What if...the Japanese had landed troops in Hawai'i immediately after bombing Pearl?

It is true that horses can become "sea-sick", but they cannot vomit due to their physiological construction, this is because of a tight muscle valve around the esophagus. However, they develop an illness which mimics, but is NOT colic which can be fatal, it is simply a "nausea" which can be easily treated with hyoscine (which has been around since 1880) before departure or while at sea.

The biggest problem with transporting horses by sea is that they become stressed when confined to dark enclosed spaces, and can lash out at their fellow equines, their handlers, or even the sides of the ship in which they are being transported. This is why "horse killers" were often aboard ship, not to put down those who became "sea-sick", but to eliminate those who had gotten so stressed out they were a danger to themselves and others.

I don’t know the breed of horse the Japanese used as draft animals during WW2, but the largest of their local breeds like the Hokkaido were tall for Japanese breeds, at the shoulder, 13-13.5 hands, and believe me that is short for a true horse (a hand is 4"). Because of this "smallish trait" (less than 13 hands) of indigenous Japanese equines, the authorities discouraged breeding purebred Kiso, Hokkaido, Tokara, and Miyako breeds and encouraged a crossbreeding program between the them and larger western horses. During the pre-WW2 period (1939) a government program was even administered for the purpose of castrating all purebred Kiso males. And until then the Kiso had been prized for their use as military horses as they seemed fearless in battle, but were not good as draft animals. An even smaller pony, the Yonaguni was found in the south, but surely not used as or for military draft animals.

That cross breeding policy nearly eliminated "pure-blood" Japanese horses, like the Miyako breed. It, like the Hokkaido breed were short, not ponies, but smallish horses. During WW2 they were crossed with larger imported stallions to increase their size to around 14 hands for draft purposes. There was another indigenous draft horse, the Taishuh but I don’t know how common they were in the WW2 period, since very few survive today with a few sperm and ova in "cold storage" at the Animal Husbandry Center in Hokkaido.

 

All too true on all counts, but the very fact that the horses would have been penned up in closed, dark holds for nearly a month aboard ship would disqualify them from any heavy lifting duties for the invasion, because their muscles would have atrophied, they would still be drugged-up and a large number of them would still be extremely sick or already dead.

 

There is the problem, not sea-sickness exactly, but atrophied muscle, and either stressed out, or doped up beyond use. I wonder how long it takes a horse, if he/she survives the trip, to get his/her "land legs" back after said sea voyage?

 

Back in the day, it took a number of weeks for a horse to completely recover from a long ocean voyage. This was a major reason that the British Army didn't send any large numbers of badly needed cavalry regiments to the American Colonies during the Revolutionary War, as they could rely on losing a prohibitively large number of horses during the long sea voyage.

 

But they made the run in toward Hawaii at a considerably fast speed. And even 14 knots is more than most cargo ships can handle. "ILW"?

Was he? I thought he was ordered to abort the mission if discovered. The northern Pacific was not completely empty. They did choose that route because it was the least likely to be discovered but it was not empty.

I do. Let's look at this in a bit more detail.

1) Not only does the battle fleet put to see but most of the rest of the navy as well as a huge transport fleet. Most of the latter of which are not usually needed for gunnery training.
2) It's a time or rather severe stress on the diplomatic front. People are expecting the Japanese to do something.
3) Is radio silence typical for gunnery practice? If not then the there are going to have to be a lot of ships out there sending messages. However
radio intercept types were pretty good at identifying what ships the messages came from at that point in time so trying to mimic that many individual ships is going to be problematic.

 

Gents,

I'm back from a Sunday of riverine warfare. The final tally was Robert 3 / Trout 0. Although I was nearly wounded by a "skunky" old beer. Fortunately, I had several pre-chilled replacements "in the line". Ya gotta love planning.

First though, a question. I note that no one has yet responded to my posting #37 here, "What events, in your opinions, would cause General Short to surrender Oahu ?"

Perhaps none of you are reading my postings ? That certainly seems to be the case for one or two of you wrt my landing plans.

Or, am I not allowed to ask questions here for some reason ?

I'll attempt to reply to your individual postings over the course of the day.

I had no idea that there were so many horse lovers hanging out here ?

