Trains in WWII

The German Class 52 Locomotive" from Tactical and Technical Trends

A review of the German Class 52 railroad locomotive, from Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 24, May 6, 1943.

[DISCLAIMER: The following text is taken from the U.S. War Department publication Tactical and Technical Trends. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate. No attempt has been made to update or correct the text. Any views or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the website.]

THE GERMAN CLASS "52" LOCOMOTIVE ​

a. General
This is a summary of information and conclusions regarding the much publicized German class "52" locomotive recently adopted as standard to replace the class "50" locomotive. The information has been sifted from various German sources, some of which conflict and many of which are of a propaganda nature. Questionable statements have been eliminated as far as possible.
The evidence points to the conclusion that the earlier class "50" locomotive, for which a program of 7,500 locomotives per year was announced by the Germans in March 1942, was a transition model of a class introduced shortly before the war and was only intended as a stop-gap to tide over a critical period. As proof of this, in the accounts of the class "52" locomotive there are several references to a "transition" model, and the photographs which have appeared in the German press are believed to have been of this simplified class "50" locomotive. Furthermore, technical experts severely criticized the older design from available photographs, particularly on the ground that the frame was light and the cylinder saddle weak. The class "52" locomotive is apparently stronger in these respects. In further evidence that the class "50" locomotive, which was light, was constructed as a temporary expedient to provide means for rapidly increasing production, the German press announced that the first of the class "52" locomotives left the factory early in September--although the design and subsequent production of the model class "52" locomotive is estimated to have required 15 months. Evidently considerable progress had already been made on class "52" at the time that the simplified class "50" was temporarily adopted as a standard model.
b. The Design of the Class "52"
A comparison of photographs of the classes "50" and "52" shows that, contrary to German press accounts, they are lighter models of the class "44," and have the same basic design. In comparison with transition class "50" the new class "52" has a deeper frame, stiffer cylinder saddle, and a welded tender of the modified Vanderbilt, frameless type in place of the riveted type carried on a frame. The bracket for the valve motion has been stiffened by a bridge girder between the bracket and cylinder. A snow plough has been fitted to the locomotive. The smoke deflector plates, the forward steam dome which contained the preheater, the feed pump, and the feed water heater have been eliminated. It is evident that the side and main rods have been redesigned; the brake rigging and similar apparatus are simplified; the locking device on the smoke box has been replaced by a ring of cleats; and the cylinder-exhaust branches are rectangular instead of circular in cross section.

The class "52" locomotive is claimed to be more effectively protected against freezing than the class "50," by thicker lagging, steam jackets around exposed piping, and transfer of exposed parts to a position nearer the boiler. Although it is difficult to verify all these claims from photographs, it appears that the boiler, cylinders, and exhaust branches are well insulated. The photographs do not indicate which pipes were brought nearer the boiler or which pipes have been steam-jacketed. However, contrary to normal practice the air-compressor valve mechanism at the top of the compressor has been covered by a casing and insulated. It has been reported that a closer fit has been made on class "50" locomotive journal-box covers in order to prevent snow from entering, and, no doubt, this has been done on the class "52" locomotive also. The precautions taken against freezing would adapt the locomotive for service on the Eastern Front. Minor differences noted are the mounting of the headlight generator above the firebox instead of on the smoke box; the replacing of two oil lubricators by a single lubricator above the boiler; and the fact that the sand dome, instead of being separate, is inclosed by the rear steam-dome casing.

