U-Boats only?

Ich verstehen ......... apoligies

 

For my point of view I can not see how that would have worked, but it's possible it would have been a bigger headache for the Royal Navy.

 

That's OK Erich you did not know.

 

I don't think Churchill would had sat back and did nothing?

 

OK, I get the point. You may be right. But I bet anything the Germans could use would have been better than the Swordfish… maybe buy some Zeros from the Japanese!

Try to pair with Germany, but, as I said, Germany could produce ships almost as fast as the US and twice quicker than the UK. There you go! If the Germans start building their carriers in 1935, the British would have taken a year or two to start their own carrier programme, and, given the ship building rate, they could have been way-ahead by 1939 and 1940.

How the-heck, exactly, does your friend think that Great Britain is going to be knocked out militarily, by U-boats? Had Dönitz had 400 U-boats in 1940, maybe there could have been a complete blockade and the war industry might have been halted, but the population wouldn't have starved… And, how do you expect to mantain that blockade permanently? Is Canada, Australia and the Commonwealth, and, above all, the USA just going to let that happen?

How long until the US Navy, along with the RN (because it can't be destroyed by U-boats) and other Commonwealth naval forces, retake the Atlantic? How long until Allied air power turns the balance?

Submarines, on their own, are small and their attacking and reconnaissence capacities are quite limited. Aircraft carrier groups, on the other hand, are less vulnerable, can handle anything and cover hundreds of thousands of square miles at the same time.

U-boats cost too much: too many men, too many matériel, too many efforts and they have no warranties of ultimate success.

 

The Germans having 4 large fleet carriers operating in the Atlantic...interesting idea to say the least. Look at the potential ramifications this would have had on the Pacific theater as well. The US would not have been able to transfer the Yorktown, Wasp and Hornet out of the Atlantic in late '41 (Yorktown) to mid '42 (Hornet then Wasp) in order to deal with the German carrier threat. This would have put a serious crimp in the abilities of the US to deal with Japan in the Pacific Theater. From this perspective we never see the Doolittle raid and the Enterprise joins Lexington at Coral Sea. Midway probably needs recapturing as after Coral Sea only the Enterprise is left active in the Pacific. Also Guadalcanal is firmly in Japanese hands with an active airfield making the taking of that island even more difficult. Depending on what the results of battles in the Atlantic are we may see some of the first of the newer Essex class carriers gone into the Atlantic if the Germans are still posing trouble thus further delaying the US ability to go on the offensive in the Pacific. Arguably we could have seen the war at least in the Pacific drag on into 1946 and possibly beyond.

 

No what I was thinking Churchill would had kicked up a right stink and drummed home the warning.

 

ah but the KM did have carriers-flatbeds used for different reasons ...........in the Atlantic and the Med

 

German Carriers?
Didn't the "Graf Zepplin" have all its anti-aircraft on one side? I think even Swordfish could figure out how to defeat that scenorio.
They need a workable design.
First the Germans would need planes, that could take off and LAND on a Carrier.
Me-109? I have to go with Redcoat, not happening.
They need an effective fighter.
Look what happened to the Buffalos, P-40s, Hawks, I-16s, on and on.
Stuka? This plane was a "Gumdrop" for any opposition, without protection. Look what happened to the Devastators, Vindicators, Battles, on and on.
Pilots? Look at the Japanese after Midway, decent Carriers & planes...no pilots (expierenced).
Carrier groups? Ask any of the Navy vets on this site on just what it takes to protect (and Run) with a Carrier.
Cruisers? German Cruisers STUNK, except for Prinz Eugen types. (Hipper disabled, Blucher sunk, Seydlitz never built. Even with the Mythical) addition of French (many were still coal fired, or coal/oil) and had NO duration for extended actions. Exceptions abound, I'm speaking of majority.
The Italians had some good stuff too but, stuck in their Italian sea.
Destroyers? 10 were sunk at Narvik, half the total number. Not enough anti-submarine protection.
French had some of the best destroyers ever (in WW-2), again along with the Italians, in the Italian sea, scuttled, or shelled out of action.
Was there EVER a naval commander who had too many destroyers? Enough?
Anti-aircraft protection? (their biggest threat)
American (best case) ideaology was to have a Battleship, ahead and behind, at least one/two cruisers each side, and a ring of destroyers around them all, per Carrier.
Room to maneuver? The North Sea is a virtualy a constant "mini" Typhoon. Not to mention running a gauntlet of narrow chanels, (ambushes of submarines, mines, PT's). Ask the Japanese about Surigaio Straight or Kai's post of that Russian evacuation. No room to evade means...shooting gallery.
Once (if) out in the Atlantic. We're back to logistics again. Oil, where would it come from? Milch Cows? You have to have control of the area you are going (or 50/50), and at least behind you (where you came from) for supply routes.
I excluded the Mediteranean because of Gibraltar. The "Cork" in the bottle.
No wonder Hitler gave up on the Kriegsmarine, except for submarines. Not that I'm saying he's smart, just the opposite, he's Chicken to a task he can't see in one delusion.

