Welcome to the WWII Forums! Log in or Sign up to interact with the community.

SS PANZER: PROKHOROVKA, 12 JULY 1943

Discussion in 'Eastern Europe February 1943 to End of War' started by Cate Blanchett, Apr 3, 2008.

  1. Cate Blanchett

    Cate Blanchett recruit

    Joined:
    Nov 29, 2009
    Messages:
    172
    Likes Received:
    4
    Good Evening and welcome to all.....:)

    Tonight, we look at the largest tank engagement of all time, the Battle of Prokhorovka, south-east of Kursk in central Russia, 1943.

    This article was a ground breaker for the originality of it's research, and the conclusions of the authors are astounding for 'freshness'. This engagement was poorly understood even by it's participants. The light that Stephen Rothwell sheds on this "mother of all tank battles" surprised the wargamer community, brought up as they were on the many myths that have gone round ad nauseum since 1943.

    So, sit back, and enjoy this piece....

    BLOODBATH AT KURSK:.......BY STEPHEN K. ROTHWELL.....(with contributions from JOHN DESCH AND TIMOTHY KUTTA)....additions to the original text in blue and white by B5N2Kate.


    "I dreamed after the war, not once but 100 times, that I was again and again on the battlefield at Prokhorovka. But I was alone and I had to get home from Prokhorovka across 1,500 kilometers of enemy territory. I was constantly thinking "How can I do it?" In my dream there were always burning tanks. It was always the same picture- this landscape rising up to a tank trap, a few tanks on fire, but I was alone, wondering how I could get home through the forests, how I could hide."
    ...................................................William Roes, SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Division.

    William Roes, at the time an 18 year old tank radio operator, has for over five decades been tormented by the memories of one of the largest tank battles the world has ever seen.

    It took place near a Russian town called PROKHOROVKA, on the southern flank of the two pronged German offensive intended to eliminate the Kursk salient. On that flank the deepest penetration of Soviet defences had been achieved by the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and on the morning of 12 July 1943, three SS panzergrenadier divisions (armoured infantry) were preparing for a final attack to capture Prokhorovka. Success, they believed, would see them through the last of the Soviet defences; the route would then be open to Kursk and victory.
    The Soviets, determined to prevent that happening at any cost, had taken 5th Guards Tank Army out of reserve, and on that same morning this mass of nearly 800 tanks was also poised around Prokhorovka. The 5th Guards Tank Army's mission was clear cut; in concert with the other armies of the Voronezh Front it was to assault the head of the German penetration and destroy 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
    The Soviets attacked first. Throughout the long, overcast summer day two huge groups of tanks, guns and infantry collided repeatedly and head on. Both sides inflicted terrible losses.

    The day became known in the Red Army as the "PROHOROVKSKOE POBOISCHE"....


    Or...the "PROKHOROVKA SLAUGHTER."

    This is the story of that day.


    BACKGROUND
    When Field Marshal Erich von Manstien's "Backhand Blow" counter offensive petered out in the mud of the Russian spring thaw, a huge salient was left projecting into the German lines, centered on the strategic rail nexus of Kursk. There, Hitler saw an opportunity to destroy a large portion of the Red Army and, at the very least, to remove the Soviet's ability to conduct large offensive operations for a long time to come.
    The oft-delayed German operation to destroy the Kursk salient, codenamed ZITADELLE (Citadel) began in the early hours of 5th July 1943. They launched a classic pincer assault, each arm aimed at one of the shoulders of the bulge. Army Group Center attacked from the north, while the other arm, consisting of 4th Panzer Army (Herman Hoth),and Army Detachment Kempf (Walter Kempf) of Army Group South, pushed from the south. It was planned that both arms would meet on the high ground, east of Kursk.
    By the time the drive started, the Germans had thrown away any vestige of either operational or tactical surprise....
    "Ost-Front" had a new Army commander since the Stalingrad debacle, KURT ZEITZLER. He had been appointed as a logistical specialist, and Hitler saw in him the ability to "move my armies where I wanted them to go". Zeitzler's conception and plan for the salient had been forwarded to Hitler as early as May 3rd, 1943. Critics of Zitadelle included von Manstein, who argued that the plan might have worked in April, when Hitler had first signed the operational order, but now he felt "success was doubtful". Field Marshal Walter Model (Ninth Army Commander) was another critic, claiming that the plan was "painfully obvious". Von Kluge curried favour by suggesting that the plan be implemented "without further delay". A known fence sitter, von Kluge simply wished to be blameless if the operation failed. The Inspector General of the Kraftfahrtruppen Heinz Guderian was scathing, and called the idea "pointless", argueing further that the recent re-equipping of the panzer forces with Panther's and Elephants made them in no way ready for a major assault at this stage.
    When "Der Chef's" lackey, Wlihelm Keitel, argued FOR the attack on "political grounds", Guderian tartly shot back at him "How many people do you think even know where Kursk is?".
    Hitler was apprehensive as well, and admitted as much to Guderian, saying,
    "Every time I think of this attack, my stomach turns over."

    48th Panzer Corps Chief of Staff, Maj.Gen Freiderich W. von Menllenthin,
    "The Russians were aware of what was coming and had converted the Kursk front into another Verdun. The German Army threw away all it's advantages of mobile tactics, and met the Russians on a ground of their own choosing. Instead of seeking to create conditions in which maneuver would be possible....the German Supreme command could think of nothing better than to fling our magnificent panzer divisions against Kursk, which had become the strongest fortress in the world."

    Historian Charles Winchester puts it into perspective, stating...
    "The idea that an offensive involving millions of men fighting across a battlefield half the size of England could be determined by a few hundred new tanks shows touching faith in technology."

    The build-up of German forces to in this post-Stalingrad period also saw German morale recover. Alfred Novotny, a fusilier of the elite Grossdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division summed it up,
    "We were totally convinced as soldiers that Kursk would turn the war around again, in favour of Germany. We, the Fusiliers and Grenadiers, would do it!"

    The Soviets had several months to dig in. Indeed, so confident had the Soviet High Command become in their growing abilities they planned not only to defeat the German offensive but, after grinding down the Nazi's mobile forces, to also launch a series of counter-offensives. They would first stretch the Germans to breaking point and then destroy their forces to the north, around Orel, and to the south, around Kharkov.
    Toward that end, the Soviets made ready a defense that would prove both stable and dynamic. Deep belts of entrenchments and minefields, supported by masses of artillery, mortars and anti-tank guns.
    This style of defense was Marshal Georgi Zukhov's speciality, and the material build up into the salient tied down half-a-million railcars, shuffling division after division into the region. 300,000 civilians, mostly women and old men, helped dig trenches and build fortifications. The southern shoulder of the position consisted of 2,600 miles of trenches, with the defences of the entire salient arranged in three broad lines for 6,000 miles of field defenses in total. Mines were laid to densities of 5,000/mile of front, and were to channel the attackers into "pakfront" crossfire. The match-up of forces for Operation Zitadelle were as follows....

    .........................MEN................ARTILLERY........TANKS/ SP GUNS..........AIRCRAFT
    SOVIET.........1,337,000...............20,220..................3,306.....................2,650
    GERMAN..........900,000..............10,000...................2,700.....................2,500

    Marshal Zukhov and his deputy, Andrei M. Vasilevsky, planned to absorb the force of German attacks and, once the enemy had been stopped, to hold the enemy where they could be hammered by reserves of tanks and mobile AT-guns kept nearby until that moment. Farther east were elements of the strategic reserve, ready to reinforce the defences within the salient in the event of German success, but their main mission was to deliver the decisive counterstrike when the time came.
    Commanded by Lt.Gen Pavel Rotmistrov, 5th Guards Tank Army was one of the powerful formations assigned to the strategic reserve. Before the start of Zitadelle, the army was part of the reserve Steppe Front (Konev), located some 170-200km east of Belgorod. On 5 July the army was ordered to full combat readiness; on the morning of the 8th, having just taken the 18th Tank Corps under command, it moved to the west bank of the Oskol river. There, Rotmistrov was ordered to prepare for operations to the south of the salient on the Oboian-Kursk axis, the area then under assault by 4th Panzer Army. Later that day, (8 July), while the army's subordinate formations (18th and 29th Tank, 5th Guards Mechanized Corps) finished their preparations, their staffs reconnoitered the area of the coming combat operations. On 9 July, the 5th Guards Tank Army was ordered to concentrate in the area to the northwest and north of Prokhorovka, in the rear of the 5th Guards Army, which was already engaged in combat.
    Approaching Prokhorovka from the southwest was 2nd SS-Panzer Corps (Hausser), which had been in action since July 5th as part of the 4th Panzer Army. Since that time 4th Panzer Army had ground it's way through the Soviet defenses toward the small town of Oboian, the key and final link in the defensive chain protecting Kursk from the south. On 9 July, with offensive on the verge of stalling, Hoth decided to switch his main thrust from northwest to northeast, in the direction of Prokhorovka. Hoping to put the Soviets off balance, he planned to sieze the area around Prokhorovka, outflank Oboian, and thereby forge a route by which Kursk could be enveloped from the southeast.
    The mass of 4th Panzer Army would be committed on a narrow sector southwest of Prokhorovka, with the left wing, 48th Panzer Corps (Knobbelsdorf) maintaining pressure on the road to Oboian to divert Soviet attention.
    A 48th Corps soldier remembers....
    "One could see far into the valley of the Psel River, the last natural barrier before Kursk. With field glasses, the towers of Oboian could be made out in the fine haze. Oboian was our objective. It seemed within arm's reach, only 12 miles away."

