The Japanese take Madagascar

But how do they keep it supplied with India essentially laying across their line of communciation/supply? Again remember that the IJN started the war with ony about 1 years supply of oil based on their prewar estimates (which underestimated consumption) and Midway alone used the equivalant of about half of that. Now if they have to devote extensive amounts to continued ops in the Indian Ocean ....

Also consider that by the time the Japanese entered the war the Italians had lost in East Africa.

 

Because hostility between GB and the Japan did not just happen in December 1941 though the declaration of war did, Japan had preferred Germany to go south and German forces possibly linked up with Japanese somewhere near the Indian Ocean.

http://www.ww2f.com/topic/46070-bloodlands-europe-between-hitler-and-stalin-by-timothy-snyder/?hl=bloodlands

As Japanese submarines sank American aircraft carriers, such submarines would be capable of sinking British vessels. On the bigger picture or strategic level, Italian and Japanese attack from the port of Djibouti on British shippings were to drag the British effort onto "a dusty and strategically useless corner of Africa" (Knox 2000, p.78)

http://www.ww2f.com/topic/40519-hitlers-italian-allies-a-book-review/

More likely Japan and Italy would not succeed in achieve the strategic goal of Japan and Italy managing well, amidst the supply problems you mentioned, at a choke point against British voyage from the south onto the Red Sea heading to Egypt. Thus from the German perspective, letting Japan to take control of French Somaliland/Djibouti would be a signal to Japan that Germany did not intend to go to the Indian Ocean but attack the USSR.

 

I'd like some sources on that. I don't think I've seen anything suggesting the Japanese thought such a link up was even remotely possible. As for hostility between Japan and the West it had indeed been building over several years primarily due to Japanese activities in China. At the very least activities such as you suggest are going to push the US towards a faster military build up along with ecomic actions and possibly even getting into the war.

It was more the other way around though. The only US carrier sunk by an IJN sub that I can think of was Lexington and she was already in very bad shape when sunk being dead in the water and having already been abandoned once. A number of IJN subs on the other hand were sunk by US carrier aircraft and acompanying escorts. The British were also much better early in the war in regards to ASW. The Japanese subs especially their long range ones were fairly slow divers and the Indian Ocean is pretty shallow this suggest it would not be the best area for IJN subs to operate. Also consider that if they are in the Indian Ocean they are not in the Pacfic where Japans major naval threat lies.

*** edited to remove extraneous material and thank USS Washington for his corrections ***
*** It was Yorktown not Lexington and as he added Wasp was sunk by a sub as well ***

How are Italian and Japanese naval forces going to get to Djibouti? They have to run a gauntlet of British air bases and naval bases to get there and so do any ships that try to bring supplies to them. Then of course they also have to take the place. Historically the French military commander in the area went Free French but the colony stayed Vichy. In this case he may well stay and fight and the colony is very likely to go Free French. If the IJN gets tied down in a battle of attrition with the British off Africa it's even worse for them than the historical one in the Solomons. Without PH the US will also be able to make substantially more contributions than was historically the case once they enter the war which is likely to be sooner as well.

 

Japan having Madagascar is about like having a poopie flavored lollipop. No point at all in other words. Just more assets lost there by Japan that would be sorely needed in the PTO once the US gets cranked up and moving forward. Japan's supply lines were at the end of their rope trying to keep their forces in Guadalcanal operating, and Madagascar is a lot farther from IJN bases than Guadalcanal. And for the Allies, just neutralize the garrison and let the rest wither on the vine, like what was done to the Channel Islands and lots of other island fortresses in the Pacific.

 

Just a minor correction, it was USS Yorktown that was sunk by the Japanese submarine I-168 a few days after being damaged by Japanese carrier aircraft at Midway, and there was also the Wasp which was sunk by the submarine I-19 during the Guadalcanal campaign, and she hadn't suffered any damage before her loss, so we did lose at least 2 carriers to submarines(albeit the former having already been damaged prior as you mentioned), but it is irrelevant, with the problems the Japanese would deal with in the Indian Ocean as you noted, successfully operating there would've been very difficult if not impossible.

 

Sara was torpedoed twice in 1942, and put out of action for several months each time. I-175 would sink the CVE USS Liscome Bay, but that was not until November, 1943.

