" (sans initiator), bomb unit number L11.
July 31; The assembly of Little Boy is completed. It is ready for use the next day.
August 1; A typhoon approaching Japan prevents launching an attack with Little Boy. Several days are required for weather to clear.
August 2; "Fat Man" (implosion type) bomb cases F-31 and F-32 arrive on Tinian, and "Fat Man" assembly begins. Oppenheimer cables Groves with a shipping schedule, and Groves reports that the next plutonium core would be ready for shipment on August 12 or 13, with a bombing possible on August 17 or 18.
Aug.11; Oppenheimer believes that the third implosion case will arrive in the Pacific at this time (he missed by a day).
August 12; un-named (implosion type) bomb cases F-33 and F-34 arrive on Tinian, but the plutoium core itself is recalled from shipment and returned to Los Alomos, and not used until the Bikini Island "Operation Crossroads" test. This core and case is the "Able" bomb which is air dropped in '46.
Aug.14; a fourth implosion case is completed (but unshipped), and this unit becomes the underwater "Baker" bomb in the '46 Bikini "Crossroads" tests.

From another "timeline source":

May 10: 2nd Target Committee meeting priotizes targets as 1) Kyoto, 2) Hiroshima, 3) Yokohama, and 4) Kokura
May 30: Kyoto removed from target list by order of Henry Stimson, secretary of war
June 10: 509th Composite Group arrives on Tinian, the Marshall Islands, with 11 B-29s
July 16 (four hours after the Trinity explosion): Little Boy shipped aboard USS Indianapolis
July 23: second plutonium core completed (the core for for the third atomic device)
July 26: Indianapolis arrives at Tinian; most of Little Boy unloaded
Same day: uranium warhead for Little Boy (the Hiroshima bomb) sent to Tinian by C-54 transport plane.
Same day: plutonium core and initiator for Fat Man (the Nagasaki bomb) sent to Tinian by C-54
August 2: "case parts of 'Fat Man # 2' (un-named) arrive at Tinian"
August 11: Interruption of transport to Tinian of the next Plutonium core and initiator by the order of G.C. Marshall while at San Franciso. Two halves of core sent back to Los Alamos.

There are gaps here, but it seems pretty obvious that on August 11 the heavy stuff (the two half cases) for the third bomb (Fat Man #2) was already on Tinian, and assembled, and that it could have been married up with the its already existing plutonium core within a week or so.

General Marshall and General Grove delayed the transport of the third bomb core, sufficiently so that it could NOT have been deployed until August 20th/21st or thereabouts.

And a person has to remember this would be the fourth atomic device (counting the "Gadget" which was not a bomb per se), but actually only the third "bomb". The Mark 1 was the "gun-type" uranium bomb, the Mark 2 (proof of theory) was the HUGE "Gadget", and the Mark 3 was the air drop capable "implosion type" plutonium bomb, and the second Mark 3 cases were ON Tinian, assembled, awaiting the plutonium core when the war ended.

Additionally, in Al Christman's book, Target Hiroshima: Deak Parsons and the Creation of the Atomic Bomb(Naval Institute 1998), notes that the operational plan in February 1945; "...called for the military use in the summer [of 1945] of 'Little Boy' and one or two 'Fat Man' bombs, followed by more if necessary."

Later in that book, "...In July, following the Trinity test of the plutonium bomb, General Groves remarked: 'The war is over as soon as we drop two of these on Japan." The cruiser "Indianapolis" brought only a couple of pieces Little Boy to Tinian on July 26. On July 28 and 29, four 'Green Hornet' (C-54) transports flew in from the U.S. with the plutonium pieces for Fat Man and the uranium insert for Little Boy."

Elsewhere in the book, Christman includes that; "...Parsons had planned and organized the Tinian assembly facilities to handle a steady stream of bombs (even before "Little Boy" devastated Hiroshima). The plutonium production facilities at Hanford continued to work at full capacity ... everything needed for the second implosion bomb was present at Tinian, and essential core materials for a third implosion bomb would soon be on their way. When the B-29 stand-down went into place, Parsons was about to go home, but Groves stopped him '...in order to assure complete readiness to assemble and deliver additional atomic bombs in the event that negotiations with the Japanese broke down'."