If the expected output of 7,500 locomotives per year is attained, 187,500 tons of material would be saved at the 25 tons per locomotive shown in the table. A reduction of 16 tons of the total of 25 is accounted for in the tender. Part of the economy in weight of the locomotive is achieved by the use of drop forgings instead of hand forgings for the whole of the valve-motion gear and side rods, and throughout the brake rigging. Reference is also made in German accounts to economy of material by using plain instead of forked ends in the motion gear, and by the adoption of a "gas tube in place of the firebox wrapper plate" (probably an arched, firebox crown sheet).
According to German accounts, a reduction has been secured in the quantity of non-ferrous metals by using 495 pounds of copper in the class "52" as against 1,600 pounds in the class "50" locomotive. It is claimed that 840 pounds of this reduction has been accomplished by the substitution of steel-backed for bronze-backed bearings for the 2 big-ends of the main rod and for the 10 axle bearings, and that a further saving of 55 pounds of copper is obtained by substituting a steel casing for the former bronze steam-whistle casing.
It is further claimed that 138 pounds of tin were saved in the steel-backed bearings, and 2 pounds of tin in using the steel whistle casing, although the main economy in tin as compared with the class "44" is the result of the replacement of plain by ball bearings for the tender axles.
e. Reduction in Labor Requirements
Careful consideration has been given in the design of the class "52" locomotive to economy in man-hours required for its construction. After comparing various reports, it is estimated that a class "52" locomotive can be built in 24,000 man-hours, representing a building period of about 10 weeks, as against 30,000 man-hours for class "50" and 60,000 man-hours for class "44." The economy of 6,000 man-hours is an estimate based on the prototype model, and not a figure based on actual experience. The 24,000 man-hour figure might possibly be attained in the largest and best-equipped plants, but it is practically certain that well over 30.000 man-hours will be required in many of the smaller European plants.
There is no doubt that a welded tender of the frameless type could be built in about half the time required for the framed type. The wide adoption of drop forgings and changes of design to reduce machining would lead to economy in labor. The following table compiled from data in the German press shows certain features in class "44" and "50" locomotives which have been changed in the "52" class, with the resultant saving in intermediate weight and man-hours.

Reports claim a reduction in machining time of a cylinder block of from 28 to 4 hours, and it is claimed that a further reduction to 1 hour will be attained upon completion of a special machine. A highly specialized tool for machining locomotive cylinders would be very costly to build, and it is doubtful whether the German machine-tool industry is now in a position to accept orders for such a machine. If such tools were manufactured, only a limited number of plants could be equipped with them. Due to the transport difficulties involved, the machined cylinders would hardly be shipped to factories distributed throughout Europe. Too much weight need not be attached to actual figures given; however, they show that every attempt is being made to economize in labor and speed up production.
It is stated in one report that by limiting the finish to one coat of paint, 235 man-hours have been saved.
f. Production of Class "52" Locomotive
A paper entitled "Estimated Main-Line Steam Locomotive Output in Axis Europe," based on the class "50" design, gave an annual output of 3,400 locomotives by the end of 1942, 4,040 by July 1943, and 6,040 by the end of 1943, on the assumption that all class "44" locomotives under construction when the plan was announced would be completed, and that all future locomotives would be of the simplified class "50" design. However, the adoption of class "52" as standard modifies these estimates.
Although the tender or class "52" could be built in about half the time of the class "50" tender, this would not appreciably affect the relative production rates of the locomotives proper. The following points should be considered: (a) modifications in design for greater output, (b) modifications in methods of production, and (c) extension of subcontracting.
The conclusion already stated on the first two points is that through these modifications, the class "52" engine can possibly be built in 24,000 man-hours as against 30,000 man-hours for the class "50" by the largest and best-equipped works, providing drop forgings are used in place of hand forgings and that they can be obtained without delay. If the locomotives are built in a number of scattered minor works, as appears likely, such forgings will have to be obtained from outside shops in a great many cases. Due to difficulties of regular supply, the economy in man-hours resulting from use of drop forgings will be a maximum of 10 percent and will most probably average about 5 percent. The production of the necessary dies for the drop forgings will lead to some delays resulting in a small drop of the estimated locomotive output in first half of 1943, followed by a rise to about 6,400 instead of 6,040 by the end of the year. If the above assumptions are correct, the chief advantage of the new class "52" design over the class "50" will not be an increase in production, but the substitution of a sound for a defective design as a standard production model.
Considering the last point, there is very little reliable information on which to base an answer to the question whether the Germans can increase locomotive output by subcontracting beyond the present estimated 10 percent. Reports have been received of proposals to convert the leading European locomotive works to assembly plants, with all components made either in other locomotive works or in plants not hitherto engaged on locomotive production. If this is done, the machine capacity of selected plants would be lost or used for purposes for which the plants were not laid out. Also, a carefully synchronized plan would have to be worked out to cover movement of parts over a transport system that is already heavily taxed. Considering that the delivery of locomotives from some leading French works is months overdue owing to various unexpected difficulties, the required degree of synchronization would be nearly impossible to obtain.
Press accounts, apparently referring to the class "50" locomotive, refer to 18 percent of the total man-hours being performed by subcontractors at the present time. Such component parts of locomotives as air compressors, feed pumps, injectors, and parts of the braking apparatus have usually been obtained from an outside firm. Some of the smaller firms obtained even the boiler from an outside source, and it is difficult to deduce whether the figure of 18 percent includes these parts or only parts normally manufactured by the locomotive builder. Some European works have always made a practice of subcontracting locomotive tenders, and a few have subcontracted boilers.
Until it is established that the 18 percent is in fact over and above the figure accounted for by subcontracting before the war, the figure of 10 percent additional output obtained by subcontracting should be used when estimating total output.
g. Utility Value of the Class "52" Locomotive
The conclusion drawn from published data and photographs is that the class "52" locomotive appears to be of sound design throughout, and should have a useful life comparable with prewar engines.
The elimination of the feed water heater at a sacrifice of approximately 7 percent in thermal efficiency will increase fuel costs but reduce maintenance. The elimination of safety couplings and bell, and the use of thin tires, are justifiable in wartime, and there will be no difficulty in changing these parts at a later date. There is no evidence that the class "52" ;ocomotive has been designed for a short working life. The retention of extension piston rods to reduce cylinder wear on class "52" is direct evidence to the contrary. From the viewpoint of normal continental practice the class "52" is a light model of moderate power, suitable for operating branch lines and local services, but not suitable for heavy, main-line post-war traffic in the Reich. From German accounts, the construction of the class "42" is to be initiated in 1944 for heavy service. This class has never previously been built in quantity but it is thought to be comparable in performance to the class "44." It is thought probable that if the class "42" is built, the class "52" locomotives will also be continued in construction.