    To the right, 2nd SS Panzer Corps was to drive on Prokhorovka, while to the southeast Army Detachment Kempf, with 3 Panzer divisions, struck north and northwest toward the town to provide flank protection and reinforcement for the 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
    The staff of Voronezh Front (and it's commander Nikolay F. Vatutin) were aware the German's were regrouping and realized a drive on Prokhorovka was imminent. They believed such a move would leave the German flanks vulnerable, which would in turn present an opportunity to encircle the enemy mobile divisions pushing north. On July 11th, Voronezh Front HQ submitted a plan for a series of concentric attacks that was quickly approved by STAVKA. 6th Guards Army (Chistyakov) and 1st Tank Army(Katukov) would attack due west at the eastern base of the German penetration against Detachment Kempf; 5th Guards Army (Zhadov) and 5th Guards Tank Army (Rodmistrov) would attack southward from Prokhorovka. That would shatter the head of the German penetration into Voronezh Front, cave in it's flanks, and encircle all German assault formations prior to their final destruction.
    Meanwhile, after their move to regroup, 4th Panzer Army and Detachment Kempf renewed their attacks on 11 July. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps advanced northeast toward Prokhorovka, and by late afternoon was within reach of the town and had also reinforced a bridgehead over the Psel River. That bridgehead had been established the previous day by the SS Totenkopf Division, and throughout the next 24 hours SS combat engineers laboured furiously under constant shellfire to build two bridges across the river.
    The command of 2nd SS Panzer Corps had hoped to press ahead with the capture of Prokhorovka, but the good weather that prevailed during the first days of Zitadelle ended and heavy rain fell on the 11th. That contributed to the delays in the advance of the corps already being imposed by the Soviet defenses. At the same time, though there had been no German breakthrough, such was the pressure against the Soviets that their own plan to unleash a counteroffensive on the 12th was also frustrated. The Germans had broken the links among the Soviet armies scheduled to take part in it, (assisted further by Vatutin's massive and chaotic redeployments).

    The brunt of the forthcoming operation would now have to be born by the 5th Guards Tank Army.....alone.

    FINAL PLANS.....
    On the night 11/12 July, Vatutin ordered 5th Guards Army to deliver it's counterstroke that morning, in conjunction with whatever elements of the 1st Tank and 5th Guards Armies. The 2nd Guards Tank corps and 2nd Tank Corps, operating on the right wing of 2nd SS Panzer Corps to the southwest of Prokhorovka, were subordinated to 5th Guards Tank Army, along with substantial artillery reinforcements. This premature commitment of two of Konev's Steppe Front Armies shows how alarming and critical the activities of the 4th Panzer Army were making it for Voronezh Front. Stalin even ordered Marshal Zukhov to fly to Prokhorovka and personally over-see the movement and deployments of the two Steppe Front Armies.
    Rotmistrov decided to employ in his first echelon the 18th, 29th and 2nd Guards Tank Corps. The day's objective was to cut off the SS Corps by driving in pincer arms from the north and east, linking near the village of Iasnaia Poliana. The 5th Guards Mechanized Corps would remain in reserve ready to exploit farther to the south if any breakthroughs were achieved by the initial attack forces. Assault units moved to occupy their final staging positions by midnight, completing their preparations by 0300. The operation was to begin at 1000hrs.

    Though unaware of the exact Soviet intentions, the commander and staff of 2nd SS Panzer Corps recognized that, given the certain committment of further Soviet operational reserves, they needed to capture Prokhorovka quickly if they were to do it at all. Accordingly, they planned their own new attack, delayed from the previous day, to go in at first light on the 12th.
    For the four divisions of the Corps the plan was straightforward.
    On the left, the mass of the Totenkopf Division was to break out of it's bridgehead on the north bank of the Psel River, driving northeast into the rear of the Soviet formations defending Prokhorovka. The divisional reconnaissanse battalion would maintain contact with 11th Panzer Division on it's left, while the remainder of the division moved up the south bank of the Psel, providing flank protection for the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler Division in the center. Despite the delay on the previous day, staff expected the attack to be successful, but added a note of caution to the order of the day by warning another such delay as had occurred on the 11th would surely allow the enemy time to move in additional reinforcements sufficient to stop the entire operation.
    In the central sector Leibstandarte, with the bulk of it's forces astride a railway, was to side step the strong defense in front of Prokhorovka, advancing to the northeast to take the town from the flank. Having earlier pulled ahead of it's neighbouring divisions to the left and right, the flanks of Leibstandarte were somewhat exposed. The base of the division's left flank was held by it's recce battalion, which overnight had been able to maintain fragile contact with Totenkopf. In fact something of a gap had developed between the two divisions, probably as a result of the Soviets in the villages along the Psel Valley, and Leibstandarte's preoccupation with the defenses before Prokhorovka.
    Between the flank and the railway, on the long, low elevation known as Hill 252, were the jump off positions of Leibstandarte's 2nd Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the ad-hoc armored battlegroup that were to make up the main assault force. Protection for the right flank of the drive was to be provided by the 1st Panzer Grenadier Regiment, supported by a tank destroyer battalion. Those units would move from their starting positions to the right of the railway toward Jamki and the Stalinsk Kolkhoz (Collective Farm).
    Right flank protection for Leibstandarte was to come from the Das Reich Division, which was to conduct it's own attack to the east toward Pravarot, in an attempt to widen the penetration by threatening Prokhorovka from the southeast.
    To the south of Das Reich was the remaining division assigned to the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, the 167th Infantry. That unit's mission for the 12th was to pry the Soviets out of their defenses to their front, then, once the success of the corps' main effort was assured, advance to the high ground to the east, providing flank protection for Das Reich against any Soviet forces operating in the gap between 2nd SS Panzer Corps and Detachment Kempf. Covering that gap meant that 2nd SS Panzer Corps was diverting it's strength away from it's main thrust against Prokhorovka, but it was hoped Detachment Kempf's 3rd Panzer Corps, (Gen. Herman Breith), would arrive during the day to eliminate the threat by adding weight to the drive on Prokhorovka. In any event, it was expected that, no later than the evening of the 12th of July, 2nd SS Panzer Corps would defeat the enemy forces in front of it and seize Prokhorovka, thus opening the way to Kursk from the southeast.

    On July 11, Breith's Tigers of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Detachment ripped through the Soviet 305th Rifle division and tore into the 107th Rifle division to it's rear. Breith's 6th Panzer Division lunged forward nearly eight miles, and his 19th Panzer Divison also made good progress. Although Breith's armored spearheads were still 15 miles from Prokhorovka, the remaining Soviet defenses were too weak to absorb another German assault.

    Unless Vatutin acted immediately, Breith and Hausser would break through to Prokhorovka, over the barrier of the third and last Soviet defense belt, and through......

    Into the open steppe country............


    THE FORCES AND THE ARENA
    The plans laid and their objectives set, both sides continued to marshal their forces throughout the short summer night. The addition of the understrength 2nd Guards Tank and 2nd Tank Corps, with a combined total of no more than 200 AFVs, brought 5th Guards Tank Army strength up to a total of 793 main battle tanks, consisting of 501 T-34s, 261 T-70s and 31 Lend-lease Churchills.
    The Soviets believed 2nd SS Panzer Corps had some 600 tanks available, of which 100 were Tigers and Elephants. Based on that assessment they felt 5th Guards Tank Army would match the Nazis in quantity if not quality.
    In actuality, on the morning of 12 July the 2nd SS Panzer Corps had only 273 operational tanks and assault guns, many of which had been damaged and repaired several times during the preceding days, and of which fewer than 20 were Tigers. Details of the exact numbers of each tank type present on the 12th are not available, but the following estimate, based on extrapolations of the best data, provides a useful indicator....


    Pz-III.........................90 (long-barreled models only)
    Pz-IV.........................80 (long-barreled models only)
    T-34..........................15 (Captured Soviet machines all used by Das Reich)
    Tiger.........................16.
    Assault Guns.............72.

    Those vehicles were further supported by about 50 self-propelled anti-tank guns and considerable numbers of cannon, multiple rocket launchers, and mortars of all calibres.

    The area about to be fought over by the converging masses of armor was bounded on one side by the Psel River, over which Totenkopf had established a firm bridgehead, and on the other by the elevated railway track of the main Belgorod-Kursk railway and the road running parrallel with it. In between the railway (the berm of which was cut with numerous crossings) and the river, to the southwest of Prokhorovka, the prominent feature was the flat topped, low ridge identified as Hill 252, stretching east-west from the railway before merging into the gentle slopes running down to meet the Psel.
    The river itself ran through a fairly narrow valley with the land on the north bank rising quickly to a height similar to that on the south. While dotted with small cultivated plots, gardens, and the larger fields of corn belonging to collective farms, the area was also cut by a number of ravines, streams and minor water courses, none of which presented any great obstacle. The largest of these ravines ran west from Prokhorovka until it joined the Psel valley near the village of Petrovka.
    The terrain was otherwise largely devoid of cover, but the presence of the hills, barrows and populated areas, particularly along the Psel valley and to the east of the railway, was of great help to the defense and a hindrance to the attacker. Thus, the terrain had the overall effect of channeling both sides forces into a relatively narrow area in which room for maneuver was constrained. That tended to favour the numerically inferior Germans, who were thereby able to maintain a stronger front line than otherwise would have been possible.
    There was also an extensive network of dirt and country roads, the exact layout of which happend to facilitate the movement and concentration of Soviet forces more than it did the Germans. After the rains of the day before, the SS found the ever more churned up, increasingly muddy roads difficult to traverse and late on the 12th the resupply of their most forward units became difficult.
    Across that varied terrain, then, the 5th Guards Tank Army would be assaulting an enemy who planned to renew his offensive at around the same time. Such circumstances led to the head on collision of nearly 1,000 tanks, hundreds of guns and tens of thousands of men on a battlefield that would later be described as having been too small to contain the events enacted in it......

    THE DAY BEGINS
    DAYBREAK, occuring shortly after 0300hrs, on the morning of Monday, 12 July, brought with it more rainfall from the overcast sky......

    Both Das Reich and Leibstandarte reported the night had passed quietly; though, the latters war diary entry, with perhaps some foresight of events to come, noted the calm seemed

    "conspicuous."

    On the north bank of the Psel, Totenkopf had been busy since first light defending against heavy infantry attacks against the extreme left flank of it's bridgehead. South of the river, meanwhile, other Totenkopf units had been involved in house-to-house fighting in the continuing struggle to clear the remaining Soviet defenders out of the village of Vasilevka. The planned drive out of the bridgehead to the northeast by the division's armored battlegroup had to be postponed until the situation on the flanks improved.
    Later, at 0500hrs, in it's routine morning situation brief to 2nd SS Panzer Corps, Leibstandarte reported there was much noise of enemy tanks to it's front and that, overhead, enemy air activity was increasing.
    At around 0630hrs, the division was assaulted by a regiment sized infantry force supported by some 50 tanks, attacking almost due south from along the line Petrovka-Prokhorovka toward the northern-most extremity of Leibstandarte's position....An SS 2nd Lieutenant related,
    "They were around us, on top of us, and between us. We fought man to man, jumping out of our foxholes to lob our magnetic hollow charge grenades at the enemy tanks. It was hell! Our company alone destroyed 15 Russian tanks."

