Tarawa.....November 20, 1943

Thanks, 1st Chutes. These two paragraphs are interesting; "Mine" appears to be a misnomer for Mili island, an important Japanese base.

As a result of GALVANIC, the Army Air Forces gained four new airfields from which to launch strikes at targets in the Marshalls. At Tarawa, a 6,000- foot runway was built on Betio, while 7,000 and 4,000-foot runways were constructed on Buota. On 15 December, the first bombers, twin-engine B–25s (North American Mitchells), arrived at Tarawa, but neither of the two atoll bases was then ready to handle its full complement of planes. As the year 1944 arrived, heavy B–24s began flying bombing and reconnaissance missions from Tarawa. In spite of swamps and soft ground,a 7,000-foot flight strip was finished at Makin early in January. Because this runway was built on sand rather than coral, it could not support the weight of B–24s. The Apamama facility, completed by 15 January, boasted 7,000 feet of hard coral surface ideally suited to heavy bombers.

Aircraft of all services joined surface ships in a series of raids planned to batter Kwajalein Atoll, neutralize the Japanese bases that surrounded it, and gain information on the enemy’s defenses. Mine (Mili), Jaluit, and Maloelap were the principal targets hit during November and December by Army and Navy planes of Admiral Hoover’s command. During January, after the Gilberts fields had been completed, the heaviest tonnage fell on Kwajalein and Wotje. Land-based planes in December and January dropped 326 tons of explosives on targets in Maloelap Atoll, 313 on Kwajalein, 256 on Jaluit, 415 on Mine (Mili), and 367 on Wotje. The Japanese retaliated by loosing a total of 193 tons of bombs on Makin, Tarawa, and Apamama. In the meantime, patrol bombers from Midway were active over Wake Island.

A significant share of the bombing took place prior to the airfields in the Gilberts becoming operational. This was by B-24s staging through Baker Island and hitting the targets in the eastern and southern Marshalls which they could reach from there; presumably they could fly further on reconnaissance missions. Of course whatever bombing they did on Tarawa or Makin could have been redirected to the eastern Marshalls if the Gilberts were bypassed.

Significant land-based bombing of Kwajalein only began in January and totalled only 313 tons, less than 20% of the tonnage cited. To put this in perspective, the Tarawa invasions forces included 18 aircraft carriers (6 CV, 5 CVL, 7 CVE) with over 800 aircraft including some 250 TBFs and 200 SBDs; they could deliver 313 tons in one mission.

No doubt the Gilberts bases were useful to the Marshalls campaign, but that's not the same as saying Operation Flintlock couldn't possibly be done without them.

The common "lessons learned" argument is not an argument for Tarawa or any specific operation. The same lessons would be learned wherever we made our first Central Pacific landing, though they might be learned less painfully if the first objective was not as heavily defended as Betio.

 

Chichi Jima was not particularly inviting either. Bradley in Flyboys quotes an unnamed Marine saying it would have been worse than Iwo. It and its neighbors are volcanic and almost entirely mountainous. There were some 25,000 Japanese troops in the Bonins excluding Iwo, most of them on Chichi. Although the island has a decent small harbor, it had no airfield and does not to this day.

The alternative to invading Iwo Jima was simply to leave it alone, except air attacks if the Japanese tried to reestablish their own aircraft on the island. This could be accomplished by carriers en route to or from other operations - they often used isolated Japanese islands like Wake or Marcus for 'practice' - or by land-based air - including fighters - from the Marianas. We would forego any airfield in the Bonins and put up with whatever nuisance Iwo presented in terms of early warning, could also bomb radar stations of course. Might as well state the options clearly.

 

Carronade,

You are not entirely correct about Chichi Jima's airfield. The island did have an airfield, it was known as Susaki airfield, as well as a seaplane base. However, Susaki airfield was not technically an operational airfield, but a dirt strip that was used for emergency purposes. There are still a few Japanese aircraft wrecks there today. It is also worth noting that even though the US Navy maintained an presence on Chichi Jima for some two decades after the war, they never made Susaki operational nor did they build their own airfield, you flew in on a seaplane/helicopter or came by boat. Had Chichi Jima been suitable for an airstrip, I would think the US or JMSDF would have built one by now.