Lone Sentry: The German Class 52 Locomotive (WWII Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 24, May 6, 1943)

 

​

 

"Notes on German Rolling Stock" from Tactical and Technical Trends

A report on premature explosions of shells in the German 20-mm quad anti-aircraft gun, from Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 31, August 12, 1943.

[DISCLAIMER: The following text is taken from the U.S. War Department publication Tactical and Technical Trends. As with all wartime intelligence information, data may be incomplete or inaccurate. No attempt has been made to update or correct the text. Any views or opinions expressed do not necessarily represent those of the website.]

NOTES ON GERMAN ROLLING STOCK​

It has been stated that the Nazis have accorded number-1 priority to transportation even to the extent of taking precedence over airplanes. Germany is vitally dependent on the smooth functioning of her transportation system. If this vital system which connects Nazi factories with their sources of supply and with their baffle fronts, is put out of operation or seriously damaged, their whole war effort must obviously be retarded.
Some interesting developments affecting the transportation set-up, tending to reduce the consumption of construction materials and other valuable economies, have been recently reported in connection with the German locomotive and freight car situations.

As was indicated in Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 24, p. 40, it was thought probable that the construction of the class "42" locomotive is to be started in 1944. This new type is said to be a refinement of type "52" (see sketch), has greater tractive power and is designed to meet the requirements of heavy freight traffic.
The same informed technical source responsible for the information mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, states that the dead weight of the railway freight cars now manufactured in Germany has been reduced from pre-war levels by 25 per cent in the case of baggage cars, 34 for refrigeration cars, 29 for flat cars, 38 for box cars. However, the average carrying capacity for all types increased by 10 per cent.
The use of these new cars will provide the following chief advantages: saving of time and labor in manufacture, saving in construction materials, and enabling locomotives to pull additional cars.
The number of types of steam locomotives was reduced by the end of 1942 from 119 to 12. This included locomotives for military and privately operated railways (mostly small gauge), and in the case of electric locomotives, from 11 to 2, and from 97 to 5 for internal combustion locomotives. The manufacture of additional types is continued in former locomotive works in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The chief types manufactured in 1942 were freight models "50" and "52" (see Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 24, p. 34) with "52" scheduled for almost exclusive production in 1943.