    SS 1st Lt. Rudolf von Ribbentrop, son of the Nazi Foreign Minister, commanded a company of 6 Mark-IVs, which drove down a slope to aid the hard pressed panzergrenadiers. Ribbentrop's company knocked out a handful of T-34s at 800 meters.
    "A T-34 began to burn; it was only 50 to 70 meters from us. At the same instant the tank next to me took a direct hit and went up in flames. His neighbor to the right was also hit and soon it was also in flames. The avalanche of tanks rolled straight toward us....from this range every round was a hit." Ribbentrop knocked out four more Soviet tanks. On the last one, he scored a direct hit at ten meters. He recalled,
    "The T-34 exploded and it's turret flew about three meters through the air, almost striking my tank's gun." Ribbentrop had turned with the waves of Soviet tanks that swept by him. Soon, they were under withering fire from German assault guns and two more panzer companies lurking down the slope behind an anti-tank ditch. Amid the thick smoke and dust, the jumble of Soviet tanks and wrecked vehicles, Ribbentrops Mark-IV remained unnoticed by the Soviet tanks around him. "Machine guns firing, we rolled through a mass of Soviet troops from behind." Ribbentrop pulled his Mark-IV into cover behind a destroyed T-34 and joined the slaughter of the Soviet's tanks trying desperately to cross a bridge over the anti-tank ditch. "Burning T-34s ran into and over one another. It was a total inferno of fire and explosions." A shell hit Ribbentrop's turret, driving the gunner's sight into his eye and inflicting a serious head injury. He was able to reach the safety of the German lines after he and his crew had knocked out 14 Soviet tanks.
    With the aid of concentrated defensive artillery fire and counterattacks by the tanks of it's panzer group, 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment (Major Martin Gross commanding) defeated this assault after a hard fought battle lasting two hours.

    Elsewhere, Totenkopf had, by 0730 managed to capture the barracks at Kluchi, on the left flank of the bridgehead, holding them in the face of counterattacking Soviet infantry. Ominously, the division then reported the arrival, around 0745 of two more Soviet regiments and about 40 tanks in the area of Michailovka.
    What Totenkopf had witnessed were units of the 5th Guards Tank Army taking up positions on their assigned start line in preparation for that army's counter offensive. During the night it had become clear to the Soviet command the left flank of their force was threatened with encirclement, by 2nd SS Panzer Corps coming northwest and by 3rd Panzer Corps of Army Detachment Kempf from the southeast. If the jaws of the German pincer could be kept apart long enough, and if the 5th Guards Tank Army could act quickly enough, then maybe the Soviets would be able to destroy the 2nd SS Panzer Corps before Breif's 3rd Panzer corps could arrive on the battlefield to decisively tip the scales in their side's favor.
    With that in mind, and with a need for pre-emption of a likely renewal of the German attack toward Prokorovka, 5th Guards Tank Army had brought forward the start time of it's own assault from 1000hrs.
    After a 15 minute bombardment, at 0830 on the morning of 12 July, the entire army began to roll forward....

    It's mission....to encircle and destroy 2nd SS Panzer Corps.

    THE MORNING FIGHTING
    The initial attacks were all launched against Leibstandarte, starting around 0915hrs. From the Petrovka-Prelestnoe area to the northwest, 18th Tank corps attacked, spearheaded by the 170th tank brigade. Attacking out of Prokhorovka, with the railway on their left, were elements of the 9th Airborne division and the 29th Tank Corp's 32nd Tank Brigade. Attacking to the south of the railway around Jamki was the 25th Tank Brigade, also from the 29th Corps. These attacks had heavy artillery support and were driven home at high speed.
    Evegny Shkurdalov was a tank commander in the 170th. He later described these early actions this way....
    "65 vehicles of the 170th Tank Brigade were lined up...We rushed forward....at the same time the German tanks began attacking. So our tanks got in among the German ones and the Germans got between our lines. They were firing at vitually point-blank range. We were like boxers fighting close in, inflicting terrible damage on each other. Our 170th Brigade, attacking the Germans from the side, destroyed about 60 German tanks, but we ourselves were completely destroyed in 10 minutes."

    The standard German practice for engaging enemy tanks was to halt and fire from a stationary position, taking advantage of their superior gunnery skills and, in the case of the Tiger, heavier armour. The Soviets, though well aware of that tactic, had devised a suicidally simple countermeasure; drive straight for the stationary panzers at full speed, trying to get in close where the German qualitive superiority would be largely nullified.
    William Roes described how the same actions looked from the other side....

    "The T-34s came straight at us at full speed, with hardly time to fire, as though they had gone mad. I had the feeling of being suffocated by the sheer number of tanks. And one that had broken through was heading straight for us. My commander kept shouting: "SHOOT! SHOOT! SHOOT!" But the gunner at the back couldn't shoot because the gun wasn't (being) loaded. So I had to crawl back and load the cannon. After I'd done that four times the commander shouted "THANK GOD, WE MADE IT!"
    After the battle we saw one tank standing 8 meters away from us. I still don't know why it hadn't fired at us."

    The Soviets were able to push 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment out of the October Collective Farm, breaking through that unit's defensive positions in the area of Hill 252. But the initial Soviet success was immediately subject to a counterattack from Leibstandarte's Panzer Regiment, which pushed into both flanks of the advancing Reds. By 1115hrs, the penetration was sealed off and the surviving Soviets thrown back.
    According to initial German estimates, over 40 Red Army tanks had been knocked out, many destroyed in close combat. By any measure the fighting had been intense; commanders had found it difficult to maintain control, and tank crewmen found it tough to identify targets through all the dust and smoke. Said Shkurdalov:

    "People were poisoned by fumes inside the tanks because they were firing non-stop. The battlefield was enveloped in a dreadful black smoke, so we found ourselves firing at the silhouettes of German vehicles."

    Having survived one head-on armoured onslaught, Leibstandarte was soon facing a new threat, this time to it's rear. Since about 0800hrs, Totenkopf had been observing 18th Tank Corps' movements around the Petrovka area and had seen part of that force, the 170th Tank Brigade, swing away from the Psel to attack Liestandarte. But the remaining enemy grouping had continued to advance along the south bank of the river, despite receiving the attentions of several Stuka divebombers.
    Just before 1000hrs another of 18th Tank Corps' tank brigades, the 181st, reached Michailovka, going straight into the assault against Totenkopf units moving on Andreevka and Vasilevka. Of the 50 Soviet tanks involved there, 20 were knocked out, though the SS men were forced to move back to the Kozlovka area, leaving the 181st in possession of the field. But the tank brigade was in turn unable to advance farther to the southwest in the face of an intense crossfire directed against it from Griaznoe and Hill 226 from (according to Soviet accounts) a force of 13 Tiger tanks.
    The Totenkopf stalemate, then, caused the deflection of a large Soviet force of tanks out of the Psel valley to the southeast, where they smashed through the thin flank guard of Leibstandarte. Pushing aside that division's reconnaissance battalion, the Reds thrust into the rear, reaching some forward gun positions.
    A tank destroyer crewman recounted...
    "Salvo after salvo of Stalin Organs rained down upon our positions, with artillery and mortar shells in between. T-34 after T-34 rolled over the hill....three...five...ten...but what was the use of counting?"

    Despite inflicting heavy casualties, most of the Soviet tanks were destroyed in close quarter fighting combined with direct artillery fire. Unable to advance farther against the hail of German defensive fire, and with it's left flank open after the destruction of the 170th Tank Brigade, 18th Tank Corps shifted to the defense along the south bank of the Psel from Vasilevka northeast to Petrovka.
    Having already fought off assaults against both it's center and left, and without opportunity to pause to reorganize, Leibstandarte was attacked again at midday, this time on it's right. There, the 1st SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment was defending among the trees south of the railway to the village of Storozhevoe, where the boundary lay with Das Reich. Once again the attacking Soviets, this time from the 2nd Tank Corps, succeeded in penetrating the German positions only to be thrown back with heavy losses, and by 1330hrs, Leibstandarte had restored the situation.
    The left flank of this latest Soviet assault also fell on the 2nd Battalion of Das Reich's Deutschland Regiment, where it was likewise defeated. A resumption of the earlier assault, starting about an hour after the first effort, was also defeated with 9 more Red tanks knocked out. Almost immediately, Deutschland counterattacked toward Storozhevoe and the southern portion of the nearby woods. Small gains were quickly reinforced to protect the right flank of the entire 2nd SS Panzer Corps from further anticipated attacks, because throughout the morning large numbers of Soviet tanks had been seen moving farther to the south in Der Fuhrer Regiment's sector.

    Sure enough, at midday, 2nd Guards Tank Corps began attacking out of the Vinogradovka-Belenikhino area toward Iasnaia Poliana and Kalinin.
    Das Reich switched quickly onto the defense.