 

Ok, let's assume four carriers are built by Germany. Three are pre-war and one is finished early into the war. Are more to follow? It would be logical to assume that to be the case. But, for now we will leave that be.
Of the three pre-war ones let's assume they are Graf Zeppelin types carrying about 50 aircraft maximum. We can further assume that the Germans quickly ditch the 150mm turrets for additional 105mm twin flak guns and once the war starts begin beefing up the smaller flak weapons as well. One could also assume that the Germans have modified all of these for a full length flight deck and possibly a "hurricane" bow (enclosed to flight deck) as the British did.
On escorts, the Germans would have to do a few things different based on this change in strategy. Their light cruisers like the Nürnberg or Leipzig would have to have had more range than they originally had. An easy way for this to happen is simply ditching half or all of the torpedo battery for more fuel along with constructing them with diesel - steam plants for a combination of good cruising range and high top speed when necessary. The 9 150mm battery and 9 or 12 105mm AA battery is sufficent as is. Destroyers would likewise require more range and also a dual purpose main battery instead of the SP 150mm often fitted originally. (By-the-by none of the German light cruisers were coal fired. Some of their newer ones had very innovative steam - diesel plants that were quite advanced for the period and all ran on fuel oil.
The big question is aircraft. Let's assume that the KM tries to form a seperate air service from the Luftwaffe. Because of competition between the services for manufacturers some go with the KM (mostly smaller ones) and others are strictly LW. So, I could envision say Henkel, a longtime seaplane manufacturer and not particularly "in" with the Luftwaffe supplying a variant of the He 112 as a fighter. Fiesler could supply the torpedo aircraft and, Henschel, who could not even get the interest of the Luftwaffe when they first proposed manufacturing aircraft builds a dive bomber.
Each battlegroup would require one or two heavy cruisers, two lights and about eight destroyers along with one or more replinishment ships. The Germans actually have very good ones for this purpose and know how to refuel at sea. Their Dithmarschen class is easily the equal of the US Cimmaron class and quite capable of sustaining a carrier group. As there would be six available replinishment should not present a big problem.
As for the British, strapped for cash and with the RAF paying scant attention to the FAA they languish with obsolesent aircraft on their carriers right up to the war. It happened that way originally, and I cannot see it likely to change much just because the Germans get a carrier or three. I would envision the British response as something like "Well, yes, they have three carriers but we have seven (never mind theirs are bigger than most of ours, we'll ignore that little problem) and ours have just as many or more aircraft (well, yes we use the Sea Gladiator, the Blackburn Skua and Roc and the Swordfish all might be obsolete but they are our design so, being British they have got to be better...)." The Admirality no doubt would still be concerned about their battleline and dumping funds into improving what battleships were available. Destroyers and cruisers for many distant stations would still be a priority. With only so much money they likely would not fight too hard with the RAF over aircraft.
Pre-US involvement, the British would have been in a world of hurt with just four carriers in German hands steaming in the Atlantic. These likely would have swept large swaths of the ocean free of shipping in short order. Both the Japanese and US did exactly the same with their carriers. Unlike submarines that can control just a few thousand yards of ocean around them a carrier can control thousands of square miles. The best the British could hope for was poor weather and an eventual surface action against such a force. They would be scrambling to get carrier aircraft that could match the Germans in performance. It likely would have been a far worse debacle than the US faced in the early days of the Pacific. To compound this, in 1939 - 40 the British lack the radar and carrier controlled interception systems necessary to effectively stop a German air strike. When combined with inadequite numbers of aircraft and their generally pathetic levels of usefullness the Germans likely win their carrier battles. On the whole, a carrier navy is a possible winning strategy for Germany.

