Torch in Sardinia & Corsica, instead of N Africa

Takao,
Churchill used the term beached whale, precisely because he was enraged at the idiot who did not advance unopposed, but waited to consolidate, providing Kesselring (the master of deployment) plenty of time to redeploy a very strong forces and trounce the "consolidated" beachhead. The landing was definitely at the right time and in the right place and cost almost no casualties. It caught Kesselring with his plants down. Unfortunately, the idiot allowed Kesselring time to pull up his pants and kick his butt.

 

I'm sorry...Does "Beached Whale" mean success then?

 

??? I consider it a good thing I don't subscribe to your fantasies. Do you have any idea what IJN naval gunfire support doctrine was at that point in the war? Here's a hint look at the ships assigned to bombard Midway during that operation. Then look at their ability to communicate with the landing parties. Dug in infantry isn't all that vulnerable to planes either unless they drop an awful lot of bombs. If Wake II had failed by the time the IJN could get another invasion attempt ready it would likely have been too late.

Again the Japanese were loosing on Wilkes Island and loosing badly enough that the Marines could have moved on to defeat the Japanese forces on Wake in all likelihood had the Marine command known the status on Wilkes and not surrendered.

 

What ´part of completely successful landing, wasted by a complete idiot not advancing unopposed do you not understand? Again, Eisenhower using the wrong man and wasting huge resources and opportunities and finally winning by shear force, rather than outmaneuvering a weaker foe.

Exactly the same situation as D-day. Successful landing (despite botched bombing and shelling, which killed Frenchmen and cows far behind the wall and almost no Germans) with a beached whale for months, just because Monty did not take Caen and the airfield right away and his troops stopped to drink tea after landing. Panzers even penetrated late in the afternoon (past a world of naval guns, planes, field artillery and tanks) all the way to the coasts and then they were allowed to pull back! It's really funny that the allies could not use the hedgerows to stop weak German armor, but the Germans used it to stop strong allied armor.

If Patton had not advanced rapidly in Gela with heavy naval gun support and repelled the Göring division, he would have been also a beached whale or worse yet, repelled.
In Saipan the army also advanced extremely slowly, while the marines on their flank broke through and had the army remove the idiotic general in charge. Otherwise, it would also have been a beached whale.

ATL Patton is leading the advance in Nov 1942 and has strong support and there are no large enermy reserves or armor forces for the axis to deploy against Patton, so you can rest assured that there will be no beached whale.

Alternately, if the invasion had been performed alone by the British in 1940 or 41 O-Connor could have led it.

 

So...Then, "Beached Whale" means a successful failure? Or, is it a failed success.

Either way, it will be a fitting description of an Allied landing at Sardinia in 1942.

 

Sure, it's really easy for marines to redeploy under complete enemy air superiority and with spotter planes for the naval guns. By the way, if planes and shells did no damage, why were communications lost? The marines were short of munitions and defeated within hours of being bombed and shelled. You talk of them as if they had resisted continuous bombing for weeks.
Here is a reality check for you:
1) Despite having Radar and 12 Wildcats and knowing that there was a war going on, US forces were so incompetent as to allow 8 Wildcats to be destroyed on the ground by a few G3M from the Marshalls.
2) The remaining 4 Wildcats allowed them to shoot down G3M, so that that bombing practically stopped. They also sank a destroyer and strafed other ships. Without these 4 Wildcats, even the planes from the Marshalls would have caused a lotmore damage and the ships would have been more successful.
3) Despite the Japanese havng 6" guns to shell Wake from a safe range all night before even attempting a landing, the IJN approached rather stupidly within a few thousand yards of the marines 5" guns, resulting in another destroyer sunk and several ships damaged (including light cruisers).

A smart Japanese commander would have used 8 to 16" shells to bomb all night (destroying the planes and silencing some guns) and attacked with planes at dawn, then all ships would rush to the island with guns blazing and with air support and land.
What dug in troops? The exposed gun crews did not stand a chance against strafing, shelling and bombing. If they hid, the ships arrive unharmed.

It is incredible that the US wasted 12 urgently needed Wildcats and good men in an untenable island and just as incredible that the Japanese attacked it without any naval planes or heavy guns and wasted a lot of men and ships taking it in the dumbest possible way. Isn't it funny that the USN deployed 12 Wildcats to untenable Wake in 1941, but none to the PI and that it deployed 21 Buffalo in Midway as late as June 1942 for the mother of all naval battles?