    THE AFTERNOON FIGHTING
    All morning the 5th Guards Tank Army had thrown itself against the center and right of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps. Overhead there had also been much activity as the air forces of both sides had intervened, bombing and strafing whenever enemy fighters and the weather permitted.
    Also at midday it became clear to the Germans their planned drive on Prokhorovka would have to be postponed again. Leibstandarte and Das Reich were ordered onto the defensive, an order that only reflected what had been a reality on the ground for some hours already. But not wanting to fully relinquish the initiative, the corps comand decided Totenkopf should finally commence it's delayed attck out of the Psel bridgehead. Though still under occasional infantry attack from the north, and all the time under artillery and mortar fire, the gamble was taken and an armored battlegroup from Totenkopf moved to the northeast via Hill 226.
    By 1230hrs the southern slopes and crest of 226 had been taken. Then, on the reverse slope, the assault ran into strong resistance from the 95th Guards Rifle Division, fighting from prepared positions and supported by two strong anti-tank groups on either flank. Fierce fighting continued for the rest of the afternoon, until evening approached and Totenkopf paused to regroup.
    South of the river, Totenkopf grenadiers had counterattacked 18th Tank Corps positions, seizing the western edge of Andreevka by mid-afternoon. That created the hope the division could outflank the defenses round Hill 226 by forcing another crossing over the river near Michailovka - but it was only short lived.
    Elsewhere during the afternoon, Leibstandarte, by calling down concentrated defensive artillery, fought off smaller Soviet attacks, usually from infantry accopanied by tanks and with strong artillery support. Another unit of the 29th Tank Corps, 53rd Motorized Rifle Brigade, had moved across the front of Leibstandarte during the early afternoon and, exploiting the earlier success of the 18th Tank Brigade, broke through at the boundary between Totenkopf and Leibstandarte, advancing on the Komsomolets Collective Farm. Reaching there around 1730hrs, a point far behind Leibstandarte's advance units, the brigade's commander decided the dangerously exposed position was untenable without additional support. The 53rd then withdrew to Hill 252 where it took up defensive positions.
    But the main weight of the 5th Guards Tank Army's counteroffensive was shifted against Das Reich and, to a lesser extent, 167th Infantry Division. Since midday, elements of 2nd Guards Tank Corps had been attacking out of Vinogradovka-Belenkhino area. An attack toward Iasnaia Poliana, by what Das Reich estimated at up to 70 tanks with infantry support, against 1st Battalion of Der Fuhrer Regiment, was defeated just before 1400, after nearly two hours of fighting.
    At the same time a flanking attack was made by 50 tanks toward Kalanin against 2nd Battalion of Der Fuhrer. As had happened so many times already that day, the Soviet tanks succeeded in breaking through the grenadiers, only to be thrown back by counterattacking panzers. There, 2nd Lt. Hans Mennel, Platoon leader of the 6th company, destroyed 6 tanks with his Tiger, bringing his total of kills since 8 July to 24. The regiment reported
    "Two enemy attacks on both sides of Kalinin were smashed to pieces: 21 enemy tanks and 1 Martin bomber were destroyed."
    But the success had been achieved at a price, as a number of Das Reich's tanks were also destroyed. More significantly, Das Reich was being tied down on the open flank of 2nd SS Panzer corps, a flank that was to have been covered by the arrival of Breith's 3rd Panzer Corps.

    DEVELOPMENTS NEARBY
    Indeed, there had been justifiable optimism on the morning of 12 July the 3rd Panzer Corps would arrive to intervene in the battle for Prokhorovka. Overnight the spearhead of it's 6th Panzer Division had driven out of the town of Rzhavets, where there was a bridge across the northern donets River, the last geographical obstacle on that flank before Prokhorovka. Despite not being able to secure the span before it was blown up by the Soviet defenders, by daybreak, the 6th had secured a firm bridgehead on the North bank. On the other side, northeast of Rzhavets, additional German forces attacked to bolster the right shoulder of this breakthrough and had taken the villages of Vypolzovka and Avdeevka. The 3rd Panzer Corps had then reinforced it's success at Rzhavets by bringing a detachment of the 10th Panzer Division over from it's left, and began to prepare to advance out of the northern Donets bridgehead into the rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army.
    But at the same time the Soviet command was giving orders to prevent exactly that from occurring.
    Three brigades were dispatched to the area around the German bridgehead with orders to eliminate every German north of the river. Two of those brigades, the 11th and 12th Mechanized, came from the 5th Guards Mechanized Corps, which had until then been held in reserve to exploit any successes against 2nd SS Panzer Corps. The third unit (26th Guards Tank Brigade), came from 2nd Guards Tank Corps, which was already heavily engaged against Das Reich. Further German gains on the south bank of the Northern Donets were to be blocked by Red Army forces already in that region.
    Throughout the morning and afternoon, then, fighting along the Northern Donets intensified until the early German expectations of advancing from there evaporated. In fact, fierce fighting continued throughout the day on this front until 1800hrs, when the Soviets recaptured the village of Ryndinka, across the river from Rzhavets. On the south bank continued pressure resulted in their retaking Vypolzovka.
    But while these developments prevented the arrival of much needed reinforcements for the SS men fighting toward Prokhorovka, they at least succeeded in taking some pressure off Das Reich and 167th Infantry Division. The 2nd Guards Tank Army, it's attacks having been stopped, and it's flanks potentially threatened as a result of the set-backs to other attacking formations farther north, withdrew to it's jump-off positions, where it consolodated to repel further Das Reich counterattacks.
    To the north, where 2nd Tank Corps was resisting fiercely the advance of the Deutschland Regiment in the Storozhevoe area, such consolidation had already taken place. But by 1600, with the whole village now in it's hands, Deutschland was again under attack from the east, both on the ground and from the air. That fighting was still going on when Das Reich made it's evening situation report to 2nd SS Panzer Corps at 1800hrs - more Soviet attacks were expected.
    Indeed, Soviet reserves were being moved in all around 2nd SS Panzer Corps positions. During late afternoon and evening the Germans watched as the enemy replacements and reinforcements came up. Details were noted in their reports of tank concentration areas on the neck of land between the Psel river and the railway, in the ravines that ran eastward toward Prokhorovka, and to the east in front of Das Reich.

    EVENING
    The last major engagement of the day saw Totenkopf finally achieve a breakthrough on the high ground of the Psel.
    At 2000hrs, after a massive air-raid, the division's battlegroup renewed it's assault to the northeast. Subduing the Pakfronts on both it's flanks, the battlegroup took Polezheav, pushing back both the original defenders and the tanks that rushed to intervene. Finally, 2245hrs, the division reported to 2nd SS Panzer Corps:
    "The Prokhorovka-Kartachevka road has been reached by the armoured group; it will be cut over night."
    Totenkopf had at last reached it's objective for the day. But the Germans were soon to find this late success would be only temporary. During the afternoon, Rotmistrov had ordered the two remaining brigades from the 5th Mechanized Corps into positions to block any attempts by 2nd SS Panzer Corps to penetrate 5th Guards Tank Army's rear area. The 21st Tank Brigade was put in place astride the Prokohorovka road where it crossed the Psel at Voroshilov Collective Farm, just a few kilometers to the east of Totenkopf's farthest advance. The 10th Guards Mechanized Brigade, farther back around Ostrenkii, was ready to frustrate any German attempt to drive beyond the road to the northeast.
    All across the front the fighting began to die down as darkness fell.
    Everywhere was strewn the wreckage of the terrible day; burning tanks, smashed vehicles and charred corpses lay all through the wrecked villages, shattered gardens and across the lush corn fields. Throughout the day little sunshine had penetrated the grey overcast sky, and there had been heavy showers. Now the rain fell again, soaking the dead and stunned survivors alike.
    As William Roes recalled...
    "There was the smell of the heavy Ukrainian soil that had been churned up and soaked by the rain. Then there was the strong stench of smoke, of gunpowder and the burning tanks. You could smell burned leather and dead bodies that were still smouldering.
    It was a mixture I can't really describe."

    AFTERMATH
    During the night both sides rested, reorganized and made ready to start over again come daybreak. Before dawn on the 13th, the vulnerability of Totenkopf's penetration to the northeast was realized, and in the early hours of the morning that battlegroup was pulled back into the bridgehead, which was in turn subjected to almost constant attack through the day. Renewed attempts by Totenkopf to push through the defenders were beaten back in a seesaw battle of thrust and counter.
    Elsewhere the main elements of 5th Guards Tank Army were put on the defensive on the 13th to regroup in preparation for a renewal of the attack on the 14th. Despite that, Leibstandarte had to endure further attacks throughout the 13th, launched from out of ravines west of Prokhorovka and from the town itself. In the face of such opposition, 2nd SS Panzer Corps abandoned the plan to envelop Prokhorovka via the north bank of the Psel, ordering the main point of attack be shifted to the right. Das Reich was ordered to make preparations to try for an envelopment from the southeast.
    But events elsewhere began to claim Adolf Hitler's attention.
    With the advent of the Soviet counteroffensive against 9th Army, whose offensive into the northern shoulder of the Kursk salient had already stalled, and with the Western Allied invasion of Sicily underway, the German dictator called off operation Zitadelle entirely on 13 July. He made one exception, that the southern attack, (the "rump" operation), should continue so Soviet reserves there could be further destroyed. Therefore, throughout the 14th and 15th Das Reich and 3rd Panzer Corps attempted to encircle the divisions of 69th Army standing between them. But on the night of the 14th/15th the Soviets simply moved back.
    Late on the 15th the southern flank of Das Reich finally met 7th Panzer Division from 3rd Panzer Corps, but it was too late. To the north, Das Reich's attack toward Prokhorovka from the southeast made only slow progress and the entire division was steadily ground down.
    Despite these setbacks, Hoth and Kempf continued to have full confidence in victory. At the "Wolf's Lair", a conference of the commanders found Hitler calling off the attack. Von Kluge agreed, embroiled as he was in the Orel counteroffensive in the North. Von Manstein, originally no supporter of the offensive, now pressed for it's continuation, stating
    "To break off the battle now would probably mean throwing away victory."
    Wishing to throw in the fresh 24th Panzer Corps, Manstein wanted to tie down Soviet efforts on other sectors of a fast unwinding front. Von Mellenthin concurred, saying,
    "We are now in the position of a man who has siezed the wolf by the ears and dare not let go."
    Manstein resolved to salvage something in the meantime, convincing Hitler to agree to a "rump" operation.
    By July 16, Hoth and Kempf were actually in a position to resume their push for Kursk. Battered and worn down, 60 miles still lay between them and Model's Northern Pincer.
    Finally, Hitler's patience ran out and the 'rump' operation was also called off. Events were demanding some panzer divisions, especially those of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps, be diverted to other missions. During the 16th and 17th, the corps stayed on the defensive as it prepared to withdraw back to it's original positions of July 5th.

    The Battle of Kursk was over.....

    Soviet propaganda made big news of the reverse by completely inflating German losses. Zhukhov wrote,
    "The picked and most powerful grouping of the Germans were destroyed here....the faith of the German Army and the German people in the Nazi leadership...was irrevocably shattered."
    Marshal Vasilevsky boasted of 500,000 German casualties.

    The massacre of Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army on July 12 was turned into "The Death Ride of the Fourth Panzer Army".
    The reality was rather different.

    Army Group Center and Army Group South lost 323 tanks and assault guns irrepairably destroyed for the entire Kursk operation. Losses in men amounted to 50,00 killed wounded or missing.

