What if Herr Speer...

Hello!

The army´s old saying isn´t too wrong: the army marches with its stomach. And by reading about the wars it has been usually the supply department that has changed the war..in the end.

I just have some stuff which I would like to bring up on this matter. Germany could have lifted its production higher early on, and thinking that even in autumn 1942 there was no need to do so, is an act of madness.February 1943 is really too late.But also several other factors influenced, so even with higher production levels the effect might have been low at the front level!

First of all, the width of the train line was narrower than in Germany so they had to change that. What a work that is! Secondly the partisans in Russia. Quite often the mid-part between the front and germany was unmanned so the partisans had time to do their tricks. Third: Not enough trains to take the goods. Russian vehicles were old and useless. The troops received 1/3-3/4 of the needed supply daily. Thanx to the last one there was loads of winter clothing in Warsaw but none in the front...( a book i just read of a Me 110 pilot who noticed this while picking a new plane from Germany ). 4. The roads in Russia. Not only during spring and autumn are they muddy but in such a shape that you cannot call them roads. Even today! 5. local policy. In Russia the organisation of local governments was poor, chaotic. Probably this was done by Hitler´s order, but the possibility of making the local factories produce should have been taken advantage of.

As Wehrmacht didn´t want waffen SS to be part of them, ss had to make their own supply route and that probably saved quite a lot as the "firemen" of the troops were in better shape. I think that Waffen SS had to buy tanks for their own use all the way to 1941, maybe 1942. If someone has information on this, I´d be glad to hear.

So even with huge amounts of supply you still face the question how to get it here?! Goering´s luftwaffe?? ( am I being nasty here? ) Jawohl, mein fuhrer!

 

No war has been won through good supply.
But many wars have been lost through bad supply.

I believe you are wrong about the Panzer IIIs. You seem to be - please excuse the expression - hypnotised by the T-34 and the idea of a tank-vs-tank duel. This was not what the tank's main role was in WW2, or the most likely thing to happen to it during the war.

A larger number of medium tanks (Pz III and IV) would have made a significant difference in Barbarassa for example. The number of T-34s and KVs was small, and in any case, tanks are not (in Blitzkrieg) meant to go and seek out other tanks. They are used for breakthrough attacks and sweeping movements where their main advantage is their speed. Ways to deal with the heavy and medium Soviet tanks were found, and if we merely increase the number of German PzDivs and the stock of replacement equipment of all types, I think the point is not quite so strong as would appear at first.

Naturally with all this upping-production the supply organisation and fuel production would also have to be increased. But if we are looking at an across-the-board increase of production, then I can see no particular problems developing with supply. More trucks, more railway gangs, more trains, more fuel => more tanks in action.

 

Very, very well, Andreas!!!

Of course, that was my point: more mobile troops, better supply lines and stronger armoured swords to cut the enemy!!!

Kai, exactly. You must remember that in the early stages of the war, there was almost any tank-to-tank combat. Except with the T-34s and KV-1s ALL the other tanks were unable to pierce each other. Beside, the German Blitzkrieg, as Andreas very well pointed out was to crush the enemy with an armoured hit, not with tank-to-tank combats. Again, that is a minor tactical detail. And you are missing the general situation, again.

 

Well, Andreas, you do have some good points there. But- first off, the russiansd had over 2,000 T-34s in service when the germans invavded, so there definetley were a reasonable amount available. And could you give some sources on tank vs. tanks combat? Anything with numbers or accounts? I think you are clearly UNDER- estimating the significance of tanks and AFVs. The PzIII example I used was just that- an EXAMPLE. And you clearly missed the point of the example- simply having extra equipment does not address the other requirements for USING said equipment.

But more to the point-

Huh? That makes no sense- an across the board increase in production REQUIRES an across the board increase in resources. So the germans are going to find all this additional fuel where? And the additional steel and iron for these vehicles- magic?