 

I am sorry, you are severly challenged. Kesselring beached the whale with armor and then shelled it with a railgun. Where is the axis going to get those things in Sardinia to beach Patton's whale? Moreover, you probably don't know that the landing force in Anzio was smaller than Torch, so a comparison is rather dumb in every aspect, especially since the landing succeeded completely in Anzio. The force landing in Anzio was a joke compared to Torch, Sicily and Salerno, yet so successful.

Although the allies landed in distant sites in Anzio, the whole operation involved only 5 cruisers and 24 destroyers for support, ridiculous to attack the enemy, compared with Madagascar or Torch to attack a neutral! Some planning, yet so successful and so wasted.

 

So, you are saying Anzio was a failure then.

 

More of mjölnir's patented wishful thinking...Here is a reality check for your "reality check."

Wake Island did not have Radar.

The Japanese bombing raids were not "practically stopped." by thr remaining F4Fs. Wake was bombed by the Japanese on December 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, and, of course, on the 23rd.

Except, of course that the Japanese light cruisers have no aviation facilities for spotter aircraft. So, an effective night bombardment is going to be an iffy proposition at best. At worst, it will be an almost complete waste of ammunition.

In late-November, 1941, the Wildcats were deployed to Wake, they were not urgently needed anywhere.

The Japanese had made heavy use of their naval aviation, those G3M Nells that had been bombing Wake prior to the first landing were naval planes. Of course, the Japanese aircraft carriers had higher priority targets elsewhere.

It is funny that you have no grasp on the Pacific War, yet, try and come across as some kind of expert...
You have no sense of the timings of the deployments. As I have pointed out, in late November, 1941, the US was at peace with Japan. Wake, being at the tip of the spear, got the better equipment, while Midway, further in the rear, received the SB2U Vindicators, with F2As being delivered in late December, 1941, and in late March, 1942. When the Battle of Midway finally approached, Midway did receive 7 Wildcats in late May, 1942.

 

So, now Anzio is a "success" again? Please, make up your mind...and ditch the rose colored glasses.

Of course, Anzio was smaller than Torch, the Allies landed on 5 widely separated points...At Anzio, they landed at only one.

 

Small correction.

 

Thank you. I don't know what I was thinking.

 

You are challenged. Spotter planes at night?
Immediately after PH the Japanese bombed Midway quite successfully, with a cruiser and destroyers, destroying a catalina, etc, The IJN were better trained at night fighting the the allied, as patently proved in the DEI, Guadalcanal, etc, It's funny that arrogant Americans still think that the IJN could not hit an Island at night, when it sent to hell several cruisers and even smaller targets.

Come on, you mean to tell me that the brilliant USN placed 12 Wildcats in a remote island without Radar in Dic 1941 or even a ship with radar?

It's funny that you think that the precious Wildcats were not deperately needed elsewhere, when some cariiers still have Buffalo in the Pacific, the invaluable DEI and Malaya are defeded by a few Buffalo and 2 battleships without air cover and an attack is expected in the PI (the admiral had sent his few ships to Borneo and Australia to save them, instead of defending them and the PI with planes). You have no idea of what urgently needed and efficient deployment mean. Again the US could not have deployed more ineptly its formidable resources in 1941 and 42. As best proven by the 2 happy times.

LWD,
Its interesting that you think that bombs don't affect marines much, the first raid which targeted the planes killed 23 and wounded 11 aviation personnel out of 55. The raid on Sep 10 detonated the dynamite, leaving a gun without shells and Vals are a lot more accurate.

 

Yes, I know you are challenged...There are these things called flares...The make a very bright light...Makes it easier to see you targets at night. Other than the the Japanese are just firing blind, and without the use of their San-Shiki shells. I foresee their bombardment being horribly ineffective. Just as the Japanese heavy cruisers were against Henderson field on Guadalcanal.

Umm...No cruisers were used to bombard Midway. Just two lowly destroyers, Ushio and Sazanami. They conducted a daylight bombardment that lasted almost an hour, and the only real damage they did was the destruction of the PBY.

Pretty poor return for the investment...Don't you think?

Hardly arrogant. We are not just talking about hitting an island. We are talking about hitting pinpoint targets on an island...Troops in foxholes, guns in gunpits, etc. Things not easily seen even in daylight. For that matter when in the Pacific War do we ever see the Japanese carrying out an effective shore bombardment? Even after the worst bombardment at Guadalcanal, the Americans were still able to get aircraft in the air in the morning.

Note to mjölnir...The Japanese Long Lance torpedoes are ineffective against islands...That is all.