    Red Army personel losses amounted to at least 177,000, with combat losses between 20% and 70% of their units commited. Soviet losses in tanks and self propelled guns amounted to 1,614 vehicles irrepairably destroyed. From July 5th - 16th, Das Reich Division alone accounted for 448 Soviet tanks and assault guns against the loss of 46 of its own.

    The Soviets claimed 400 German tanks destroyed for July 12 alone, and 3,100 destroyed for the Zitadelle Operation entire.

    German morale, for the homefront, and for the fighting soldiers, remained high.....

    Recently de-classified Waffen SS combat records and the allowance of public access to Russian archives has revealed the true nature of Kursk, and Prokhorovka in particular.

    A brilliant tactical victory for the Germans....

    But a decisive strategic victory for the Red Army.......

    CONCLUSIONS
    Despite the heavy fighting and ensuing losses, neither side achieved it's objectives on July 12.
    The 5th Guards Tank Army failed to encircle and destroy 2nd SS Panzer Corps, and by mid-afternoon, had been forced to abandon it's counter-offensive, shifting to the defensive all along it's front.
    The Germans had been denied the opportunity to develop their planned offensive to take Prokhorovka and move beyond to Kursk.
    The SS Panzer Grenadiers had enhanced their reputation as elite fighting troops, at least in Hitler's eyes, for they had achieved the deepest penetration of the Soviet defenses during Zitadelle and had not buckled under the weight of massive armoured assaults. They showed great determination on 12 July by not giving in, refusing to give ground, and by their efforts to keep the initiative.
    In defense, the SS demonstrated tremendous skill in organizing concentrated all-arms fire to defeat Soviet mass-assaults, and in marshaling their panzers in reserve, ready to seal off any breakthroughs. But tenacious defense could not achieve the corps objectives. To do so they needed to attack in strength. The succession of Soviet assaults throughout the morning and early afternoon of the 12th kept the SS tied down, forcing them to postpone their own planned attacks. When the German attacks were eventually sent in, they were undertaken without sufficient mass to break through the enemy defenses. Exposed flanks, particularly on the right, forced 2nd SS Panzer Corps to fatally disperse it's fighting power.
    At the same time, the Soviet attacks were themselves launched hurredly, for 5th Guards Tank Army had to go in before German reinforcements arrived, thereby altering the balance of forces in the area. The intence pressure applied by the 4th Panzer Army on July 11 had disrupted Soviet plans, compelling 5th Guards Army to attack the next day without the support of it's neighbouring armies, and without substantial superiority in it's own sector. In this, they had no choice, for in all probability 2nd SS Panzer Corps would otherwise have taken Prokhorovka.
    The Soviets attacked after only a brief artillery bombardment, relying on mass and speed for success rather than on tactical prowess. Despite suffering heavy losses with these ruthless but simple tactics, 5th Guards Tank Army succeeded in pinning 2nd SS Panzer Corps and inflicting severe damage in return. After defeating the Soviet attacks, the SS divisions found the Soviet defense was as tough as their own had been. The Germans switched the main point of their attack back and forth throughout the day, attempting to regain the initiative and breakthrough to Prokhorovka, but without success.
    In launching a concentric series of attacks against 2nd SS Panzer Corps, 5th Guards Tank Army certainly stretched the Germans to the limit, but that approach also had the effect of dispersing Soviet combat power. Fewer but more powerful attacks focused against the flanks of the SS penetrations might have been more successful than the head-on assaults against Liebstandarte in the center. But 5th Guards Tank Army's real success that day was in stopping 2nd SS Panzer Corps in it's tracks; by simply achieving that the Soviet High Command demonstrated how much things had changed on the eastern front since the year before.
    Though outclassed at the tactical level, the Soviets at Kursk showed they had mastered the operational art of war in at least four ways.
    First, they achieved operational surprise as the Germans did not expect Soviet reserves to arrive on the 12th.
    Second, the Soviet command was able to assemble sufficiently large quantities of tanks, guns and men at the right place at the right time, to not only launch a major counteroffensive but also to retain adequate reserves to reinforce success, or, as it turned out, to build a strong defense in the event of failure.
    Third, the Soviet's ability to assess the situation, predict their opponent's next move and, most significantly, to act before that opponent could implement his own plans had wrested the initiative away from 2nd SS Panzer Corps.
    Finally, the Soviet high command demonstrated great flexability and adaptability in it's responses to changing circumstances.

    The actions near Prokhorovka on 12 July 1943 have often been characterized as massive meeting engagements with two fleets of tanks charging one another, fighting in a solid, eight-hour free for all.

    That is simply not true............

    Though the number of tanks involved was unprecedented for such a constricted battlefield, the nature of the fighting was more a series of short, intense clashes between small units of both sides. The day was also interspaced with periods of inactivity during which commanders on both sides attempted to regain control of their formations and assess what had to be done to accomplish their objectives.
    In sum, by playing to their own strengths throughout the fighting around Prokhorovka, the Red Army succeeded in fighting the Germans to a complete STANDSTILL....

    It only remained to shove them back from where they'd come......

    .....................................................CONTINUED BELOW.............................................................................

    ..............................................................................................................................................................
     
  2. Cate Blanchett

    Cate Blanchett recruit

    Joined:
    Nov 29, 2009
    Messages:
    172
    Likes Received:
    4
    ..........................SS PANZER: CONTINUED................................


    :?: LOSSES, NUMBERS & MYTHS: :?:....By Stephen K. Rothwell
    .....On the morning of 12 July 1943, 5th Guards Tank Army had nearly 800 tanks and assault guns on line. About 600 of those were divided among the army's own 18th and 29th Tank and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps; the remaining 200 were with 2nd Guards Tank and 2nd Tank Corps, which had been placed under the command of the army especially for the counterattack.
    Oft quoted Soviet sources claim there were nearly 1,000 German tanks and assault guns ranged against them; 600 of them with 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the balance belonging to 3rd Panzer Corps. Further, of those 600 machines, the Soviets claimed more than 100 were heavies; Tiger tanks and Elephant assault guns.
    In actuality, 3rd Panzer Corps began operation Zitadelle on 5 July with about 290 tanks and assault guns of all types, but by the 12th they had been reduced to somewhere between 150 and 200 operating machines. On the main sector, in front of Prokhorovka, 2nd SS Panzer Corps had 273 working tanks and assault guns, many of which had already been damaged and repaired. Of that total fewer than 20 were Tigers and none were Elephants. Excluding the additional 50 or so self-propelled anti-guns, used mainly for defense, 2nd SS Panzer Corps armor strength on the 12th was therefore less than half that claimed by the Soviets.
    In relation to their claims about the number of Tigers present, it seems the Soviets were afflicted with the same malady subsequently experienced by the Western allies in Normandy: in the eyes of the allied tank crews, most German Panzers were considered to be, and were reported as,"Tigers", until proven otherwise. But with only one Tiger company in each of the 2nd SS Divisions, the total available in that corps at the start of Zitadelle was only 35, and by the morning of the 12th there were fewer than 20 operating. All 90 Elephants had been deployed in Zitadelle's northern pincer, and it's therefore certain none were to be found on the field at Prokhorovka.
    Some accounts of the battle also have the SS equipped with Panthers, and while it's true SS Panther detachments were in the process of forming in rear areas they are not shown in any strength returns from 2nd SS Panzer Corps during this period. It's unlikely the first Panthers went into action with the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer corps before August, joining Das Reich on the eastern front and Leibstandarte in Italy. All of the 244 Panthers used for Kursk were deployed to 48th Panzer Corps.

    TANKS & ASSAULT GUNS AVAILABLE IN DAS REICH, JULY 1943

    ............................4 JULY.............12 JULY.............18 JULY
    Pz-III......................48....................38.....................37
    Pz-IV......................30....................20.....................56
    T-34.......................18....................12......................2
    Tigers....................12......................2.....................11
    Assault Guns..........33....................25.....................24
    Marders*...............10......................9......................9

    * = Self-propelled AT Guns

    That the overall cost to both sides on 12 July was heavy is beyond dispute, but it's difficult to form an exact assessment of the day's losses in men and material. There are claims 2nd SS Panzer corps lost over half it's tanks and assault guns, and while strength returns for the evening of the 12th aren't known, it's unlikely the German armor was reduced that much.

    AFV AVAILABILITY:
    ...........................ARMY GROUP SOUTH (30 JUNE).....................

    DIVISION.......................TANKS..........ASSAULT GUNS.........TOTAL
    Grossdeutschland.............163..................35.....................198
    Leibstandarte..................126...................35.....................161
    Das Reich........................128...................34.....................162
    Totenkopf........................140...................35.....................175
    Wiking..............................31.....................6.......................37
    3rd Pz. Div........................63.....................2.......................65
    6th Pz.Div.........................86.....................0.......................86
    7th Pz.Div.........................87.....................0.......................87
    11th Pz.Div.......................98.....................0.......................98
    19th Pz.Div.......................70.....................0.......................70
    23rd Pz.Div.......................61.....................0.......................61
    Pz. Brig. 10 (Panthers).....252.....................0.....................252
    TOTAL AGS.....................................................................1,452

    .................................ARMY GROUP CENTER (30 JUNE).............
    DIVISION.......................TANKS ONLY
    2nd Pz.Div...........................98
    4th Pz.Div...........................94
    9th Pz.Div...........................96
    12th Pz.Div.........................55
    18th Pz.Div.........................32
    20 Pz.Div............................61
    TOTAL AGC........................436