While the small dirt airfield might have been extended and improved to handle the B-29s, US Navy target studies had concluded that it would take an inordinate amount of time and effort to realize this goal. IIRC, the first B-29 to land on Iwo Jima, landed while the battle was about halfway through - This would have been impossible had the invasion taken place on Chichi Jima.

Also US aerial reconnaissance had found Chichi Jima to have formidable defenses, especially around Futami harbor. The there was also the lack of suitable amphibious landing sites.

While Chichi Jima did have a fine harbor, as well as, necessities such as fresh water supply & ample space for supplies, it was the lack of suitable airfield sites that nixed it as an invasion target. Such was the changing nature of warfare, where Chichi Jima would have been more important in 1941, when the battleship reigned supreme, by 1944, the airplane had supplant the battleship, and airfields were more important than harbors.

 

Thanks, Takao, for the correction and additional information.

 

Hate to burst your bubble, but critique of the US Marines applies to their upper echelon officers, not to the poor buggers that had to carry out their orders.

Of course, if I display a general garment, and you claim it cuts to your fit, then this is your personal beef entire.


All the saluting in the world doesn't change the fact that Tarawa was a fiasco from start to finish, principally because the officers who planned the assault would not listen to local advice. End of story.

And, as I pointed out further, other operations planned by many of the same individuals had the same results....too many bloody casualties compared to the numbers involved.

As to Chichi Jima only having s "Dirt strip for emergencey purposes", this is really all that was required of the airfield site on Iwo, so this makes no sense.

Iwo Jima was an opportunity for the US Marines to "fly the flag", and mount yet another costly frontal assault. Great planning....yeah.

Patton and Bradley would have laughed at that. Macarthur hated the Navy, and he would have hooted too.

The high command of the US Army weren't fooled either. So go on and keep rowing that boat fellas! It's what the Navy do best, row their own boat....

Best Regards.

BTW...Australian operations in the Pacific make the operations of the US Marines look ordinary. Same thing happened in Vietnam. And we are still with you for this current stoush as well. So, pep up and realise that the Australian Army isn't fooled either. Just ask any Australian soldier what he thinks of Yanks, if you dare!!!

It was your Corps buddies that paid for this with their lives, and thee wounded who went home by the thousands to mass postwar indifference from the wider community. Such is the lot of the serving soldier in all wars. Glory is fleeting, and once the truth sinks in that the service you gave your life or limb for is an organisation that doesn't want to know you anymore, you then begin to think otherwise about exactly why you find yourself in the situation you are in.

You guys are just like Policeman that have been accused of misconduct. When questioned by your superiors, you band together to form the same story. I think we've just proven author Frank Herbert's assumption that the Police mind and the military mind are similar in the way they work to protect their own self interest first, above every other consideration, and at the expense of their integrity.

If you wish to keep defending these costly bloodbaths as "Job well done", then I would hate to see any of you in high command, with the lives of thousands hanging on your choices.

 

Island hopping was all about airfields: Either denying the enemy the oppurtunity to launch attacks or exploiting the Airfield to use against them. Once there was an Airstrip it could maintain either fighters, for escort, or cargo planes and bombers.
Takao is right on target when he asserts that by 1943 the airplane surpassed the battleship on the battlefield.

Tarawa was emensly important, at the time, in that it afforded a large enough airfield to support strategiac and tactical aircraft operations and act as a logistics logistics hub. The importance or Tarawa deminished quickly as the tempo accross the Pacific picked up steam and Tarawa was quickly relegated to "Rear area" status.

