What if Herr Speer...

Friedrich,

For me the number of panzer divisions tends to make me shiver. I bet you know that the germans made more panzer divisions for the barbarossa but the number of tanks never increased in the same manner.So they were less equipped with tanks even called panzer dv. It´s not always good to do so.

wasn´t it Hitler´s last questions in the bunker: " What is Wenck´s 12th army doing? "...Quite a big army, to my knowledge it only existed on paper. An as ordered to attack the russians in late april (from the north of germany) Dietrich refused...

 

Crazy

Fuel is one area, and admittedly a pretty critical one. There would have to be a serious diplomatic offensive on Rumania to pressure her into supplying more oil earlier than she did. But there are other fields too. Germany had little or no experience of mass-production techniques. The USA, pioneered by Ford and supported by a vast internal market had this experience in depth. The USSR had invited in and widely copied the ideas of Ford (The Ford way is the Best way - a famous slogan) and was also prepared in depth. Britain and France were not tooled up in this way, although Britain had started it's factory reserve program in 1935, earmarking factories for conversion and what they were capable of.

One of the reasons the Germans could not match the Soviets was this lack of mass production experience, hindered by over-complex designs and a lack of standardisation. Later German tanks were accompanied by an army of engineers and mechanics to overcome the reliability issues (I'm not just talking about Panther Ausf A either).

Elsewhere in this thread reference have been made to bottlenecks in the system - Tungsten, Manganese, Chrome, Ball Bearings, Rubber etc. Necessity is the mother of invention. Without the pressures of the war would the later replacement sources be available so early on? Similarly producing more Pz IIIE and PzIVD by 1941 would not have provided any sort of technological leap: it would have been solely numerical.

Jumbo

 

Good point, Jumbo. German equipment was rarley designed with mass production in mind, and "overly-complicated" could in many cases be an understatement! (One thing does come to mind though- when the germans finally did come up with a machinegun aimed at mass production (the MG42), it went on to become one of the most feared weapons of the war...). But that is definetely an exception, not the rule. By the end of the war, germans were attempting to standardize some of their production, but it was too littel too late...

One the resources... There is one main problem with germany securing more resources early on. Many of the resources germany acquired that allowed for increased prodcution came from conquered terrirories. Poland supplied Manganese, Tungsten, and Rubber, France supplied rubber, molybendum, and tungsten. So on and so forth. So it's kind of a catch-22- germany needed more resources to prosecute a wider war, but the only war germany could secure resources for said war was by conquering territory. (I think that makes sense!)

Early increased production also could have backfired very seriously- until russia, the germans thought their equipment was the best. So if they had gone in 1939 and produced many more tanks and vehicles, this would have been only marginally beneficial. They would have rolled into russia with a greater number of ineffective tanks- not at all a benefit. It would have been easier to modernize the one that survived, but what's to say that more would have survived?

 

Something I just read on actual production orders in 1941.

Hitler ordered on 14.7 1941 as the barbarossa went well that production would be slowed down or in some cases stopped altogether! Only 50 mm cannon ( AT probably ) ammunition production was left as it was, otherwise artillery supply was brought down. Also the building of rocket launchers and some cannons was ended. The number of tanks beinb built was not changed, but not increased either.This meant that even the number of lost tanks could not be met.

The russians lost 9372 tanks ( about half of all )within the first five weeks of barbarossa, germans 994. This left the germans with 2273 tanks, most of which needed new engines. Hitler promised 300, which was just a drip in the ocean. many tanks were unused as they were waiting for a new engine...

This part was somewhat alarming: there were more men working on the jews question than the tank production lines (?). In 1942-1943 the percentage of jews in europe as dead-alive turned from 25%-75% to 75%-25%. A lot of man power went into this as well as skilled jews died, not to mention the humanity side of this, again!
But thinking in terms of productivity this was awful waste. I don´t know how much effect it had, but also as the Zyklon B was created ( 1942-43? ), there was less need for soldiers to kill jews and manpower was released to other duties. As well the main part of jews was killed by then already.

The cruel thing is that IBM had made the card files for the nazis by which the germans could do their job very efficiently with some kind of computer system...There is a book on it.

 

Just found the numbers on pz divisions for barbarossa.

Hitler ordered 20 Panzer divisions to be formed, and normally as they had 300 tanks, the number was ordered to drop to 196 tanks per division. Unfotunately this was not enough, as the number fell to 150/division in many cases.

