The Tiger/Sherman Ratio [Assistance Request]

Rather than guess at the numbers of German tanks available in the theaters, the numbers from Uncle Sam's Project #47 on German Tank Losses published by the European Command Historical Division in 1950 gives the following numbers for available tanks strength by type in the theaters:
For early 1944:
View attachment 15801

The infallible Wiki gives the allocation of Shermans to be about 40K that would face off against the German armor (4K East front, 36K West front).

You guys can do the mathematical mastication...

 

If you are going assume the total production run of Shermans as being present and in the field (40,000 all at once!) in 1944/45 then should you not give the total production numbers for the Pz IV/Tiger/Panther?

 

The charts give both the total production and the number available for action for German Vehicles. The percent of the 40K Shermans that were available for action at the moment in time that you pick is up to your imagination.

 

Imagination?
Why do that when I can simply look up the Western (France) numbers in service in the Commonwealth and US Forces on various dates 1944-45?
A more relevant number would be the German strength on May 31st 1944.
West, a total of 1928 tanks and 355 Stug. in service/in repair/in transit
East, a total of 1913 tanks and 2180 Stug. in service/in repair/in transit
Italy, a total of 750 tanks and 514 Stug. in service/in repair/in transit


Readers might be better aquainted with your source if you use the words 'Mueller Hillebrand'.

 

Listen carefully and you might hear the central point wooshing by as it goes over your head.

It would seem that in order to make the fairest comparison of the numbers of Shermans versus the number of a specific type of German tanks, one needs to use so much imagination to manipulate the numbers that the conclusions drawn aren't going to tell us much of any concrete value.

1) One cannot simply compare the numbers of vehicles produced. Vehicles wore out and became battle casualties. So we need to compare the numbers of vehicles in service at a similar point in time. Project #47 provides some data on German vehicles at a couple of points in time.
2) The fairest numbers to use for any vehicle is the number available for action, not those in repair, not those in transit. We have some numbers for the German vehicles from the Project #47 File, but not (so far) for the Shermans.
3) Then we must allocate the vehicles by zone, as we want to discount vehicles that were in the west but not on front-line status. i.e. not in England, the US, backwater garrisons, Ord. Depots, etc. Only count the tanks that were ready for action and in a place that might see action.
5) Then subdivide the vehicles by type, as we seem to be interested in Shermans vs. Tigers (maybe Panthers as well), and don't care about how many Shermans gang-banged each Stug or PzIV. So we only care about the number of ready for action tanks in a "hot" area that were facing the correct type of opponent. And how to adjust for a mixed opposing force on the German side further complicates the equation. "Tiger never hunts alone."
6) Then subdivide again to take into account the number of times the opposing tanks actually faced off so there is real data.

There are so many variables that need manipulation or best guesses or imagination that trying to approach this question using a quantitative approach is just silly.

We are therefore left with the anecdotal tales and eye-witness accounts.

And regarding my source, here's the cover:
View attachment 15802
I refer to a source by it's cover info, in this case title and source. Gen Mueller Hillebrand was the author/team leader of the original report that is contained within, and as such was subjected to at least two rounds of oversight/reviews before being published by the European Command Historical Division in 1950. If you're related to the General and feel I didn't give him his due I profoundly apologize!

I hope nobody goes down this rabbit-hole about the numbers - it's a waste of time.

 

IMHO,the whole discussion is senseless,because you will never get the answer on the following aequation :
X numbers of Shermans,faced by Y numbers of Tigers,destroyed Y1 numbers of Tigers at the cost of X1 numbers of Shermans .
And,if you got the answer,the conclusion(X Tigers =Y Shermans) would be wrong,
1) because it would not say anything about the value of a Tiger/Sherman:the mission of a tank was not to destroy the enemy tank
2) because there are (in any fight) a lot of unknown and immeasurable factors as:
speed
weather
ammunition
fuel
training of the crews
the fact that in a lot of cases a tank was not eliminated by one factor,but by a combination of several factors
terrain
intervention of other participants as infantry,artillery,aircraft
the defensive/attacking factor
numerical superiority/inferiority
etc...
One exemple:
10 Tigers were attacked by 30 Shermans,and had to leave ,resulting in the loss of 5 Tigers and 10 Shermans .Conclusion ?
Or 10 Tigers attacked 11 Shermans.Result :the attack failed,5 Tigers and 7 Shermans were lost .Conclusion ?
The possibilities are legion .

 

It was mentioned before, the tanks were not supposed to slug it out like knights on horseback in a medieval tournament!
But there are several examples that, when the US army combined arms combat team worked well, the german losses were catastrophic. As an example one could cite the fighting at Domaine de Bütgenbach on the 20th and the 21st of december 1944. The 2nd Battalion of the 26th Infantry with the help of a platoon of Shermans, four M10's and late on the twentyfirst four M36, about a dozen 57mm towed AT guns as well as a formidable amassement of artillery held of repeated attacks by vastly superior elements the 12th SS Pz. Div. In the end the germans had lost fortyseven tanks and SP tank destroyers, the americans 3 Shermans and one SP tank destroyer.

