US Marine Rifle Company

I have to really disagree with most of your assumptions. I am sure there you are correct that there is some "talking past each other", going on, but some of the other assumptions you've made really do not make sense if you've ever served in an infantry company.

The Captain would be too busy to monitor the net. When traffic was directed to him or he needed to speak directly to another station he would simply take the handset, if the CO had the RTO with him. The soldier or Marine carrying the radio would generally stay close to the CO or at the command post with the XO when the CO was moving about his lines.

I agree, but more than likely most of the communication within the company would be done by the runners, because the different elements would be located in close proximity. The Battalion net is a different beast, there would be sit reps, resupply requests, casualty reps, evacuations and the myriad of other communications necessary to coordinate a battalion in combat. The battalion commander is fighting his three companies and his weapons company, he has to maintain spatial awareness of where each of his companies are, he has to insure that each company is aware of what is going on in the other companies sectors, he has to coordinate supporting arms, medical, he needs intel from the forward companies so the S2 section can determine enemy intentions and capabilities, etc. etc. If the company only had one radio it would need to be on the battalion net.

I am aware that the SCR-300 could only monitor one channel at a time, that is no different from most radios. As stated earlier if only one radio is available it would most likely be on the battalion net. I would agree that the CO would utilize whoever he thought best, in his opinion to be his radio man, be it his orderly or some other soldier or Marine. As to HQ size, it is general practice for the XO and the First Sgt. to establish and run the HQ while the CO is fighting his company. Generally, the CO's radio operator functions as the six for radio traffic purposes. He recieves, logs, and passes on the radio traffic for the company. Depending upon where the CO has him located he may actually be with the CO or at the HQ location. If Battalion needs to talk to the company commander himself, they would specify the six actual. If operating in the HQ element the RTO would be sending and receiving traffic, if something required the CO's attention or was information the CO needed immediately a runner would be dispatched by whoever was running the HQ and receiving the traffic.

Also, I think the company is being discussed in a vacuum, when many of the assets that were available to the company were located in the battalion. The battalion had a fairly robust communications section. For instance if wire communications were to be used they were normally run from the battalion to the company instead of vice versa. The USMC Series F TOE we were initially discussing had a Communications section composed of one officer and 39 enlisted. 14 of those were wiremen and 15 RTO's, then additional personnel to run the message center. If a company required additional radio personnel or equipment they could be chopped from the battalion. Additionally, artillery FO's, naval gunfire liason teams and forward air controllers had their own RTO's. If the company were utilizing those assets these personnel would be located with the HQ or following the CO around.

 

This statement has me thinking you are not recalling the SCR-536 correctly. This link may be helpful.

http://www.ww2gyrene.org/equipment_SCR_536.htm

The page also has the recollection of a replacement lieutenant on Iwo Jima that carried the SCR-536. I think he stopped carrying it later.

The grinding battle on Iwo is the type of situation where I think a company commander would need more "voice" time with his three platoon commanders and could be found using/carrying the company SCR-536.

 

I'm well aware of what an SCR-536 is and how it operates. I am also aware that the SCR-536 is often referred to as a "Handset". If you read the little section on the link you provided where it is quoting Leon Uris from his book "BattleCry".
"At least we got one break. We wouldn't have to hike with ass packs. We had received a shipment of Army SCR [handie-]talkies. They were little hand sets weighing just a few pounds, set to one channel. They were perfect for communications on the march—if they worked. We packed the TBY's in the comm cart, just in case."

Battlecry the movie isn't that bad. James Whitmore who plays Mac was a WWII Marine, real Marines were used as extras, and since the main characters are in a WWII Battalion Communication Platoon watch it and you'll probably see some real communications taking place.

Now before you dismiss a quotation from a novel, Leon Uris was a United States Marine (1942-45) and served as a radioman with 6th Marines at Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Saipan. He was well versed in the equipment, proceedures and terminology used. When I wrote; "When traffic was directed to him or he needed to speak directly to another station he would simply take the handset," I selected the word carefully so that it was equally applicable when used to refer to either radio, the SCR-536 or SCR-300..