 

And even more spesific numbers from the net for each pz division:

http://www.orbat.com/site/data/historical/germany/pzdivs062241.html

 

Good info, Kai. This goes further to show the problems germany had with resources and materials. Before even considering the question of increasing production, we would have to look at the german forces already in the field. Besides the low unit strengths, even further to the point is the numbers on "combat-ready" tanks. Out of these combat ready tanks, many were PzIs and IIs, which. although battle ready, were of limited value. And the ones that were not battle ready- it is very likely that, even at this early point in the war, resource problems and shortages were already hampering germany's armored and mechanized forces.

 

I always wonder on what such blatant statemets are based on.

I think it has much to do with the fact that Todt died in 1942 and Speer had all the time to write one memoir book by another to "create history"...

I don't want to spoil your statistics party, but...

...as the German historian Rolf-Dieter Mueller had proved, Speers so successful production statistics and his "production miracle" (Overy) was a based on, well, lies.

Especially for 1944.

(source: Kroene/Mueller/Umbreit: _Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereichs. Kriegsverwaltung, Wirtschaft und personelle Ressourcen 1942 - 1944/45_ in:
Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Vol. 5/2, 1999, pp.753)

Mueller's findings are supported by Hans Mommsen (_Der Mythos von der Modernität. Zur Entwicklung der Rüstungsindustrie im Dritten Reich_ in: Stuttgarter Vorträge zur Zeitgeschichte issue 3, 1999).

So be careful in trusting any of "his" numbers.

Cheers,

P.S.: Kudos to CrazyD88, you've got it right, man.

[ 23 August 2002, 06:06 PM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

And I always wonder where those stupid uppish comments come from...

Whichever the numbers are. (We have discussed them quite a lot around here) It is obvious that Albert Speer did quite impressive achievements in 1944, he raised the production and took it to unprecedent levels, even with a shortage on the resources and the allied bombings. Todt did not have those awful conditions and did not do it that well. Abd perhaps the "total war" policy might influence this a bit, but not entirely.

 

Thanks, Andy...

I'd sort of think that any discussion of Speer VS. Todt would be academic because of the time frame. As Andy notes, Todt died in 1942... at that point the war was still going relatively well for the germans. But by the time Speer's services were really needed, german was in very bad shape. Thus, anything Speer was able to accomplish was held in much higher regard than Todt. We would really need to put the two in a similar situation for the comparison to work.

Andy, I do wonder about your sources on Speer (I love it when someone cites their sources!). What aspects of Speer's work do they cast doubt on? All of my sources note very high production numbers for germany in 1944. ADmittedly, some of this came from the move to a war economy. But I would think that Speer does deserve some reasonable credit. He came up with the idea (or, essentailly, the "reaction") to spread out germany's manufacturing, protecting from air raids somewhat. I don't have any info offhand, but I do get the idea that he helped the armamanets industry a bit...
Andy, I'd really be inetersted in more from those sources...

 

And I always wonder where those stupid uppish comments come from...
</font>[/QUOTE]I wonder if you ever will post some evidence to prove that Speer was "far more capable" than Speer, or that "'total war' policy might influence this [raise in production, A.W:] a bit", etc.

Fact is that Todt WAS NOT ALLOWED to put the German economy on war footing until the winter disaster 1941/42. Once Hitler realized that the times of "blitzkrieg" is over and that this will be a long war (Hitler's Order re: "Armament 1942" issued Jan. 10, 1942), Todt immediately made substantial organizational changes (much to the disfavour of Goerings Ministry of four-year-plan) to get Germany on war footing. Todt died on Feb. 8, 1942 in a plane crash: Are you seriously blaming him for not showing a better performance in one month compared to Speer who had 39 months?

BTW, Speers economic and organisational conception in spring 1942 was exactely based on what Todt installed started in Jan. 1942.

Saying that Todt was "less capable" than Speer is like saying that FRG's minister and "godfather" of Economy, Ludwig Erhard in 1963 was "less capable" (1963's German GNP was EUR 184 B) than Kurt Schmücker in 1965 (German GNP under "his" rule: EUR 234 B)

Source: A.S. Milward. "Fritz Todt als Minister für Bewaffnung und Munition" (Fritz Todt as Reichs minister of Armament and Ammunition) in: VfZ 1966 pp.54

Cheers,

 

@ CrazyD88

Of course Speer was not a complete moron, in fact he was a pretty good minister for Armament and Ammunition.

