The Czech crisis

LJAD when did the British and French consult the Czechs before agreeing to give Germany all of the Sudetenland and not just the German parts. They mobilized because they were being threaten by Germany. In yet another case of your vast ignorance, Czechoslovakia was never part of Germany. There were Poles living in Germany so therefore Poland had a right to demand that territory. Your argument that the French did not need the Czechs is so laughable, Germany concentrated almost all of its forces against France in 1940 because it had no threats. The allies guaranteed the borders a second time at Munich and yet Germany still ignored the Czechs peoples right of self determination when they invaded the full country and yet still the allies sat on their hands. If their army was so poor then it was suicide to for them to declare war in 1939 because they clearly would be beaten. Note the Somua and Char b were available in those years and the Germans had no tanks to fight them

 

These are all irrelevant and wrong arguments

1) Britain and France did not give anything: the Czechs gave the Sudeten

2) You don't know that there were no non-German parts of the Sudeten :the Germans were the majority in all parts , in some of them a small majority in other parts an overwhelming majority :thus it was not possible to determine which parts of the Sudeten should go to Germany and which parts should go to CZ.Besides ,even after Munich there were still a lot of Germans who remained in CZ .

3) I never said that CZ had belonged to Germany

4) It is not so that Poland could claim parts of Germany because there were Poles living in these regions :they could claim only these parts where the Poles were the majority .

5) About France needing the Czechs : you are still failing to reason logically . Saying that France lost because it had lost the Sudeten is meaningless, because you suggest that there still would have been a war,if CZ was not occupied by the Germans .This assumption is more than unlikely .You can'"t use a ATL to prove a claim .

6 ) The Allies did NOT guarantee the borders of CZ a second time at Munich ,because before Munich,Britain NEVER guarenteed the borders of CZ , and I doubt that France did it .It is also laughable to say that they sat on their hands : they did nothing when Hitler occupied Czechia, because there was NO reason to do anything .NO ONE was fighting, thus ,why should they fight ? Besides, they knew that Czchia would become a German satellite;they only hoped that it would happen without an open German invasion.Besides, there was nothing they could do,unless declare war ,a war who would last several years and who would destroy Eurpe,they wuld liberate the Czechs who still would be saddled up with the Sudeten .

7) Your argument about the strength of the French army is also wrong : the Allies were convinced that they would win, but that meanwhile the Czechs would be occupied by the Germans ,which would not be good .Besides the decision of war and peace did not belong to the French ,but to the Czechs : if the Czechs were fighting, France would be compelled to fight .

It would take the French weeks to start an offensive in 1938,and such an offensive would be useless : a year later, the Saar offensive did not prevent the fall of Poland ;in 1938 the French mobilisation was a disaster;in 1939 the French were able to attack with 11 divisions; they would not be able to do this in 1938 .

The allies did declare war in 1939 not because they were stronger, but because they were obliged,and they were obliged, not because of a guarantee (countries do not declare war because of a guarantee/ treaty ,such things are only window-dressing),but because there was a war going on : there was no possibility that Britain and France could look the other way,while Germany started a war of aggression .

Britain and France did not fight in 1939 because of Danzig : they did not care about the city :those who were thinking about it,agreed with the German point of view;Britain and FRance did fight in 1939 because Germany started a war and to start a war, two are needed:if the victim is not fighting, there is no war .The Germans did not fight in 1938, neither did the Czechs, thus neither did Britain and France .

 

The story of the French tanks against which the Germans had no answer is also a wast of time as military factors are subordinate to political factors to declare war . In september 1939 the French declared war,although the Germans also had no answer against the French tanks.

Imagine Daladier saying to the French parliament in 1938 : we must declare war on Germany because the Germans have no answer against our tanks .

Imagine Truman asking in 1949 congress to declare war on the SU with as argument : we will destroy their cities and they can not destroy our cities .

In both cases the attitude of parliament would have been very negative,there would have been an impeachment attempt in the US and Daladier would have been fired .

 

So why would the French declare war in 1939 when they would be defeated by Germany????? IF you recall Chamberlain was fired for his spineless appeasement. Nevertheless, perhaps discouraged by the pessimistic and defeatist attitudes of both military and civilian members of the French government, as well as traumatized by France's blood-bath in World War I that he personally witnessed, Daladier ultimately let Chamberlain have his way. On his return to Paris, Daladier, who was expecting a hostile crowd, was acclaimed. He then commented to his aide, Alexis Léger: "Ah, les cons (morons)!".[4]

 

1) Military arguments are subordinated to plitical reasons for a DoW.And, the French were convinced that they would win .

2 ) Chamberlain was NOT fired,and there was no spineless appeasement . Appeasement,which started immediately after Versailles (all British governments,also those of which Churchill was a member of ,did support appeasement )stopped when Germany started a war of aggression .
Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Baldwin, McDonald, were not fired because of appeasement :appeasement was Britain's traditional policy (even before WWI) :the aim of appeasement was to prevent a big war on the continent .

Chamberlain did not invent appeasement .

 

balony, Churchill was very clear in his warnings about Nazi aggression. Google appeasement and you will find Chamberlain. What you don't understand is that the policy of preventing war ensured that it would happen on far worse terms for the allies. Chamberlain came back with a piece of paper that lasted months when Hitler broke it

 

Never heard of the 10 years rule, which was implemented when Churchill was chancellor of the exchequer ? And which was nullified when Chamberlain was chancellor of the exchequer ?
The facts are that Churchill was saving on defense and that Chamberlain started Britain's rearmament .Winston had no reason to be demanding .