 

I did not mean to suggest that German light cruisers were coal fired. I should have been more specific in my previous post. I was talking about French Heavy Cruisers.
The four Suffrens, the only cruisers designed after WW 1 with coal bunkers. To be specific Suffren and Colbert. Foch and Duplex retained coal as well as oil.
Algerie (32) was best of breed, twice the endurance of the others. Scuttled in Toulon. Three others were planned but never built.
Light Cruisers
The George Leygues after refit in US 43/44 (radar), came out 9-6" guns, and a speed of 31 knots. As good as any
An interesting scenario to have four Nazi carrier groups out in the Atlantic. Especially with Gibraltar taken and the French navy intact/re-patriated to Vichy, and the Italians free of their pond.
Big trouble for the Allies, and probably defeat in short order.
At that time.
I also did not mean to suggest that a Carrier group is not effective, as far as firepower, range, and mobility. (The Brown-shoe Admirals put the Black-shoe Admirals pretty much out of business). They most certainly are!
As time/history has born out, the "protected" Carrier...wins against surface fleets of big guns.
The unprotected Carrier gets sunk first.
Getting to that point for the Nazis is what I thought would be the impass.
This senario is not unlike the Japanese taking The Hawaian islands (immediately after Pearl Harbor), and using it for a base to attack the U.S.. The West Coast would've been Ska'Rude.
At that time.

 

All very loud & clear except for the last sentence, could you please transmit non-coded for a poor furriner?

 

Leaving aside for the moment the French cruisers, the scenario of Germany having several carriers does not equate to Japanese use in the Pacific in any way. The reason for the difference is that Germany is a land power for whom sea power is optional whereas Japan is a sea power and has no choice (at least effective choice) but to project that power in a war.
The resulting difference is that Germany can literally sacrifice their entire navy in the crippling or destruction of the Royal Navy and not suffer a whit beyond the casualties. Britain in this instance would still be forced to produce another fleet, replacing their losses, regardless. The Germans are under no such compunction.
The closest historical comparison is the Punic wars between Rome and Carthage. Essentially the same situation existed. Rome was a land power, Carthage a sea power. Rome chose to build a fleet and challenge Carthage's sea power. They actually built three fleets before defeating Carthage completely at sea. Following the fall of Carthage the Romans disbanded their navy as it was no longer necessary.
Carthage on the other hand chose to try and fight as a land power. Hannibal did fairly well with what forces he had but in the end Roman numbers and tenacity won on land. At sea Carthage would not go to the expense of rebuilding their fleet after it was crushed by Rome thus yielding their sea power advantage to Rome. For Carthage their strategy was a recipe for defeat.
For Japan the loss of their fleet means the loss of the war, just as it really does for Britain. A Britain faced by a adversary who dominates the sea is a Britain lost.
Now, as to the Hawaiian note. The Japanese could not successfully invade Hawaii as a follow up to Pearl Harbor. This has been discussed at length on this board, among others, and the result is always the same. The Japanese can land no more than 2 divisions at the very most and only by giving up other operations elsewhere. The US forces on the island, not to mention coastal defenses, are such that the invasion would likely fail on the beaches and certainly within days otherwise. The Japanese fleet is of little help as it is unable to maintain station off Hawaii for more than a few days. With the US still possessing a substancial fleet in the area the threat to their amphibious forces and the naval units tied to protecting those ships is such that the losses alone guarrentee a Japanese loss. The US West coast is in even far less danger from a Japanese naval action due primarily to its distance from Japan.