But it's simply wrong to assume that ANY invention and progess made under his time was just HIS idea and achievement...as said above, others (namely Todt and Thomas) had the same ideas of "Total War", "economic mobilization", of mass production and rationalization, but they wren't as close buddies of Hitler as Speer was, so they were never able to convince Hitler that Goering wasn't that capable for his job.

It's Speers major achievment to convince Hitler that Goering and his 4-year-ministry was a major "showstopper". Hitler had a deep trust in Speer, unlike to most others.

WRT to Speer falsifying numbers; this has been proven at least for the 1944 statistics (see my post above), so the consequence is that you just can't trust his numbers, but you need to cross-check them with other statistics to know if they are really true.

Cheers,

[ 26 August 2002, 12:46 PM: Message edited by: AndyW ]

 

(I hear you on the source thing, Andy- I'd rather post from home when I can cite sources, but...)

On the numbers, Andy, certainly- I was not using Speers numbers, but numbers from other sources. And one other minor detail on the AFV production that often gets overlooked- the AFVs being produced in late 43-45 were generally MUCH heavier than earlier ones, thus requiring much more steel and resources.

I was not claiming that Speer was responsible for ALL the improvements and ideas during his tenure; by the same token, you can't say he was responsible for NONE of them. I haven't read anywhere near enough about Speer, but I would think that Hitler's trust in him would account for one major advantage he had over Todt. With Hitler's trust, Speer could accomplish some things faster tahn the usual beurocracy.
But again, you are correct on the time period issue... it's really impossible to compare Speer and Todt...

 

Well, I have just bought a book about weaponry and war economy, so I'll come with something and you'll see.

 

Yes, always heard of organisation Todt but didn´t know much of the man. So I read what is said in the net.

I do think comparing the two, Speer and Todt, is useless. Both were very good at what they did. Actually for Todt the creating of Autobahn, Siegfried line and West wall were professional duties, as Speer had to trust his instincts as he was an architect, and had to come up with problem solving spontaneously.Of course he had made this "kind" of thing with buildings in Berlin and Munchen etc but otherwise his knowledge of industry was quite minimal at the time and accepting the job in 1942 sounds quite disastrous to begin with.By crushing the bureacracy and getting more people ( slaves etc ) to work, creating mass production sites he got it working. They both were dedicated and gifted but it seems also totally different kind of people.
There´s no question that Fritz Todt was a great man. The Autobahn etc prove that.If the possibility was given he would have brought the German industry to mass production. Also Speer with his planning in Berlin alone made him huge, not mentioning what he did with the production in 1944.I think the latter being more of a miracle than it would have been by Todt. Yet there´s more to it...

Here´s some sites you might want to look into:

Todt speaking in 1936 about Autobahn ( what a dedication for Fuhrer! )

http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/pt36todt.htm

Westwall:

http://web.ukonline.co.uk/gaz/hist.html

The political system of nazi Germany ( very heavy reading...)

http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/germany/lectures/29nazipolitics.html

Some stuff on underground facilities and plans

http://www.tighar.org/TTracks/11_4/OpSep.html

Albert Speer: pics etc

http://albertspeer.tripod.com/

http://www.dataphone.se/~ms/speer/story.htm

Fritz Todt grave:

http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=pif&GRid=11377&PIgrid=11377&PIcrid=639179&

In some articles ( above and later on I´ll include more here, which I have printed for myself only ) it is said that Todt was convinced during the winter 1941-1942 that Germany could not fight Russia longer, and that the production was too small to keep it goin on.He told Hitler that they should end the war in the east. After this meeting he was returning on the Ju 52 that exploded as it was landing (?). Speer was supposed to be going on the same plane but didn´t make it... (??)
Todt was dedicated but did he lose his faith in the wrong place or is it just a coincidence? I found only these scraps of info so if possible I would like to hear more of the accident that killed Todt.
During the 30´s and later on Hitler and Speer had long talks on Berlin and its architecture and they were very close. So the decision to appoint him to replace Todt was not a strange thing. And as he was a close friend of Hitler´s he could make changes that were required to create mass production. Later on Speer even stopped Hitler´s orders of destroying German cities as he was preparing for the time after Hitler. And Speer got away with it.