In "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists", May-June 1998, Stanley Goldberg notes that; "... on the morning of August 10, 1945, Robert Bacher of the Environmental Physics Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory was supervising the loading of a plutonium core onto a truck. The core (presumably the casing and imploder "works" were already on Tinian or en route) was to be flown to San Francisco, thence to Tinian, to finish its journey over the city of Kokura on or about August 20. Robert Oppenheimer then appeared and told Balcher to stop loading the core. No further shipments were to be made."

Charles Sweeney published his memoirs as; War's End: An Eyewitness Account of America's Last Atomic Mission (Avon, 1997). During the party following the successful Hiroshima drop, he recalled that Paul Tibbets took him aside and told him that he was to command the second atomic mission (using Bock's Car), with Kokura as the primary and Nagasaki as the secondary target. Timing was important, Tibbets said: "It was vital that [the Japanese] believed we had an unlimited supply of atomic bombs and that we would continue to use them. Of course, the truth was that we only had one more bomb on Tinian (without the core, since that trans-shipment had been halted).

But if the Imperial Japanese had NOT accepted the "Potsdam declaration", and production slowed up, we could have had many, many more before the end of 1945. Thank the maker that after the Japanese scientists discovered the high radiation at both Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the 10th of August, they knew full well that not only were they "atomic" bombs (as advertised), but that America could produce them in more quantity than either their own or the Nazi scientists expected.

And even with the Hanover Plant being shut down in plutonium production after the surrender of the Japanese, when it was re-started under the Atomic Energy Commission instead of Manhattan Engineering Department auspices, it produced implosion and combination type implosion bombs at a prodigious rate. Between 1945 and 1949 there were 120 of the Mark 3 bombs were produced, before the Soviets even tested their first one.

We (America) had also produced a total of 5 HEU gun-type bombs, only one was used at Hiroshima. The other four were dismantled and their HEU uranium used in the combination style bombs after 1950. This was the Mark 4 which was a redesign of the Mark e"Fat Man" type. It was the first assembly-line produced nuclear bomb, and 550 of them were produced between 1949 and 1951. It could also be configured to for various yields - 1, 3.5, 8, 14, 21, 22, and 31 kilotons, and was the combination type referred to by Groves back in 1945.

If the Soviets had been foolish enough to try to "advance" toward the west militarially both the atomics and the allies jets would have come into play as well. America had 30 P-80s sitting in the Philippines at wars end, and those few in Europe were only sent as the war was winding down. We sent the bulk of the P-80 planes, ground crews, and spare parts to the PTO.

We (America) already had the B-29 "Silverplate" delivery systems, which could reach Moscow and other targets from a variety of bases flying at 32,000 feet. This was above the altitude which Soviet fighters were designed to reach, they could be altered to do so of course, but not before Moscow was a ruined city. This also ignores the B-36 which may not have been put on the back burner if the Soviets were "intransigent" as per the end of the war and their agreed to borders after 1945. In June 1943 General Hap Arnold placed an order for 100 examples of the B-36, with the first prototype to be ready for flight by September 1944. By mid-1944 the war was going quite well for the Allies, and the priority level of the XB-36 was reduced in light of the success of the B-29 in the Pacific Theater. Progress continued slowly, with the first XB-36 only being rolled out on September 8, 1945, and not achieving its first flight until August 8, 1946.

However, even the A model could (in theory) take off from a base in Maine, fly to Berlin and back without refueling carrying a single atomic bomb, at nearly 40,000 feet. The B model was even better, the first B-36B took off on its maiden flight on July 8, 1948, but would it have been that long in development if the Soviets were being a problem? The B models performance was even much better than expected. The B-36B could carry up to 86,000 pounds of bombs for short distances. An average cruising speed of 303 mph could be maintained. At its combat weight of 227,000 pounds, the B-36B had a top speed of 381 mph and a service ceiling of 42,500 feet. Ironically (as a test), on December 7-8, 1948, a 7th BG B-36B flew a 35 1/2 hour round-trip simulated bombing mission from Carswell TX., to Hawaii. It was undetected by the more modern Hawaiian radar systems, and the aircraft's 10,000 pound dummy bomb load was dumped in the ocean a short distance from Hawaii. The total distance flown exceeded 8000 miles.


