Welcome to the WWII Forums! Log in or Sign up to interact with the community.

USS Indianapolis (CA-35)

Discussion in 'Naval Warfare in the Pacific' started by Gunney, Aug 24, 2011.

  1. namvet

    namvet Member

    Joined:
    Jul 26, 2008
    Messages:
    193
    Likes Received:
    45
    the Navy back then had a policy of not reporting the movements of warships. it proved to be a disaster here. the Indy was to be handed off from one command to another. but neither knew its location and there was no communication between the two. the Indy was caught in the vacuum of this policy. no one at her new command had any clue at first she was overdue. so she wasn't reported for many days. after this disaster the policy was changed. I saw it myself during the Nam war. all ships, regardless of type or class were required to send a departure message to their current commands and CC to the arrival command. it gave TOD, course, speed and ETA to both. up on arrival we were required to send a message back to our former command to let them know we had arrived. it was called a MOVREP. movement report.

    note: after delivering the bomb the Indy sailed to Guam to get her orders. now, the Navy knew about enemy sub activity in the area she was going to sail. no one told Mcvay. he also asked for a destroyer escort and was denied. the disaster was set in motion here. and plenty of blame to go around.

    the issue in the court martial for the prosecution was the zig zag maneuver which proved to be of no value at all. they brought in the sub CO who testifed it only required a change in firing time. the defense also brought in a USN sub CO who confirmed what the Japanese CO said.
    bringing this former enemy into court to testify against Mcvay sparked public outrage. including the media and the politicans. Admirals Nimitz and Spruance did every thing they could to stop this stain on Navy honor.
    but King was SOPA. he was CNO. and over ruled them. he wanted his revenge and got it.

    source

    the movie made was called mission of the shark
     
    Gromit801 likes this.
  2. namvet

    namvet Member

    Joined:
    Jul 26, 2008
    Messages:
    193
    Likes Received:
    45
    ok Patton I found it. King was NOT court martialed but given a formal letter of reprimand placed in his record. my mistake.

     
    George Patton likes this.
  3. George Patton

    George Patton Canadian Refugee

    Joined:
    Aug 22, 2010
    Messages:
    3,223
    Likes Received:
    1,171
    Location:
    Ontario, Canada
    Thanks for the link. I didn't know about that. It certainly sheds some light on the motives for McVay's court martial.
     
  4. George Patton

    George Patton Canadian Refugee

    Joined:
    Aug 22, 2010
    Messages:
    3,223
    Likes Received:
    1,171
    Location:
    Ontario, Canada
    To throw in my opinion on whether McVay should have been put on trail, I'll say "no". Hopefully all of this isn't just a repeat of what others have said:

    1. McVay had no knowledge of subs in the area because the navy withheld the information for unknown reasons (likely negligence or incompetence). In addition to knowledge that I-58 was in the area, the Indianapolis also was not informed that the destroyer USS Lowry and the cargo ship Wild Hunter had been attacked by a Kaiten launched from I-58 just a few hours after the her departure from Guam, although the Lowry reported this even to authorities. However, McVay was informed of submarine activity outside of his area. It would appear that whoever was in charge of the intelligence for his sector was either "asleep at the switch" or just plain negligent.
    2. McVay asked for a escort, and didn't get it. This shows that McVay suspected a submarine threat, and the navy did not either believe it to be serious, or some personnel were not informed (tying back into my first point).
    3. I-58's captain said that he could have sank the Indianapolis whether she was zig-zagging or not. Looked at his record (specifically the fact that he damaged ships throughout the war without being sunk, and his ship survived the war) this is likely true. Would McVay have been brought up on trial if he had been zig-zagging?
    4. As I learned from namvet, there is the possible revenge motive on the part of Admiral King, which would make sense.
    5. The fact that in a disaster, someone has to be held accountable. McVay was the captain, and his ship was lost with a great loss of life. Its was common sense (from the view of an outraged public) to bring him to trial. I believe he was used as the scapegoat, and this view is backed up by most of the crew accounts I have read.
     