 

Hate to burst your bubble, but critique of the US Marines applies to their upper echelon officers, not to the poor buggers that had to carry out their orders.<BR><BR>Of course, if I display a general garment, and you claim it cuts to your fit, then this is your personal beef entire.<BR><BR><BR>All the saluting in the world doesn't change the fact that Tarawa was a fiasco from start to finish, principally because the officers who planned the assault would not listen to local advice. End of story.<BR><BR>And, as I pointed out further, other operations planned by many of the same individuals had the same results....too many bloody casualties compared to the numbers involved.<BR><BR>It was your Corps buddies that paid for this with their lives, and thee wounded who went home by the thousands to mass postwar indifference from the wider community. Such is the lot of the serving soldier in all wars. Glory is fleeting, and once the truth sinks in that the service you gave your life or limb for doesn't want to know you, you then begin to think otherwise about exactly why you find yourself in the situation you are in.<BR><BR>You guys are just like Policeman that have been accused of misconduct. When questioned by your superiors, you band together to form the same story. I think we've just proven author Frank Herbert's assumption that the Police mund and the military mind are similar in the way they work to protect their own self interest first, above evry other consideration, and at the expense of their integrity.<BR><BR>If you wish to keep defending these costly bloodbaths as "Job well done", then I would hate to see any of you in high command, with the lives of thousands hanging on your choices.

 

oops...double post. Sorry..

 

By the way again, I'm not talking one bit about the IMPORTANCE of these objectives. Or the obvious results from seizing them.

I am criticizing the METHOD by which they were captured. And in the case of Peleliu and Iwo jima, that the assaults had to be mounted at all.

So, most of your howling means NOTHING to the critique that I'm espousing...

Got ya...

I've been WAITING to drop that little tit bit.

Go back and read my posts again. I am criticizing the METHOD, not the fact that these islands were necessary objectives.

Stick that in your pipe and smoke. Draw long and hard now!

 

Volga;

Tarawa was a blunder caused by poor tactical planning that wasnt repeated afterwards. Nothing wrong in learning some brutal lessons, as long as its never repeated.

Iwo Jima was a small island where the only tactic was to go head in. There was no room to maneuver and the tactics used by the IJA was brilliant.

Pelilue was a planning blunder by the JCS for allowing the invasion to procede. How different it would have been if Iwo was invaded then instead of these useless islands.

 

O.K. Volga, here are some facts:

1.) The Marine Corps did not pick the objectives. So if there was, and I am not saying there was, a problem with planning at the strategic level, it was not Mrine Corps officers that had the final say. Opinions could be voiced by the staffs, which did contain Marine Corps officers, but there is no guarantee their opinions would sway decisions.
2.) Betio was a very small piece of land but one of the few places in the atoll that could support the type of airfield the Army Air Corps wanted. If they were to follow orders the division staff that planned the invasion would have to decide how to attack the island. Intelligence was very good, they knew almost exactly how many troops, where most of the emplacements were and what type weapons they contained. They also had a good idea of what the other defensive measures were. This was the first time an atoll had been attacked by the Americans and they could attack from the ocean side or across the fringing reef. The sea side was as heavily fortified as the lagoon side but it had more anti-boat obstacles and mines. Planners were also aware of the problem caused by little or no water across the reef at low tide and the possibility of a dodging tide making passage over the reef by LCVP's and LCM's impossible(note1). Shoup one of the cheif planners went to the navy about special shallow draft boats but was turned down. They then came up with the innovative use of LVT's to carry the assault waves. Prior to this they had only been used as logistics vehicles. There was a great deal of concern that adding armor to the cab and additional weapons would so decrease the freeboard that they would swamp or the added weight to the cabs would cause them to capsize. These problems were addressed and what seemed a viable alternative for assaulting across a reef was decided upon. The next problem was that there were not enough of these vehicles to carry all the initial assault waves. That's where the information that I posted earlier about the 100 LVT-2's located on the west coast is applicable. The operation was on a tight time table and the higher ups at the JCS and at Pearl Harbor would not allow for any delays because it would effect the planned Marshall's operation.

