Torch in Sardinia & Corsica, instead of N Africa

You really do think you know what you're talking about. I'm sorry, but that spate of words you just typed is so much nonsense. I suggest you look at some of the G-2 Air assessments pre-TORCH. Never mind of course invading Sardinia and Corsica does squat all to defeat Axis forces in the Mediterranean. Instead, it gives them a lot of territory to build airfields for air forces they did not possess until 1943, but what the heck...

No. Invading Africa allowed the Allies to make maximum use of their strength at the time - naval power - while exercising an economy of forces WRT ground and air forces they did not yet possess. It ensured the destruction of two Axis armies...well three depending on how you count it.

You write an awful lot, but don't say much of consequence...or that has any bearing on reality. You do realize the French "air power" in North Africa was virtually nonexistent don't you? The forces of Luftflotte 2, Luftflotte 3 in southern France, and the Regia Aeronautica are rather a bit more to deal with than the dispersed and poorly maintained forces of the Vichy Armee de l'Air in North Africa. You might note that the Allied carrier air power had bare numerical superiority over the French in terms of fighters, c. 186 to 156. At the time it was understood the II. Fliegerkorps in Sicily alone could have as many as 240 aircraft and the ability to rapidly redeploy.

So, you do realize the Gela "hills" you are blathering about were just five miles from the beaches, whereas the Alban Hills at Frascati are about 26 miles from the beaches...as the troops march rather than the 22 miles as the crow flies, while the hills overlooking Frosinone in the American sector were 42 miles away?

BTW, you still ignore the simple fact that Patton advised Lucas "don't stick your neck out Johnny". yet another indication your "what ifs" are driven by fantasy rather than reality.

 

Five miles from the beaches and captured by infantry using white phosphor mortar shells and directed by Patton. In Anzio tanks, Jeeps and trucks were available earlier than in Gela and there was stronger air support.
2 battalions of the 82nd had saved Clark's butt in Salerno, dropped behind the beachhead days after the landing, when it was about to collapse. After heavy fighting Clark ordered the 2 battalions to retreat. Their commander replied "retreat, hell, send me my other battalion", which saved the day. Incredibly, the USN and USAAF allowed Kesselring's Panzers to advance 6 miles from the beach in Salerno, instead of blasting them!
Do you know why the geniuses landed a battalion of the 82nd airborne using landing craft in Anzio, instead of dropping the whole division inland, where they were much more effective? Lucas had huge resources, he just could not have been more incompetent. Much like a paralyzed fawn at the beach.
I also wonder why they did not use battleships in Anzio, to provide adequate artillery support and better AAA and why the uSAAF allowed Kesselring to move tanks, guns, men, etc, by train during the day to rapidly reinforce the area.

Patton resented Lucas' commission, do you think the vainglorious bastard is going to tell Lucas to rush in, kick ass and capture Rome in days with limited casualties, rendering Patton's capture of Palermo and Messina trivial achievements?
Patton thought that Eisenhower was a dumb clerk without any idea of strategy and with too much power as is obvious in his diary. However, he never told Eisenhower what he thought.
What people advice or comment is completely different from what they think and do.
Moreover, when Patton told Lucas that, he could not know that the landing would go practically unopposed (a few planes strafing the landing craft and bombing the ships)

 

Dear Lord, but its obviously best to ignore you and leave you to your comic book fantasies. Sargent Rock and The Ghost Tank make poor references for military history. Have fun making more things up as you go along.

 

How does invading a very weakly defended, large axis island with prime location provide additional territory for the axis to build airfields? Nothing better than a person who cannot master very the basics and claims knowledge in depth.

 

So, you're implying that Patton "set up" Lucas at Anzio because he was resentful?

 

I don't think so...

What he is implying is that he knows nothing about nothing when it comes to World War II.

This is why he wants to invade an island that is deep in enemy territory with a force ill-equipped for the task. Ignoring the fact that the Germans can draw on their aircraft located in France to help defeat the Allied invasion of Sardinia & Corsica. Further ignoring the fact that the Allies have no close major base of supply(maybe the idea of capturing North Africa was not so useless)

 

Malta is deep in enemy territory and close to axis planes (hell to reinforce and supply) and it survived, Sardinia, certainly isn't in deep axis territory. It is the axis W outpost, farther from Italy than Tunisia is from Sardinia. Tunisia is deep in axis territory (flanked by Sardinia and Sicily and much easier for the axis to reinforce from Sicily) and the allies struck there.