    ZITADELLE GRAND TOTAL............................1,888

    Totenkopf is reckoned to have suffered the most, but that division had, by the evening of 8 July, already lost more than 30% of it's most important vehicle types - long barrelled Pz-IIIs and IVs, Tigers and assault guns - that had been on the line at the start of Zitadelle. Some or most of those earlier losses may have ended up being included in the estimates of losses for the 12th alone. In any case, by the 16th Totenkopf had recovered somewhat, with it's armor strength back up to 58%, demonstrating not only the effectiveness of German repair teams but also the possibility losses on the 12th were lighter than has been claimed.
    Losses in tanks and assault guns incurred by Leibstandarte also appear to have been lighter than sometimes reported. On the evening of 11 July this division had 66 tanks and assault guns, 48% of it's pre-Zitadelle total, but two nights later that number had been reduced by only 2 vehicles, though included in this figure was the loss of some 15 Pz-IVs, the total being made good by the return to action of 11 assault guns.
    Figures available for Das Reich for the 14th show this division to have retained 76% of it's strength of the main vehicle types, perhaps indicating it was less closely engaged than it's brother divisions. That was to change, however, during the next two days, when, in new fighting on the Corps flank, Das Reich's tank and assault gun strength dropped to about 69% of it's pre-Kursk total.
    More information is actually available for the period around the battle, from 11 July through 16 July, than there is for the 12th alone. One Soviet estimate is that around 800 damaged and burned tanks of various types from both sides were left on the field that day, but this appears to be more representative of both sides total losses for the period as a whole. Other Soviet estimates of their own and German losses appear to support this conclusion, with the 5th Guards Tank Army losing about half it's AFV strength, and German losses estimated at 300 tanks, including 70 Tigers, 20 self-propelled guns, 200 other guns of various calibres, 300 vehicles and 4,500 personel.
    German sources indicate far fewer tanks were lost, and a report made by the Chief of Staff of 2nd SS Panzer Corps on 21 July puts the number of total write-offs during this period at only 36. When that figure is examined in conjunction with known and estimated stength returns, it can be presumed an additional 90 - 110 tanks and assault guns were non-operational at the end of the offensive, possibly lost to the enemy or under repair.
    Further examination of the Data (see table below) shows the most significant loss of SS armor strength had already occurred prior to 12 July, and that it remained remarkably stable from the evening of the 11th until after the withdrawl, which began on the night of 16/17 July. Certainly it's clear that by 16 July 2nd SS Panzer corps had roughly the same number of operational armored vehicles as had been available on the evening of the 11th.
    A possible conclusion is that SS tank losses on 12 July were light, possibly even very light.

    2ND SS PANZER CORPS TANK & ASSAULT GUN STRENGTHS & LOSSES, 4 JULY TO 21 JULY, 1943

    DATE...........PZ-III.......PZ-IV.......T-34.......TIGER.......AG........TOTAL

    4 July............117..........151..........18..........35..........95..........416
    11 July............92..........100..........15..........16..........50..........273
    16 July............72...........83...........11..........23..........75..........264
    21 July............72...........94...........17..........30..........78..........291

    ...................................REPLACEMENTS........................................
    20 July.............?.............?.............?.............5............?..........5.?

    ...................................WRITE-OFFS............................................
    20 July.............5............23............?.............3............5...........56

    ...................................NON-OPERATIONAL..................................
    21 July............40...........34............1.?...........7..........12..........94

    Note- The breakdown by type for 11 July is an estimate.

    The Soviet estimate of SS personel losses doesn't seem too wide of the mark when compared to the total of nearly 6,500 for the period of 5 to 16 July, inclusive. A detailed breakdown of that overall figure is not available, but one for Leibstandarte casualty figures is (see below). This shows the division's losses were split fairly evenly between the events leading up to Prokhorovka and those for the battle itself and, as would be expected, it can be seen casualties for 12 and 13 July were significantly higher than those on other days.
    It should also be noted the heaviest losses were suffered in the panzergrenadier regiments that bore the brunt of the Soviet assaults, and such losses would certainly have curtailed the overall offensive capabilities of 2nd SS Panzer Corps. While incomplete, the figures available do give insight into the losses incurred by the Germans on the 12th.
    By any standard, 5th Guards Tank Army was mauled on 12 July. Provisional claims by 2nd SS Panzer Corps for the day went as high as 244 Soviet tanks knocked out, with concomitant heavy casualties among the Red infantry. The claims for Soviet losses inflicted on 12 and 13 July were recorded in 2nd SS Panzer Corp's war diary and are shown below as well (last table).
    Though the majority of losses claimed were reported on 13 July, they presumably occurred the day before, given the likely delay in compiling the statistics and the timing of daily reports. The figures for tank losses may be reasonably accurate, for immediately after Prokhorovka Soviet armor strength was down to about half what it had been eight days before the battle, and the subsequent Soviet pursuit of the withdrawing Germans suffered in it's effectiveness as a result of those losses.
    The 29th Tank Corps lost 60% of it's AFVs at Prokhorovka; 18th Tank Corps lost 30%, while losses in AT-Guns and infantry were also high. The bulk of the losses would probably have been suffered on the 12th, the day that saw the most numerous and intensive Soviet assaults. The losses in men were also high, and while the figures for dead and wounded are not known, that they must have been large is indicated by the 1,500 prisoners and deserters counted by the SS.
    Despite the losses, 5th Guards Tank Army did stop the advance of 2nd SS Panzer corps. Further, while the SS divisions recieved few replacements during the next few weeks, 5th Guard's losses were made good in time for the start of Voronezh Front's next major offensive on 3 August. In just three weeks the strength of the army was restored to around 37,000 men, 503 tanks, 40 self-propelled guns, 560 other guns and mortars, and 45 multiple rocket launchers.

    The critical point about Soviet casualties at Prohorovka is that whatever the actual cost, it was one Moscow could afford to pay.......

    .............CASUALTIES FOR LEIBSTANDARTE, 11 TO 16 JULY................

    DATE.......................KIA...........WOUNDED............MIA............TOTAL.......

    11 July....................21.................203...................0................224
    12 July....................48.................321...................5................373
    13 July....................64.................260...................2................326
    14 July....................21.................114.................16................151
    15 July....................24.................103...................3.................130
    16 July....................16...................86...................3.................105

    TOTAL....................194...............1,087................29.............1,310
    TOT 5-18 JULY/......474...............2,202................77.............2,753

    Note- Total 2nd SS PzCorps casualties for the period 5-21 July were 6,428.
    ..................................................................................................

    ....2ND SS PANZER CORPS' CLAIMS FOR SOVIET LOSSES, 12-13 JULY.......

    CATEGORY...............LEIBS........DAS REICH......TOTNKPF..........TOTAL

    Prisoners...................897..................78...............302...........1,277
    Deserters..................156..................56.................26.............238
    Aircraft.........................5..................12...................2...............19
    Tanks........................242.................10..................69.............321
    AT-Guns......................57..................1....................7...............65
    AT-Rifles...................103.................32....................9.............144
    Machineguns..............20..................37..................26...............83
    Artillery.......................9..................12...................0................21
    Submachineguns..........0................194..................66.............260
    Rifles.........................10................515................121.............646
    Mortars.......................2..................60...................3................65
    ......................................................................................................



    :arrow:THE TANKS OF "ZITADELLE" :arrow:- Brief notes and their usage at Prokhorovka by John Desch and B5N2Kate

    T-34... Called the "Prinadlezhit-Chetverki" (Thirty-Four) by Soviet troops.
    The technical quality of the T-34 to a large degree compensated for the lesser quality of the typical Soviet tank crews and small unit leaders during the first 2 years of the war in the East. This unchallenged technical superiority over the German's main battle tanks often permitted the Soviets to dictate the tactical conditions for tank engagements. They would often engage the Germans at about 800 meters, thereby taking maximum advantage of their superior armour and heavier gun.
    The disadvantages of the T-34 included poor turret layout in which the tank commander had to perform the functions of two men, and the mechanical unreliability of it's engine and transmission in extended operations. When Tigers and Panthers began entering the field in significant numbers in the first half of 1943, the quality situation began to be reversed. Then, it was the Soviets who had to rush to close with the enemy to engage sucessfully. That they did during the fighting on 12 July, suffering heavily for it. Most of the tanks lost during the battle were T-34's.
    An ironic tale from the T-34 is the story of the fate of it's designer, M.I Koshkin. Taken ill, he was personally ordered by Stalin to deliver a new production model of the T-34 to another factory. Driving through the snow in the unheated compartment, Koshkin's condition worsened. He succumbed to pneumonia in mid 1940, a victim of Stalin by default.
    KVI (Klim Voroshilov I) This heavy tank caused it's German opponents many headaches in 1941, but was rapidly becoming obsolete in 1943. The Tiger outperformed it in nearly every respect, and the fact that it couldn't keep up with the T-34 decreased it's utility. It's armor was still thick by 1943 standards, but it's gun was no better. Further, these ponderous beasts lacked maneuverability, and were expensive and complex to produce, eventually being assembled solely at the Chelyabinsk Tractor factory; it's original "home" plant at Leningrad was evacuated to the east and amalgamated to form an immense "heavy' vehicle plant at Chelyabinsk called "Tankograd", the only plant to produce heavy vehicles that the Soviets possessed, with over 13,000 vehicles rolling out of this plant by the end of the war. Small numbers worked against it, being difficult to mass produce, unlike the T-34.
    These machines did not play a prominent role on 12 July, with only a few mixing it up with Totenkopf late in the day. an upgunned version (85mm) saw brief service later in 1943, but none of these improved models were available for Prokhorovka. It was eventually replaced by the IS (Iosef Stalin) series, a much more enlightened design.
    T-70...Built to replace the even more inferior T-60. Like all light tanks, it could be turned out in great numbers, and it was thought this was better than not being able to turn out enough machines to equip all the formations. One can imagine German tank crews crying tears of joy every time they encountered these vehicles. With a crew of only two and a puny 45mm L/46 gun, it's utility even as a light tank was highly questionable. It filled a production gap, fleshing out the tank units. "Fodder" would be a more appropriate term. Surviving chassis converted to SU-76s by 1944, no doubt to the immense relief of the surviving crews.
    PANZER-III (or SdKfz 141)...The Pz-III was showing deficient signs of obsolescence by July 1943. Long the workhorse of the German Army, it's puny gun and thin armour put it at a significant disadvantage against T-34s. About 90 of these tanks were on hand for Prokhorovka, mostly in Das Reich and Totenkopf, where they performed well enough despite their inferiority. They reaped a great harvest of T-70s while the heavier German tanks engaged the T-34s.
    PANZER-IV (or SdKfz 161) ...Inferior speed and relatively thin armor were the handicaps of this mainstay of the German army, but the new long-barreled main gun gave them the firepower they'd lacked previously. If a Pz-IV crew got off the first shot - which all else being equal, was highly probable - this tank was capable of defeating the best Soviet machines. AND it was the only German design to stay in production for the entire course of WW2, with over 8,000 deliveries.
    TIGER I (PzKw VI or SdKfz181) Much has been written about this overweight, underpowered and short ranged tank. It's much maligned as being a clumsy vehicle on the battlefield, which was certainly true in the mountains of Italy and the marshes around Leningrad.
    But at Prokhorovka in July 1943, the Tiger reigned supreme.:cool:
    Each of the divisions of the 2nd SS Panzer corps began Zitadelle with a company of about 15 Tigers, but there were only a dozen operating Tigers in the entire 2nd SS Panzer Corps by the 12th. Still, every broad stroke account of the battle would have us believe there were 100 - so great was the effect of that dozen. The Germans put their best crews in these tanks, which, with it's powerful gun and thick hide, harvested astonishing numbers of Soviet tanks.
    Seven of the 12 Tigers at Prokhorovka were rendered inoperable by the end of the day, each requiring multiple hits from 76mm guns or greater before going down. Over 80 hits were found on one of the damaged Tigers, yet it was repaired in 3 days, just as soon as four replacement road wheels and a spare sprocket could be found.
    Tigers were usually in the van of every German attack and in the most crucial sector of every defensive battle. Used agressively by well trained crews, these tanks remained a major problem for Western Allied and Soviet commanders until the end of the war.
    The ironic story with this machine is that by August of 1944, only 1,355 had been produced. Assembled basically by hand, mass production "line" facilities were not wartime Germany's industrial fort'e.
    PANTHER-(PzKw V or SdKfz 171) Contrary to much popular history, the 2nd SS Panzer corps did not commit any Panthers to combat prior to August, 1943. For the Kursk offensive about 250 of these machines were brigaded together and attached to the Grossdeutschland Panzer Grenadier Division in 48th Panzer corps. Their dismal performance that July has been widely, and incorrectly, heralded as one of the major reason's the offensive stalled.
    It is true those first Panthers' engines had a bad habit of catching fire, and their thin side armor denied their crews the high degree of survivability in offensive operations that Tiger crews enjoyed. Nevertheless, by August many of the glitches had been remedied through field expedient modification, and the Panther turned out to be an extremely deadly defensive weapon the Soviets soon learned to respect. With over 5,000 produced by the end of the war, you could expect to find this machine anywhere in the defense of the Reich; not at Prokhorovka though.