From Hyperwar:

"Through aerial photographs, especially those obtained during the United States raids on Tarawa on 18 and 19 September 1943, planning agencies of Central Pacific Force, V Amphibious Corps, and 2d Marine Division estimated the numbers and types of weapons on Betio, and located their emplacements. A post-operation survey proved that the estimates were unusually accurate.[SIZE=-1][SUP]11[/SUP][/SIZE]
Information on the tides and on the reef that fringed Tarawa Atoll, both on the exterior and interior, was equally complete. To reach Betio Island from the sea or from the waters of the lagoon, regardless of the direction of approach, meant crossing the reef. "The ideal defensive barrier has always been the one that could not be demolished, which held up assaulting forces under the unobstructed fire of the defenders and past which it was impossible to run, crawl, dig, climb, or sail. The barrier reef fulfills these conditions to the letter, except when sufficient amphibious tanks and similar vehicles are available to the attackers" (CincPac Op. Report, November 1943). To land its assault waves on Betio, the 2d Marine Division had decided to use amphibious tractors (LVTs) and had conducted successful experiments with them. Later waves would have to go in boats (LCMs and LCVPs).
It was necessary that the last of the tractor waves cross the reef as the tide approached the flood so that there would be enough water to float the boats over when they arrived at the reef. To get information on Gilbert tides, the division turned to some men who probably knew more about them than anyone else. Since available charts of the Tarawa waters were known to be inaccurate, Fifth Amphibious Force obtained the services of several British who had lived in the various islands of the Gilbert group, or had been shipmasters operating small steamers and schooners among these islands. A part of this group was sent to the 2d Marine Division to assist in its planning; it consisted of Maj. F.L.G. Holland, who had lived on Bairiki (the island adjacent to Betio) for 15 years, a Captain Warnham who had been in the atoll for about 5 years, and several small craft skippers who had sailed the waters of the Gilbert and Fiji Islands. During the early planning, Gen. Julian C. Smith learned from the tide tables furnished by these men that he could expect 5 feet of water on the reef at high neap tide, enough to get the boats in to the beaches.[SIZE=-1][SUP]12[/SUP][/SIZE] However, General Smith also learned that these tides were not always dependable; that there were frequent dodging tides. Early in the planning stage, when it became apparent that amphibian tractors would have to be used to get its first waves ashore, the 2d Marine Division requested that additional tractors be furnished. The division had about 100 tractors, 75 of which were thought to be in suitable condition for the operation. According to Colonel M.A. Edson, 100 LVT(2)s were assigned the division but they were still in San Diego and could not be shipped out in time to reach the division at Wellington, nor could the Navy furnish sufficient LSTs to transport them. However, 50 could be sent to Samoa in time, and this was done. Trained personnel from the 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion were sent to Samoa to form a new company, with the LVT(2)s, which would join the division at Tarawa on D-day."

The division also rated 243 flame throwers and 243 M1 bazookas, because these were new weapons and the division was at the end of the huge Pacific supply chain they could not reach the division in time for the assault, so they went in with zero bazookas and like 24 flame throwers. (I'll double check these numbers when I get home but I'm pretty sure they're correct). Also originally the Gilberts operation was to be carried out by the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions or alternately the 7th ID which was then involved in the Aleutians operation. The original objectives were Tarawa, Apamama and Nauru. MacArthur put up a big fight to retain the 1st Marine Division and claimed it's loss would unnecessarily delay his operations even though Admiral King agreed to transfer an Army division to MacArthur to take their place, MacArthur refused. (At the time he still contemplated assaulting Rabaul which was eventually bypassed). In the end a reinforced Regimental Combat team from the 27th Infantry was substituted. The Marine planners complained that Nauru was too heavily fortified, too far removed from the other objectives and there were insufficient troops available to include this objective. Shipping constraints convinced the Navy and Makin was substituted as an objective for the 27th division. 2nd Division planners also requested that they be allowed to make a preliminary landing on a neighboring island to Betio in order to set up artillery to support the landings. This request was also denied by the navy because it would cause a delay in the main landings.
When the landings actually took place the first assault waves actually arrived ashore intact, it was during the follow on waves that things began to fall apart because of the low tide and amtrac losses. It was the Marines trying to hide how successfull the use of LVT's had been from the Japanese that led to the landings getting the reputation for being ill planned. (I posted info on this earlier and will not re-post it here).
The question I would like to ask you is: How/what could they or should they have done differently given the resources and orders they were given?