Much of the data is from Joe Baugher’s excellent site on the B-36:

Convair B-36 Peacemaker

 

If air superiority is at challenge here, I believe that no matter how brave and valiant the VVS was, it would be hard pressed to match the western allies in either bombers, ground attack, fighters, or recon. And since it is in 1945+ the atomics simply cannot be ignored. And since Stalin knew full well of our atomic project through the spies Hall, Nunn, Fuchs, and Greenglass he wouldn't have ignored their existence. The speed with which the MED project advanced to an air-dropped weapon was a surprise, and probably why he accelerated his own declaration of war and attack in the east by a couple of weeks.

I have been trying to locate all my old "files" on this stuff, just so you won't think I am blowing smoke up anybody's skirt, or making the "third un-named bomb" up out of whole cloth. This is pertinent because while the "plutonium core" of the next implosion type "Fat man" bomb was complete before Aug. 9th, 1945 it was sitting awaiting shipment at Los Alamos and could have been "air-shipped" in two separate four-engine transports just as "Fat Man's" core had been. The "Little Boy" core was also shipped in two sections, one (the"target") with the case aboard the "USS Indianapolis", and the other (the smaller "projectile") with the initiator were aboard an aircraft (C-54).

Since the Hanford Plant and Oak Ridge Plants were finally "hitting their stride" in late June of '45 (only slowed in production after Japan accepted the full "Potsdam declaration", unconditionally on Aug. 13-14th), the generally pessimistic General Groves had made a prediction of bomb production numbers mentioned in his "memo" to Marshall, and it may not have been too far out of the realm of reality. Here is an excerpt from that "memo" to Gen. Marshall two weeks before the Japanese accepted the Potsdam declaration:

Leslie R. Groves' Memo to the
Chief of Staff (George C. Marshall)
30 July 1945
MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF

(a few paragraphs after Groves describes the successful Trinity test)

..." 3. There is a definite possibility, [sensitive information deleted] as we increase our rate of production at the Hanford Engineer Works, with the type of weapon tested that the blast will be smaller due to detonation in advance of the optimum time. But in any event, the explosion should be on the order of thousands of tons. The difficulty arises from an undesirable isotope which is created in greater quantity as the production rate increases.
4. The final components of the first gun type bomb have arrived at Tinian, those of the first implosion type should leave San Francisco by air-plane early on 30 July. I see no reason to change our previous readiness predictions on the first three bombs. In September, we should have three or four [more] bombs. One of these will be made from (U) 235 material and will have a smaller effectiveness, about two-thirds that of the test type, but by November, we should be able to bring this up to full power. There should be either four or five bombs in October, one of the lesser size. In November there should be at least five bombs [more], and the rate will rise to seven in December and increase decidedly in early 1946. By some time in November, we should have the effectiveness of the (U) 235 implosion type bomb equal to that of the tested plutonium implosion type.
5. By mid-October we could increase the number of bombs slightly by changing our design now to one using both materials in the same bomb. I have not made this change because of the ever present possibilities of difficulties in new designs. We could, if it were wise, change our plans and develop the combination bomb. But if this is to be done, it would entail an initial ten-day production setback which would be caught up in about a month's time; unless the decision to change were made before August 1st, in which case it would probably not entail any delay. From what I know of the world situation, it would seem wiser not to make this change until the effects of the present bomb are determined.

L. R. GROVES
Major General, U.S.A.

Source: Manhattan Engineer District -- Top Secret (de-classified), Manhattan Project File, Folder 4, Trinity Test, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Here is another "time-line" set (from Oppenheimer's memos), which in the most important dates agrees with everybody else's memories;