 

I didn't forget about Saratoga being damaged twice by submarines, just that I was only counting Carriers that were sunk, and I also left out Liscome Bay because, just as you noted that happened later in the war, and I was also just counting Fleet Carriers, since their imo the main flat-tops of any navy, but thanks for bringing them up as well, nonetheless.

 

Anyone got a good count on IJN subs lost to carrier battle groups (escorts and aircraft)? A quick look showed not as many as I at first thought due to carrier aircraft. Not sure about the escorts. There's a list here:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/SubLosses/SS_losses-japanese.html
But it doesn't mention if the ASW vessels were part of a carrier battlegroup or not.

 

I'm sure Takao does. He has everything.

 

Not without going back through my books. Could probably get a decent list by rereading Polmar & Carpenter's "Submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy; 1904-1945"

 

Mauritius and Reunion are smaller (easier to invade and defend with a small force, which is easier to supply for a long distance) and closer to Japanese Malaya and farther from British E and S Africa and just as useful to attack convoys. Japan could have easily invaded either one if they really wanted a base, even after Churchill wasted a large force for a long time invading Madagascar.
Moreover, Ceylon is closer to Japanese Burma and Malaya and it had very useful naval facilities (like the ones the Japanese got in Singapore at a low cost) with it in Japanese hands, the UK would have no access to India and it was one of the few remaining sources of rubber for the allies and it had cinnamon! It is much easier for the Japanese to invade Ceylon with troops already in Burma, Malaya and the DEI than it is for the British to try to defend it. Finally, capturing Ceylon isolates India and allows the axis to rule the central and east IO and to stop traffic through the Persian Ocean to Iran (denying oil to Britain and L-L to the USSR. So instead of just raiding Ceylon, Japan could have used all the fuel and time wasted for the raid to invade Ceylon.

 

Which they didn't have the log system to support. The raid used a lot less fuel than an invasion would have by the way.

 

Not really, an invasion would have captured fuel (as Rommel did in Benghazi and Tobruk and Japan did in Malaya-Singapore, Burma, etc,), rubber and useful bases and would have released the carriers in a week. Leaving the E IO to Japan. The Ceylon raid did minor damage (few ships and planes being in Ceylon, even less damage than the pointless raid on Pearl Harbor, which wasted a lot of fuel already in Japan) and required the carriers to roam the IO attacking shipping and burning more fuel than planes, submarines, etc, from Ceylon would have (and wasting invaluable carrier time) Most importantly, fuel would be the least problem in the W IO controlled by Japan, since by the time of the raid Japan was restarting production in former British Borneo and American subs would have a hard time operating in the IO, trying to sink tankers. Let alone IJN capturing tankers from the Persian Gulf. from Ceylon.
Japan's fuel problem was in Japan not in the DEI and it was caused only by subs and mines sinking most of the few tankers that Japan had. So Japan moved most of the fleet to Borneo and Singapore, where it could refuel. Therefore refueling in Ceylon is easier than in Japan. On the other hand, carrier and escort wear and some planes were wasted on the raid, instead of invested on an invasion.

The interesting point is that after the raid, Churchill wasted a huge force invading useless and neutral Madagascar for months, leaving British Mauritius and Ceylon still vulnerable. How could he conclude that the same Japanese who dared not invade valuable and nearby Ceylon (the key to India), or easily invadable Mauritius and French Reunion would try to invade and defend very distant and huge Madagascar?

Of course, invading Ceylon would preclude L-L supplies to China flown over the Himalayas from India (where they arrived by ship). Exacerbating Chiang's problems.

 

Unfortunately, this is wrong on many levels.

- An invasion would have captured fuel, go figure right. But, how much fuel would the Japanese have captured?
- Rubber? The Japanese already control most of the world's supply of natural rubber. It is not a good reason for invading Ceylon.
- Useful bases? Useful bases are not located 50 miles from the enemy's coastline, especially when he controls the interior lines, and the closest large Japanese military base is some 1,500 miles away.
- Planes and submarines will be using less fuel than Kido Butai...But, they will also be far less successful in sweeping the British from the Indian Ocean.
- Please tell me more about this "hard time operating in the Indian Ocean" that American subs will be having. I am soooo curious about this.
- How is the IJN going to capture Allied tankers from the Persian Gulf from Ceylon?
- Quite odd that the American submarines will be having a "hard time" sinking Japanese tankers, but the Japanese will be capturing Allied tankers by the arms full.