 

"What he is implying is that he knows nothing about nothing when it comes to World War II."

Its long past mere "implying"...

 

Let's see you start off with a couple of straw men. then throw in some assumptions and questionable conclusions. Here are a couple of questions for you. How many IJN ships were armed with 16" guns? What did they have for shore bombardment ammo? How many heavy cruisers shelled Wake? How many FO's who could all in naval fire support deployed with the Japanese landing forces? If the gun crews didn't stand a chance why the Japanese losses?

 

Malta didn't need to be invaded.
Tunisia was hardly "deep in Axis territory". Nor was it really flanked in by Sardinia or Sicily in a military sense. True it could be reinforced but it couldn't be supported at a level that had any real chance of victory so supporting forces were in essence throwing good money after bad. The progression of North Africa to Sicily to Italy rather indicates that the allies weren't "stuck there" either.

You are getting to the point where you've going to get something right by accident .... or not.

 

it is at least an order of magnitude easier to reinforce and supply Tunisia from Sicily for the axis or Sardinia from Gibraltar for the allies, than it is Malta.from Gibraltar.

Monty in Egypt, Libya and S Tunisia had to be supplied around S Africa! precisely because they were past Sardinia, SIcily, the mined narrows of Tunisia (deep in axis territory).
Militarily speaking, planes, subs, ships, etc, in Sardinia and Sicily, the mined Narrows of Tunisia and PT boats, etc, in Pantelleria certainly flank Tunisia and blockade Malta. In contrast, Sardinia has a completely open W flank.

Patton alone spent months stuck in Morocco, while Fredendall was trounced and the Soviets incurred heavy losses. The absurd progression: heavily defended Morocco-Algeria-Tunisia to heavily defended SIcily to heavily defended Italy cost the allies invaluable time (over a year and 2 months between Morocco and Anzio) and heavy casualties for useless terrain (Italy had not nearly fallen by D-day Normandy) and provided Hitler invaluable time to produce planes, tanks, synthetic fuel, munitions, soldiers, pilots, etc, and to fortify the Atlantic coast using iron ore and steel from Alsace-Lorraine and food and labor from France, quite close to Sardinia and Corsica.

The first two good size batches of Spitfires to arrive in Malta had to be ferried by Hornet (Churchill had his carriers busy in Madagascar and Pedestal). The first batch of about 50 was wiped out on the ground within minutes of landing by the LW in Sicily, because there was no carrier or twin engine fighter support (Hornet had to sail back after launching the planes before the mined Narrows of Tunisia. With carrier and P-38, mosquito and Beaufighter cover and larger numbers of Spitfires, P-40, P-38, etc, landing in Sardinia, it is impossible for the LW to wipe out landing planes from much further away.

Americans had to rapidly build an airfield in tiny Gozo (without a decent port) to support the costly invasion of SIcily, after the first airfields in SE Sicily were captured, all that work was rendered moot. In contrast, airfields in large Sardinia and Corsica will be invaluable for a much longer time, supporting the invasion of the French Riviera and bombing the axis with 4 engine planes (forcing the LW to defend against not only raids from Britain, but also from Sardinia and Corsica, spreading its planes thin already in late 1942).

 

Not really. Especially sense Torch opened up the potential of supplying through Morocco and Algeria and then the invasion of Sicily and Southern Italy pretty much opened up the Med. Axis supply to North Africa was both more dangerous and more difficult than allied supply of that theater.

 

I suppose if I keep reading this thread I will have to get used to the constant bouts of inanity and historical ignorance.

It was USS Wasp, not Hornet, twice, not once. The first, Operation CALENDAR was problematic. 52 Spitfires of 601 and 603 Squadrons were embarked, 48, 47, or 46 of which, depending on the source, were launched and landed. The German bombing attacks may have destroyed as many as 21 or as few as 13 of those, since 27 were operational the next day and approximately six were lost in sorties against the German bombing attacks. The second, Operation BOWERY was with 47 Spitfires plus 17 on HMS Eagle and 61 arrived.