July 16: At 5:29:45 a.m. The "Gadget" is detonated in the first atomic explosion in history. The explosive yield is 20-22 kilotons (initially estimated at 18.9 kt), vaporizing the steel tower.
July 19: Oppenheimer suggest to Groves that the U-235 (target and projectile) from Little Boy be reworked into uranium/plutonium composite cores for making more implosion type bombs (4 implosion bombs could be made from Little Boy's core). Groves rejects the idea since it would delay combat use.
July 23: Secretary Stimson, in Potsdam, receives a new target list. In order of choice it is: Hiroshima, Kokura, and Niigata. He also receives an estimate of atomic bomb availability: The uranium gun-type "Little Boy" will be available for delivery on Aug. 1st. The second plutonium implosion-type "Fat Man" should be ready for use on Aug. 6th , and a third implosion-type would be ready between Aug.17/24th. Additionally, since the production plants were finally approaching reasonable efficiency, three more cores should be available in September. With more being produced each month, topping off, or reaching seven a month or more by December.
July 30; The nuclear components are inserted into "Little Boy" (sans initiator), bomb unit number L11.
July 31; The assembly of Little Boy is completed. It is ready for use the next day.
August 1; A typhoon approaching Japan prevents launching an attack with Little Boy. Several days are required for weather to clear.
August 2; "Fat Man" (implosion type) bomb cases F-31 and F-32 arrive on Tinian, and "Fat Man" assembly begins. Oppenheimer cables Groves with a shipping schedule, and Groves reports that the next plutonium core would be ready for shipment on August 12 or 13, with a bombing possible on August 17 or 18.
Aug.11; Oppenheimer believes that the third implosion case will arrive in the Pacific at this time (he missed by a day).
August 12; un-named (implosion type) bomb cases F-33 and F-34 arrive on Tinian, but the plutoium core itself is recalled from shipment and returned to Los Alomos, and not used until the Bikini Island "Operation Crossroads" test. This core and case is the "Able" bomb which is air dropped in '46.
Aug.14; a fourth implosion case is completed (but unshipped), and this unit becomes the underwater "Baker" bomb in the '46 Bikini "Crossroads" tests.

From another "timeline source":

May 10: 2nd Target Committee meeting priotizes targets as 1) Kyoto, 2) Hiroshima, 3) Yokohama, and 4) Kokura
May 30: Kyoto removed from target list by order of Henry Stimson, secretary of war
June 10: 509th Composite Group arrives on Tinian, the Marshall Islands, with 11 B-29s
July 16 (four hours after the Trinity explosion): Little Boy shipped aboard USS Indianapolis
July 23: second plutonium core completed (the core for for the third atomic device)
July 26: Indianapolis arrives at Tinian; most of Little Boy unloaded
Same day: uranium warhead for Little Boy (the Hiroshima bomb) sent to Tinian by C-54 transport plane.
Same day: plutonium core and initiator for Fat Man (the Nagasaki bomb) sent to Tinian by C-54
August 2: "case parts of 'Fat Man # 2' (un-named) arrive at Tinian"
August 11: Interruption of transport to Tinian of the next Plutonium core and initiator by the order of G.C. Marshall while at San Franciso. Two halves of core sent back to Los Alamos.

There are gaps here, but it seems pretty obvious that on August 11 the heavy stuff (the two half cases) for the third bomb (Fat Man #2) was already on Tinian, and assembled, and that it could have been married up with the its already existing plutonium core within a week or so.

General Marshall and General Grove delayed the transport of the third bomb core, sufficiently so that it could NOT have been deployed until August 20th/21st or thereabouts.

And a person has to remember this would be the fourth atomic device (counting the "Gadget" which was not a bomb per se), but actually only the third "bomb". The Mark 1 was the "gun-type" uranium bomb, the Mark 2 (proof of theory) was the HUGE "Gadget", and the Mark 3 was the air drop capable "implosion type" plutonium bomb, and the second Mark 3 cases were ON Tinian, assembled, awaiting the plutonium core when the war ended.

Additionally, in Al Christman's book, Target Hiroshima: Deak Parsons and the Creation of the Atomic Bomb(Naval Institute 1998), notes that the operational plan in February 1945; "...called for the military use in the summer [of 1945] of 'Little Boy' and one or two 'Fat Man' bombs, followed by more if necessary."

Later in that book, "...In July, following the Trinity test of the plutonium bomb, General Groves remarked: 'The war is over as soon as we drop two of these on Japan." The cruiser "Indianapolis" brought only a couple of pieces Little Boy to Tinian on July 26. On July 28 and 29, four 'Green Hornet' (C-54) transports flew in from the U.S. with the plutonium pieces for Fat Man and the uranium insert for Little Boy."