Horses can follow narrow and steep mountain footpaths such as found on Oahu while trucks, don't do nearly so well there.
Horses aren't totally silent but they are much quieter than running truck engines.
Horses can graze on the local vegetation while trucks, can't.
You can always eat a still dizzy horse if you have to while that doesn't work nearly so well with a truck.
Horses will unload themselves by swimming ashore on their own. Japanese trucks, well known for being stubborn that way, just plain refuse to do so. Period. Ever. Even if you bodily drop them over the side of the ship.
Without going too deeply into it, the JSNLF "patrol boats" are far too small to be horse transports and those troops don't need horses anyway. The three regiments of the 7th IJA Infantry Division do need a few horses to pull thier 6 organic AT guns and another 6 organic 76mm field guns but at 20 knots, each of the three BIG Asama Maru class cargo-liners will cover the 3,400 miles between Yokahama and Honolulu in just 7 days. After some 9 years of landing horses on the China coast, I'd think the IJA to be somehow familiar enough with horses in war to be able to regularly exercise a few for that minimal 7 day passage time. Thet weren't complete idiots, afterall.


I'd also like to take this opportunity to apologize for the way in which my Invasion Oahu is being presented here. It has grown into a hypothetical plan of monsterous size and complexity, yet we jump "here, there and everywhere" all thru it, as questions come up one by one. All without even an overall rough outline being presented to you all to aid in keeping it all sorted out. My problem being that I am just one person with only a very few spare hours per day available to respond to all of your postings. I am also hampered by a lack of computer graphics skills, otherwise I could present a map or two which might help you all considerably.

I make no promises as to when anything useful will arrive here but I will make attempts in both categories.

 

lwd responded with,

But they made the run in toward Hawaii at a considerably fast speed. And even 14 knots is more than most cargo ships can handle. "ILW"?

My first landing wave (1LW, not ILW, although that could work too as short for "Initial Landing Wave") arrives in 9 vessels each capable of 20+ knots.

Certainly, once surprise is no longer so vital, follow-on IJA troops for successive night's landing waves (2LW, 3LW and so on) will arrive off of Oahu after the Dec.6-7'41 groups, even though they left before, since they would be slower.

Was he? I thought he was ordered to abort the mission if discovered.

Only if "discovered" (which, in my ATL, I define as, discovered and reported because Yamamoto couldn't sink the discoveror before a radio mesage was sent out) more than 3 days out from Oahu.

Please don't forget that the OTL KB had 3 IJN submarines scout out some 60 miles ahead so that any potential discovering ship could be avoided instead and that in my ATL, the pre-approved cargo-liner Tatuta Maru would also be out ahead as a scout, leading the invasion towards Oahu.

In the OTL, Nagumo had the choise of returning to Japan if "discovered" two days out from Oahu but was historically ordered to attack anyway if reported only one day offshore.

Having an ATL Yamamoto along, in command, makes order alterations so much quicker and easier.

The northern Pacific was not completely empty.

There were indeed some American cargo vessels and a Yankee tanker or two running "lend/lease" thru Alaskan waters to the Russians in Vladivostock but they were never anywhere near Hawaiin waters.

They did choose that route because it was the least likely to be discovered but it was not empty.

Save for albatross and whales, for all practical Oahu attack purposes, I believe that it was. If you have a sourced list to the contrary, please present it to us all here for further investigation and lively, spirited discussion.

1) Not only does the battle fleet put to see but most of the rest of the navy as well as a huge transport fleet. Most of the latter of which are not usually needed for gunnery training.

As per the OTL, most of that ATL Japanese shipping is clearly heading south for Mindanao, Malaya and Thailand.

The Combined Fleet battleships taking gunnery practise in the (more southerly) Bonins is entirely in line with the Japanese habit of providing "distant support" for any of their naval ventures that might run into unexpected trouble. As per the OTL, I do still assign two IJN BBs to move much further south as a counter to the historical Force Z British BB moves between the Indian Ocean and Singapore.

2) It's a time or rather severe stress on the diplomatic front. People are expecting the Japanese to do something.

As per the OTL, my Japanese are indeed still openly moving large formations towards Mindanao, Malaya and Thailand. What other "something" would you prefer that they do as a realistic distraction cover for the invasion of Hawaii ?

3) Is radio silence typical for gunnery practice? If not then the there are going to have to be a lot of ships out there sending messages. However radio intercept types were pretty good at identifying what ships the messages came from at that point in time so trying to mimic that many individual ships is going to be problematic.