As far as Marines not criticizing their own that too is B.S. General Rupertus has been heavily criticized for his handling of the Peleilu fight. This operation was undertaken at the insistance of MacArthur, with Nimitz's concurrence, because he wanted it to secure the flank of his Invasion of the Phillipines. Once events made the operation unnecessary neither MacArthur nor Nimitz would push to have it cancelled. Halsey was a vocal advocate of cancelling the operation as unneccessary but his opinion did little to change the orders.

There is a saying "The enemy gets a vote". That is the reason amphibious assults in the Pacific remained costly it's that enemy defenses and tactics changed to meet the changing tactics employed by the allies. The lessons of Tarawa were largely implemented by the time of the Marshall's campaign and it was an etremely well run operation with relatively light casualties. Each subsequent operation became more costly as the distance from Japan decreased and new and better defensive tactics were employed by the Japanese.

Iwo was pushed by the Army Air Corps because of heavy losses in the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. Crippled B-29's were landing on the airfield within two weeks of D-Day. It was also intended to support fighter escorts, house Search and Rescue aircraft and prevent it's use as an early warning base by the Japanese. Even though it was secured less than 5 months before the end of the war, more aircrew lives were saved than ground troops were killed. If planners had known that the war would be ended by the atomic bomb, they probably wouldn't have taken the island, and probably not Okinawa either. But looking forward towards an invasion of Japan and long term bombing raids it looked more important,. But then we have 20-20 hindsight. Iwo Jima's 26,000 American casualties (6812 dead) is high in retrospect. What then of the 51,429 American combat casualties at Okinawa (12,513 dead) or the 28 ships sunk and 386 damaged? What did we get for this expenditure? Nothing in hindsight but it would have been critical if the war had continued.

Note:1 Pre-war the Marine Corps became interested in Andrew Higgin's, Eureka Boat. They pushed for development and adoption by the navy. The Eureca Boat became the LCP(L) (Landing Craft Personnel, Large). Marine observers in China saw Japanese landing barges with front ramps for debarkation, they pushed for this modification to the LCP and you had the LCP(R) (Landing Craft Personnel Ramp). This craft was modified with a full width ramp to become the LCVP.

 

I agree with these evaluations.

I think if you'll look a little deeper Syscom3 you'll find this evaluation doesn't hold up. It can be argued that Tarawa should never have been invaded, in that case the fault rests with the JCS. As far as the overall tactical planning was concerned I fail to see any blunders. If you would point out specific issues I'd be more than happy to re-assess my position.

 

According to Morison, land-based aircraft dropped about 200 tons of bombs each on Mili, Wotje, Maleolap, and Roi-Namur (one of the two principal objectives within Kwajalein atoll) in January 1944. This is basically consistent with the Marine history. No mention of Jaluit, but the wikipedia article on the island says it was bombed on five occasions in November and December 1943 by B-24 Liberator bombers of the USAAF 7th Air Force., which would have been staging through Baker or Nanumea at that point; apparently Jaluit was considered to have been sufficiently suppressed. Presumably the January bombings were mainly from the newly opened airfields in the Gilberts; there were also a few B-25s on Tarawa in the last days of December.

Morison also writes that the heavy bombers operated mainly at night after losing three B-24s in a daylight attack on Maloelap and that night attacks were "not accurate". In particular these were the only aircraft which could reach Kwajalein

Japanese air power in the Marshalls was largely untouched, with ~150 aircraft operational as late as Jan 27. They were wiped out in a few days when the fast carriers arrived in advance of the invasion.

Were the Gilberts used for anything logistically beyond supporting these air operations and their own garrisons? The Marshalls invasion was staged entirely from Hawaii. Once Kwajalein and Majuro were secured, they became the bases for advance further west.

 

I'd like to thank both you and Takao for the very informative posts you've provided in this thread. You've "fleshed out" things I'd read with further details. Example: I had read that Chichi Jima was unsuitable, but didn't really have details as to why. Another thing I've learned here, I don't remember what post or link it was, was about the orientation of islands being important for their use as airfields because of predominant wind direction. I had always assumed that it was only their size, topography and type of terrain that dictated their suitability as an airfield. Examples of what I knew: Lunga being important because it was a flat plain where most of the island was hilly/mountainous or swampy (topography and terrain type). Makin-portions of the ground under the runway too swampy to support fully loaded bombers (Terrain type).

