USSR Declares war on allies after berlin?

Here's a link to one of Clint's recent postings on availability of atom bombs post-war: http://www.ww2f.com/battle-europe/3...viet-union-out-eastern-europe.html#post416104

 

Killin' me........Karl, Take Lou's advice and refer to Clint's link. There was a third bomb waiting in Benicia to be shipped to Tinian when the Japanese quit. There were several others in "the pipeline".

 

moutan1 reply,

The German production spike of Sep 44 did not so much signify the failure of strategic bombing as the inefficiency of German industrial production prior to Speer. The Germans realized little of their capacity, so that the bombing destroyed many capabilities that the Germans were not using.

Regardless, the oil and steel camapaign was well on its way to destroying the German economy if the ground forces did not beat the air force to it. German shortage of petroleum was certainly a deathblow to the panzerwaffe.

The American Civil War was one the bloodiest in history.

That is why serious economists do not take "balanced budget" seriously. FDR proved that certain types of national debt simply did not matter if the economy is expanding. At the end of WWII, the USA produced more materiel than the rest of the world combined.

Yes, but in limited production and they were low yield tactical nukes. Basically one bomb does the work of a fleet wide raid, but essentially not very different.

 

I doubt reconstituted German divisions would be of much help. Most German troops were demoralized veterans, old soldiers and young men. The Red Army veterans of Berlin remarked, with a note of contempt, that the most lethal German soldier they fought were the teenagers because they still had spirit.

I have my suspcisions that those German soldiers who would still talk about their experiences now, come overwhelmingly from the minority of elite troops or very well motivated soldiers at the time. The majority that had lost heart is far more likely to be silent about their own experiences. Without conducting a poll--"would you fight the soviets?" at 1945, this question might not have an answer.

 

the USAAF needed more than 200 bombs to hit one target in daylight
the inefficiency of German industrial production prior to Sep because Hitler thought he will win even that he canceled many production order and turn it toward civil purpose until 1943(Kursk) at that time he woke up from his pink dreams

the oil campaign was the most successful campaign but was late

all civil Wars in history was bloody so the civil war was exception ,the civil war means that the whole country will collapse,so you cannot give up or surrender in such war until you win or die .

my point is the democratic nations can not begin the war and cannot accept high numbers of casualties at opposite of dictatorial nations even they said that if the whole world nations is democratic no more wars

USA did not pay WW2 debt until now
you can not borrow more money for every war forever , the all experts say the balanced ratio( National Debt to GDP) is 50% and if it exceed 100% the economy will not expand and that happened after the war(1945-1955)

there are many persons do not agree with you ,the fear from the weapon is more important from the weapon itself , 2 atomic bombs end ww2 and saved 2 million life from both sides, if the allies decided to invade Japan

 

my point is the democratic nations can not begin the war and cannot accept high numbers of casualties at opposite of dictatorial nations even they said that if the whole world nations is democratic no more wars

This is not proven. The USA initiated quite a few wars by shedding first blood and I am sure it'd be tedious to list them.

USA did not pay WW2 debt until now
you can not borrow more money for every war forever , the all experts say the balanced ratio( National Debt to GDP) is 50% and if it exceed 100% the economy will not expand and that happened after the war(1945-1955)

Hm? My impression was that the US economy expanded rapidly throughout this epoch until the the energy crisis of 1970. Balanced burrowing is kind of sacred object of worship in classical liberal economics, but that isn't exactly the model nations use in times of war or sharp recession. In any event, in a total war, economy is basically directed from top down, and market concerns would be ignored for the duration. The Germans, Japanese, United Kingdoms and Soviet Russia were all using far more draconian system of rationing and directed economy and they survived well. Necessity is the mother of innovation... or painful adaptations.

there are many persons do not agree with you ,the fear from the weapon is more important from the weapon itself , 2 atomic bombs end ww2 and saved 2 million life from both sides, if the allies decided to invade Japan


Japan was a fragile theocratic-militarist state with a pre-modern ideology of emperor-worship. Do not confuse it with the USSR.

 

[Sorry that the post was made about half a month ago... ]

Yes, T-54 entered full production in 1947, but it had no take at all in the Korean War.