 

Ah so I was right.
You have no idea who Mueller Hillebrand was.
As I was saying you would have more impact if you refered to the author (who is well known for his work in this area) rather than an obscure US paper.
Oh just so you know I have a copy of the paper but I find it of little use because of the limited data points. Mueller Hillbrand expanded this area greatly in his later german works and I am glad I was able to help you out by posting a more complete version of the numbers for the summer of 1944.

It is if you are using the data you posted.

 

Why is this the fairest? Certainly one mearsure of merit for a tank is its availability rate and this completely elliminates it from the comparison.

 

A most curious response full of contradiction.
My reference to the "obscure US paper" wasn't incorrect after all, was it, Kenny?

Your position is that had I referenced the esteemed Mueller Hillbrand, the input would have had more impact. But, in the next sentence you undermine the paper's usefulness "because of the limited data points." You can't have it both ways, Kenny, it's either useful or it's of little use.

The data points presented in my first post were two of those "limited data points." Do you dispute their validity so that even the limited data present in the Project #47 Report is suspect and the Mueller Hillbrand data is completely worthless as a reference? If so I would appreciate your providing source material to contradict the data.

Ironically, the data that you quoted in your first response wasn't attributable to any reliable source. Perhaps you should practice what you preach and name the source, but only if you wanted it to be more impactful.

As I suspected, you missed the whole point.
The accuracy of starting data is irrelevant in this case. Start with any dataset and by the time the proper assumptions, guesses, and modifiers are applied the result is worthless.
Fortunately, LJAd completely understood; re-read his post for another explanation.

 

LWD,
for the purposes of this question, availability is rather moot. Folks want to examine the results of a battle between a number of shermans vs some number of Tigers and draw a mathematically-based conclusion. The number of vehicles on the line ready for action are the only ones that count. While this number is impacted by the efficiency of the service companies the number of vehicles being repaired or on railcars is irrelevant.

 

It very much depends on the level you are talking about though. If you are talking about a tactical situation then indeed availabiltiy may not be as important. On the otherhand if you are talking about operational or strategic levels then it becomes important. Not sure either of these make much sense though as you don't send x tanks to take out a Tiger you send a platoon or a company to take out an opposing position. If you know they have armor or indeed know they have any sort of prepared defence you also allocate a fair amount of artillery to the mission as well.

 

Exactly - it makes no sense. That's why I doubt Otto (or anyone else) will find any published source to confirm or refute the "Sherman/Tiger Ratio."

Numbers aren't going to give a quantitative answer!

 

Yes it was obscure. Unless you consider 2 copies to be a best seller.

More to the point 'we' would have instantly known that your source was compiled by one who knew what he was talking about.

I presume it is of use to you but those who have access to M-H and his later works realise how basic the US version is.
I fail to see how a Western Front total for Feb 1944 tells us anytrhing the numbers available in June-Aug 1944.

The report has no info on the build-up of tanks to July 1944. Therefore it is of limited value.

The numbers are arrived at by a compilation of the individual German returns for the period. The documents used in the compilation of the report you put so much store in-just a more complete version!

 

They do not.
Your posted tables give the in-service totals and at the end they give the total with Units on that date. Production numbers are not listed at all although they are given in appendix 3
The error is in comparing a total of one nations tanks on a given date (one month from 48) and comparing this to the total production run of anothers for 48 months.
Note that the German reporting system broke down in 1945 and if you have any real interest in production numbers then I recomend the Panzertracts 23 title by Jentz & Doyle. "Panzer production 1933 to 1945'
It contains detailed production figures/informed guesswork for individual factories in 1945.

You assume I am defending this mythical 'Tiger-Sherman ratio'. Most here will know I have spent years showing it is a complete nonsense. You have arrived quite late in the game but all help is appreciated.
All this just because I questioned the validity of assuming 35,000 Shermands in the ETO?

 

I thought they were pretty successful with the method they did use; bomb the living crap out of the country and annihilate its army in the fields after having assumed complete air superiority. If it wasn't broke, don't fix it.

 

[FONT=&quot][/FONT] You are right JB, I have read that the majority of German Armour in Normandy was destroyed by Air to Ground Fire and also that the Majority of allied infantry casualties were caused by German Mortars.

 

Not so.
The Normandy Panzers were destroyed by men on the ground, the bulk of the execution being done by anti-tank guns if memory serves.
Air power denied them daytime movement, broke up cohesio, scattered and confused. It was not, however, the tank-buster it's often painted as.
Which has little to do with this thread, other than being another myth, so I'll get my coat.

~A
Ps. For what it's worth, I'm also firmly in the camp that sees ' five shermans to kill one tiger' as thus far unsubstantiated balls.

 

From Jentz.

A British examination of 223 Panzers captured in Aug 44 revealed the following cause of loss.

24 AP shot (tank or AT)
1 Hollow charge projectile
4 Artillery HE
7 Aircraft rockets
1 Aircraft cannon
2 Bombs
108 Destroyed by crew
63 Abandoned
13 Unable to determine.

So the vast number were destroyed by the troops of the Panzerwaffe. Obviously the air power helped create the conditions for the destruction/abandonment but was not the actual cause.

 

This seems to disagree quite strongly.

"Germans lost around 1 500 tanks, tank destroyers and assault guns in the Normandy campaign, less than 7% were lost directly to air attack."