US 37th Armored Regiment at Arracourt. "The Battle of the Tanks"

Why were the surviving Heer/SS Panzer regiment tankers not rearmed and reformed for such a vital assault?

Was it due to the extreme combat exhaustion and demoralization most of them suffered in the previous battle?

 

Apparently it was Hitler's decision for reasons unknown. The only possible explaination I can think of is that existing units were too depleted to be available for combat, but new troops had just been assembled and the tanks ready, so he just threw away what he had.

This is still a very unsatisfying explanation, since the regular armor formations were not spared of defensive responsibilities at the West Wall until the Ardeness Offensive's planning was well under way.

 

The material that was lost in this poorly-implemented "emergency" assault would have brought most of the Panzer divisions involved in the Ardennes offensive to near or full strength, particularly in armored halftracks and panther tanks. The assault gun/Jad/Tiger II units could then be removed out of the order of battle.

 

It might if the material were available, if the depots hadn't been bombed, if the entire French railway system hadn't been shot to pieces, you know, small details or how do you think wars are won, with pretty, sexy camouflage schemes?

 

Logistics?? LOL.

 

This red herring shick is really getting tired, you know? You're confusing me with someone else.

 

Anything you want to say to contradict my statement above, or do you prefer to stay in the emotional register?

 

I think the Germans couldn't have won the war, which is probably the same opinion as yours. In fact, I've argued for this very case in the past.

As for the red herrings (which you've done in the past), did I state anywhere in this thread that the "Germans could have won?". I think the stated "grand slam" objective of the Ardennes mission was impossible, as well, even with full contingent. My post here is about the damaged and much less effective condition of the Panzer arm in the final state of the war.

You seem to have chosen me as an "opponent" or someone to make thinly veiled insults and snarky comments towards without even getting to know my point of view. Those long PMs you sent me are rather telling. I'm clearly not the most knowledgeable person here hence my inquisitive nature, but I'm not an idiot.

I'm also not interested in being slowly goaded into participating in "e-fights" which is the impression I'm getting from you.

 

Taking the panzer brigades available and using them as replacements would have been possible. But, this would have negated any possibility of a useful counterattack in September or October as the Germans originally did....unless.... you want the same result. The problem here is that you cannot simply take one of these brigades, break it up, and then integrate it instantly into a panzer division. Doing so accomplishes no more than using it as a seperate brigade.

Why? Because the new units will still need some degree of training to integrate them into the division. This includes resetting radios, officer and nco assignments, staff training, combining division assets with the replacements and distributing both. This might require restructuring companies and reassignment of men elsewhere within the division. Then there will be some need to operate in training together for at least a short period of work up before going into the line. Without this sort of thing, the division is just a big bunch of semi-orgainzed men and material that will be ground up like sausage.

So, the choice for the Germans was throw the panzer brigades into the fight as is or, forego the counterattack, rebuild their divisions, and then use them in December or January at the earliest. Of course, this might have rendered the whole Ardennes offensive moot as the Allies might have advanced further as a result of the Germans not counterattacking in September / October.

 

The wisdom of the whole counterattack is in my opinion dubious. I think the West Wall and Metz fortifications and allied logistical crisis at this period did more to stop the allied onslaught then any German offensive action.

The problem is that (in my recollection) Patton's attack had been paused long enough by inadequate fuel supply that the Germans were able to man their positions in the Metz fortifications, and the First Army barely missed their chance to run through the Aachen sector without opposition for the same reasons.

I also think that too much had been made of the panzer brigades' lack of experienced troops but not enough on the fact that they were actually led by seasoned veteran officers. For whatever cause, the leaders of the brigades completely underestimated the power of American (and French!) arms.

 

Good point T.A. . Amazing how Logistics and training rear their ugly head LOL.

 

Good point

So this attack did have some strategic value then even though the brigades were destroyed with little major damage to the Allies? I suppose it made the Allies more reticent about advancing more aggressively eastward then.

 

I don't think that is the case. 12th Army Group was almost clean out of fuel by the end of September. The 21st's failed effort to take Arnhem siphoned a lot of resources.

 

Not to in any way discount the achievement of the Americans, but Prokhorovka lasted only one day and the casualties are estimated at 70 to 80 German tanks Battle of Prokhorovka - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For the whole battle of Kursk, the Germans lost about 248 tanks, by their own estimate.
And this was when the Wehrmacht was supposedly still well-trained and in its prime.
I'm not discounting the US Army, I'm just giving the Red Army its due. Kursk was nicknamed the "Death Ride of the Panzers" for a reason.

 

Not discounting the Germans at Prokhorovka. But,

"Two of the new panzer brigades were wiped out in the fighting, and by the end of the fighting for Arracourt, the 4th Armored Division had destroyed 285 German tanks and armoured vehicles for the loss of 25 medium tanks and 7 tank destroyers. " The point the author of the article was making was,
If these figures are accurate, a single American armored regiment at an little known battle had actually destroyed more German vehicles than the Russians at the reputedly largest tank battle of WW2!

 

Ok, but it sounds a little like the Marianas Turkey Shoot on the ground.

 

You are right. I should have said they were in better shape in June 1943 than they were a year a half later.

 

The main problem at Kursk was simply the fact that there were too few German units involved. If they wanted to break the back of the Soviet armed forces, they needed far more than 900,000 men.