 

For anyone to suggest that (in this crazy scenario) the Germans would have fought alongside the allies is insane!

Such an act would denigrate all of the brave American, British, French etc. lads who fell in Europe trying to defeat the same evil who would now be fighting alongside them against the Russians!?!?

This would mean that all of these brave allied troops died for nothing.

Not to mention that no matter how brave or patriotic a German soldier may have been, none who have actually served on the Eastern front would have ever volunteered to fight there again.

 

Insane / crazy / absurd ... All part of the same basket. In for a penny in for a pound. and all that.

Niether side was dumb enough to want anything like this although a few individuals both then and now might accept the above qualifiers and be its proponents.

 

I just love how even though there are older threads, people insist on making these newer ones hot threads. If you want to cause a buzz, start a new thread with one of these titles!

What If...
Germany Wins the War!
Someone Kills Hitler!
Russia Invades Japan!
Japan Invades Russia!
America Goes Axis!
Russia Goes Axis!
No Barbarossa!
No Atom Bomb!
Atom Bomb for Germany!
Battle of Britain is Lost!
Russia Invades Post-War Europe!
And Various Other Far-Fetched Ways That Germany could Conquer the World!

Take any one of these for a low price of your dignity, and you will have a guaranteed hot topic!

Please people, some more imagination.

 

USA could not begin any war without a reason in all the history ,why?because the people have the right to say no, that is enough and the president will follow who elected him
while the dictatorial nations could easily begin a war whatever that costs (lives&money)
and their people had to follow the dictator and do what in his mind

the current recession, the worst downturn since the recession of 1948. (so the recession of 1948 more powerful than recession of 1973)
let me share with you the GDP of the US in the late 40s (in 1990 USD)
1945: $1,644,761,000,000
1946: $1,305,357,000,000
1947: $1,285,697,000,000
1948: $1,334,331,000,000
1949: $1,339,505,000,000
1950: $1,455,916,000,000
you can see that economy shrink not expand after the war

and let us take ww2 as example
the GDP expanded 120% through the war
while National Debt expanded 800% so if the war against USSR keep going(another five years ) the GDP will expand another 120% while National Debt will expand more than 500% so the ratio ( National Debt to GDP) will became 300% , that cause reducing the Dollar value causes more inflation ,the government will force to borrow and print more money that lead to huge inflation making recession cycle.....

A Review Of Past Recessions

I did not understand your point here, did you mean if USA nuke USSR ,the soviets will keep fighting or you mean something else could you explain more

 

On the other hand reasons can be "manufactured". Look at the Spanish American war for instance.

 

Not according to the friends that I knew. One ethnic German was from Lithuania, another was from East Prussia. Both were waiting for the Americans to re-arm they and their fellow POW countrymen, so that they could kick the Russians back into their own territory.

Once that it was seen that a greater evil now existed and that an Iron Curtain was descending upon all of eastern Europe, I'm sure that the Anglo-American Allies would welcome any and all former Wehrmacht troops, no matter what branch of service they formerly belonged, to fight alongside them as allies.

 

That is true, on the surface. The outbreak of the war was ignited into reality by the explosion of the battleship Maine, but that had been sort of "in the works" since the end of our Civil War. Grant (as President) had even expressed that Spanish held Cuba was one of our destinies as a military target as it was the last bastion of slavery in the northern section of the western hemisphere. As such it should be overthrown and the slaves freed as the "natural extension" of our own end of slavery. Mexico had outlawed slavery after its independence from Spain, one of the many problems with the Texans actually. Canada was also slavery free as a part of Great Britain.

President Grant, and everyone after him in the White House had looked at Cuba with "squinty eyes", trying to find justification for an invasion. The Maine was (as you say) used as an excuse. The explosion was an accident, but the outrage was manufactured, see Hearst/Pulitzer and the Yellow Press.

America has only officially "declared war" a few times actually (1812 to WW2), but we have used military "influence" well over 200 times against foreign soil since our founding. The Civil War doesn't count since we couldn't declare war on ourselves!

 

This is going to be my last post on a rather tedious thread.

