Typhoon Dominance upto and after D-Day

In the after action reports of combat tank losses in Normandy the chances of hitting a tank with rockets from a Typhoon or similar are around 4%. The main weapon of air power was its fear and most crews would abandon their vehicles when faced with air attack when in reality the safest place was in your tank.

 

The typhoon and most other ground attack aircraft best use was in interdiction style missions. they would attack lines of communications. the best example of this is the battles around falaise. where the germans were trapped in a meatgrinder.

 

I am still convinced the fighter bombers did a whole lot damage to the German tanks but here´s one calculation :

http://www.simhq.com/cgi-bin/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=98;t=008886;p=

From "Flying Guns: World War II' by Tony Williams:

"The fighter-bomber pilots pressed home their attacks with great courage throughout the campaign despite the often ferocious light Flak
which caused loss rates far above those experienced by fighter units (one Typhoon squadron suffered 100% casualties in an eighteen-month period). They were confident that any German tank they spotted was as good as dead, and they earned a considerable reputation for tank killing, with substantial claims being accepted. However, British operational research (OR) carried out at the time (but not publicised
for obvious reasons) presented a more complex picture. As the Allies were advancing, intelligence officers were often able to examine a battlefield shortly after an air attack, and what they discovered causes controversy even today. (Much of this section is taken from Ian
Gooderson's "Air Power at the Battlefront", which explores this issue
in great detail).

The evidence gathered by the OR teams indicated that very few tanks were destroyed by air attack. A British War Office analysis of 223
Panther tanks destroyed in 1944 revealed that only fourteen resulted from air attack (eleven to RPs and three to aircraft cannon). During
the Mortain battle of 7-10 August, the RAF and USAAF launched sustained attacks on a German armoured column over a period of six
hours, claiming 252 German tanks destroyed or damaged in nearly 500 sorties. It was subsequently discovered that there had only been a total of 177 tanks or tank destroyers deployed by the Germans and just 46 of those were lost, of which only nine could be attributed to air
attack (seven to RPs and two to bombs). During the German retreat from the Falaise pocket later in August, the RAF and USAAF claimed 391
armoured vehicles destroyed. Shortly afterwards, the battlefield was examined and only 133 armoured vehicles of all types were found, of
which just 33 had been the victim of any sort of air attack. In the retreat to the Seine, large numbers of armoured vehicles were left
behind and Typhoon pilots alone claimed 222 destroyed, but only thirteen out of 388 AFVs examined were found to have been knocked out
by RP attack. In the Ardennes salient, just seven out of 101 knocked-out AFVs were definitely or possibly attributed to air attack,
compared with claims for 90. It should be noted that in the prevailing circumstances of a continuing retreat, there was no question of the
German Army having recovered any damaged tanks in these later actions, in fact the battlefields were often littered with undamaged tanks
abandoned by their crews.

 

Thought I would add some parts from Zetterlings essay on Allied air-power in Normandy.

While I do not doubt the huge psycological impact of Allied ground attacks, I do doubt tha ACTUAL effectiveness of the attacks. For instance...

"At trials on training grounds in England, the probability of achieving a hit (with a rocket) was at the most 4%" See Gooderson 'Allied Fighter-bombers versus German Armour NW Europe 1944-45: Myth and realities.

"Probably no more than 100 tanks were lost due to hits from air weapons in the entire campaign... attacks by aircraft on on tank formations protected by AA units were more dangerous to the aircraft than the tanks. Allied losses of aircraft were considerable, the 2nd Tactical Air Force lost 829 aircraft, while the US 9th Air Force lost 897." See Ellis 'Victory in the West' HMSO 1962.

"In german war diaries it also seems the losses due to enemy air power were exaggerated."

"Three British studies of captured Panther tanks or the wrecks - two during Normandy and one during the Ardennes - gave the following results...