  5. Takao

    Takao Ace

    Joined:
    Apr 27, 2010
    Messages:
    10,103
    Likes Received:
    2,574
    Location:
    Reading, PA
    George Patton,

    1. AFAIK, McVay had knowledge of 3 submarine contact reports within reasonable distance from his intended track. More specific details were lacking because, IIRC, they were from ULTRA decrypts, which were not discussed with departing ship captains.

    2. McVay asked for an escort, because he knew of the submarine threat. He knew of the submarine threat because he read the submarine contact reports. IIRC, no escort was provided because none were available at the time. Also, it was not the first time the Indianapolis had sailed alone in the Pacific.

    3. Are you sure you read Hashimoto Mochitsura's record? Considering his first war patrol was not until January 15, 1944 when he departed Truk, in RO-44 to patrol of Espiritu Santo. How do you equate 1944-45 to, as you say
    Perhaps, you are including his time as CO of the submarine training boats RO-31 & I-158. If so, then your statement would be a little more truthful. Hashimoto Mochitsura took command of RO-31 in July, 1942.

    Still the fact remains that he was not damaging ships theroughout the war. Unless I miss my guess, Hashimoto Mochitsura's score was, and still is: one ship sunk/damaged in the Pacific War.


    As to "zig-zagging", it is just as likely to put you in a submarine's cross-hairs as it is to take you out them. Also, unless I misremember, the USN had enplaced a "speed restriction", in an effort to conserve fuel, on ships not in combat areas. This explains the slow speed of the USS Indianapolis when she was sunk, had she been traveling at a faster rate, the probability of a successful submarine attack would be diminished. About her best defense would have been "constant helming", where the ship is always turning one way or the other. However, "constant helming" is very demanding on all involved, and as such, was not often used.

    4. There is the "revenge" motive, but there is also the very influential father, Thomas D'Arcy Brophy, whom pressured many, including Truman and Forrestal, for the court martial. This is discussed in Dan Kurzman's book, "Fatal Voyage: The Sinking of the USS Indianapolis."

    5. I believe you are misinformed as to the "outraged public". The USS Indianapolis's loss was not announced until August 15, 1945, by then the Court of Inquiry, which is needed to recommend a court martial, had begun on August 13th. So, whatever public outcry, if any, there was, had no effect what so ever on their recommending of a court martial.
     
  6. namvet

    namvet Member

    Joined:
    Jul 26, 2008
    Messages:
    193
    Likes Received:
    45
    Truman and Forrestal were pressured by King. Following a court of inquiry into the loss of the Indianapolis, Admiral Chester Nimitz proposed reprimanding McVay. Instead, however, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal followed the advice of the chief of naval operations, Fleet Admiral Ernest King. who is Thomas D'Arcy Brophy if you don't mind

    the "outraged public" was during the trial. in dec 45 over the Japanese CO being called to testify against his former enemy Mcvay. also the Court of Inquiry was cancelled because of the Abombs and wars end. the Indy sinking was a very small back page story.
     
  7. Takao

    Takao Ace

    Joined:
    Apr 27, 2010
    Messages:
    10,103
    Likes Received:
    2,574
    Location:
    Reading, PA
    namvet,

    From all accounts I have read Thomas D'Arcy Brophy Sr. was a very influential and pissed-off father, and not, as you say, Admiral Ernest King.

    Not in the sense that George Patton wrote:
    Clearly, George Patton is referring to an outraged public bringing Captain McVay to trial/court martial, and not the USN's bringing Hashimoto Mochitsura to the United State to testify in the court martial.

    Further,
    The Court of Inquiry was not canceled, but completed in seven days with 47 witnesses. It then passed it's recommendations on to Admiral Nimitz.
     
  8. namvet

    namvet Member

    Joined:
    Jul 26, 2008
    Messages:
    193
    Likes Received:
    45
    and D'Arcy Brophy Sr was the father of who??? I didn't read the book

    the newspapers had Hashimotos' photo on the front page. and politicans were outraged. it was unprecedented. some of the crew got up and walked out. so his appearence in court did cause outrage. I think we're splitting hairs here.
     