Lone Sentry: Notes on German Rolling Stock (WWII Tactical and Technical Trends, No. 31, Aug. 12, 1943)

 

My dad's friend Richard Audet was done in by a flak car while strafing trainsRichard Joseph "Dick" Audet
December 29, 1944 - Ace In A Day
The only RCAF pilot of the War to destroy 2 jet fighters

 

World War II Hospital Trains


Diagram of military hospital train as used in World War II.
In the 1940s, during World War II, rail was still the most important mode of transportation for longer distances on land. Although Army aircraft were being used for aeromedical evacuation, capacity was quite limited and trains were heavily used for evacuation from Echelon II to and between higher echelons of medical care.
When evacuation was indicated from Collecting Stations or Clearing Stations (Echelon II) to Mobile Hospitals (Echelon III) or rearward to static hospitals (Echelon IV), the patients were brought to the nearest railhead for transfer by hospital train. Transfers between hospitals or from ships returning to CONUS with transoceanic evacuees were also accomplished by these trains. Transfers from interior combat zones, and their Echelon III Evacuation Hospitals, involved using trains to take patients to a coastal port where hospital ships took them onward.

Col. T. M. Lowry, Port Surgeon, Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, standing beside Medical Dept. Hospital Ward Car, USA 8906, on Pier 5, Newport News, VA, 29 May 1943. The car is standing by awaiting debarkation of 204 wounded American soldiers from Tunisia. Two of these hospital cars transferred the patients to the Valley Forge General Hospital, Phoenixville, PA.
Hospital trains were ultimately replaced by modern air transportation as higher capacity aircraft became capable of handling the load. The greater speed of air evacuation, beginning to be realized in WW II, and the gradual decline of rail transport in general, made the hospital train obsolete.

WW II HOSPITAL TRAINS

 

JC I wonder if you can find in the un-numerable photos on the net with the basic German loco and cargo boxes along with the Fla fits ?

have interviewed many P-51 pilots in latter part of 44 into 45 that were successful Loco busters and they spoke well of the light Fla placed behind the engine and towards the middle and the back of single 3.7cm and the four barrel 2cm Flakvierlings. Interesting reading the tactics they pursued on best to assault the trains

good thread

 

Thanks. I don't think some realize what a large part railroads played in the war. I will have to look around for that info for you .

 

In the article above it states,

Where trains are to be protected by means of antiaircraft machine guns, the troops transported will furnish 3 antiaircraft sections. Three antiaircraft railroad cars are provided, one at the center of the train, and one at the center of the front and rear halves of the train. There are two types of railroad cars: an open high-sided car with a superstructure or scaffolding, and an open low-sided car. The type of car used depends upon the make-up of the train. Thus in the case of non-motorized units which will use roofed cars for the most part, the guns must be placed at a considerable height in order to get a clear field of fire. Therefore, two high-sided cars with a superstructure are used, and only one low-sided car. This allotment of cars is reversed for motorized units. The high-sided antiaircraft cars are spotted in the train with the roofed cars, the low-sided antiaircraft cars with the open cars. Where possible, the guns are mounted on vehicles when the low-sided car is used. In conjunction with the antiaircraft machine guns, 20-mm. antiaircraft guns may be used. When the 20-mm. guns are to be used, 2 antiaircraft sections are formed, and 3 low-sided cars, specially designed for antiaircraft use, are provided. One car is placed at the tail-end of the train and another at the center. The third car is placed immediately behind the locomotive so that when the direction of the train is changed, as in switching for example, the tail car need not be shifted; if possible, this car should also be provided with a gun. At least 2 open cars with low loads should be coupled to either side of these special antiaircraft cars in order to give a good field of fire. Additional 20-mm. guns may be used when required.

Ill looks to see if I can find any photos.