The thread presumes that the Soviet Union declared war on the US. When a war was declared on a nation, presumably without cause, you will have very strong popular support. Before Pearl Harbor Americans previously cared very little for Japan or Europe.

Urm, the great depression of 1948? At the age of the baby boomers? That will be the first time I heard about it. I'll let Americans more interested in economics answer that one. As for GDP, I am sure you are aware that there was an extremely sharp fell-off of demand of industrial goods due to the end of the war. Ergo, the reverse can be argued--the end of massive government spending ended economic growth.

Absolutely the Soviets would keep on fighting. There was not much left in European Russia to bomb and the rate of nuke production needed a couple of months to speed up. Once that warmed up, though, the US would be in a powerful military position.

 

While this is from May, I think it shows you are mis-informed about the 1948 recession being the "worst", or maybe you are reading the data differently than these fellows;

U.S. in Longest Recession Since the 1930s

By Adam Price

San José, CA - The United States is now in its longest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s. At the end of April, the recession that officially began in December of 2007 reached 17 months in length, passing the deep 1981-82 and 1974-75 recessions. The economy has lost almost 6 million jobs, or 4.1% of total jobs at the beginning of the recession, the worst downturn since the recession of 1948. Unemployment in the African American community hit a depression-level 15% in April, while unemployment for Asian Americans has risen the fastest, more than doubling over the last year.

See:

Fight Back! - May 2009 - U.S. in Longest Recession Since the 1930s: Economic Pains for Working People Mount

And the unemployment rate, while depressing seems to be showing some signs of slowing down in its rate of increase. Not that employment is growing, but that the rate of its expansion is slowing.

WASHINGTON (MarketWatch) -- The U.S. unemployment rate jumped to a 26-year high of 9.7% in August as nonfarm payrolls fell by 216,000, the 20th consecutive monthly decline, the Labor Department estimated Friday.
U.S. payrolls have dropped by 6.9 million to a total of 131.2 million since the recession began in December 2007, the government data showed.

Unemployment has increased by 7.4 million during the recession to stand at 14.9 million.

"Joblessness continues to mount, which will only make it harder for households to repay debt and build savings, thereby impeding a consumer-led recovery," wrote Sal Guatieri, senior economist for BMO Capital Markets.
The 216,000 decline in payrolls was close to market expectations of a 233,000 drop, but the unemployment rate rose higher than the 9.5% level expected. The unemployment rate was 9.4% in July.

See Economic Calendar.

It was the smallest decline in payrolls since August 2008.

Payroll losses have moderated in most industries in the past two months after severe declines earlier in the year. In the past three months, payroll losses have averaged 318,000 per month, compared with 491,000 in the previous three-month period.

Although payroll losses have moderated, the loss rate in the past three months is as bad as it was at the worst of the 1980 thru 1982 recessions, said Charles Dumas, an economist for Lombard Street Research. "You have to have faith to think that job losses at the worst rate of 1980 and 1982 are consistent with level to growing GDP," Dumas said.

Economist Robert Brusca said the trend is favorable, adding that he couldn't understand the pessimism of so many observers. "I feel like a parent locked in a car with a little kid screaming " DADDY! ARE WE THERE YET?"

See:

Unemployment rate jumps to 26-year high of 9.7% - MarketWatch

What I am reading seems to show that the economists seem to be worrying more about "deflation" than "inflation" at the moment, a'la the Great Depression.

 

I can see that a lot was written on this topic, but I feel there are things that were not adequately addressed. I will try to give a fair and balanced analysis of the issue.

Note please that I am discussing a purely hypothetical CONVENTIONAL war on May 1945. Let’s be honest, no one can really begin to fathom the effects of the use of the A-bomb.