So now in addition to tanks, you would have germany also producing thousands more trucks. Plus, more trains does not address Kai's point- the railroad systems were of a different guage, so what kinds of trains would you produce? And more men for the railway gangs mean less men for the front.

Friedrich, don't you understand that your "general situation" does not exist without the minor details? You can ignore that stuff if you want, but reading of sources clearly shows that these were hugely important factors.

Not to mention that no-one has even addressed germany's manpower shortage. Even if your theory holds, and germany could somehow produce all this stuff without the necessary resources, where would the soldiers come from? The Factory workers?

 

NO, crazy!

The minor details which do not matter are those 2.000 T-34s you mention. Those tanks, until December 1941 were completely useless. They were easily knocked out by ATs or simply, the always mighty (then) Luftwaffe took care. Or the minor details about a Mark III against a T-34. It doesn't matter.

Perhaps you are right in that about the resources needed. It is true that we did not have as many materials as the US or the USSR had, but we could achieve getting them. We are very good improvising. And about the man power. I have always pointed out in my posts about the men. Read the topic "Kursk, Stalingrad or..." and you will see that I point out Moscow and Stalingrad as the turning points of the war, because the losses in men. In the other hand, you point out Kursk as the turning point of the war because of the losses on materials... Do you get what I mean here?

In 1941 we could put enough men, pilots and staff at the front. We did not have that hard situation of 1945, when we started recruiting old men, kids and prisoners from the concentration camps... Certainly we would have had a lack of German workers, but we had free workers. No problem. It is right that women would have been better, and the quality of weaponry would have been improved. But anyway. At least in 1941 we had everything in our favour.

And here, let's change the topic a bit. Speer as minister of weaponry in August 1939, Hitler declares total war, to smash all its enemies, including the Soviet Union by the end of 1941.

 

Like I said, Friedrich, you can ignore "minor details" like that. You just keep on saying "It dosen't matter"... Fact of the matter is, ALL those things DO matter.
I'm talking about logistics, which you clearly don't understand.
from a webpage- "Amateurs study strategy, professional study logistics." That's my take.

And I'd love to hear how germany could "improvise" bessemer steel or tungsten or fuel.

Clearly you did not read. I said MEN and materials, especially veteran officers.

[ 09 August 2002, 01:32 PM: Message edited by: CrazyD88 ]

 

Friedrich

We seem to have drifted from "What if" to Cloud Cuckoo Land - I'm sure Hitler would have been as impressed as Rommel would have been depressed by this development.

Invading Russia is like advancing into outer space. Rule 1 of any war is don't say you are going to win it by Christmas. Rule 2 is don't invade Russia.

You seem to think solely about the point of the sword. As Crazy says, logistics are what matter. In Russia mud is a killer for logistics. Coupled with large distances I really don't see how more men would have helped, or given the road and rail network - be adequately supported. Besides the Germans made such a hash of their strategy in late 1941 that it is questionable whether more mouths to feed or starve to death would have helped matters much.

Jumbo

 

Well, you are misunderstanding my points and making me seem like a stupid. And I am not.

Do you think I was saying that by improvissing I meant inventig a tree of coal or iron?! Please! I meant that diplomacy and things could have worked to bring fuel from Bulgary, Turkey, etc.

And I am not ignoring logistics either. I know how important they are. I perfectly know what the mud, the distance, the partisans and the different railroads meant. But that could be solved somehow, at least partially with the production of trains with the Soviet standard, build more transport aeroplanes and replacing ALL the horses with lorries and/or trains. (Take on account that this happened 60 years ago and that it is all especulation... but we all especulate a lot in this kind of topics... so, it's OK). And you should know that logistic are a big tactical detail which contribute to make strategy. That is the most important tactical detail in strategy. If the guns were 75 or 88 or the tanks were Marks or Ts or whatever, the rifles, bla, bla, bla. All that has no importance.

Crazy. There were enough officers and experienced people in 1941. Would you please remember the year?! This is not 1944, when there was not anything available.

