This is both a book report, a commentary and a question for discussion. The book titled above is collection of post-war intelligence/historical interviews of KM and LW officers centered around the use of LW against convoys and other naval targets. It points out what the LW did, tried to do but failed and what it didn't try to do. It also goes quite a bit into the LW's take over of the KM's naval air arm in the pre-war period where the LW took over most of the Navy's planes and aviation officers, leaving the navy with just ship-launched sea planes and some short-range patrol craft. Hitler told Goring to help the KM as much as he could and coordinate the LW's efforts with the KM. In practice this really didn't work well because the LW had its own agenda and gave the sea war short shrift. There was one LW unit engaged in anti-shipping activity but this was inadequate. German naval officers felt there was only one example of good LW/KM coordination that was Operation CEREBUS (AKA "The Channel Dash). Adolph Galland came up with a system using fighter officers aboard the ships ensuring good cooperation between the protecting fighters and the naval force. The most daunting problem for the Germans in the Atlantic was finding and tracking the convoys heading to Britain. German airmen often didn't have the navigational skills to correctly locate the position of the convoys that they found so that U-boats were directed to empty ocean. Compounding the problem there were never enough long range patrol planes to cover the North Atlantic continually. Huge gaps in the coverage that was provided allowed many convoys to get through unmolested. The other problem was the lack of air cover over the Bay of Biscay where U-boats were under considerable risk of air attack. The LW didn't feel it could do this and maintain its other duties so this was neglected and resulted in heavy U-Boat casualties. Commentary: Some of these comments by LW and KM officers were partially reflecting the usual inter-service rivalry common to most countries. However, I think that the KM officers made a good point that the navy needed either their own air arm or at least given a certain amount of LW assets that would be under Naval command. Question: So instead of engaging in the very costly and futile "Battle of Britain" would the Germans gotten better results in the long run by trying to help interdict the British ocean lifeline? It would be understood that they would have to produce more long-range aircraft and have a much closer relationship with the navy.