Don't you know all this? Oh yeah, that's right, you don't...

The radar was to have been sent to Wake Island, but the war intervened. So, the radar remained safely at Oahu. Further, it is not just Radar, but you also need a trained fighter director team to guide the fighters to intercept incoming air raids.

It's funny that you are trying to conduct an argument when you have no clue what you are talking about.

The Lexington and Saratoga were already scheduled to trade in their F2As for F4Fs. Isn't it funny that you think it wise to swap aircraft in mid-stream, so that all those trained pilots in F2As, suddenly are flying F4Fs, in which they now have no time in type.

Ummm, the DEI and Malaya were defended by Dutch and British Brewster Buffaloes, purchased by their respective governments, and flown by pilots of those respective governments. They were not American aircraft flown by American pilots.

There were no VF or VMF deployed in the Philippines, that was the province of Douglas MacArthur and the USAAC with their P-40s.

So, yes, you do have no idea of what is urgently needed and efficient deployment. The idea that a relatively paltry number of Navy/Marine F4Fs or F2As would make one whit of difference in the defense of the DEI, Malaya, or the Philippine Islands is patently ridiculous.

You really are that stupid...

Here is a hint, Sherlock...The first Happy Time began in July, 1940, and lasted until sometime between October, 1940 - April, 1941. The US was at war with anyone yet. The only deployments were on the Neutrality Patrol.
Read: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a245396.pdf

 

The landing in Anzio was the most successful of the war (fewer resources and fewer casualties than in neutral French Africa and in actual enemy territory), too bad that an American general had to spoil everything by standing still while the Germans took the hills, moved armor, infantry, planes and a railgun and built a complete defensive line, pouring concrete at night, under the idiot's nose. So that a lot of allies died and long months were completely wasted to finally get to Rome.

Not that you can understand the difference between a successful, suprise landing and a rapid, successful advance.

Good luck landing a sea plane at night, its hard enough during the day.

Too bad that you don't know that there were American pilots in the DEI and that Holland had to make do with poorly rebuilt Buffalo with underpowered export engines, because the Wildcats were considered much too precious (they would be used to defend an untenable, useless island, instead of Java's and Sumatra's oil, rubber, tin, etc,).

 

Compared to what? Dieppe? If you are using Dieppe as your baseline, well then yes, Anzio was successful. However compared to most any other WW2 amphibious assault, it was an abject failure.

Still have those rose-colored glasses on I see.

So...Now you are back to Anzio being a failure...

I understand the difference between an Operation that achieves it's objectives and one that doesn't. Operation Shingle did not achieve it's objectives.

The Japanese did it successfully quite often enough...

Before the war? Or orphans from the Philippines, or new pilots just in theater flown up from Australia? Of course, there were several American pilots that wound up in the DEI after the war began, usually flying P-40s.

Ummm...A few of the DEI Brewsters were mounted the less powerful Wright R-1820-G105 engine(1,100hp), but most had the more powerful Wright R-1820-G205A powerplant(1,200hp). So, no the Dutch Brewsters, on the whole, were not using underpowered export engines.

So, let me get this straight...You believe that by sending F4Fs to the DEI...Where there is no established spare parts supply, no trained mechanics for the Grumman, and fresh pilots with no time in type...Is an efficient deployment?

Pass me some of what you are smoking and/or drinking.

 

The landing in Anzio had fewer resources (not a single battleship or carrier and it used its small fleet for a short time for the rapid landing) and fewer casualties than Dakar, Narvik, Madagascar, Dieppe, Tarawa, Torch, Sicily, Salerno, Dodecanese, D.day, Kwajalein, Leyte, Iwo, Saipan, even the French Riviera, etc, and with the exception of D-day & the French Riviera it took place in much more valuble territory than all the others and in much more weakly defended territory. You simply cannot appreciate the fact that an idiot standing still, instead leading the advance can ruin the most brilliant landing.

The only other landing with few casualties was Guadalcanal, where the Japanese were caught with their pants down. However, Guadalcanal was a completely useless, remote island, a completely different leeague from Anzio.

Again, Patton was the only American general who really understood the value of advancing rapidly to minimize losses and at the time of Anzio and D-day had the most amphibious and Blitzkrieg experience, yet Eisenhower used him for neither. Like Anzio and Guadalcanal, ATL Patton catches the axis with its pants down in invaluable territory in Sardinia and at the best time, instead of the allies wasting men, planes, time, ships, etc, in Morocco and Algeria.