BTW, "Hornet" did not "have" to sail back because of mines nor did the "lack" of fighter coverage - carrier or twin-engine - have much to do the results of CALENDAR. For one thing, Malta Hurricanes and the CALENDAR Spits sortied as they could - at least as many as "Hornet's 14-odd F4F's could have managed. For another, IT WAS NEVER PLANNED TO RISK ONE OF THE FEW US FLEET CARRIERS BY HAVING IT STAND OFF MALTA IN AXIS DOMINATED AIR SPACE. Any more than it was expected to do so WRT a "Sardinian invasion".

 

Completely false, it was also an order of magnitude easier for the reduced axis fleet in 1942 to supply nearby Tunis and Bizerte (far from Malta) than very distant Tripoli, closer to Malta. The axis transported hundreds of thousands of troops, Panzer's (including Tiger), artillery, plenty of munitions, etc, to Tunisia, while Rommel could only dream of those supplies, even by the much stronger axis fleet in 1941 and 42 through Tripoli.

It is much easier to debark Patton's force in weak enemy territory in Sardinia, than to send Patton's force overland from Morocco all the way to Tunisia (after fighting the French and rather idiotically slow and causing a lot of wear and requiring a lot of fuel) and then lose Grant and Sherman against Pz IV, STUG III, Tigers, dozens of 88 mm guns and a large LW in Tunisia, instead of using them to secure weak Sardinia and Corsica and then invade France with nearly intact forces.

Not only did Patton have to kill many Frenchmen, 6 each French destroyers and subs and a cruiser were sunk, a battleship damaged and dozens of French planes and tanks destroyed or heavily damaged just capturing neutral Morocco. All these men and pieces of equipment would have joined the allies soon after the fall of Sardinia and Corsica. Moreover, American troops deeply resented French resistance (which killed or wonded many AMericans) and created many problems insulting the French after Torch. In contrast, spontaneously joining the allies in Sardinia and Corsica would have resulted in much better Franco-American relations and cooperation throughout 1943, 44 and 45.

Sardinia in August-Nov 1942 had about 36,000 axis men and 124 planes (mosly SM.79, Stuka and Ju 88 and no FW 190) spread over a large area and poorly equipped (few trucks, field artillery, tanks, etc,) and after an allied landing, they could not be reinforced or supplied. In contrast, in July 1043 Sicily had 262,000 axis troops, 150 Panzers, 130 Italian tanks, 780 planes (hundreds of fighters) and about 100,000 reinforcement troops, 640 planes, etc, arrived soon after the landings and received plenty of supples during the invasion and a large part of the German force was evacuated to Italy.

A large predawn bombardment by the fleets OTL wasted in Pedestal, Madagascar and Dieppe destroys or heavily damages 28 planes on the ground in coastal airports and a dawn attack by carrier planes and twin engine fighters and bombers from Malta and Gibraltar destroys at least another 58 planes on the ground and in the air in coastal and inland airfields. Very strong naval AAA and fighters destroy another 29 planes attacking the invasion fleet during the first day of the landings.

The capture of airfields on the 1st day (which are repaired by the early morning of the followig day) allows 64 each Spitfires and P-40 ferried from Gibraltar and 24 each P-38, Mosquito fighters, Mosquito bombers, Beaufighters, Wellingtons, B-17, 24 and 25 to land in Sardinia after dropping their munitions on the 2nd day of the invasion. These planes wipe ot the few ramaining axis planes in Sardinia and French planes in Corsica on the 2nd day and all multiengine engine planes begin attacking air and naval bases in SIcily and mainland Italy at dawn on the 3rd day of the invasion.
The overwhelming invasion force induces the isolated, decimated and demoralized Italian force in Sardinia and the French force in Corsica to surrender on the 3 day of the invasion.

On the 4th day of the invasion, minesweepers with heavy twin engine fighter and naval support begin clearing the Narrows of Tunisia. During the 4th night the fleet bombards airfields, coastal artillery and ships in E Sicily and sails to refuel and rearm in Sardinia and to escort an invasion force to Crete and a supply convoy to Malta.
The convoy arrives almost intact in Malta on the 7th day of the invasion and Crete is invaded on the 10th day of the landings in Sardinia and Corsica by 1/3 of the troops landed in Sardinia, plus additional American, Canadian and British-Polish-Free French troops (the latter from Egypt), after strong preliminary, night bombardment and dawn bombing from Alexandria, Cyprus and Malta and by carrier planes. Again, the invasion is led by Patton, who returns to Sardinia after capturing Crete and prepared to land in the French Rviera. Bombers from Crete rapidly destroy Ploesti, further impairing German ability to fight. Planes from Crete disrupt completely axis maritime supplies in Greece and the Dodecanese. They also heavily bomb Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, Bucharest, Constanza, Craiova, etc, in early 1943, forcing Bulgaria and Romania to abandon the axis and sue for peace, weakening the WM in the USSR.