 

Friedrich, really...
You are still doing the same thing...

How? Your response to all logistical questions seems to just be, "oh, we could solve that"... Concrete solutions were needed, not just wishful thinking.
And, you again miss another point- the germans had MORE resources available in 1944 than in 41...

Logistics is NOT a part of batlefield tactics. Logistics determine WHICH tactics are available- no gas, you can't use tanks... bad roads, you must accumulate reserves. Tactics refers to the specific methods one uses to defeat the enemy.
And you can't just say "All that has no importance"... I know you aren't stupid, but statements like that sound stupid. One must consider all aspects- you can't just dismiss the ones that don't work for your argument.

 

Sorry for the tone of that last one, Friedrich. Like I said, I know you're not stupid, and I apologize if I implied so.

We'll just agree to disagree on this one, eh?

 

I'm not missing your points at all. I think I addressed them quite clearly. Our problem seems to be that we are talking past each other, nobody really understanding what the other means.

The saying "amateurs study strategy, professionals study logistics" is (IMHO) a lot of rubbish, because if you don't make logistics part of your strategy, you have already lost. To speak of a "strategy" that does not include logistics is pointless, but the saying implies that they are two completely different things!

But anyway, if we want to solve our little dispute here, my feeling is we should go point by point and consider solutions for each one. The last three or four posts (indeed most since my last one) seem to be on the border of obtuse, resorting to overgeneralisations and oversimplifactions and language usually heard in the sandbox. Perhaps I myself am also guilty of this, in which case I apologise.

But let's try and get some structure in here, shall we? What are the issues?

1. Increasing War Production
2. Adapting the "War Plan"
3. Fighting the War (and saying why which side would win)

Ad 1: Naturally if you increase war production, you must decrease civilian production. Labour was there, just take the women. The whole of the Wehrmacht never numbered more than 10-13 million at any time, and in 1941 it was even somewhere like 5-6 million I believe. Germany had over 80 million inhabitants with all the annexed territories, so the labour shortage is not as acute as thought before if we calculate in the use of women. I'm trying to play out a "best-case" solution first. That the Nazis wanted the wife standing in the kitchen and taking care of the children must be swept under the carpet for now. And who doesn't!
So even an increase in production without a significant (or shall we say threatening) decrease of civilian production would have been possible. This must be common sense, as Britain managed it as well.
Concerning resources - synthetic oil was made out of coal, I believe, and Germany had quite a sizable share of the world supply of that. A few more plants to create this (this IS a best-case scenario!!) and all fuel problems fly into the wind until a serious bombing campaign starts.

Ad 2: later

 

Germany did have a large share of synthetic oil but only because no one else had a need for it. Germany began producing synthetic oil in the thirties but at its highest production rate it only accounted for 3% of German oil consumption. Its a nice idea but very expensive and time consuming to produce and not really viable on any large enough scale to meet required needs, not to mention the wastage of large amouts of coal. It matters little how much stuff you build, what really matters is if you have the fuel to put in them.

 

Good point. So we really need to know whether or not Germany COULD cover its fuel needs with synthetic oil.

 

No chance. They would never have been able to make large enough quantities of synthetic oil to cover their wartime consumption. They could not make enough to cover peacetime consumption. It was only ever regarded before the war as a stop gap/ emergency supply. But if it had been researched further who knows where it could have led.

 

Agreed, Andreas. Back to some intelligent discussion! The logistics issue frustrates me, because I study it alot, whereas much historiography on ww2 seems only concerned with Rommel and Stanlingrad, etc etc,.