Surprise and Planning:
First, it is difficult to stress how much intention and surprise are key factors in any engagement of this kind. Whichever side planned and succeeded in taking the opposing force by surprise would have a decisive advantage. Aside from the immediate strategic edge of surprise, planning provides the necessary ability to ingrain in your commanders/soldiers the notion of what is about to be done (imagine the shock, especially of the OPBlue side, of being told they are going against the Soviets, who they were told were their brothers in arms for the last four years). The truth is that the OPRed (NKVD, intelligence service arms) were much better able to maintain strategic secrecy and find out what was being planned by OPBlue. Not only did they have the brutal efficiency (inherent in repressive regimes), Stalin was for a long time very paranoid about OpBlue and had an incredibly sophisticated spy network in Western capitals. Therefore, it seems very unlikely that the Kremlin would not be forewarned of OpBlue intentions (Stalin may be many things, but do you really think he would allow himself to be caught with his pants down after June 22, 1941?) Therefore, despite substantial risks and difficulties, OpRed would seem to have more of a chance of gaining the strategic surprise, aided by the inherent chaos of an army still in the last stages of an assault on Nazi Germany.


Logistics:
Furthermore, advanced planning logistically allows you to start positioning your forces for the very arduous task ahead regardless of which side initiates. The greatest weakness of the Soviet Army in 1945 was logistics. This is very surprising to many due to the fact that the USSR managed to advance across much of Eastern Europe at a relentless pace, albeit with significant problems that at times forced a halt. The reason is simply that while Moscow threw its production into tanks, aircraft, guns and all kinds of assorted weaponry, they largely depended on the Americans for hundreds of thousands of transport vehicles. Consider for example that while the USSR had produced more than double the amount of artillery and medium/heavy mortars than the USA in WWII, they produced less than one tenth the amounts of trucks as the US. In fact, the United States sent 433,967 assorted logistical vehicles to the Soviets during World War II, of which 49,250 were jeeps and 87,452 were deuce and a half trucks. In other words, around 2/3ds of all Soviet logistical vehicles were American made. Off course, in case of conflict, the sudden flow of trucks to the Soviets would stop, but where does leave OpRed?

First of all, the map is of key importance when looking at logistics, so here are some numbers to give us an idea of the situation. The approximate distance in a straight line between Moscow and Berlin is about 1,000 miles or 1,600 kilometers, while the distances between Berlin and Brussels are 400 miles, Berlin and Paris 550 miles, and Berlin and Pas de Calais 500 miles. Essentially, this means two things, the Russians will have to husband their logistical resources for a, if successful, 500 odd mile push, and furthermore they will have to bring resources to a possible 1,500 mile far front, (potentially even 2,000 miles considering the factories in the Urals). Meanwhile, with the U-boat war over, OpBlue finds themselves in a much better situation logistically, with only a 500 mile line of communication. Furthermore, OpBlue is the first functionally motorized force in the history of the world. However, despite the more tenuous logistical situation, OPRed certainly had enough logistical capacity remaining to launch at least one withering offensive that could go all the way to the Atlantic if successful (approximately 300,000 vehicles). Furthermore, Central European roads were significantly superior to those found farther East, reducing mobility attrition. Finally, even if the OPBlue did not turn off the vehicle spigot, OpRed would never have hoped to become fully motorized in the 1940s, and would have had to continue to rely on the oldest means of transportation: the horse.


The Short Campaign:
For the masters of attrition, 1945 would sure have provided a different picture. For many reasons, the only way the Soviets could win is if their first massive initial offensive met with considerable success. OPRed had been severely devastated by the Germans with millions dead, an economy under severe strain, and a rather exhausted force. The Soviets lost just shy of 15 percent of their 1939 population during World War II, and they were coming to the end of their reserves. The British actually were in a very similar economic situation to the Soviets, and their Army could not be mobilized any further. The United States in 1945 on the other hand still had plenty of economic juice and could even potentially mobilize another wave of men if in dire need. However, it is also clear that OPBlue would simply be too exhausted to march/fight the 1,000 miles to Moscow from Berlin if successful against the Soviets (never mind the political considerations and the home front morale). Therefore, what we are looking at is very likely a war that would be decided in the initial devastating short campaign. Results would in all likelihood be in three broad categories:

1) OpRed decisive victory/ march to the Atlantic (Cross Channel operation impossible obviously.) God knows what happens next.
2) OpBlue decisive victory. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Balkans, liberated. Potentially Baltic States.
3) Somewhere in the broad middle of a stalemate. If it wasn’t for politics and home front morale, this would be slightly better for OPBlue than OPRed due to deeper economic reserves/revolts in Poland and other parts of Eastern Europe against a now weakened USSR.