There was already appeasement in the twenties : Austin Chamberlain was one of the first who used the word during the Locarno negociations .

 

Winston Churchill was chancellor of the exchequer in August, 1919, when the rule was implemented? You sure about that.

 

He was chancellor between 1924 and 1929 and he applied the rule without any objection .

British military spending in 1928 : 125,2 million of £ for a GDP of 4.6 billion £

In 1938 :205.9 million for a GDP of 5.5 billion £


And in 1928 Churchill successfully urged the Cabinet to make the rule self-perpetuating

 

1) No, he wasn't :besides : a German aggression was not important unless it was threatening British interests and, what was the solution Winston did propose ?

2 ) Hindsight and wrong : a democracy can not start a war of agression founded on the claim that otherwise there will be a war on far worse terms and it is not so that the war which occurred in the OTL happened on far worse terms than a war F + B would have started in the ATL

3 ) Irrelevant : the piece of paper was only a piece of paper without any value and Hitler did not broke the piece of paper .

 

Mmmmm...And Chamberlain also applied the rule without exception for his first four years as exchequer. He also applied it more heavily than Churchill.

British military spending in 1932, Chamberlain's first year as exchequer: 112.9 million£(lower than Churchill's lowest budget).
Did Chamberlain increase it the next year...Nope, he lowered it. 110.9million£ in 1933, this was the lowest British military budget during the inter-war years.

Cherry-picking gets you nowhere LJAd...

 

Forgot to add...

You leave out that it was reviewed yearly to see whether or not it should continue.

 

He did not :

military budget

1932 : 112,9

1933 :110,9

1934 :116,9

1935 :121,9

1936 :145, 5

1937 : 195, 2

GDP for the same years

4.2 billion

4.3 billion

4.5 billion

4.7 billion

5 billion

5.3 billion

The military budget was going up when needed and when possible .

needed : when there were problems in the Far East and when Germany was rearming in Europe

possible : when the GDP was going up

between 32/37 the GDP was going up by 26 % and the military budget by 73 % , thus Winston's claim (which was parotted after the war by the usual ignorants) that Chamberlain neglected the defense of the realm was not founded .

Winston wanted more and faster rearmament, something which was politically and financially not possible .Besides,it is not so that with a faster rearmament, Britain could /would have pursued an other policy : British tax-payer was willing to pay more taxes for the defense of Britain, not for sending a big BEF to the continent ,AND, what a lot of ignorants and Britain centrics ignore is that all was depending on France, not on Britain : without the approval of France, Britain could do nothing :reality was that at the end of the twenties France had abandoned the region east of the Rhine,something Britain did not regret .Britain did not rule the continent and France had abandoned any such attempt after the failure of the Ruhr occupation .

Already before WWI, France had tacitly abandoned the alliance with Russia, because this alliance was to dangerous (it risked to involve France in quarrels which were superfluous for France) and because the alliance with Russia would not help France if there was a war with Germany .

20 years later, it was the same :the alliances with Poland and CZ were to dangerous and would not help France if there was a war with Germany .

Before WWI,Britain was not interested in Central and East-Europe for the same reasons as France . 20 years later, it was the same,for the same reasons .

The money for Britain's rearmament had as destination the RN (to defend the LoC with the Empire ) and the RAF (to prevent mass air attacks on London) :this money would not be used for an other Passendale .

Both (Britain and France ) had no objections to a German domination of this region,because they had not the means to prevent this domination and because this region was not very important for both countries .

If one asked Winston what the destination would be of additional money for defense, his answer was : the navy and the RAF;more money for the navy and the RAF would not help Poland r CZ .

 

SO the German z plan was not a threat to Britain?? the issue was not whether or not Germany was a threat, its the idea doing nothing would eliminate the threat

 

The British shipping industry was outproducing the Germans :in september 1939 the KM was no serious threat to Britain .

The HSF was in WWI stronger than the KM but had no harbours from which it could threaten Britain and thus it was rarily leaving the German territorial waters.

The KM had harbours from which it could threaten Britain,but it had not enough ships and was also not able to threaten Britain .

 

The assumption that in 2026 country A could threaten country B is not a valable reason for country B to attack country A in 2016 .

In 1947 it was obvious that in 1957 the SU would be stronger ,and possibly /probably strong enough to invade Western Europe (which it could not do in 1947),but no one in the US would propose in 1947 to start a preventive attack against the SU .

 

The Z plan was not a threat for Germany : the chance that it could be executed was nihil . and at the outbreak of the war, it was immediately abandoned

Even the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 (which was very modest compared to the Z plan) was not implemented.After the war Winston attacked the Conservative government for signing the AGNA,without mentioning that on this issue he had voted with the government (source : the RN and the Battle of Britain Chapter two,note 72 ).

One should be very cautious with what Winston was writing and saying after the war .

 

Germany lost WWII for exactly the same reasons it lost WWI. Lack of resources and failure to mobilise the war economy. The efficiency of the German army came as a shock in 1940, but the underling strategic view of the British (outlined in 'Grand Strategy and The Economic Blockade) still held true. The US Army was in more or less complete aggrement with the British and the strategy the Allies followed was based on principles evolved in 1937. . . . . its all there in the US Army Green books 'Planning for Coalition Warfare' and 'Global Logistics'

 

Tooze in his book 'The Wages of Destruction' makes the same observations allied strategists made

 

Tooze makes a strong case that they had mobilised their economy, and had indeed already done so prior to the war, and continued with increasingly draconian mobilisation of it ("totally"), throughout the war. For instance German women were present in the labour force already in 1939 to a higher degree than they ever were the US or the UK throughout the entirety of the war.