 

"The defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 was perhaps the most significant event in modern history. From the defeat of Germany, evolved the world we know today. Significantly the freedom we have to express our opinions and to debate topics such as this are the direct result of the actions of millions of brave men and women who fought to defeat Hitler’s regime. We owe a great debt to the many who paid the ultimate sacrifice for what we take for granted today.

As much as the defeat of Germany was achieved by force of arms from the Allied nations, defeat also came from within. Germany was not adequately prepared for war in 1939, and the early victories were achieved through the relatively new tactics of Blitzkrieg, modern equipment, superb training and leadership, ineptitude of the enemy and plain good luck.

Significantly Germany’s ill preparedness for war manifested itself in the first months of war and by December 1940 was readily apparent in the German transport system which was buckling under the demands of the German armed forces. This was no more apparent than with the Reichbahn, the German railways, an amalgamation of the former state railway systems.
The Reichbahn was forced to absorb a vast network of railways in varying condition, and locomotives and rolling stock that were often incompatible. As there were few common designs the new railway system was burdened by operational problems, increased and often duplicated costs and a maintenance headache of mammoth proportions.

Much of the plant and equipment was built in the late nineteenth century and the early 1900’s and had not been modernized because of the Great War, the chaos of the Weimar republic and the Depression. As much as a massive modernization programme was begun, with a view of upgrading track and other facilities, the construction of standardized locomotives and rolling stock, it was not complete by the beginning of war. This problem grew as the war progressed as they advanced deeper into the Soviet Union. Because of the restricted loading gauge and the increased demands of the German forces, the Reichbahn was forced into a never ending cycle of building more locomotives and rolling stock to achieve the task.

With the invasion of the Soviet Union the demands on the railways reached crippling proportions, culminating in the coal shortage of winter 1941/1942. There was no shortage of coal, but a lack of coal wagons which had been appropriated by the Wehrmacht and due to the chaotic conditions at the railheads behind the front these wagons were simply tipped off the tracks to allow space for the following trains.

Equally problematic for the Germans were the loss of over 100,000 trucks and 200,000 horses between the opening of Barbarossa and March 1942. These losses were to have an impact against the chances of success some six months later at Stalingrad.

It was clear such a situation could not continue otherwise the rail system would soon collapse. Albert Speer (Minister for Armaments and Munitions Production) and ErhardMilch (Director of Air Armament & state secretary in the Air Ministry) were charged with setting the railways right, and with brutal efficiency they cleared out the railway administration, sacking the incompetent heads of the railways and throwing out the rule book. To alleviate some of the operational problems, longer and heavier trains were run at faster speeds. An accelerated programme of converting the Russian broad gauge system to the German standard gauge system, the construction of longer passing loops and new railway yards was set in motion.

Short term measures alleviated the crisis, but only a massive construction programme would provide a permanent solution. The effects of the enforced intervention was highly visible in 1943 with the construction of over 4,500 locomotives and nearly 52,000 freight wagons. As formidable as these figures may seem they were never enough to resolve the crisis that engulfed the Deutsche Reichsbahn from 1939 to 1945.

Rheinmetal Borsig were charged with building a family of Austerity class locomotives, all based on standardized designs. One of these locomotives was so successful over ten thousand were built and many remained in service until the end of steam operations in Europe.

All these measures were only partially or such successful as the demands from the various fronts, in particular the Eastern Front, continued to place undue strain on a system that was not designed for such traffic. To transport a fully equipped panzer division could require up to three hundred trains. Multiply that out over the entire Eastern front, coupled with the normal supply demands and it is easy to see why the German railways could not keep up with the demands of war.

In addition the railways had to compete for labour, cope with the burden of transporting Jews, which coincidentally often had priority over trains heading for the front. Until the bombing campaign against the railways intensified in 1943 the system held together. Most aiming points for these raids were on the town centres, where the central railway stations and yards were situated, so as the bombing tempo increased, so did the damage and disruption.