Cause of Vehicle Loss.
A/P - 63
Hollow Charge - 8
HE Round - 11
Aircraft Rockets - 11
Aircraft Cannon - 3
Destroyed by crew - 60
Abandoned - 43
Unknown - 24"

"Even during the Falaise pocket no more than 1,100 - 1200 cars and trucks were destroyed by aircraft. This might at first seem considerable but it means that 0nly 2.5-8.9% of all sorties flown resulted in a motor vehicle hit. The 9th, 10th and 12th SS Pnz had 7783 cars and trucks operational or in short term repair on 1st June. Allied research teams estimated that the Germans had 30000 cars and trucks when the Falaise battle began. If anything this number may be on the low side. This means that about 3% of the cars and trucks were hit by air weapons during this period when Allied air forces had the best opportunities imaginable."

"Except for railroads the destructive power of aircraft seems not to have been considerable."

"Even though the amount of equipment destroyed when fighter-bombers attacked German ground combat units was usually very small, the effects on the behaviour of the soldiers were usually greater. Crews frequently bailed out when subject to air attack despite the fact that inside a tank was probably the safest place to be during an air attack. This effectively halted German attacks and could delay reserves."

Basically, the point on Allied airpower is that its material effects were rather small. Its main contribution was in the less tangible aspects that effectd the german behaviour and morale.

In short they were psycologically damaging rather than materially damaging.

I would recommended Zetterlings essay to anyone interested in Allied air power and also Goodersons work that featured in the Journal of Strategic Studies. I believe Zetterlings essay is on the internet somewhere...

RED

 

Thanks for looking this information up. It reinforces my thoughts about Hans Rudel's claim of killing 500 tanks all by his lonesome. He was good but not that good !! As I said on anought thread, just picture how big a field it would take to park 500 Russian tanks.

 

I would add that, at least, the US got better at coordinating CAS as the NW Europe campaign went on. Initially for example US L-4 Grasshoppers did not carry aircraft radios to communicate with fighter bombers they were later equipped with these allowing a more real time response. By Nov 44 it had become common place with at least 1st and 3rd US Armies to have figher bombers on station accompanying advancing columns and have those aircraft directed on targets by L-4s and ground controllers with the columns.
I would agree in large part with Zetterling's findings where ground attack aircraft were not being directed onto targets by either ground or air controllers. On their own, it is difficult for fast ground attack aircraft to locate targets and subsequently effectively attack them.
It is also obvious that where they can, like in the case of railroads, they were very effective.

 

Here is a link to Zetterlings article:

http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normandy/articles/article.html

Its good but is effective outlining what Ian Gooderson argued in his book. While it is true not many tanks were destroyed allied aircraft, especially the typhoon, had a certain morale effect similar in away to what the Tiger tank had on allied tank men. This is someting significant missed int he historiography.

It is true that in the CAS role it was very hard to pinpoint a stationary target but a moving one was easier. The best use for the aircraft was in the Battlefield Interdiction Role i.e. stopping the reinforcements and supplies reacginh the frontline. by the time of normandy the allied TAF were effectivly able to cordon the area off and seriously hinder the movement of german forces into the battle zone. This was probably their most significant contribution to the campaign.

 

Well, ran across this little bit of data from a book titled aircraft of ww2 by Jim Winchester.

The FW 190 could also carry a bomb called the sc1000, which weighed 3.968 lbs. " The " largest & most powerful bomb carried by any fighter of the war.

 

View attachment 14771 See also: http://www.ww2f.com/weapons-technol...tuka-hawker-typhoon-p-47-fighter-bombers.html

RAF Hawker Typhoons in ground attack action: France 1944

A very good RAF propaganda film concerning the ground attack/heavy fighter Hawker Typhoon, which was deployed to devastating effect against German armour, convoys, trains, and barges.

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=820_1251059262

Same film with some additional clips

[video=youtube;Iffnw_rbB1Q]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iffnw_rbB1Q[/video]