Elsewhere in the book, Christman includes that; "...Parsons had planned and organized the Tinian assembly facilities to handle a steady stream of bombs (even before "Little Boy" devastated Hiroshima). The plutonium production facilities at Hanford continued to work at full capacity ... everything needed for the second implosion bomb was present at Tinian, and essential core materials for a third implosion bomb would soon be on their way. When the B-29 stand-down went into place, Parsons was about to go home, but Groves stopped him '...in order to assure complete readiness to assemble and deliver additional atomic bombs in the event that negotiations with the Japanese broke down'."

In "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists", May-June 1998, Stanley Goldberg notes that; "... on the morning of August 10, 1945, Robert Bacher of the Environmental Physics Division of Los Alamos National Laboratory was supervising the loading of a plutonium core onto a truck. The core (presumably the casing and imploder "works" were already on Tinian or en route) was to be flown to San Francisco, thence to Tinian, to finish its journey over the city of Kokura on or about August 20. Robert Oppenheimer then appeared and told Balcher to stop loading the core. No further shipments were to be made."

Charles Sweeney published his memoirs as; War's End: An Eyewitness Account of America's Last Atomic Mission (Avon, 1997). During the party following the successful Hiroshima drop, he recalled that Paul Tibbets took him aside and told him that he was to command the second atomic mission (using Bock's Car), with Kokura as the primary and Nagasaki as the secondary target. Timing was important, Tibbets said: "It was vital that [the Japanese] believed we had an unlimited supply of atomic bombs and that we would continue to use them. Of course, the truth was that we only had one more completed bomb case on Tinian (without the core, since that trans-shipment had been halted).

But if the Imperial Japanese had NOT accepted the "Potsdam declaration", and production slowed up, we could have had many, many more before the end of 1945. Thank the maker that after the Japanese scientists discovered the high radiation at both Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the 10th of August, they knew full well that not only were they "atomic" bombs (as advertised), but that America could produce them in more quantity than either their own or the Nazi scientists expected.

And even with the Hanover Plant being shut down in plutonium production after the surrender of the Japanese, when it was re-started under the Atomic Energy Commission instead of Manhattan Engineering Department auspices, it produced implosion and combination type implosion bombs at a prodigious rate. Between 1945 and 1949 there were 120 of the Mark 3 bombs were produced, before the Soviets even tested their first one.

We (America) had also produced a total of 5 HEU gun-type bombs, only one was used at Hiroshima. The other four were dismantled and their HEU uranium used in the combination style bombs after 1950. This was the Mark 4 which was a redesign of the Mark 3 "Fat Man" type. That version was the first assembly-line produced nuclear bomb, and 550 of them were produced between 1948 and 1951. It could also be configured to for various yields - 1, 3.5, 8, 14, 21, 22, and 31 kilotons, and was the combination type referred to by Groves back in 1945.

If the Soviets had been foolish enough to try to "advance" toward the west militarially both the atomics and the existing allies jets would have come into play as well. America had 30 P-80s sitting in the Philippines at wars end, and those few in Europe were only sent as the war was winding down for evaluation. We sent the bulk of the P-80 planes, ground crews, and spare parts to the PTO, since that part of WW2 wasn't yet finished.

We (America) already had the B-29 "Silverplate" delivery systems, which could reach Moscow and other targets from a variety of bases flying at 32,000 feet. This was above the altitude which Soviet fighters were designed to reach, they could be altered to do so of course, but not before Moscow was a ruined city. This also ignores the B-36 which may not have been put on the back burner if the Soviets were "intransigent" as per the end of the war and their agreed to borders after 1945.

In June 1943 General "Hap" Arnold placed an order for 100 examples of the B-36, with the first prototype to be ready for flight by September 1944. By mid-1944 however the war was going quite well for the Allies, and the priority level of the XB-36 was reduced in light of the success of the B-29 in the Pacific Theater. Progress continued almost at a glacial rate, with the first XB-36 only being rolled out on September 8, 1945, and not achieving its first flight until August 8, 1946. But that may not have been the case if the Soviets advanced beyond their agreed to borders.