As much as the emergency measures freed up the traffic to and from the Eastern front it was obvious the chain of patched up railway lines leading to the railhead on the river Chir over 100 kilometers west of Stalingrad were incapable of supporting German forces. The track was not well ballasted or in good condition, slowing trains considerably. The Luftwaffe used four trains per day, but this was not enough and many supplies, especially fuel were flown into German held airbases. Further compounding the problems were a rail yard too small to cope with the traffic and the resulting congestion placed great strain on the largely horse drawn vehicles supplying German troops in Stalingrad.

This situation was compounded in late October 1942 when it was obvious the Soviets were preparing an offensive against the flanks of the German forces. To reinforce the 3rd Romanian army, Hitler ordered the 6th Panzer division with two infantry divisions to transfer from France on the 4th November. Nearly one thousand train loads were required for this move east and it was nearly one month later these forces arrived, long after the Soviet offensive had surrounded Paulus’ 6th army.

The situation was hardly better in the buildup for Operation Citadel, with lengthy delays of moving the troops and equipment forward. On a smaller scale the sheer difficulties in transporting the new Tiger tanks to the front caused delays, that were only resolved with a combination of ingenuity, skill and a lot of sweat.

By mid 1943 the Allied bomber offensive was causing very real disruption for the railways. Although damage could be repaired relatively quickly by experienced crews, damage was becoming cumulative in some areas where bombing was frequent. Of added concern were the rising casualties amongst train crews, mechanical and maintenance staff along with the various administrative branches that kept the trains running. While the personal strength reached over one and a half million by the end of 1943, the replacement of skilled personal was not easy, as a consequence the standard of maintenance gradually declined and the accident rate which had been on the rise since the beginning of the war, worsened.

This was compounded in early 1944 when after the defeat of the Jagdwaffe in February-March, American fighters after completing escort duties were allowed to attack targets of opportunity. They were so successful in shooting up anything that moved, the Deutsche Reichsbahn reported in June the daily average number of trains wrecked in May by marauding Allied fighters was over forty trains per day! This loss rate was outstripping German production of locomotives and rolling stock, already in decline to the increasing demands of the German armed forces. Now repair crews had to range far and wide over the German countryside, clearing train wrecks and repairing track. The destruction of railway bridges became a further dislocation as these were harder to repair. Another grave concern was the massive loss of experienced train crews, placing further strain on the overburdened system. A worse situation existed in the occupied countries, especially France where the railway system had been damaged beyond repair by Allied airpower in preparation for the D-Day landings. Without the railways the German army was forced to endure lengthy and dangerous road marches attempting to reach the battlefronts.

Fortunately for the Deutsche Reichsbahn Allied air support for the invading forces diverted much airpower away from German targets, however day and night bombing of German cities continued to pummel the railway system. Though the railways operated right till the collapse of the Third Reich, the ability to adequately supply German armed forces in the chaos of the collapse was no fault of the railway crews and staff who performed Herculean efforts to keep the trains running.

The German railways, like German industry was not prepared for war in 1939, and incompetence and poor planning led to the crisis of early 1942. The efforts to alleviate the situation, while tackled with vigour and considerable expense would never make up the shortfalls of the early war years, ensuring the German armed forces could never be adequately supplied to fight a protracted war.

A common factor soon appeared, especially on the Western front, where German armoured columns were forced to drive to the battlefronts because the railways were no longer operational.

By war’s end the German railways were a barely functioning shambles, though some services were still operating remarkably efficiently. With the flow of spare parts, replacement troops, fuel, munitions and rations slowed to a trickle by the collapse of the railways the effectiveness of German forces decreased dramatically.

Six years earlier the German railways were hard pressed to supply Germany’s war needs and they never were able to. Without an adequate supply chain, no nation can win a war.