I don't believe that I have ever typed "radio silence" wrt faked CF gunnery practise in the Bonins. The term "radio deception techniques" was used IIRC. As per what Nagumo's Kido BUtai historically did. They left their regular radio operators behind in Japan, with orders to send fake radio messages daily that would make it seem like the IJN's biggest carriers were still in Japanese home waters. My ATL CF would do similar by sending the regular BB radio operators by ship to the Bonins from where they would transmitt truely inpressive BB gunnery scores back to Tokyo AND to the evesdropping Americans/British.

 

You mean here:

Fort Hase
(Marine Corps Base Hawaii - Kane'ohe Bay)
(1918 - 1948/present), Mokapu
Originally known as Kuwaahoe Military Reservation and then Camp Ulupau until 1942. Occupied the eastern portion of the Mokapu Peninsula. ..... Battery Kuwaahoe two 240mm howitzers (1927 - 1941) was also on Ulupau Head (foot of west rim, site destroyed in 1992). There was also East Beach Battery (1941 - 1942) four mobile guns in Ulupau Crater (two guns sent to Wailea Point), replaced by Battery East, and ....

( Hawaii Forts: page 3 )

I am thinking a single ship would not stand a chance to land very many troops. Even any troops that made it to shore would have a tough time defeating the ringed defense of the Island. The North Shore consists of Beach area and High Ground.........the US controlled them all

There is no way that a Japanese BB is going to get close enough to Oahu to make that attack. As soon as a Japanese BB came within 100 miles of Hawaii the US Navy would have sortied and run the IJN out of the area.

Again I am going to refer you to :
( Hawaii Forts: page 3 )

You will find interesting that there were already field pieces in place all along the North Shore............many on railway carriages.

You need to realize that the propaganda of "America at Sleep" just prior to WW2 was manufactured to gain support for FDR declaring war. "From Here To Eternity" is not an accurate depiction of American forces in Hawaii prior to 7 Dec. 1941. The US had already began to establish a more "realistic posture" and were something more than "sleeping" in 1941.

There were 2 US Army Infantry Divisions and 1 Marine Brigade in Hawaii prior to the attack.

( The Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941 - United States Army, Pacific )

President Roosevelt: "The Island of Oahu, due to its fortification, its garrison, and its physical characteristics, is believed to be the strongest fortress in the world."

Because that is the "Fun" of the "What If" threads. You get to pour your heart and soul into creating a situation that everyone else gets to refute and debunk (i.e. tear apart).

You provided an outstanding argument that was as well thought out as it was presented.

Kudos to you.

Brad

 

After spending weeks aboard ship, those horses will barely be able to walk, let alone swim. You can torture them all you want, but sick horses with atrophied muscles won't respond like Secretariat running in the Kentucky Derby. They will simply collapse and die. The US Army tried a like-minded manuever during the Spanish-American War, during the Invasion of Cuba, where they threw their horses over the side of the transports, expecting them to swim to shore. A very large percentage of the horses drowned, or started swimming back towards Florida where they too drowned. Even eating those drugged horses could make your own troops sick.

The horses that do make it to shore will need weeks of rehabilitation before they will be capable of any work.

 

John, it seems that while you were composing a reply for !0:48am I was editing at 10:33am. As per my slightly altered message, the Japanese horses would only be on-board my 3 big cargo-liners for some 7 days, not for weeks.

I believe that you exaggerate the consequences.

In any case, we do know that the IJA used more horses during the Pacifc War than they did trucks, and still somehow managed to beach land on and capture island after island from their Allied defenders for the first 6 months. It seems to me that the IJA well knew how to take care of it's horseflesh.

 

How does one avoid the US Coast Guard offshore patrol, not to mention the hundreds of fishing boats that ply their trade in the waters surrounding Oahu, both day and night? I'm sure that a number of those boats had radios to communicate with the shore.

 

I do not exaggerate the consequences. The aforementioned massed horse drownings did occur during the Spanish American War and this was after only a day or two at sea, in the time that it takes to sail the 90 miles between Tampa and Cuba. The IJA might have used more horses than trucks in the Pacific War, but they didn't use them right after being unloaded from a ship. They would need days to recover from the voyage.

 

When looking at the possibilities of the Japanese Landing an invasion force on 7 December, one must keep in mind the logistics of the situation. At the start of hostilities Japan pressed much of its merchant fleet into service to support its conquests and transport the troops needed. Oil was the number one resource Japan needed most but also needed rubber and tin. 11 Divisions were earmarked for various planned invasions of Malaya, NEI, Philippines, Hong Kong etc. Japan’s merchant capabilities of the time necessitated that one or more of these planned invasions could not be completed along with an invasion of Hawaii. Japan not only needed the natural resources which compelled them south historically, but needed them as fast as possible. To make an invasion of Oahu even remotely possible, Japan has to give up some of the other invasions. The most likely candidates for this would be to cancel the invasion of Malaya with the 25th Army, and possibly Hong Kong by the 38th Division. This would give Japan 5 divisions to land in Oahu.