Now, I know an additional important factor is the terrain allows for construction of a runway oriented into the wind, kinda like a carrier with wind over the bow. I'd never considered this aspect.

As for your last post, it was my understanding that long range aerial reconnaissance flow out of the Gilberts was of more import than the bombing staged out of there. The Japanese had controlled the Marshall's as a pre-war mandate and intell was primarily was very scarce and primarily limited to that which could be gathered from submarines.

 

Carronade wrote:

Agreed the Marshalls campaign could have gone forward without the Gilbert's campaign. Marine General Holland M. Smith expressed this opinion in his memoirs, published 6 years after the battle.
Heres a link to the book online:
HyperWar: Coral and Brass (Gen. Holland M. Smith, USMC (Ret.)
None of the other principle leaders shared his assesment Nimitz, Turner, and Julian Smith disagreed. So who knows?

Carronade wrote:

I've pondered this very good point since you first posted it. The more I've considered it the more I couldn't come up with a good alternative. Amphibious assault on a fortified atoll required a whole new skill set. Was it too big a gamble to risk the Marshall's being their learning experience? Very hard question.

 

Thanks for the compliment, and you're welcome!

Reconnaissance is a good point, but again I'd say it falls short of proving that the Gilberts operation was an absolute prerequisite. Reconnaissance could also be conducted by carrier planes; in fact one of the most crucial photos was taken during the carrier strike Dec 4? It showed a bomber-sized airstrip under construction on Kwajalein island in Kwajalein atoll, which is oriented east-west, another good point. This helped planners decide to go directly to Kwajalein rather than landing on one or more of the eastern Marshalls first. If we had not already settled on the Gilberts strategy, we would likely have launched carrier attacks on the Marshalls earlier.

There was legitimate concern about Japanese aircraft in the Marshalls. G4Ms torpedoed the carrier Independence during the Gilberts operation and Lexingtion during the December raid. There was a strong feeling that carrier commander Pownall had botched that operation, which led to his being replaced by Mitscher. Mitscher designed a very aggressive program for our return to the Marshalls, which as noted earlier promptly eliminated Japanese air there.

Was it too big a gamble to risk the Marshall's being their learning experience? Indeed a good question, but for twenty years of prewar planning that had been our intention. There was no expectation of the Gilberts being in play in a purely US-Japan war, although we did hope to still have Wake as a reconnaissance platform. It was appreciated that a large fleet would be required, including many transport, cargo, and support ships either built or converted from civilian service, even auxiliary aircraft carriers although these were expected to be converted from fast passenger liners. Hopefully any learning experience would be an overly costly victory rather than outright defeat.

 

Carronade wrote:

It's been my impression that most US pre-war plans took for granted that the Gilberts would still be in British hands, so retaking them wouldn't be necessary. I do know that most pre-war planning assumed that Britain, particularly it's navy, would be a major factor in any future war with Japan.

 

I have to thank all you contributors for an excellent thread - never knew anything about Tarawa before.

One of the school books we were made to read was "Pattern of Islands" by Arthur Grimble. Beautiful book about a minor Civil Servant who was sent out to "govern" these Islands with the aid of a couple of local policemen (year around 1900). Crime was stealing your neighbours fishing net and the great excitement of the year was when the Copra Boat arrived to collect the total wealth of the Islands.

Sorry but I had to smile at "Islands in the hands of the British" - all five of them!

 

I think by the time Tarawa rolled around the Japanese knew what to expect and they had time to plan for it; this is evident in that we start to see the Japanese plan their defenses "at the water line" beginning with Tarawa/ Betio. As I said before Tarawa was the harbinger of things to come.

I guess there must be a better way to capture an island than send young men with rifles over a beach to locate, close with either kill or capture the enemy with fire and manuvre.