The American railroad system
The American railroad system was blessed with a generous loading gauge and consequently with fewer train movements could move greater tonnage. Thus America won the tonnage per mile war, which was to be a critical factor in 1944.
Another factor was the wear and tear on track and equipment. All combatants during the war experienced a decline in the efficiency of their railway systems under the increased traffic demands, America included. By the end of the war, many US railroads were in a bad way from these demands. Consequently in the immediate post war period many railroads were forced to spend heavily on track and plant repairs, replacement of locomotives and rolling stock without any assistance from the US government which was spending its tax dollars on airports and highways.
Consequently some railroads went into insolvency or were forced to amalgamate with their competitors. The replacement of worn out engines was another problem and proved to be prohibitive. Companies were faced with replacing large numbers of steam locomotives, not a cheap option by any stretch of the imagination. Diesel locomotives were a cheap option and the railroads embarked on a massive dieselization programme. Unfortunately for the railroads a lot of the first generation diesels weren’t much good and they were forced to replace them within ten years. This was an expense many companies could not afford, indirectly leading to more bankruptcies and forced amalgamation of some railroads.
In consequence the demands of America’s war effort had large scale and long terms effects on the US railroads and that was without the dropping of one bomb on the US mainland."

German Transport System WWII « War and Game

 

in all probability it was mid 1944 not early that some 40 trains a day were popped, the US AF was really stuck with non freelance and aiding the US heavies on the journey into the Reich with P-7's the 9th Af 354th fg had been equipped with the P-51B in December of 44 and not until the 8th AF was issued with the P-51 was the long distance shoot at anything targets observed in full fold. your posting after my initial response is just what the P-51 pilots claimed as to AA 'Sections' noted on the train cars, with folding down sides

 

Shot of a 88 Flak gun with multiple tanks kills. Eastern Front

 

because of the weight problems the 12.8cm was not often used on railcars and was then afixed in standard ground positions. what was used was the reliable 8.8cm and 10.5cm, the guns constantly moved throughout the Ruhrgebeit which gave our bombers a real headache

 

Well they certainly look like there would be a weight problem for the cars themselves for sure.. Not to mention the added weight the Locomotives would have to pull. I would think that the smaller caliber guns would be more numerous just because of that and the fact you could put more of them on the railcars

 

JC many times in this case 4-6 heavy Flak were transported by two locos end to end, brought out on rails and left for several days, then at night the Flak-cars would be moved to another area not to make prime targets by the US or Bomber Command. this was the case in the Ruhr as well as places like Hamburg and Kiel. heavy Flak cars were not long term due to the in-balance at firing so the guns were then removed and placed in fortified bunker positions.

 

(this is a captured Chinese armoured train)











from
http://blinda.ld.infoseek.co.jp/vkg_214b.html
http://www.hx.sakura.ne.jp/~troll/tetudou/index.html

 

"Railroads such as the Pennsylvania and the New Haven committed even more of their equipment because of their strategic locations. Filling an ocean liner in New York or Boston harbor with 13,000 troops involved as many as 21 trains. These might require over 200 coaches, 40+ baggage cars and over 30 kitchen cars.

Troop movements of over 12 hours were assigned Pullman space, if available. Pullmans sometimes slept 30,000 members of the armed services a night. This effort was helped by the fact that Pullman had about 2,000 surplus cars, mostly tourist sleepers, which had been stored instead of scrapped. When extra equipment was required for larger-than-normal troop movements, the government would request removal of sleeping cars from all passenger runs less than 450 miles. This resulted in extra standard sleepers for those times when, for instance, many troops from Europe were being transferred to the Pacific.

In 1943 and again in 1945, the government ordered 1200 troop sleepers from Pullman-Standard and 440 troop kitchen cars from ACF. These designs were based on a 50-foot box car equipped with "full-cushion" trucks capable of 100 mph. The center-door sleepers slept 30 in three-tiered, crosswise bunks. While not up to the same standards as the rest of its equipment, Pullman treated these cars service-wise as if they were the same - linen and bedding changed daily, etc. The Korean War again saw troop trains, but by Vietnam the numbers were down. This was due to availability of more large airplanes and also to the reduced capacity of the railroads. After the Korean War, some use of rail was made for reservists going to summer camp. I remember Lackawanna trains in the summer going to Camp Drum near Watertown from New Jersey. "

http://www.ubuyvacations.com/Railroad/TroopTrain1.html#TroopTrain

 

Finland

 

Here's a bit higher tech thread:
Axis History Forum • View topic - North African railroads
It's 13 pages of discussion about trains in North Africa. Down to details on the locomotives.