The next problem to overcome is where and when to land. Any landing made by the Japanese after the morning air strikes have occurred will meet heavy resistance on the beaches. Any aircraft still capable of flying will be on hand to torment the invasion force, as well as any and all ships still capable of leaving port. Airfields would undoubtedly have been the primary targets of the landing. Odds are that the Japanese will break up the invasion, making no less than three separate landings around the island, none of them supported by the other. Waiting until after the air attack would also mean that Japanese landing ships are waiting just over the horizon on 7 December. Being that close to shore almost guarantees that the US recon flights spot the force long before the carrier aircraft arrive. Landing at night would give a slight edge of surprise to the Japanese but also negates any effects on aircraft the raid has. Knowing of a landing force just off shore the AF and Navy would be ready to pounce at first light.

IMHO no invasion of Hawaii could hope to be accomplished in less than three weeks. The carriers were unable to stay indefinitely to provide air cover for any invasion. On the return trip from the raid two of the carriers were diverted to assist in the second invasion of Wake Island. Nagumo protested stating that the carriers had insufficient fuel for the air wings. One could argue that the oil in Hawaii would be more than enough for six carriers, but they would be unable to draw from the stores until after they have been captured and are relatively safe from air or naval attack. This would only occur after Oahu has been neutralized. The Japanese fleet would have been forced to retreat after maybe a week off the shores of Hawaii. Even a week is giving a lot of leeway to the Japanese. With no air cover or fleet support for the forces on land the US begins to hack away at the Japanese left behind.

Such spirited defenses of US forces on Wake and the Philippines leaves me every reason to believe that shortly after any landing, the US forces would regroup and toss the invaders back into the sea. Such a defeat would have crushed Japan on day one.

 

Myself, I think that Japan could have landed perhaps 4-500 marines somewhere in the islands and perhaps led a suicide raid to utterly destroy Pearl harbor, this would have been much more effective then a long land battle and im sure the convoy ships needed to support a garrison (If they won) could have been better used in the pacific.

If they succeeded in destroying most of pearl and the grisly ship hulls pockmarked the bottom of the port then it would have set back the USA at least 1 year in starting a pacific campaign.

 

A couple things to ponder;

1) Hawaii is small enough to defend in depth yet large enough to maneuver. That makes for an extremely hard "nut" to crack.
2) The Japanese forces will essentially be light infantry with none of the specialized engineers and eqmt needed to neutralize heavily defended positions.
3) The IJN carriers are "raiding" forces that dont have the capabilities to remain for long off of Hawaii. With the US carriers not being at Pearl, and with attrition of their dive and torpedo bombers, the Japanese will not be able to provide or support their invasion with air support.
4) Just how many of their transports will be needed to haul their "Daihastu's" at the expense of other needed supplies? Are we going to see more and more transports being taken away from other area's?
5) Just how are the Japanese going to support their troops if they get a toehold and find the going to be really slow? Are more transports going to be assigned here at the expense of other area's?

 

Unfortunately for the Japanese there were no undefended beaches on Oahu in December, 1941. The northern, western, and southern beaches had to be rules out due to the winter surf conditions; that left only the southern beaches around Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. These were some of the most heavily defended beaches in the world at that time. And don't tell us that everyone was on leave that night; it just wasn't the case. Any Japanese invasion force coming to anchor off thse beaches would have taken several hours to launch the landing craft, load the troops and combat cargo, and get to the beach. They would have been observed and a major portion of the troops assigned to defend those beaches would have been able to get into position to do so. Your fantasy of a completely unopposed landing is nothing more than that.

Well, no, the point is they didn't win. They were slaughtered and repulsed until the British and americans withdrew. The defenders of Oahu wouldn't have withdrawn because they had no where to withdraw to. Furthermore, the Oahu defenses were far stronger than any on the Malaysian coast or those on the beaches of Corregidor.

I suppose you think the Japanese were just on dinner cruise the first time around at Wake?

The reason no landing attempt was made the first time at Wake is because the defense was too good, not because the Japanese didn't INTEND to attempt a landing. Your logic is sophistry and you know it.