However, even the B-36A model could (in theory) take off from a base in Maine, fly to Berlin and back without refueling carrying a single atomic bomb, at nearly 40,000 feet. The B model was even better, the first B-36B took off on its maiden flight on July 8, 1948, but would it have been that long in development if the Soviets were being a problem? The B models performance was even much better than expected. The B-36B could carry up to 86,000 pounds of bombs for short distances. An average cruising speed of 303 mph could be maintained. At its combat weight of 227,000 pounds, the B-36B had a top speed of 381 mph and a service ceiling of 42,500 feet. Ironically (as a test), on December 7-8, 1948, a 7th BG B-36B flew a 35 1/2 hour round-trip simulated bombing mission from Carswell TX., to Hawaii. It was undetected by the more modern Hawaiian radar systems, and the aircraft's 10,000 pound dummy bomb load was dumped in the ocean a short distance from Hawaii. The total distance flown exceeded 8000 miles.


Much of the data is from Joe Baugher’s excellent site on the B-36:

Convair B-36 Peacemaker

 

Yes, I think it is safe to say that the USAF would have a significant advantage in the air.

 

The food supply was worse in 42' then it was in 46'

Respectfully, one could say the same exact thing about the U.S.'s ability to remain in any conflict upon taking too many casualties...

Roosevelt would have a far more difficult time keeping a population happy and in control during a conflict thousands of miles away in a democracy then in Stalin would in Russia.

History has proved this to be the case.

All the best

 

Sure... you're just saying that because of where you are from...

 

Just an aside for the B-36, one of these planes was used in the ANP (Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion). Yup a plane that flys off a nuclear reactor. Imagine if one of those crashed.

 

zing!.................and there you have the sumation of the Cold War

 

Don't forget those Luftwaffe aces and Wehrmacht tank aces. The Allies would use them and the war would be over in no time LOL.

 

I remember reading a tidbit of SS General Meyer as a POW. He formulated a plan to his captors and wanted them to give him the permission to fight the Reds with a reorganized and retrained German division composed out of POWs under his leadership...

 

It's not 46 that's so critical it's 45. As far as the Soviets go my understanding is that one reason they demobilized so quickly was to use the troops to help harvest (and plant?) and move the the food available for harvest in that year as well as reduce the load on the transportation system. With the need to maintain troops in the field and without their labor in the fields at least according to some sources there would have been a famine in much of the Soviet Union. If they go to war vs the West they they are also looking at significantly more losses to transportation infrastructure which will take them quite a while to replace. Now much of western Europe isn't in any better circumstances as famine there was averted because the US and Britain could use the log system they had built up to distribute food from the Americas to Europe. In this scenario much less is going to be available.

One could but one would not necessarily be right. It would depend a lot on how the war started. If the West was the aggressor then it would take a pretty good salesman or something that really aggravated US and British citizens to get much backing. If the Soviets could reasonably be portrayed as the aggressor then I don't see any problems for a couple of years and that should be enough.

I'm not at all sure this would be the case. Especially once the western forces started advancing. They wouldn't be making the same mistakes that the Germans did after all.

 

My gut feeling is that this wouldn't be done and wouldn't be worthwhile but is certainly an area that could be debated. They'd probably be of more use as advisers/intel sources than in actual combat formations and then probably mid level officers would be of the most use.

 

Yeah that was the project that was cancelled in 1957 after a few years of testing to find out what kind of radiation problems would be involved for the crew and all the ground support personell. Really a wacky idea, but what the world didn't know about nuclear power in the fifties was staggering. Here is a pretty decent run-down on the NB-36 from the Joe Baugher site:

Convair NB-36H

 

LOL I agree. Too bad sarcasm doesn't go over well on the internet LOL.

 

Well I got some of it but on the other hand it's been raised a serious option so many times I thought I might as well deal with it. I personally don't see what would motivate a landser to return to the eastern front in this situation. Now if offered a training bilit in the US especially if any of his family can come along and he probably won't even need a plane to get there.

 

I figured I would mention it before some of our more pro-German members got around to it LOL.

 

Well, one thing is for certain, the Western nations wouldn't bother using ex-Luftwaffe aircraft. ..... Now the Russians..... could be they might start using some of these because they don't have anything better themselves.... Nightfighters, jets, high altitude fighters, to name a few.