US on the left and Brits on the right

For a current detailed description of Omaha Beach read Balkowskis book 'Omaha Beach' . I'd also recomend Ellsbergs book 'The Far Shore'.

There were several reasons the British naval attack lasted longer. One was a preference for naval gunfire. Bradley thought air attack more effective and placed greater reliance on the heavy bomber attack made just before the first wave landed. His corps commanders disagreed (both had served in the Pacific) but Bradley overruled them. As we have often read the heavy bomber attack failed on Omaha Beach.

A second factor were the tides. At O beach the low tide median coincided with the edge of the German obstacles, and with the best approach for the landing craft. The British beaches were fronted by wide shoals of mud sand & silted rock. The tide had to rise enough for the landing craft to float over the shoals. The German obstacle belt started well above this shoal or mud flat. Landing the Brits at the lowest water would have caused them to wade across 800 or more meters of muck, tidal pools, and loose rocks. Then they would have reached the first obstacles. It varied from one beach to another but the water was deep enough to carry the small craft across the shoal 60 to 90 minutes after H hour, or the O & U beach landings. The Brits took advantage of this for some extra naval gunfire on the beaches.

Exactly how the Brits & the US would have handled the different circumstance I cant say. The only clue I have is in Bradleys attitude towards naval fire support.

 

Apropos the original question, I though that the US dealt with the west end because this would allow supply direct from the USA to French ports (eventually) rather than having to move up the Channel across the path of shipping from England.

As for dictating to the enemy, several of Monty's colossal cracks were timed to prevent German attempts to deploy the Panzer units for various counter-strokes against either end of the bridgehead. Ultra allowed him to forestall these and force the Germans to use them to prevent the eastern defence from collapsing. They succeeded but only at the cost of using their best forces and having them seriously depleted. When the Germans had to risk collapse in the East to redeem that in the west, the latent danger of which they were well aware, the eastenders' advance accellerated. The forces that the Germans could commit to Luttich were a motley nowhere near adequate for the task.

All in all, I favour the view that Normandy was a battle of attrition where Monty made it work for the Allies. Sadly the yah boo mudslinging of the Allied commanders in the 60's and 70's has been a historiographical dead end which has only recently been rectified by the likes of Buckley, Hart, French, Reid et al who have gone back to primary sources like proper historians.

As for 'doctrine' (a euphemism for 'theory'?) Buckley claims that the lack of theory or at least a mechanism for enforcement served the British-Canadian forces well since the unexpected length of time the Allies spent in the Norman hinterland required much of it to be changed anyway, which began within a fortnight of D-Day. It has occurred to me that much of the fighting in Normandy could be considered to have been in a 'temperate jungle' what with the foliage and terrain reducing visibility.

 

Good Heavens, would never happen...Us Brits like to be close to the sea dont you know?
The French would think it a miracle if their British allies were ever to venture too far away from the water....

 

I'd be inclined to deride that comment except it occurs that I've lived on the coast ever since I got away from home.

 

One reason for the assignment of the beaches was the location of the various armys in Britian. The US ground units were posted mostly close to the western ports like Liverpool. Many were in Ireland. The Brits tended to be towards the eastern side of the isle. With those locations reversing the beaches to be attacked would have required making the movement to the embarkation ports and subsequent sea transit even more complex. In war anything one can do to simplify is a good thing.

 

Just for the record : -

'' When the first American division came to Great Britain it was put in the Southwest of England ; that dictated we should come in on the right flank. The choice was dictated not by any long-range staff planning but by the availability of suitable accomodations. To have switched the flanks once these conditions were imposed would have meant an impossible criss-cross of transportation in England".

Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith ; interview with Roland G Ruppenthal 14/09/1945, quoted in D'Este, Decision In Normandy.

 

From Harry Yeide " Tank Killers"

The Germans faced the same difficulties as the Americans in the Bocage and could rarely employ more than a platoon or company of tanks at once.

 

Something so many people seem to be unaware of

 

well, we´ve seen some threads putting the main panzer force in the US zone and as well this helps in putting that option away. As well it was not all true what Monty said that he managed to keep the panzers in his area by his actions. We know there were some other reasons as well. Right? and again just my opinion....

 

Many books seem to mention that the British/Canadians faced heavier German armoured opposition in Normandy following the lodgement phase than did the US Forces - but the extent of the difference is rarely mentioned.

I was interested to note while reading Buckley's 'British Armour In The Normandy Campaign' that by 25th July the British/Canadian front faced five SS and three Wehrmacht Panzer Divisions, plus the three heavy Tiger Battalions ; the US Forces faced two Panzer Divisions.

 

Regarding the Panzers in the British/Commonwealth area. Rommel himself complained that the pressure applied by the allied forces denied him to replace his panzer in the frontline with regular infantry. Rommels plan called for bringing the Panzers out of the line and deploy them en masse for a counterattack.

How practical this would have been or successful remains a 'what if', but it is clear from Rommels point of view that the tactic used by the allies denied Rommel to fight the battle as he wanted. (for better or for worse)

 

Got any figures what the Germans had in operational use? I mean they did not get much to cover their losses while the Allied could lose several and replace them instantly. Thanx!

 

Good point, Kai - I'll have to read some more to try to find an answer to that....

 

No problem, Martin!

Sometimes there are some interesting extra points in the books by the veterans.

Like this from a Panzer Lehr officer:

The Panzer Lehr Panthers, all 90 of them were on their way to the eastern Front ( in Poland ), but as the invasion started they were sent back by the Fuhrer.They returned on 10th of June.

So the tanks were not available until earliest on the 10th.

Amazon.com: The Western Front 1944, Memoirs of a Panzer Lehr Officer: Books: Ritgen Helmut

 

The figures I have for the German forces at around the time of Goodwood/Cobra operations are as follows.

In the British/Canadian sector.

8 Panzer divisions with 654* tanks, and 92 infantry battalions
In the US sector.

2 Panzer divisions with 190 tanks and 85 infantry battalions.


* At this time all the Tiger I and Tiger II equipped units were in the British/Canadian sector

 

From my notes the tank numbers look ok, but you must mean 'infantry battalions' not "divsions". Had those ten Pz divsion been full strength they would have had what, 2200 or 2300 tanks?

 

Sorry about that, I've corrected my original post

 

Around 1200 tanks was the real tally.