 

Sorry about wrongly stating that it was Hornet, when it was indeed Wasp (both sting). I did mention two batches not one, the first one being wiped out. Several planes of the first batch were not delivered (one having to fly back and land on Wasp, a feat for a Spit), owing to faulty drop tanks, which made the Capitan of the Wasp force the British to correct the major problem to his satisfaction , before sailing with the 2nd batch.
The idea that 13 Spits were destroyed is absurd, even if 27 were operational out of 46 the following day (which is not the case), at least 19 would hav been destroyed.
It is a fact that Wasp and all other carriers, battleship, etc, at the time had to head back to avoid the mined Narrows and planes from Sardinia and SIcily. and that caused many Hurricane, etc, to run out of fuel before reaching Malta.

I never mentioned Wasp supporting Sardinia (only Ranger, Victorious and CVE in Nov wasted in Torch or in August RN carriers wasted in Pedestal and Madagascar). However, it is certainly a much better investment using Wasp for a few days to support American forces in the capture of invaluable territory (rendering the ferrying of planes and escorting of convoys to Malta mch easier and safer), rather than wasting several weeks ferrying planes to a small island deep in enemy territory.

This is from wiki regarding the first batch:
This addition to Malta's defences was in vain. The Luftwaffe anticipated the Spitfires' arrival and bombed Ta'Qali airfield within minutes of their arrival. Most were caught on the ground and within 48 hours all were destroyed. Those that did fly were hampered by the faults with which they had arrived.[1]

Wiped out!

 

Yes, Wiki of course. No, the Spitfire that returned to land on Wasp was during BOWERY, not CALENDAR. Nor were his drop tanks "faulty"..he was by dropping them by mistake after taking off.

As for the losses in CALENDAR:

"The fighter strength was reinforced on the 20[SIZE=small]th[/SIZE] by the arrival of 46 Spitfires from UK…Prior to the above mentioned reinforcement there was a period when it was not possible to have any fighter aircraft airborne at all, due to unserviceability. It was very noticeable that with the arrival of the fighter reinforcements, the enemy precluded his bombing attacks with fighter sweeps and maintained fighters over the Island even after the bombers had made their get-away.

During the period when the 46 Spitfires were necessarily grounded for refueling and re-arming and brought into a fully operational condition, many were damaged on the ground by enemy action. The inability to scramble our aircraft was due in the first place to the fact that minor details such as cannon testing were not done, and it would appear that the aircraft had come straight from the factory without being tested to see that they were fit to fly operationally.” War Diary, Air HQ Malta, April 1942

The 46 (47 in the Air HQ Ops Report) were reported landed between 1000 and 1100 hours, after the all clear at 0935 following the German raids between 0815 and 0935. then from 1230 until about 1853 a series of attacks involving over 100 aircraft target the island. It is noted at 1720 two Spitfires were lost at Luqa by Bf 109 strafing. Then at 1730 five Spitfires of 601 took off to engage the Germans, of which four were lost. At 1930 another large formation of Germans approaches and eleven Spitfires from Tal Qali and five from Luqa take off. Three are lost and two damaged.

So, 46 or 47 landed, 27 were operational the next day. So 19 or 20 were lost or damaged to all causes. Seven are known lost in air actions and two damaged. So that leaves ten or eleven. Two are known lost to strafing. That leaves eight or nine lost to German bombing. I was being conservative.

 

The person who wrote the report was either shell-shocked or rather ignorant and not thorough at all, he probably means "the enemy preceded his bombing runs with fighter sweeps, rather than precluded, which would mean that there were no bomber attacks, because he then states that LW fighters remained after the bombers departed, hence there were bomber attacks.