RedBaron is getting at my main idea here. Germany was way too dependent on synthetic oil. And as an aside, from what I've read (which is not defeinitive, so we could look for better info), the process of creating syntheitc oil from coal was inefficient and costly for the yield recieved.
But more to my point- RedBaron points out the difficulties Germany had with fuel, and I think he's right on- Germany BARELY had enough fuel throughout the war. THEN, combine this shortage with all the other resources needed for war. Tungsten- that was one that really hurt. Among other things, AP and FlaK ammunition require large amounts of Tungsten- amounts that germany had to import. Even more common (to us, anyway!) was copper- required for any electrical wiring and many other things realted to armaments. Germany also repeatedly, especially in 44, suffered from copper shortages. Molybendum- required for high grade steel, and VERY rare. Manganese- the list goes on and on. And germany had no consistent supply of any of the above.
And the main problem with all this is, ALL the resources like the above were necessary-wether in small or large quntities, all were needed. In some cases, germany was able to work around shortages. But quality often suffered. And there were shortages that could not be worked around- like fuel and steel.
Decreasing civilian production would have had some effect, but there still would have been the resource issue, because most civilian production did not utilize as many resources. Slowing Civilian production would have had some impact on some of the resources, like making more copper and rubber available. But the problems germany had with some of the more "exotic" resources would still have remained.
So, IMHO, any scenario relating to increased production for germany has major problems because of these resource shortages. I do think germany could have addressed the manpower and labor issues. But resources were another thing entirely.
So in essence, Anreas, using your post above- the problems inherent with #1 made #s 2 and 3 non-issues. Germany could not adequatley address a major aspect of #1 (resources), so increased production on a wide scale was not really possible.
One thing that could have effected this, and could make an interesting production-oriented discussion- what if germany had SHIFTED production areas? Say, more aircraft at the expense of armor? or vice versa?

and on the amatuers statement- that was mainly due to frustartion. Apologies! The idea there was not to seperate the two, but a complaint that logistics often gets ignored as part of strategy.

 

Good post and many good points. AFAIK, Poland is actually sitting on one of the largest copper deposits in the world, but apparently it wasn't yet discovered back then, because copper was a constant theme even in the OKW. "Discovering" this deposit in time might have helped!

In the early part of the war, would it have been possible to increase production by increasing the imports from the Soviet Union for example?

 

Andreas

As well as Polish Copper I think Hitler would have been far more interested in North Africa if he had known how much oil the Italians were sitting on in Libya. Germany did have the Austrian oil fields and progressive access to Rumania, but as for all the other rarities like Chrome, Tungsten, Manganese, Aluminium and Rubber had to come from somewhere.

Could the USSR have filled this shortfall? The question is would they have been willing to?

Jumbo

 

Good point, Andreas. I think the russians would have been perfectly happy to increase supplies to germany. The treaty signed by Hitler and Stalin in 38 (? 39? 40?- don't remember exact year) stipulated that russia provide germany with goods and resources. Considering how focused Stalin seemed to have been on appeasing germany, I'd think he would have OKed the extra resources. But again, this goes back to Hitler. Hitler didn't think that germany needed any extra resources at the time. It wasn't until germany attacked russia that germany's resources shortages became apparent, so it's kind of a catch-22. Germany could have gotten more resources from russia, but didn't need those resources but for attacking russia... (I think that makes sense )
Jumbo, I thought Hitler did know about the oil deposits in Libya and Egypt, and that that was one of the aims of the N. African campaign. Did they know about the oil?

 

That is true Crazy. As a matter of fact, Stalin did increase the shipments of resources to Germany when he was getting information (of which he refused to believe) of Germany's buildup along the border and her intent to invade. I think Stalin was hoping the increase would appease Hitler. He also did not believe even though he was being told by different sources of Hitler's intent.

 

Crazy

Well if Hitler knew about the Libyan oil he didn't tell the Italians! They were busy scuttling around East Africa looking for it in the 30's but ignored Libya. I don't think the Libyan reserves were tapped until the early 60's. Until that point the Libyan cash-crop was scrap metal from vehicles destroyed during the war in the desert.

The big sources of British oil were the gulf and Persia, especially through the old anglo-iranian oil company.

Jumbo