Yes, it was. And it's precisely because they were smart enough to attack where the defenses were weakest, that they won't even attempt a landing where the defenses are the strongest; you have never explained why, or how, the Japanese IGHQ would ever be dumb enough to approve an invasion of Oahu.

Hmmm, I suppose that somehow the Japanese wouldn't be low on food, ammo, air support, and radio sets this one time? That was they way they always planned invasions, on a shoestring. You even admitted that in one of your posts. Yet you want us to believe that this one time, when they were facing the same well prepared defenses and determined troops, something would somehow be different. That somehow, this one time, because it's your brilliant idea, an idea the Japanese staff planners were incapable of conceiving, things would turn out in their favor? Sorry, but it's not in the cards.

The Marines were Supermen? Hardly, but even you have to admit they seldom lost and never went down without one helluva fight.

Except that historically, that wasn't the case. Oahu was the most heavily defended island in the Pacific at that time. Even more heavily defended than Okinawa was in 1944. If anything, Japanese intelligence would have indicated that the Oahu defenses were impenetrable, and the Japanese IGHQ reccommnedation would have been to avoid a battle there at all costs. There is no way the IJA would have agreed to commit troops to such a hopeless invasion.

What you don't understand, and the Japanese never realized, is that attacking American territory, and threatening American interests was NOT the way to intimidate the American public, nor induce them to demand negotiations. The only hope, slim though it was, the Japanese ever had of limiting the war was to appear, as much as possible, non-threatening to American interests. Attacking Pearl Harbor was the dumbest thing they could have done, and was completely unnecessary to their strategy. Invading Oahu would have simply compounded their mistake, and made the US an even more implacable enemy, if that was possible.

 

First, what authority confirms the above figures?

Second, were all of these transports available in time to participate in a landing on December 7th? For example, the Japanese didn't make their main landings at Lingayan Gulf until December 21st. And it's well known that the Japanese had their logistical shipping on a very tight schedule during the first three months of the war; transports would participate in one landing then be rushed to some port to load for another. So what was the schedule for each Japanese ship? Just skipping the landings on Luzon doesn't prove the vessels were available for some operation that might take a month of more at Oahu.

My research indicates that these passenger vessels were, in fact, requisitioned for conversion to troop transports and were, upon the outbreak of war, either undergoing such conversion or were already in service as Army transports. The latter situation would indicate that the IJA was actively using them as part of it's logistical shipping pool and that they were involved in the landings in the southwest Pacific. Can you prove this was not the case?

Awaiting confirmation that these vessels were in fact not in use in other operations.

Awaiting confirmation that these vessels had completed conversion to troop transports and were not committed to other operations.

What authority confirms these dispositions? Garzke?

As for the Yamato, the Japanese did make her completion a matter of utmost priority from July 1941 on. In fact, her crew was not considered sufficiently trained to serve in the Combined Fleet until April, 1942, despite the urgency of war time commitments.

Whether or not you agree, my skepticism stands until you can cite authorities confirming the availability of the tonnage you claim.

Your "homework" is incomplete. You need to resolve the incompatibility of both the assault landing, which must take place in conditions of complete darkness, and the air attack which has to occur in day light. Both events require tactical surprise; so which one takes place first, and which one foregos the required "tactical surpirise"?

Yes, but that doesn't answer how you achieve it twice; once for the assault landing, and a second time for the air attack.

Yes, my opinion, as well as that of virtually every military analyst who has ever commented on the issue.

Well, there is a problem with timing. The Yamato isn't going to be available no matter how much alien intervention you invoke. The eight Japanese battleships might just be able to neutralize the eight American battleships at Pearl Harbor, althought that's very doubtful given the fighting power of each.

But the point is, a naval battle fought to neutralize the American naval forces has to take place PRIOR to any invasion and that sort of compromises your plan for tactical surprise by the invasions forces.

Yes, but you forget, the landing has to take place BEFORE dawn and the air attack can't wreak the havoc you imagine until AFTER dawn. So at first light, when your intrepid assault troops are approaching the beaches, they're going to have to endure strafing and bombing by those aircraft that HAVEN'T been destroyed by the air attack or the Combined Fleet battleships who have miracaculaously survived the sea battle. Jeez! what is it that you don't understand about the process of an invasion?

You can't launch an air attack simultaneously with a pre-dawn landing; either the landing will compromise the air attack, or the air attack will put the beach defenses on alert, thus compromising the landing. As I said previously, you only get to achieve tactical surprise ONCE on the same objective.