Wiki states that they were destroyed completely over the following days. You are considering only the first day. The only contradiction is that wiki states that most were detroyed within minutes after landing, while the report states that the attacks started 1 1/2 hours after the last landing. It does state than 6 Spitfires were lost just between 1720 and 0600 and attacks lasted 6 h 23 m.

Where does it state that 27 were operational? A long series of attacks by over 100 German planes, which destroys or damages 9 Spits just in the air (much more difficult than on the ground), has to destroy a lot more than 8 or 9 very vulnerable Spitfires by bombers and two by strafers, sitting ducks on the ground,
In PH a smaller number of inferior planes attacking US planes (most of the 352 planes attacked ships, installations, barracks, vehicles, the hospital, etc,) destroyed 188 planes and damaged 153, including tough, air cooled engine fighters and tough and large twin and 4 engine planes. A strafing Zero has less ammo than a Bf 109 in 1942 and twin engine bombers are in a different league from Vals and Kates and AAA defenses in PH during the second wave are much stronger than in Malta, where even AAA amo was scarce.

You think that only 2 were destroyed by strafing, that is only at 1720 and only in Luqa, with strafing sweeps throughout the afternoon, a lot more had to be lost to strafing than shot down. The poor report does not specify the total number of planes destroyed and damaged each by bombing and strafing. In any event it is irrelevant how many were operational the following day, since they were wiped out in days, requiring Wasp to waste even more weeks (wasting an urgently needed fleet carrier to ferry planes between April 15 and May 13 is extremely stupid, since the planes will have to be supplied running the gauntlet). Using Wasp and a large fleet for a few days and the Spits to capture Sardinia, greatly weakens the gauntlet (allowing destruction of planes in E Sicily and sweeping the Narrows free of mines).

 

You really like to make assumptions based upon what you think "has to" happen in different situations, don't you?

Anyway, do some research, the good Doctor Price as always is helpful. Forty-seven Spitfires were loaded, 46 landed, one went missing on the run in. Meanwhile, Spitfires Over Malta (p. 23) gives the figure of 27 serviceable on the 21st, reduced to 17 on the 22nd. BTW, you do know there is a difference between an unserviceable aircraft and a destroyed one? Oh, and the key problem was the lack of fuel bowsers, the arriving Spitfires had to be refueled using 4-gallon flimsies hand poured - 21 of them for a fill.

BTW, do you shave yet? I only ask because you display the behavior of a snotty-nosed ten-year old.

 

Again let's look at this an element at a time.

Simply stating your opinion doesn't make it so. Looking at one side of an equation doesn't mean you have solved it. By that point in the war the allies had the supply chain to support North Africa indeed the British were always better able to support their forces there than the Axis. Rommel's problems with supply for the most part were not getting things from Italy to Africa except with the exception of a few periods. The problems were with getting the supplies to his forces. PLS also note the air lift of supplies in particular fuel to North Africa during that period. You don't use airlift if it's easy to use other means. Furthermore both the shipping and the aircraft were subject to significant threat for most of their journey. While the allies had a longer journey they also had orders of magnitude more shipping are significantly less threat.

PLS also note what happened to the supplies, men, and equipment sent to North Africa. The Axis lost all most all of it. In the Tunisian campaign alone they lost over 3 times the number of aircraft the allies did. Not a raito that they could afford by any means. That's not even considering the other equipment and men which were also lost in greater numbers than the allies. If you are out numbered and out supplied loosing men and equipment at greater rates than your opponents isn't really helpful is it?

 

Or not. Indeed under most definitions of easy not.

The landings at Torch were not strongly contested and the fleet both transports and warships were subject to pretty limited threats over a fairly short period of time. That would not have been the case with Sardinia. The Axis would know when the allied forces moved into the Med and have more time to react to them. That means multiple subs and potentially attacks by MTBs as well as aircraft. Then there's the fact that, which you refuse to address, that the allies would be dependent on carriers for air support and carriers can be rendered incapable of flight operations with a single bomb much less a torpedo. So you have the makings of a potential disaster. Even if Sardinia is taken the naval losses may well render it a Pyric victory. Then there's the fact that has been noted many times that the Axis lost huge quantities of men and material in North Africa. Would Sardinia inflict anywhere near these levels? Almost assuredly not. Indeed it might prompt the Axis to abandon North Africa which would result in the Allies facing those troops in much more difficult positions.