 

Good stuff, Kai. I'm also very curoius about this Todt death thing. I really haven't read much at all about Todt and Speer, other than as they relate to production. That plane accident thing does sound fishy...

 

Nice sites, Kai, as always!

 

Now, this is not true.

Todt told Hitler on November 29, 1941, that the "war is already lost from a military and armament point of view". His plane crashed at Februray 8, 1942.

(K.H Ludwig: _Die deutschen Flakraketen im Zweiten Weltkrieg_ (German AA-misseles in WW II), in: MGM 1969 H.1. p.89 and J. Thorwald: _Die ungeklärten Fälle_ (Unclear cases),1950, pp129-150)

Hope this helps.

Cheers,

 

Concerning on Todt´s businesses during the time in 1942 the articles are very vague, some pointing out that he had promised a 55% increase on production during 1942...Then again he was telling Hitler to end war or something like that. In some articles it is said that he flew with Ju 52, in some He 111. Some claim the plane exploded during take off, in the air close to the meeting place , some say in the landing phase. What to believe? Definitely a mysterious death so far if " the plane exploded "? Have you got articles on this Andy?

Somebody had the Speers book inside the Reich. I have one in Swedish, and I´ll have a look at it in a couple of days time. Maybe some answers will be found.At least I hope to find some story on the plane´s accident, why Speer did not enter the plane and the first reactions to taking Todt´s place.

Hitler seemed to have been shocked by Todt´s death, as he made a huge speech during the burial ceremony. Then again he might have thought it was a sacrifice for the Reich, or even better, for Him, if Todt ever made Hitler´s ideas questionable. Thinking of it that way would have made Hitler very emotional anayway during the speech. OK, just playing with thoughts but after the " night of the long knives" everything could be expected , I think. Even Rommel was not big enough to escape the butchery.

 

Here´s some things from " The Panther tank " by
Dr Matthew Hughes and Dr Chris Mann.

Up to 1943 Britain outproduced Germany and her European empire in almost all major weapon systems, despite Britain´s far smaller economy. Moreover, the German economy had been the one most prepared for war. By the summer of 1941 considerably more than half of the German workforce was involved in military production. It was higher that Britain in 1941 and higher than the US throughout the war. Yet German industrial output remained stable. Armamnet output in 1941 was little more than it had been in 1939. The reasons are complex and unclear.To quote Richard Overy:

" There was no straight line of command between Fuhrer and the factory. In between lay a web of ministries,plenipotentiaries and Party commissars, each with their own apparatus, interests and rubber stamps, producing more thna the usual weight of bureacratic inertia.At the end of the line was a business community, most of whom remained wedded to entrepreneurial independence, and resented the jumbled administration, the corrupt nazi Party hacks, the endless form-filling, which stifled what voluntary efforts might have made to transform the war economy."

The Germans also struggled with mass production. Their armed forces preferred working with smaller firms and skilled craftsmen, sensitive to frequent design changes and producing sophisticated specialised weapons. Their industrial economy had always been good for high quality, skilled workmanship and technical advances, all demanding time and material. Technical sophistication was preferred to quantity.
The Panther is a case in point.The layout of MNH plant in Hannover resolutely ignored the mass production methods pioneered in the US. The tanks were not built on a Ford-style production line as preferred in the US and Soviet Union, where each worker was assigned a limited, repetitive task.At Hannover the Panthers were moved from station to station and at each station, a spesific task was performed.It ensured high quuality but did little to speed production.

Hitler recognised the problem abd wanted "more primitive, robust construction".Speer established a central planning board and rationalised armament production.He closed down small firms, redistributed skilled labour, and decided the allocation and distribution of raw materials and machinery on a national level. He set up a system of committees for major weapons which were responsible for all the firms producing a particular weapon type. These committees planned and supervised all military production, resulting in large improvements in efficiency, coordiantion and central control.
Perhaps most importantly, he managed to reduce the role of the military in the war economy and limit their interference in production.Factories had been forced to respond to countless demands for changes in design and spesification.The military also set production schedules, although they rarely consulted the industrialists and engineers.While this produced some excellent weapons, the constant tinkering and design changes slowed production.Hitler noted that his industrialists were always complaining about this niggardly procedure-today an order for ten Howitzers, tomorrow for two mortars and so on.
Speer brought in industrial engineers so that production could be run by those who knew something about it.This paid considerable dividends.