I am wondering when robdab/dabrob's Super Ninja Leap Froggers will be putting in an appearance.

Madagascar sits astride the British shipping lanes coming around Africa, while Ceylon is somewhat distant from any active major shipping lanes. The few that Ceylon did use were generally abandoned following the initial Japanese successes in the area.

It would? How so? Ceylon is some 1,500 miles from the main Lend-Lease port of Karachi. So, the hypothetical Japanese capture of Ceylon would pose no immediate threat to Lend-Lease shipments to China.

Did you not know that the port of Calcutta was not immediately used for Lend-Lease or are you ignoring that fact. The shift from Karachi to Calcutta did not begin until 1943, once the Indian theater had stabilized and the Japanese threat to the area was on the wane.

 

In contrast to PH, during the Ceylon raid the Japanese destroyed large fuel tanks in Ceylon, which would not be bombed but captured duing an invasion. The RN had to keep large stores in Ceylon, because it was the main base in the IO, even before Singapore fell (just like the USN kept large stores in PH)
Ceylon was the main rubber producer in the world. I mentioned that it was one of the few remaining sources of rubber for the allies. Therefore, capturing it is a major blow for the allies. In April 1942 rubber from Ceylon was crucial for Britain, the US and the USSR, so from the point of view of resources, capturing Ceylon is far more harmful to the allies than capturing Madagascar. Ceylon is also much less difficult to defend than Madagascar (owing to its much smaller size size, long distance from Britain and the US and much shorter distance from Japanese Sumatra).
In 1938 Abadan in Persia was the largest refinery in the world, so attacking its lanes (which also supply the USSR) is quite harmful for Britain and the USSR.
OTL the Japanese deployed Submarines all the way from Singapore to damage a British battleship in Madagascar. With bases in Ceylon, Mauritius and Reunion, long range IJN subs and planes can inflict major damage to shipping lanes to Egypt, Karachi, Aden and Iran.
As I stated, capturing, defending and supplying Madagascar with the allies in W and S Africa is far more difficult for the IJN than doing so in Mauritius and/or Reunion.
Even in 1942 Japan could not supply adequately any of its garrisons in New Guinea, the Solomons, Gilberts, Marshals, etc, much closer to Japan and further from allied bases. Imagine supplying a large force defending huge Madagascar so very far from Japan and so close to British Africa.

Did you know that after losing Repulse and PoW in December 1941, the rapid fall of Malaya, Burma, the Andaman ISlands, etc, and the Ceylon raid in April 1942 the RN temporarily hid in Kenya? Imagine what they would have done with the IJN in Ceylon, Reunion and Mauritius. Not only Karachi, but Iran, Egypt and Aden would be isolated with the Japanese in Ceylon and Mauritius.
Britain had a few officers in India. Without the ability to transport Indian troops from India to the Med and middle east or supplies and reinforcements to India, how long do you think India would take to overthrow its few British rulers, especially if Japan provides air support from Ceylon?

Again, invading, supplying and defending Mauritius, Reunion and Ceylon is much easier, faster and harmful to the allies (including China and the USSR) than doing so only in Madagascar.

Preemptive invasion of neutral Madascar, instead of heavy reinforcement of Ceylon and without heavy reinforcement of Mauritius and Reunion is typical, deplorable Churchillian strategy.

Whereas the Malagasies fought the British stubburnly, the Ceylonese hated the British and would probably assist the Japanese (much like the Burmese did).

 

Rubber is misleading as a commodity, as the Allies did better than just manage with first with current stocks and recycling, and then with synthetic rubbers. However, the effect on the British may have been more precarious, it wasn't the Allies, however, trying to build important military vehicles without rubber, but the Germans.

The defences of Ceylon were reinforced by the 7th Australian Division and elements of the 1st (African) Division because of the island's strategic importance.

