The Spanish-American war does not occur

In this scenario, the P.I. are not in American hands.
This assumption does not negate the need for Japan to attempt to cripple whatever US forces are in the Pacific because of the growing feud between the two countries over their differing policies. So whether the US fleet is based in Pearl Harbor or wherever in the Pacific, the Japanese will do something, especially with the embargo that the US had imposed on Japan.
Sycom, since it is the US government that had been leading the effort to thwart Japan from reaching its objectives, it follows that the US effort would also mean deployment of the needed resources, both diplomatic and military, even if there is minimal public support for such actions. That's an executive decision. And with Europe at war and British resources stretched thin, the US was the one left most able to fill the gap to do something for those European colonies in Asia, which Japan covets.
And when there's a military move on the US side, Japan couldn't ignore such an action. Japan will do something, especially with the US holding Japan in an economic stranglehold. The stage is set for a confrontation, whether anyone likes it or not.
And Mac, we both know that when one's forces are not sufficient, we don't dare do such a foolhardy thing such as entering the lion's den. It's better to do what we can with what we have and, as much as possible, make the foe fight the way we want him to fight, not vice versa.

 

Absolutely correct. The feud you mention was not primarily over the Philippines, but over China and Japanese aggression on the Asian mainland. As I pointed out in post # 27, The US Pacific Fleet was not sent to Pearl Harbor in 1940 to make it easier to defend the Philippines; WP 46, the war plan in effect in 1940, had no provision for the USN to defend any US possessions west of Midway. The Pacific Fleet was sent to Pearl Harbor to underline the US determination to oppose Japanese aggression against China. Thus, the Pacific Fleet would have been at Hawaii in 1941, even if the US had never held possession of the Philippines.

And with the Pacific Fleet stationed at Pearl Harbor, Japanese planners could not risk the assumption the US wouldn't support the British and Dutch if they were attacked; they HAD to assume the US would react to an attack on Malaya and Singapore as though it were an attack on it's own territory. This was especially true since Roosevelt had publicly proclaimed such support would be forthcoming in the event of a Japanese attack on British and Dutch possessions in the Pacific.

With respect to why the US Pacific Fleet couldn't proceed directly to Tokyo Bay, it boils down to the fact that Japanese naval and air bases in the Mandates meant that the US had to secure air and logistical support bases in the western Pacific before it could project power across the Pacific. It would have been as foolhardy for the USN to attempt a direct attack on the Japanese Home islands as it was for the IJN to attempt an attack on Hawaii in 1942. The USN had not yet created the fleet train of service and support squadrons that allowed it to exert true power projection in 1945. That was the same reason the IJN was defeated at Midway in June, 1942; Yamamoto forgot that the IJN could raid very effectively, but it could not stay operational at sea for more than a couple of weeks, and thus had only a transitory effect in any given area.