  9. George Patton

    George Patton Canadian Refugee

    Joined:
    Aug 22, 2010
    Messages:
    3,223
    Likes Received:
    1,171
    Location:
    Ontario, Canada
    My sources don't match that. ULTRA decrypts showed that four submarines (one being the I-58) were in the path of the Indianapolis. These were classified, and McVay was not told. The USS Underhill was sunk by a submarine a few days before the Indianapolis left port. The information was passed from the Combat Intelligence Section to Commodore James Carter of Pacific Fleet Command on Guam, but it isn't clear if he knew about it prior to the meeting. McVay met with Carter before the Indianapolis sailed, but he told him nothing (either because he didn't know, or thought it was the port director's duty). Carter later testified that it was the role of the port director to inform the captain, but the report was withheld from the port director because it was deemed to be above his level. However, Carter knew that there were four submarines operating in the path of the Indianapolis, and failed to tell McVay. Again, he thought this was the duty of the port director. The port director, Lt. Waldron, withheld this information from McVay. However, before the ship sailed McVay was told that there were three possible submarines in the area, with two of those contacts listed as "doubtful". There was solid evidence of four submarines in the area, and he was not told. The sinking of the Underhill would have been enough to corroborate the threat from the 3 possible contacts McVay was told of, but this information was withheld from him.

    So yes, he had knowledge that some possible submarines were operating in his general area, but was not told the full picture (specifically the concrete evidence that 4 submarines were active).

    Regardless of whether an escort was available, the port director, Lt. Waldron, was told by VADM George Murray that "it [wasn't] neccessary" (commander of the Marianas). In an interesting twist, Murray was absent from McVay's trial. Asides from the submarine threat (which, as I addressed in response to #3), prior to sailing McVay wanted his crew to go through more training before sailing into a warzone. In response, he was ordered to train once he reached Leyte since it was no longer conducted at Guam. Regardless of the submarine threat, McVay clearly felt his crew wasn't combat-ready.

    The Indianapolis' speed was restricted to 16 knots for the voyage. Previously, when it sailed without escort carrying the Hiroshima bomb, she was ordered to procede at top speed. The Indianapolis could make 33 knots, far faster than any submarine. This, coupled with the sketchy submarine contact reports, could have been enough to make McVay to ask for an escort.

    If an escort wasn't available, then why didn't McVay's superiors alter the Indianapolis' plan to allow her to use her superior speed? This would have rendered the submarine threat (which McVay's superiors knew was serious) a moot point.

    Hashimoto was the torpedo officer on the I-24 during the Pearl Harbour attack. To my knowledge, he served in that capacity until the summer of 1942. At that point it was given command of the coastal submarine RO-31 (to my knowledge, not a training submarine). In 1944 he commanded RO-44 on a patrol. He was given command of I-58 when it was launched in 1944, and set out on war patrols. He unsuccessfully engaged numerous targets with Kaiten suicide torpedos (in other words, despite being in the battlezone, he was not conducting the attacks himself). He successfully evaded anti-submarine patrols, which were sinking dozens of Japanese submarines a month, perhaps through luck or skill. The fact remains that Hashimoto saw action from the beginning of the war to the end, and as such was an experience officer. Looking over my sources, I saw that I was wrong to say that he damaged several ships -- I must have been thinking of another officer.

    The court martial was announced in November 1945, and it began in early December 1945. The purpose of a court of inquiry (correct me if I am wrong) is just investigate the events, find the cause, reccommend disiplinary action and find how to prevent it from happening in the future. The court of inquiry, as you said, began on August 13th. There was public outrage over the sinking, and someone's head had to role. Rather than assigning blame to high ranking navy admirals, it was decided to use McVay (who was already viewed in a negative manner by an outraged public). There was 3 months from the time where the Board of Inquiry convened to when the court martial was announced.
     
  10. George Patton

    George Patton Canadian Refugee

    Joined:
    Aug 22, 2010
    Messages:
    3,223
    Likes Received:
    1,171
    Location:
    Ontario, Canada
    The loss of the Indianapolis made the navy look bad. The public was outraged over the loss, and the navy promptly moved to cover their bases and assign blame. By making McVay appear responsible (specifically, court martialing him), the public's anger was directed at him. He was the commander of the vessel when it was sunk -- making him responsible. To my knowledge, this is how it was portrayed to the public.

    The Court of Inquiry was also incomplete. VADM Murray, commander of the Marianas when the Indianapolis sailed and the man who said an escort "wasn't necessary" did not testify. In my opinion, the navy moved promptly to cover its bases and assign blame so that the high ranking admirals were not held responsible.
     
