The Tanks of May 1940

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OK the germans had their tanks bunched up in divisions rather than dispersed as detached batallions to the infantry , that was the critical difference ,
virtually autonomous break out by an armor heavy force
the stugs don't count , they were artillery from the start

my point is that the great panzer rides were a transient situation ,
the design and manufacturing of the tanks was a more conventionnal affair
the PZKW 4 was intended primarily as a infanrty support assault tank ,
the panzer divisions were a visionnary british concept , it could simply not work and the autonomous divisions broken up , the tanks would still be needed

As early as during early barbarossa , guderian had to beg some infantry divisions from von kluge to function ,
putting himself under a despised commander and starting a long lasting feud .
the old strategy of infantry tanks would be back with the panther ,
by 44 infantry always had to be able to call on armor in defence
while breaking the line was impossible without heavy tanks

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The subject of technology influencing warfare is vastly overstated in most sources. It is easy to say that one side won because of better tanks, better planes, or in other cases better body armour or gunpowder weapons; because this is such an easy explanation it is often readily accepted, even though technology is but one factor influencing a conflict.

I would argue that while the British and French did have better tanks in terms of hard factors (firepower, armour thickness), this failed to influence the outcome of Fall Gelb because of factors entirely irrelevant to technology. For example, the Germans made an effort to destroy all Allied lines of communication, be it through rapid breakthroughs or aerial bombardment. The Germans also knew an officer's mentality of initiative and responsibility rather than simple obedience, making them more flexible and ambitious. These are just two things that have determined the outcome of the French campaign to a greater extent, I think, than which side had the better tanks.

 

I think you can also see the fallacy of only looking at the "hard factors" in assesing how "good" a tank was.
Any French tank armed with a 47mm gun, or the longer 37mm, was a match for the armor of any German tank in use in May 1940, as was any British tank armed with a 2pdr (40mm).
The "best" French tanks, the H-39, S-35 and Char B1 bis, had armor that gave them a clear advantage at combat ranges over 500m and probably from 300m out. From this it would seem that in a one on one battle, especially in defense, they should have dominated the Germans. But the battles weren't one on one, and there is more to even an individual tank battle than gun and armor. The one man turret, and overall small crew size, had to have been a severe drawback for the French. Imagine the situation when a French tank commander sees an opposing tank:
1) Line up gun,
2) fire,
3) spot fall of shot,
4) empty breech,
5) find another shell,
6) re-load,
7) re-acquire target,
8) line up and correct for last shot and
9) fires again.
And he has no way to communicate the threat to other tanks in his unit, and losses awarness of the situation around him.
Imagine the opposing German tank commander:
1) Calls out: "Gunner, tank at 2 o'clock"
Then uses tank's internal intercom system and orders radio operator to call out warning over radio to rest of platoon, company and battalion all the while looking for other threats.
Gunner meanwhile keeps sight on target, corrects, and fires when dedicated loader announces "ready" until target is destroyed or lost. Then aids commander in searching for next target. The French commander has to perform nine actions for one by his German opponent.
The biggest issue clearly was the organizational and tactical usage of the French tanks. None of the French DCRs or DLMs ever saw battle as organized formations, much less as part of a Corps of Mechanized divisions. On the few occasions when scattered elements did run into equal or smaller numbers of German tanks they generally did alright, sometimes better (Stonne) than others (Flavion), yet the Germans generaly won the battles and unquestionably won the campaign.

 

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All good stuff , roel got a critical point with the german tradition of initiative ,
" you have been made an officer of the kaiser's army to know when to disobey an order "
in good hands the french could still have used their strength to plug the breach by smothering it wit mixed tank- infantry structure
but the french command was pathetically slow ,there is this feeling of delay in the info-order loop
the systematic break in the communications , further hampered by the french army routine use of land line ,
let the units on the ground receive good orders ..... just twenty four hours late :kill:


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