The IJN had no capability to provide pin-point barbardment of shore targets; it would have resorted to an area bombardment of Oahu, just like the USN did at Tarawa in 1943, only Oahu presented a much bigger area. And because the invasion was scheduled to occur BEFORE dawn, the bombardment would be in the dark, literally, with no aircraft spotting taking place, This is a very ineffective way to counter ground troops, especially at the limits of the IJN's gun range. And the IJN still would have to deal with the American naval forces at Pearl Harbor; they are going to be very busy, providing shore bombardment and fighting a major engagement at the same time.

By the time, the Japanese troops can land on the beaches, the American troops will be able to get into position to oppose them; if you think this is going to be a cakewalk for the Japanese you are dead wrong.

What isn't obvious to you is that, if your troops land at night, it will be BEFORE any air attack can take place, which means at first light, your landing force will be subject to both air and naval attack. Not only that, but when the air attack by Nagumo's carrier planes does occur, it will be against a completely alerted defense that is already attacking the Japanese landing forces.

So you think you are going to be able to coordinate an invasion landing, a major sea battle, and an air attack, so that they all occur within minutes of each other, despite the fact that the invasion convoy will have to transit more than 100 miles of heavily trafficked waters, and the surface naval forces will have to proceed the invasion convoy and destroy the enemy naval units before the troop transports come within their range? All of this without radio communications, and avoiding active radar surveillance? All I can say is, GOOD LUCK!

What you are ignoring, from a practical standpoint, is the impossibility of convincing any sane military planners that something like this could ever work. There are just too many things that could, and would, go wrong for any military staff to accept the risks, no matter how desperate the alternatives.

Just out of curiosity, can you name a single division-sized assault landing where there were no delays, no errors of timing, and no events which were unforeseen? I can't think of a single one, and in fact, most had major departures from schedules for things like bombardments, landings, and air attacks. And in every single assault landing I have read about, there were mistakes and confusion which affected the outcome. Can yyou assure us that the Japanese will make no errors? I don't think so.

Oh, now THAT is going to make a big difference. You save, at best, maybe 30 minutes in the process of loading and launching the landing barges, and you run the risk of dumping some of your troops in the drink. The invasion transports are still going to be seen and heard anchoring. And you will still have to organize the assault waves which takes time. Worst case for the Americans, they will realize that something is happening off the beaches and the military will be alerted. That means at first light, planes armed with bombs, will be over the transports. That's not a good omen for a successful invasion. It alo means that your air attack will find fighters in the air and the AA batteries manned and ready. Of course that presupposes the naval battle isn't yet in full swing and the American naval units aren't at sea already, something that is highly unlikely.

No, I read that nonsense. You haven't proved the Japanese had three cargo liners capable of 20 knots.

Second, the Japanese had only one type of daihatsu barge in 1941; they didn't begin building variants until 1942 when they desperately needed them to run supplies between islands in the Pacific. And they didn't have all that many of them either; I believe they had only nine available for the initial Malaya landings and those nine were quickly destroyed by the Indian Brigade's anti-boat guns.

In any case your estimate of the Japanese capabilities for loading and unloading of the daihatsu barges is hopelessly optimistic, especially in the dark.

Not if you continue to use the best case scenarios for every thing the Japanese try to do, and the worst case scenario for everything the Americans attempt

Desperate times may call for desperate measures but even the most desperate of antagonists seldom resort to hopelessly suicidal means.

I have actually read your posts, and I really do find your relentlessly optimistic assessment of Japanese chances, and consistently pessimistic evaluation of American defensive measures to be amusing. You seem to think that everything will break in favor of the Japanese and that they will not make a single mistake nor encounter a single setback. Do you really believe that military plans ever go as anticipated?

You've been watching too many movies.

Silenced pistols? My God, that would sure guarantee that no one called the military authorities to ask if they knew any thing about the transports anchored off Waikiki, or the landing barges coming ashore near Diamondhead. And, of course, in one of your scenarios, the Japanese troops would unerringly find the right beach and land in exactly the spot assigned, and every American is asleep or drunk.

Do you really think, the IGHQ is going to risk the kind of resources required for an invasion of Oahu on the chance that some duty officer prefers to pretend that an informant is merely a drunk rather than cover his ass by sending someone to check out a suspcious report? I can assure you they won't.

Well, I have read your posts, and frankly, I consider that a waste of time. Obviously, this is some sort of hobby with you, but in the process of pursuing it, you've lost all sense of objectivity and reality.