  11. namvet

    namvet Member

    Joined:
    Jul 26, 2008
    Messages:
    193
    Likes Received:
    45
    also he requested the escort because the Indy had no sub detection gear. he was blind as a bat and deaf as a post.
     
  12. Takao

    Takao Ace

    Joined:
    Apr 27, 2010
    Messages:
    10,103
    Likes Received:
    2,574
    Location:
    Reading, PA
    Thomas D'Arcy Brophy Sr. was the father of Ensign Thomas D'Arcy Brophy Jr., the son, whom survived until the final rescue but drowned whilst attempting to swim to the rescuing PBY that had just landed near his group of survivors. Brophy Sr., is covered in great detail in the books; "Fatal Voyage: the Sinking of the USS Indianapolis" by Dan Kurzman, "Out of the Depths" by David Harrell, and to a lesser extent "Left for Dead" by Peter Nelson.


    We're not splitting hairs here, we are talking about two completely different subjects; forum member, George Patton, mentioned in his Point #5, that
    Implying that, he, referring to Captain McVay, was brought to trial because of an "outraged public", yet, there was no "outraged public", so to speak, that wanted McVay's head on a platter. Most likely, the public did not know who McVay was until the court martial was splashed across the front pages of the newspapers.

    You, on the other hand, are talking about the USN bringing Hashimoto Mochitsura to the United States, for the express purpose of calling him as a witness to testify against McVay, and the public sensation doing so caused. While this underhanded maneuver by the USN did bring about an "outraged public", that is not what George Patton is talking about.
     
  13. George Patton

    George Patton Canadian Refugee

    Joined:
    Aug 22, 2010
    Messages:
    3,223
    Likes Received:
    1,171
    Location:
    Ontario, Canada
    I am not saying that McVay was "publicly wanted" to be reprimanded in the eyes of the public. What I am saying is that the public was outraged that such a disaster could happen, and it looked very bad on the Navy. Rather than just assign blame to those who deserved it (high ranking admirals and other shore officers who were negligent), it seemed that the logical move was to assign blame to the ship's captain. Think about this from a non-historical perspective. A ship was lost with many lives. Superior officers are largely responsible for it. Rather than assign blame to themselves (which would make them look bad), someone had to be found to bear the brunt of the blame. McVay was already in a vulnerable position (he was the Captain, and was despised by Adm King).

    The Navy blamed McVay, and succeeded in funneling the public outrage over the disaster at him, and saving their own reputations in the process.
     
  14. Takao

    Takao Ace

    Joined:
    Apr 27, 2010
    Messages:
    10,103
    Likes Received:
    2,574
    Location:
    Reading, PA
    That does not track. The McVay court martial was already a go, before the vast majority of the public even knew who McVay was.

    It was as complete as it was going to get. Vice Admiral George D. Murray, was one of three Admirals named to the Court, when he should have been named as an "interested party". This created a clear conflict of interest on Murray's part - being tasked with judging his own command. Had this be a civilian court, instead of a military one, Murray would have been required to recuse himself due to the conflict of interest.
     
  15. Takao

    Takao Ace

    Joined:
    Apr 27, 2010
    Messages:
    10,103
    Likes Received:
    2,574
    Location:
    Reading, PA
    There is a lot more to it, I think, than just the Navy playing the "blame game" to protect the careers of a few individuals.
     
  16. George Patton

    George Patton Canadian Refugee

    Joined:
    Aug 22, 2010
    Messages:
    3,223
    Likes Received:
    1,171
    Location:
    Ontario, Canada
    As far as I know, the Board of Inquiry convened in August, and the court martial wasn't announced until November. And to emphasize this again, I am not saying that the public wanted McVay to be punished. Yes, you are likely correct when you say that they didn't even know who McVay was. However, a large navy ship was sunk with heavy loss of life when the war was already "won" in the minds of the public, which looked very bad on the navy brass. Someone had to be held accountable - and I believe that it didn't matter who in the minds of the public. The naval brass (specifically ADM King) chose McVay to take the fall. When McVay became known, it would have seemed to be common sense (from a public perspective) to hold him accountable for the loss of his ship. He was the captain, it was his ship that was sunk -- he would be responsible.