To broadly sum up, the USSR would really need a substantial victory to hold on to any new spoils. OPBlue on the other hand would be put in a better position vis-à-vis OPRed even by a stalemate (though God knows how after WWIII anything can be called a better position).

So Who Wins?

This war, as a continental war, would mostly have been a land/air affair. It would have been decided mostly on the first few months on the German plains/ French border.



Quantity:
In terms of manpower, OPRed at the end of the war possessed a whooping 11 million men of which 6 million were in the army. In total, OPRed had approximately 7 million men on the German front. In comparison, U.S. Army Forces in European Theater of Operations in May possessed a total strength of 3,021,483 troops of which 2,639,377 were on the continent. The British and the Canadians had 1,095,774 troops on the 31st of May in North West Europe. All in all, there were 7 million OPRed versus around 4 million OPBlue in the potential battle areas. OPRed had a larger campaign reserve (less than four months) than OPBlue while OPBlue boasted a larger strategic reserve (more than six months). In terms of experience/training, OPBlue generally had superior training but OPRed had a wider veteran base. If you ask me, I think OPRed had the slight advantage as there is no better training than to be shot at.

In terms of weaponry, OPRed had around 100,000 guns/mortars/rocket launchers, 12,000 tanks/SPs, and 15,000 combat aircraft. OPBlue on the other hand had around the same number of artillery and tanks/armored vehicles but nearly twice the amount of aircraft in Europe. Note however that a far larger proportion of OPBlue aircraft were training and liaison aircraft as compared to the ratio of these type of aircraft to purely combat types in available to OPRed. Furthermore, while OPBlue possessed far stronger strategic Air Forces, OPRed relied on a heavily battlefield centric Air Force.

Quality:
I won’t give an exhaustive account here but just a general round up.

In terms of artillery, OPBlue generally had superior fire control, organic fire support, and responsive times. These advantages will be crucial in the fluid segment of the campaign but will largely be negated during the very initial stages when the rigid Soviet coordinated preplanned bombardments are possible and come into play. Furthermore, the Soviets relied somewhat more on Rocket Artillery while OPBlue had solid types of medium caliber gun/howitzers.

In terms of ATGs, OPRed have a slight edge with 100mm and 122mm ATGs though the US 90mm and British 17 pounders are solid guns.


In terms of aircraft, OPRed fighter aircraft are generally equivalent to OPBlue types. In any such conflict OPBlue will have to channel fighters to intercept the OPRed battlefield attack arm while OPRed fighters will have their hands full intercepting Bomber Command and the Eighth.

In case of conflict, we will likely see the T-44 and Centurion going into mass production, but they are unlikely to show up in significant numbers to influence the course of the war. OPRed has a slight advantage here due to superior heavy armor, namely the many JS-IIM and small numbers of JS-III. OPBlue has limited numbers of M26s and a little more than 2,000 easy eights as the mainstay of their force.

Conclusion

In terms of quality, both sides have their advantages and disadvantages, and the truth is, none have a weapon that could be called a game changer. On the other hand, OPRed does have nearly double the amount of troops available on theater. If they manage to initiate, plan, and launch a surprise attack, they will very much have a lot going for them for the first three months. The first three months might be what it takes to ensure victory in the long run. On the other hand, too much could go wrong. Lets just thank God we didn’t live to find out what the result of such a war could be.


Certain things I have noticed on this topic that should be addressed:

Arming the German forces: Not only politically unfeasible, it is also very risky and will create a logistical and organizational nightmare. For example, half of their country is already occupied and the other half will be a battlefield. At most this will give you half a million viable men, and OPBlue will be better served calling up a fresh wave of troops from the Home Front.