 

That is a rather wordy and roundabout way of saying "Yes, Anzio was a failure."

Why is everything that does not meet you approval useless?

Guadalcanal destroyed the IJNAF as an effective fighting force Further, it would prove vital as an advance base and airbase for further moves up the Solomons chain.

Apparently your definition of "Useless" needs to be reexamined.

So, I guess your excuse for Patton's conduct at Metz is that he had a "brain fart".

Patton had never conducted an amphibious assault, only amphibious landings, so his experience would count for little at D-Day. Further, he served D-Day far more invaluably with his central part in Operation Fortitude.

 

I am sorry, but your statements reveal a complete lack of understanding of the amphibious doctrine in place in 1942-1944, as well as of the events of Operation SHINGLE and the experience and capabilities of George Patton.

Doctrine required at at least contested air superiority. Sardinia and Corsica were out of reach of any Allied land air power, while intelligence assessments of the time indicated the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica's capabilities were too strong for the limited Allied carrier assets to contest.

Lucas did exactly at Anzio what doctrine required and his friend Patton advised. First secure and consolidate the beachhead and then expand. If the "lunge" to the Alban Hills was attempted the most likely result, given the speed and strength of the German response and the necessarily dispersed Allied positions, would have been the annihilation of the beachhead and the loss of the better part of two reinforced Allied divisions. Most critically, the Allies could only get ashore two tank battalions before 29 January, which were well outmatched by the German AT presence by the morning of 23 January and was matched by the German tank presence by c. evening 24 January.

 

The allies did not stay away from Sardinia, because they determined that axis air or land or sea forces were too strong in September, October or November 1942. Churchill (the worst strategist after Mussolini) had decided long months before Torch to invade Africa (before Trident conference in May 1942), because the Germans had trounced him so badly in Europe and he much preferred to blow up houses in Germany and let the bulk of the WM to the Soviets, while he fooled around with a small German force in Africa, which he expected to be poorly supplied (not realizing that Tunisia allowed much better supplies than Tripoli) and Churchil persuaded Gullible Roosevelt to invade Africa, against US military advisors (Marshal, etc,), who regarded Africa as delaying the invasion of Europe pointlessly and wasting troops and resources in Tangential operations.
Invading Africa was as pointeless as wasting months in Madagascar with a strong fleet or the later invasion of the Dodecanese, in which Marshal had to tell an insistant Churchill that no American boy will die in those damn beaches (basically sending him to hell and letting him waste only British lives, ships and planes gallore).

Churchill also insisted over 20 times to cancell Anvil, in favor of Yugoslavia, but by that time Roosevel knew that Chuchill was a prefect idiot and ignored him. Anvil was as successful as the landing in Anzio, but Anvil was not wasted thanks to rapid advance in much easier terrain than Normandy's Bocage.

Churchill operated hormonally rather than reasonably. After being trounced by planes and tanks for years, Tobruk, Dieppe and the Dodecanese had stronger enemy air and land forces than Sardinia, yet he authorized pointless raids on the first two and the invasion of the latter in extremely costly debacles..

Axis air, land and sea forces in Sardinia & Corsica were a joke throughout 1940, 41 and 42, just like they had been in Pantelleria in 1940, when admiral Keyes proposed an invasion, which would have made supplying & flying planes to Malta and keeping free of mines the narrows of Tunisia much easier for Britain and supplying Tripoli impossible for Mussolini. The French Med coast was also weakly defended in 1943.
In contrast, Sicily, mainland Italy and Normandy had strong enemy forces in excellent defensive terrain, yet the allies invaded them, wasting a lot of men and time

What air support did Patton receive from Gibraltar against French armor, fighters, coastal guns and forts in Morocco? His success hinged on destroying French aviation with carrier plane strikes and dogfights and rapidly capturing an airfield and landing there 77 P-40 from Chenango. 40 Spitfires and 37 P-40 ferried from Gibraltar and landed in a rapidly captured airfield in SW Sardinia would have done the same. Chenango deploys 31 Wildcats to support D-day and at dusk she sails to Gibraltar to land the Wildcats and collect the Spits and P-40, which she then launches hubndreds of km to land in the captured field.

Lucas did not secure the beachhead, he left his forces exposed if the enemy captured the hills, which Patton immediately occupied to secure the beachhead in Gela. The best way to secure the beachhead is to rapidly advance and capture airfields, crossroads, bridges, etc,. How long did it take Patton's forces to reach 30 km inland in Sicily agianst strong opposition and how long did it take Lucas' initially unopposed force?