    KILLER TANKS .:tinysmile_classes_t...by John Desch...Expansion by B5N2Kate
    ...For decades experts in the world's major armies have spent a great deal of time exploring why a few tank crews in every outfit inflict the lion's share of their unit's battlefield 'kills'. When one or two crews out of a company of 15 tanks routinely compile over 75% of the kills inflicted by their company, there is good cause for study. Virtually every possible reason has been considered, from the crews' socio-economic backgrounds to the mechanical reliability of the individual tanks being used. Historical case studies have been meticulously assembled and examined to try and extract conclusions. Some of the resultant ideas have been apparent to the tankers themselves from the beginning of mechanized warfare.
    Without doubt, the most important factor is how long the crew has been together. With just school training, any crew can be made to muddle through the basics; it takes combat experience to transcend those rudiments to achieve expertise.
    Everyone in tank combat is extremely busy. The tank commander must acquire targets, lay the gun (or assist the gunner in doing so), and maneuver his tank within the platoon. If he's the platoon leader or company commander, his responsibility for overseeing maneuver greatly outweighs his need to fight his own tank, hence the need for good gunners who can do things on their own. The driver must know not only how to drive the tank, but also how to maneuver it in formation while making the most of opportunities for concealment. A tank commander who must busy himself riding shotgun on his driver is not doing his other jobs. Loaders and gunners tend to be less busy, but are obviously no less important.
    Thus the trick is really to get everyone to be able to do his job - and more - without the need for supervision. For example, loaders who aren't immediately involved with their primary task (servicing the main gun), should assist the tank commander in scanning for targets. This seeming bit of common sence is really not that common in practice, and the simple fact German loaders did more of it than their Soviet counterparts gave the Panzer units a major advantage. With two pairs of eyes searching, German tank crews almost invariably got off the first shot against their opponents. (In T-34s the tank commanders also served as loaders!)
    Though equipment is less important than crew cohesion, the greater the superiority of the tank itself over those of it's opponents the better chances are for the crew to survive to develop skills. The most important feature of a tank in this respect is the protection it offers it's crew. It's not surprising, therefore, that the Tiger fostered more killer crews than any other vehicle in World War 2. It's superiority over Allied tanks during 1942-44 is well known.
    Extraordinary efforts were usually required to knock out a Tiger. Allied tankers calculated as a rule of the thumb it usually took about 20 Shermans to knock out one Tiger. With superiority like that, it's no wonder the Tigers often created field days for their side. Increased survivability permitted Tiger crews to live to fight another day. Virtually every Tiger 'ace' worthy of note had more than one tank shot from under him, but only rarely did a shell hit kill an entire crew.

    B5N2Kate's Expansion
    Prokhorovka provides examples of such aces. Youv'e already familiarized yourself with one from the above text, SS 1st Lt. Rudolph von Ribbentrop and his remarkable action in a Pz-IV against the morning Soviet attacks. Using his head, Ribbentrop let the Soviet wave 'roll over him', and un-noticed, began to cut a swathe of Soviet machines from the middle of their own formation, using wrecked tanks and the poor visability to maximize his action 'run'.
    Another remarkable performance at Kursk was the 6th Panzer Division's Major Fritze Bake. With a captured T-34 cunningly heading his column, Bake managed to spearhead the advance of the entire 3rd Panzer Corps on the night of the 12th of July, pulling it along in the wake of his daring success....

    "A T-34 led a column of vehicles into the darkness behind Soviet lines. The guards at the trenches must not have looked closely, because the T-34's markings were painted over and replaced with a small cross. It was one of the score or so of T-34's in German service, and Bake used it to lead his battalions past the Russian sentries. After six miles or so, the T-34 broke down,"No doubt moved by national sentiments," Bake commented.
    On crept Bake's battalion, past stationary T-34s, their crews sleeping in the grass. A column of Soviet tanks appeared heading in the opposite direction. In the darkness, all tanks looked the same, or did they? He recalled "They obviously believed us to be their own tanks returning from the front. 22 tanks passed my unit, almost track to track. but then 6 or 7 pulled out of the column, turned, rolled back and pulled in behind us." Bake turned his Panzer to block the T-34's. although his own command panzer had only a dummy gun for protection, Bake ordered the rest of his unit to continue and secure the objective bridge.
    The T-34s ominously drew up in a semicircle while Bake and his operations officer slipped out of their panzer. They crept up to the T-34s and attached hollow charges. A handful of infantry was hitching a ride on one of the T-34s. One of them noticed Bake and raised his rifle. Bake snatched the rifle from the Russian's hand and jumped into a ditch. One after the other, three explosions lit up the night. One of Bake's own tanks knocked out a fourth T-34. German and Soviet MG and tank fire erupted. The startled Soviets withdrew across the nearby Donets bridge at Rzhavets and blew it up behind them but could not prevent German Grenadiers from wading across the river. The bridge was captured and repaired, leaving the 3rd Panzer Corps free to thrust northward."

    A cool head and a clear mind are also obvious assets to good tank operations. July 14 saw Bake spearheading the entire 6th Panzer division with another officer called Hunersdorf in an attack on Alexandrowka. Bake's tank knocked out 2 soviet machines and an anti-tank gun "while his battlegroup destroyed another 29 tanks and 25 AT guns." Remember how important maneuver was said to be for a tank commander acting as a platoon/company battle group leader? Initiative and experience are both elements of a successful 'ace', something Bake's story shows very well.

    Good teamwork was responsible for one of Das Reich's Mark-IV 'aces'. SS 2nd Lt. Hans Mennel knocked out 24 Soviet tanks during the midday fighting of July 12th, sniping at Soviet machines during their attempted penetration of Das Reich's positions.

    But, Prokhorovka also saw another young SS 2nd Lieutenant perform well. His career would lead him from this obscure Ukrainian field to Normandy, where he was responsible for the most studied single tank action of all time, at the Norman village of Villers-Bocage where his Tiger, solo, halted an entire arm of a British offensive as he crept through the town to destroy 24 tanks and vehicles of the 4th County of London Yeomanry, July 13th 1944. That 2nd Lieutenant was none other than Michael Wittmann, with his gunner, Balthasar "Bobby" Woll. Wittmann was already a practiced professional by the time of Kursk, starting in an armoured car, then a STG-III in the Heer, before joining the Waffen-SS in 1942 and recieving training for the Tiger. His presence in a Tiger was no accident, for as is noted above, the Germans put their best crews into their Tigers to maximize their effectiveness. Although 'Bobby' Woll was resting on the day of July 12, he was to accompany Wittmann to other battles, including their Villers-Bocage romp. This pair provide a classic example of the commander/gunner team, utilizing their quick reflexes and material assets to outperform the Soviet attackers closing in for a high speed gun duel....

    "Meanwhile, north of Oktiabrs'kii, the Tigers of SS Captain Heinrich Kling's 13th Heavy Panzer company crushed through the hedgerows and thickets. Suddenly, a wave of 60 Soviet tanks swept out of a wood less than a mile away. Second Lieutenant Michael Wittmann's Tiger rocked from the recoil as his 88mm gun knocked out the first T34. The Soviet tanks fired on the go, rapidly closing the distance. Four Tigers were hit and temporarily crippled.
    Wittmann's Tiger shuddered from two hits but remained unfazed although his radio operator recieved a wound in the upper arm.
    "Three o'clock, three hundred!", cried Wittmann.
    A T-34 appeared out of some bushes. It swung it's 76.2mm gun toward Wittmann's Tiger, but Wittmann's gunner, Balthasar Woll, was faster. The 88mm muzzle flashed and blew the turret off the T-34.
    Wittmann's platoon of three Tigers pushed on through the storm of steel, through flames and smoke of burning grass. He had passed Prokhorovka when Kling's voice rang through the radio,
    "Achtung! Strong force ahead! Many tanks!"
    Soviet tanks of the 181st Brigade closed in from about a mile away, dissappearing into a valley and then reappearing over a rise. The stationary Tigers opened and maintained a rapid rate of fire. Numerous Soviet tanks were blown to pieces, but the remaining machines kept coming. They had to close within 800m to be able to penetrate the Tiger's frontal armor.
    Leading a group of 15 tanks, Cpt. P.A. Skripkin's T-34 closed in on Wittmann's platoon. "Forward, follow me!", Skripkin shouted. Skripkin fired a round into the Tiger's side, disabling it. Wittmann's Tiger responded by pumping two rounds into Skripkin's tank. Skripkin was wounded, and his crew pulled him out of the burning T-34. The driver jumped back in, and like a flaming ball of fire his T-34 tore down onto SS Staff Sergeant Georg Lotzsch's Tiger. Lotzsch steered straight toward the oncoming Soviet tank, slammed on the brakes and fired. The 88mm round hit the edge of the turret and ricocheted into the sky. The 30-ton T-34 rammed Lotzsch's Tiger, shaking the ground with it's impact. Flames engulfed both tanks. Lotzsch kept his nerve and backed out just before the T-34 exploded.