Misunderstanding of the use of the strategic bomber: The ultimate use of the strategic bomber is to target heavy industry, which in this case is too far away to hit effectively. In the cases where the heavy bomber was used in the tactical role (Normandy for example), it was used during static lulls and the effect was double edged with a lot of terrain obstruction and friendly fire losses. Use of the heavy bomber in the tactical role is impossible in fluid operations as it takes a long time to plan these operations and slight changes in the lines could make the run too risky to friendly forces. In such a scenario, the heavy bombers would undoubtedly be mainly used to strike at rear echelon transportation hubs and bottlenecks. This would cause significant damage, but would also result in heavy losses against OPRed fighter packs and will not ensure victory for OPblue.

 

Overall not a bad assesement. I do have a few quibbles of which I'll go into two below.

One factor you have neglected is the number of those in the Red army who are not dedicated communist. Indeed many were anti communist they were just more anti-nazi. The provide a signifcant security threat to such an operation. There are also significant western units in the Soviet zone at the end of the war. Much would depend on when this would take place.

Again I disagree. Strategic bombers should be used for startegic reasons. The destrution of Red logistics (both supplies and transport) is an appropriate use of it as well as suppression of Red airpower. Furthermore it could be effective vs troop concentrations especially if they were not in contact with friendly forces. As for heavy losses I suspect not for a couple of reasons.
1) The Soviets were not used to attacking heavy bombers. They are both tougher, better armed, and are used in supporting formations.
2) Allied escort tactics were also well evlolved at this point.
3) The engagements are likely to be at altitudes that favor allied aircraft.
4) Both the US and Britain have jets in service the Soviets won't for some time.

A note on the "continuous advance" of Soviet forces. It was hardly continuous. The Soviets tended to build up the required supplies close to the front launch an offensive and if it was successful it continued until those supples were exhausted. Most such offensives didn't get 500 miles.

 

Big difference between 1945-46 Turkey, and 2003 Turkey. In fact, the Turks welcomed the USAF with open arms throughout the cold war.

And Turkey is not the only place to base a B-29 with a combat range of 3,250 miles.

From Incirlik, Turkey. 2594 miles round trip.


From Andoya, Norway. 2968 miles round trip.


And while yes, the Soviets had a couple planes that could reach 36,000 feet (B-29 ceiling), tell me, just how good were the oxygen equipment in those birds? Almost non-existent. And their short wingspans would make maneuvering very difficult at that altitude. You send an entire squadron of B-29's, only one carrying a nuke. Good luck stopping that.

 

If you read what I wrote closely, then you will see that my assertion is that OPRed had a better chance of acheiving strategic surprise than OPBlue despite substantial risks and difficulties. In other words, I am stating that there will be many things that could go wrong in the attempt by OPRed to acheive surprise. Therefore, I will assume that your disagreement is that OPBlue has a better chance of acheiving strategic surprise than OPRed.

I disagree. Moscow had far more spy networks in key areas of Western Capitals were these decisions were sure to be circulated. Do you remember how the USSR got the A bomb? Furthermore, many Soviet generals who would have been briefed in advance on such an operation would never dream of betraying the motherland despite their hatred towards Communism. I believe the overwhelming number of active Soviet Generals in 1945 were very patriotic. Therefore, I disagree that OPBlue had more of a chance of acheiving the strategic surprise.

By the way, please name a few anti-communist Soviet generals in 1945? It really seems liks something that I would be interested in studying further.

I was wrong to say that the ultimate use of the strategic bomber is to target heavy industry. Heavy industry is only one (albeit perhaps key) targets of the heavy bomber. The point stands that the use of the heavy bomber has been misunderstood in such a conflict, the use of the strategic bombers in tactical roles was frought with risk and largely impractical in a fluid theater.

As for losses, over 100,000 Allied bomber crewmen were killed over Europe during World War II, one in every ten Americans killed was a member of the Eighth Air Foce, and a bomber crewman had a 71% chance of being killed over thirty missions. Many of these losses happened when the Germans were largely diluted and unable to offer substantial resistance in the air. Sure Allied tactics have evolved, but the Soviets were also getting better pilots and machines. Now look at the number of fighters available to the Soviets in 1945 and look at those available to the Germans in 1944/1945 and then see how the Air War just got a lot worse for the bombers.

Exactly. Did I say otherwise? Show me.