    As complete as it was going to get, but still a mockery of justice. VADM Murray, despite being the man in charge of the area didn't testify in the trial (to my knowledge), although he was the man who told McVay that an escort wasn't necessary. McVay was used as the scapegoat.
     
  17. George Patton

    George Patton Canadian Refugee

    Joined:
    Aug 22, 2010
    Messages:
    3,223
    Likes Received:
    1,171
    Location:
    Ontario, Canada
    I don't think there is. The Navy could have investigated the causes of the sinking, and assigned portions of the blame to all of those responsible (shore officers, VADM Murray, maybe McVay himself for poor judgement). Instead, they used McVay to "cover their bases". The loss of a major warship with heavy loss of life just weeks before the end of the war looked bad on the Navy, and someone had to take the fall.
     
  18. Carronade

    Carronade Ace

    Joined:
    Feb 17, 2010
    Messages:
    3,278
    Likes Received:
    846
    also he requested the escort because the Indy had no sub detection gear

    Like every other cruiser (except the Atlanta class?), capital ship, fleet auxiliary, transport, cargo ship, etc. People tend to look at the incident in isolation, but it reflects an overall policy. We certainly could have made every ship in the Pacific wait until an escort or convoy was available; mainly it would mean that a lot of ships and supplies would be delayed getting to where they were needed, ultimately that the entire war effort would be delayed. The generally unenterprising nature of Japanese submarine operations made us willing to let ships go without escort; it would be interesting to know how many ships made unescorted transits in similar circumstances without incident.
     
  19. namvet

    namvet Member

    Joined:
    Jul 26, 2008
    Messages:
    193
    Likes Received:
    45
    Patton brings up a good point here

    why such a slow speed in enemy waters???

    also concerning the escort. the Indy was fresh from the builders yard. why didn't they add sonar when she was being repaired???

    BTY King caught hell for turning a blind eye to operation drum beat in 42. but that's another story
     
  20. Takao

    Takao Ace

    Joined:
    Apr 27, 2010
    Messages:
    10,103
    Likes Received:
    2,574
    Location:
    Reading, PA
    First off, the water were not considered 'enemy' waters. The front line was was several hundred miles north of Guam, focused on Okinawa and to a lesser extent Iwo Jima.

    As to the slow speed, as I said earlier, the USN had emplaced a "speed limit" of 16 knots on ships that did not have to be at a certain destination by a given time. This had been done to conserve fuel. To travel faster than the limit, you had to get approval from the proper authorities.

    Now, as to the Indianapolis's case, different authors have different ideas about how the Indianapolis's speed was set. Richard Newcomb, has Captain McVay dutifully following the speed limit, after comparing a 2 day trip at 25 knots and a three day trip of 15.7. Doug Stanton has Captain McVay concerned over the condition of his engineering plant and thus decides on the slower 15.7 knot journey. Dan Kurzman postulates that, since McVay was not fully informed of the submarines in his path, McVay chose the slower speed of advance. While, David Harrell does not even mention the subject.


    Four words, "Tit's on a Bull." As in sonar/hydrophones would have been about as useful to the Indy as...

    While, official literature says that the SONAR/hydrophones can be used to search at 20-24 knot speed, in a real-world setting this proved to be somewhat less. So, even had the Indy been outfitted with an acoustic suite, given her 17 knot speed, it is very doubtful that the Indy would have detected the Japanese submarine.

    Now, had the Indy been using active sonar and not just listening on passive hydrophones, in all likelyhood, the same situation would have occurred. Since SONAR, like RADAR, can be detected at a greater distance than which it detects. I-58 would have known she was coming, and still have been able to advantageously position herself to torpedo the Indy. i know the Japanese used an anechoic coating on some of their submarines, but I don't know if this was used on I-58. also, if the submarine is pointed, more or less at the target, active SONAR has a harder time detecting the submerged submarine, than if the submarine was broadside to the detecting ship.

    So, no, I don't think an acoustic suite would have saved the USS Indianapolis from her fate. Also, I believe most Japanese submarines were first detected on the surface, and were not first detected submerged.
     

Share This Page