    Quick thinking, teamwork and reflexes. A cool head with a bit of luck thrown in.
    These are the assets that took Wittmann and Woll from one engagement to the next.
    And made them the most famous commander/gunner team of them all.

    'Killer' crews in the crucible of the "Prokhorovskoe Poboische".......






    ..............................................................CONTINUED BELOW.............................................................................



    .......................................................................................................................................................................
     
  3. Cate Blanchett

    Cate Blanchett recruit

    Joined:
    Nov 29, 2009
    Messages:
    172
    Likes Received:
    4
    .................................................................SS PANZER CONTINUED......................................................................



    ELEPHANTS AT WAR: THE TRUTH : :tinysmile_angry2_t:....BY TIMOTHY J. KUTTA
    By the end of the 1940 campaign in France it had become obvious to the German High command their army needed new tanks.

    At a minimum they needed a larger, heavier tank to replace the Mark-IV. By the following spring, the design firms of Henschel and Porsche were hard at work on new, larger tank models.

    The Army Weapons Office designated new tank development programs as Versuchskonstruktion (VK) or, in English, 'experimental'. The VK designation was followed by a two or three digit number representing the maximum tonnage of the new vehicle. The next two numbers represented the place of the project in that weight class. If more than one company was submitting designs, the VK numbers would be followed by a letter in parentheses designating specific corporations. Thus the VK4501(P) was the first in a series of 45 ton tank designs, this one submitted by Porsche (P).
    The VK4501(P) was Porsche's version of the Tiger tank. It looked a lot like the machine from Henschel that did eventually reach production as the Tiger. Their turrets were nearly identical, but differences existed in their hull configurations. The design had wide tracks needed to maneuver well in the road-sparse eastern theater, along with the most advanced engineering features the Porsche company could put into it.
    It was armed with the 88mm KwK 36 cannon, which was a conversion of an anti-aircraft gun to anti-tank duties. It also had two 7.92mm machine-guns and front hull and turret armor of 100mm thickness. Though the vehicle was powerful, it was slow. Equipped with two Maybach petrol engines, generating a total of 530 horsepower, it had a top road speed of only 12.5 miles/hour and a maximum cross-country rate of just six.
    On 20 April 1942 the Fuhrer was presented with two of the prototypes as a birthday present. He was impressed with both machines, but liked the Henschel entry best.
    Thus, it entered production in August 1942 to become the PzKw VI Tiger tank.

    BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD.
    The rejected Porsche prototype was taken back to the factory. At the time they lost the competition, there were 10 additional chassis in various stages of construction on the assembly line. With so much time and capital already invested, Dr. Ferdinand Porsche, the company's head, decided to try to modify his VK4501 into some new and better vehicle that would get Hitler's approval.
    By the time the Tiger began production, Porsche was far enough along on his upgrade project that he again showed it to the Army Weapons office. The new entry was still based on the original VK4501, but it sported a new and enlarged turret housing an improved 88mm L/71 cannon. The redesign was so obviously impressive the army again offered the project for competition.
    Thus the VK4502 project was born.
    Henschel also entered this new race to design what was to become the King Tiger (or Tiger II). Again Henschel won the competition based on a superior drive train, engine and internal layout. Once again Ferdinand Porsche was left with an assembly line full of unusable tank chassis. In fact, now he had enough parts, pieces and hulls to outfit over 90 vehicles.
    At this point Porsche's previously frustrated efforts were rewarded. Recognizing a great deal of valuable time and money had been invested in the project, the Army Weapons Office appraoched Porsche to ask about the feasibility of turning his VK4501/02S into some kind of super tank killer. The thick frontal armour and long range punch of it's 88mm gun would make the "Ferdinand" a mighty tank destroyer.
    Of course the project had to be finished on the cheap; there were no additional funds for elaborate turrets. All the Weapons Office asked Porsche to do was mount the cannons inside a heavily armoured box atop the VK4501/02 chassis.
    Thus was born what became known as the "Ferdinand" or "Elephant" tank destroyer.

    ELEPHANT TANK DESTROYERS.
    The new tank destroyer was an impressive vehicle.
    26' 10" long, 9' 10" high, 11' 1" wide, with a combat range of 95 miles. It was also well armored. In addition to the original 100mm (3.94 inches) front plate and hull armor, Porsche engineers added anther 100mm of supplemental protection to those areas. The hull sides and rear had 80mm (3.15 inches) and the top had 30mm (7.88 inches) of frontal armour and 80mm on it's sides and rear.
    The real power of the Elephants lay in their 88mm anti-tank cannon, which could penetrate up to 8.1 inches (206mm) of armor at 500 meters, and up to 6.2 inches (158mm) at 2,000 meters. The best tank in the Soviet arsenal at the time was the T-34/85, which had only 3.8 inches (97mm) of frontal armor, and an 85mm gun that could only penetrate 4.3 inches (110mm) of armor at 500 meters, and 3.5 inches (89mm) at 2,000 meters.
    As they came off the assembly line, none of the Elephants had a machine-gun mounted on the chassis' bow. After all, these were tank destroyers and not intended for close quarters action against infantry. The only doctrinal reason they would need machine-guns was for anti-aircraft defense or the occasional chance meeting with an enemy infantry patrol. Thus, all the Elephants were given a 7.62mm machinegun, stowed inside along with 600 rounds of ammunition, which could be quickly mounted on the commander's hatch ring.

    KURSK
    90 Elephants were completed from late 1942 through the start of the summer the following year. All of them were issued to Tank Killer Battalions 653 and 654. The two units trained hard and fast and were soon ordered to the Eastern Front to help with the attack of the German's northern pincer at Kursk in July. Field Marshal Walter Model, commander of the northern effort, decided to use the Elephants (along with a battalion of Tigers) as the point of an armoured spear that would pierce straight through the Soviet defenses. The attack would be launched across a narrow front, with the powerful Tigers and Elephants punching the hole while the older tank models and infantry covered the flanks and brought up the rear.
    The Elephants trundled forward into the first Soviet defensive belt early on the morning of 5 July. Moving at six miles/hour they were easy targets for enemy gunners. Though most of the Soviet guns couldn't penetrate the Elephant's frontal armor even at point-blank range, many of them advanced into predesignated "final kill zones" where specially trained anti-tank infantry and combat engineers moved in close to use satchel charges. The concussion from such demolitions instantly disabled or completely destroyed many Elephants. Some of them also foundered in the belts of anti-tank mines strewn in front of Soviet positions. Too clumsy to maneuver, too slow to retreat, the Elephants were picked off with ease by Red Army defenders. Committed in this way the Elephants never really had a chance...
    40 of them were soon destroyed.
    After the offensive ended, General Heinz Guderian, then serving as Chief of all Germany's armored forces, commented that the use of Elephants against dug-in infantry was like using cannon to shoot quail. Still, despite their high attrition rate, the Elephants were credited with destroying a total of 502 Soviet tanks between 5 and 27 July.
    The surviving Elephants were withdrawn from Russia late in 1943 to be sent back to Germany for refit and overhaul. One of those changes was the addition of a bow machinegun.
    In 1944 they were transferred to Italy where they were used with some success against the Western Allies. There, however, whenever an Elephant opened fire it quickly became a target itself.
    In fact, it tended to become THE target, since Allied commanders always attempted to do everything in their power to rid their sector of German 88mm guns. The few remaining Elephants were regrouped into Heavy Tank Destroyer Company 614 late in 1944, a unit that disappeared from German records early in the new year.

    ELEPHANTS GRAVEYARD.
    The Elephants failed in Russia because they were not committed properly. They were wrongly used as Assault Guns, moving forward with tanks and infantry to engage in close combat. But the Elephants were Tank Destroyers which means they should have been place at key terrain features in positions with long, open fields of fire. So used they could easily have destroyed huge numbers of attacking Soviet tanks at long range, thereby stalling enemy offensives and counterattacks. Impervious to almost all Soviet return fire at long range, the Elephants could have maintained such positions until they ran out of ammunition or enemy aircraft intervened.
    Model, however, impressed with the Elephant's armor and gun, sent them into their worst possible scenario. He used them against dug-in infantry that was well supported by anti-tank guns, artillery and aircraft. Even though the Elephants started with German infantry support, the Soviets had by that point in the war learned how to break up such attacks. First, artillery and machine-gun fire forced the infantry to go to ground away from the tanks and suppressed their ability to fire back. The same fire forced the vehicle commanders to close their hatches, making it difficult to aquire targets and observe. With the tanks now unprotected and blinded, tank-killer squads could close in to destroy the machines with satchel charges used against the sides or rear.
    In the final analysis, the issue of the Elephants missing machineguns can be seen for what it was, a smokescreen put out by the Germans after the fact to cover Model's foolish misuse of the new tank destroyers as assault guns.

    Comment from B5N2Kate....
    For Model, "The Fuhrer's Fireman", where there's smoke, there's definately FIRE in this case. And no amount of water will put this one out!
    .....What a joke!
    He needed SS General Willi Bittrich to pull his chestnuts out of the fire at Arnhem as well!
    :tinysmile_cry_t3:Walter Model should be near to the bottom of everybody's list of competant German Generals!






    And so, this article comes to an end. Hope you enjoyed! Comments or pictures most welcome!

    MORO! (Cheers!)

    B5N2Kate
     

Share This Page