 

It was meant as being...not unlike as "unlikely" as 4 German Carrier groups, sneaking out of Germany, attacking up and down the East coast of the Atlantic, smashing all resistance, and bringing England to her knees.
I wasn't serious about that.
It took years to perfect Carrier tactics, not to mention shipbuilding, pilot training.
Didn't the Roosevelt take 7 years to build? Aren't Carrier landings (especially at night)(rough weather), or both, the "toughest" job in the navy? (beside SEALS)
Both England, Japan, and America lost more than a few (ships/pilots) before they learned, both combat (ship & plane) tactics and vulnerabilities. Japan too late.
Would the Germans be immune from this learning expierence? Where would replacements come from, after losing ships to the inevitable, being caught with you pants down.
This 90 day wonder Naval air wing, with dominating equipment, (Plan Z to the 4th power)out of nowhere, and totally expendable.
I like the Carthage/Rome analogy, it works!
They are both, Japan steaming to the west coast with no troops/refueling/ammunition, and a German well shipped, well planed, well trained Fleet Air Arm....fun thoughts, but just silly.
Out of reach, for both.
As much as nobody wants to admit (for PC purposes), natural resources, money and time friendly situations often result in Victory. Rather than Bismarcks, Tiger Tanks, and Me 262's.
Both would have run into (as you point out in the Japanese thing), more opposition than they could handle, and not just from troops, planes, and warships.
I agree with you about the navy thing, Germany had no chance to defeat the Allies without the abilities of Carrier groups. It would have made what they did accomplish easier, and less costly, and they would've went much further. A remarkable savings in time ,money, and lives.

just an opinion, thats all.

this is all just for FUN.
I don't have to be right, I like being full of it...sometimes...

Za...Ska'Rude=Screwed

 

Well, this carrier thing is one of the very few what-ifs that could have been done within actual, real circumstances, unlike the invasion of Britain, Rommel in the Middle East or the Germans marching on Kursk...

But we know that no German strategist at the time, and even less within the arch-conservative Kriegsmarine, could forsee the real posibility of Germany being able to out-match, out-class and out-fight the Royal Navy, only if they used their resources a little more wisely.

I mean, Germany, as a totalitarian State, simply couldn't care less about efficiency or pragmatism. According to the Nazi ideology, any conflict was going to be decided by the superiority of the German race; and, according to traditional Prussian military thinking, victory was ensured by brute force alone. Therefore, there was no way the Germans could think that WWII recquired economic power, long and meticulous planification and a wide vision. Of course they were not going to prepare and train for 'Barbarossa' or 'Seelöwe' for 5 years before launching it: they lacked the vision and the actual economical, technological and industrial might to do so successfully. But, in the case of this carrier-thing, for the first time, Germany does have the technology (not the best, but just enough to give the Brits quite a licking), the industrial power (for the first time it can actually beat the Allies!) and the time, even if they lacked experience (that's the biggest problem I can see).

 

German advantage in the air was the Me-109. Its Nimbleness, firepower, and rate of climb.
The British made a Seafire out of the Spitfire, so who knows.
If the Germans can build four Carriers,
why not a long range Wasser-Schmitt, Ozean 109 as well.
If they succeed at this...look out.
An air protected navy. Bismarck, Tirpitz, and the rest of the "Heavies" would still be around. Instead of having to fight by themselves against Swordfish, Lancasters, and recon flights spotting them everywhere they went, without being chased off or shot down.
A very different situation for the Allies, possibly too much to handle.
An option they (Germany) perhaps should not have overlooked early on.