Let's not get too carried away about any Burmese "assistance" rendered to the Japanese. The Japanese lied, stole, brutalized and forced their will upon the Burmese. "Assistance" rapidly dwindled once the character of the Japanese occupation became apparent. Which is why the BNA ended up switching sides... Not exactly a tale of Brave heroics, or of Japanese enlightenment in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

So while there may have been a window of opportunity to subvert British rule, the Japanese would've created more problems for themselves. Many of the British on Ceylon may have been racist pigs, but the Japanese were all too-often vindictive violent racists. As seen throughout the area they occupied. It was simply never going to last.

 

Recycling rubber in 1942?

The 7th Australian division was not in Ceylon. the small 2/7 battalion was. However, Ceylon is large and much of it is jungle (a little like Malaya),
A few second rate African troops are not much hope either. Especially when the Ceylonese troops are hostile to their few British officers.
it would take a very large, coherent and well equipped force to defend Ceylon against naval and air superiority and experienced Japanese divisions. Much larger Austalian-British-Indian-Scottish forces were defeated in Malaya-Singapore. Anzac-British-Greek troops were wiped out by paratroopers with air suport (despite complete British naval superiority) in Crete. Strong allied artillery, armor and infantry were defeated by LW superiority in France. It is odd that after so many battles were determined by air superiority in WW II, you still think that a small infantry force can defend an Island very much larger than Iwo (3,100 x smaller than Ceylon) or even Okinawa (54 x smaller than Ceylon).

I am not saying that the Burmese fell in love with the Japanese, simply some Burmese fought against Indian and British troops during the invasion and even some civilians murdered some stragglers withdrawing to India. That is all it takes to invade Ceylon (any help makes a big difference in the initial stages of an invasion).

The occupation of large Burma by a small force lasted until the allies kicked them out in 1945. The Burmese would never have been able to kick them out alone and for isolated Ceylonese to expel Japanese forces from coastal bases, with naval artillery and air support is impossible.

 

Yes, Recycling rubber in 1942.


http://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-rubber-tires-gathered-to-be-recycled-in-august-1941-natural-rubber-50051482.html
Caption is
Rubber tires gathered to be recycled in August, 1941. Natural rubber was always expensive, and more so after World War II cut of supplies from Southeast Asia, making rubber conservation and recycling was essential.

(Image is from 1941, I'm sure you'll forgive the difference)



Re: Australia in Ceylon:
Curtin did permit part of the 6th Division to defend Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). The island’s naval base at Trincomalee was important to Australia, as a British fleet was based there and it was the principal refuelling point for convoys travelling between Australia and the Middle East and Europe. The 16th and 17th Brigades spent five months on Ceylon between March and August 1942, training and preparing defences. Trincomalee was attacked on 9 April 1942 by Japanese aircraft launched from aircraft carriers and several Australians flying Hurricanes flew in its defence, one of whom was killed and another died of wounds. Others flew in a low-level bombing attack against the enemy fleet in which nine Australians were shot down and killed.
http://www.ww2australia.gov.au/farflung/fareast.html

 

If the allies are so short of rubber that they are recycling at great cost and difficulty, the loss of the largest rubber producer (Ceylon), certainly hurts more than the loss of Madagascar.

You said the 7th Division, now you say part of the 6th div, which is the battalion I mentioned. Like I wrote, it was a very small Australian force for a vey large Island, it would have taken many divisions to secure Ceylon against a Japanese attack, w/o a strong allied air force and navy.

The equivalent of a British div with heavy air and naval gun support had a hell of a time for several months invading Madagascar againt 8,000 troops (mostly Malgasy and Senegalese and only a few hundred Frenchmen and with very few planes, vehicles, guns, etc,). Likewise, an Indian, many Chinese and a Burmese (partly British) division with some armor were rapidly defeated in Burma, imagine how many troops would be needed to defend Ceylon against very experienced Japanese forces with strong air and naval gun support.

Some scrap collection campaigns in WW II were meant more to get the civilian population involved and in the spirit of war than an important material source.
I really don't think that in 1941 or 42 they could recycle rubber in a large scale and without enormous cost. A Malay men got a patent to recycle rubber profittably about a few decades ago and became a millionaire, but all over the world, still today they are huge tire piles constitute a health hazard (mosquito breathing grounds, fire and pollution hazard, etc,) because it is much more profittable to use natural and synthetic rubber.

Tons of tires are chopped and used for playgrounds, etc, but this is not really recycling (producing new rubber products from discarded rubber).