As to Lt. Craig Leman's recollections, he was a very "green" Lt. and states so. "As a green officer new to the unit, I was not sure how to resolve the dilemma of how to pass the word." and "Just another example of how an experienced [Marine] helped educate a green lieutenant."
His description of how he first fought his platoon that fifth morning, indicates he wasn't particularly proficient or he may have come out of the fight with more than the eight Marines he ended the day with. I would not use the brief description of the experience of a "green" Lt. to justify an assumtion of the standard proceedure for handling communications in an infantry company. If you will notice the small details in the story and read between the lines and are aware of the proper way to fight an infantry unit from a tactical standpoint, you can glean a great deal more from Lt. Leman's brief story. First, the focus of the article is, recollections of the SCR-536, so that piece of equipment would be the focus. Capt Donald Castle, the CO was probably proficient and experienced judging from a number of things he did. It also illustrates why you use all your communications assets, using a particular asset for a specific situation. Lt. Leman mentions he received the attack orders, the fourth night at 0200 by land line. You wouldn't use a runner at night, too big a risk of his being lost, hit by friendly fire, if he doesn't return to the CP you do not know if the attack message was received. Lt. Fischer mentioned the lack of encryption on the radio net, which makes the land line more secure. He also mentions the use of the field telephone a number of times, so communications by land line was probably a significant method of comms. Ex. " at about 0200, I got word via the field telephone" and "I don't remember whether we used it or the field telephone that night or next day."
He mentions, "but I managed to keep [the CO] semi-posted", which is what I was trying to explain earlier about a commander needing to maintain situational awareness as to the location, progress and condition of his component elements. He mentions that the captain, offered him the use of a supporting asset, an M3 75mm GMC; "accept his offer of a half-track to support our efforts". This is a regimental Weapons Company asset, so the captain probably arranged for it through a request routed through battalion and transmitted by SCR-300. The vehicle would probably have come up on the battalion net (SCR-300) when it neared the company position using an AN/VRC-3 to advise of its arrival and to determine where it was to be deployed. So in this case if the CO were humping the radios as you suggested in an earlier post. He'd have to be operating at least two, the SCR-300 and SCR-536.
You'll also notice that the captain was asked to send up stretcher bearers, "I was able to tell him to send up all the stretcher-bearers he could find". Well what probably happened is the captain handed the radio back to his RTO, grabbed a runner and told him to find the weapons platoon commander and put together a stretcher party from his mortarmen and have them report to the CP. The weapons platoon commander would grab an NCO tell him to grab all the men he could spare and report to the CP for a stretcher party. Then the weapons platoon commander would go back to directing/coordinating his 60mm fires, insure ammo was getting forward to his MG teams and all the things a weapons plt. commander does in combat.The stretcher party would report to the CP and the CO, XO or 1st Sgt. would brief them on the tactical situation How 1 was in and show the party leader, the approximate position on the map and determine from the topography the best avenue for the party to travel. The CO would have his RTO contact battalion and advise that they had casualties they were extracting and arrange for a collection point. The stretcher party leader would be advised of where the pickup point is and how best to reach it and what time to be there. Then they'd be off. When the CO is properly doing his job he's thinking and issuing orders, he has others to handle the communications, party gathering, coordination etc.
The Lt. mentioned two call signs. How 1 and How 6. Radio proceedure within an infantry unit would designate who was what number. Lt. Leman was commander 1st platoon, company H. Therefore, How 1 would be the 1st platoon HQ element. Lt. Leman himself would be How 1 actual. 2d platoon would be How 2, third platoon How 3, wpns platoon How 4, the XO would be How 5, CP How 6, Captain castle How 6 actual, the 1st Sgt. How 7.
Lt. Lehman notes at one point that, "Frost's squad at one entrance, and I joined [Pfc Frederick] Sisk's at the other entrance, and ran back and forth between the two, carrying my M-1 in one hand and the handie-talkie in the other. [Capt Donald] Castle, the Company Commander, was on the other end, back in the Command Post. I had trouble coping with the button system and remembering to turn it on and off as I tried to figure out what to do with the hornet's nest we had stirred up, but I managed to keep [the CO] semi-posted," Now consider if the Lt. had a runner or other Marine operating the radio, keeping the Captain informed of the tactical situation and relaying messages to the Lt. while he was concentrating on coordinating the fight at the cave entrances. Both tasks would have been performed better.

*Note for those interested the AN/VRC-3 was a modified SCR-300 for vehicular use. SCR stands for Signal Corps Radio, AN/VRC stands for Army, Navy Vehicle Radio Communications

Note some details in this photo, the RTO is packing the radio and another individual is communicating via the handset. The RTO is also wearing head phones in order to monitor the net for traffic directed to his station.

And again here.

It was noted earlier in the article that you linked to that the SCR-300 and SCR-536 could not communicate. The SCR-300 was an FM radio operating in the 40.0 to 48.0 milicycle range and had 41 channels seperated by 200 kilocycles each. The SCR-536 was an AM set. It had 50 channels in the 3.5 to 6.0 millicycle range.


PFC Harold C. Schreckengest, CO's runner, is using an SCR-536 to direct movements of Company E, 2d Battalion, 2nd Infantry Division, U.S. First Army in Koenigsfeld, Germany, 9 March 1945.

Note it is not the CO but the CO's runner using the handset.

Now, if I'm not mistaken a US Army infantry company in 1944 rated six of these sets (SCR-536), one for each of the three rifle platoons, two for the weapons platoon and one for the CO/CP. What I don't think you realize is how much traffic, priority and routine comes across a units net. Everything from routine daily reports, to resupply and medivac requests, orders, combat sit reps, etc. It is a full time job to monitor the traffic, you have to listen continuously for your call sign in order to pick up on traffic directed to your station. Much of the traffic is critical and is written down, transmitted and repeated back to insure the receiving station has properly received the message. Flip two numbers and your artillery or air support hits you, another friendly unit or falls harmlessly on an unoccupied area. In this case you would probably have to retrans, or take the message over the AM net, then retransmit it over the FM fire control net or by landline. If the grid coordinates or hill number you are supposed to attack is garbled in transmission, or you record it incorrectly people die needlessly, and battles are lost. That's why you use a dedicated RTO to transmit and receive traffic while you (the company/platoon commander) coordinate and fight your units.