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What if the Japanese strike at Hickham and Pearl Harbor succeded but the one at Clark failed?

Discussion in 'What If - Pacific and CBI' started by Falcon Jun, Oct 26, 2007.

  1. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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  2. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Interesting stuff posted on what happened at Clark. Thanks for referring these stuff. Lt. Jesus Villamor and his fellow Filipino pilots didn't down a single enemy aircraft but they did succeed in disrupting a bombing run using inferior planes.
     
  3. John Dudek

    John Dudek Member

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  4. JCFalkenbergIII

    JCFalkenbergIII Expert

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    I agree! Alot of information in over 500 pages LOL. And free is a very good price :).
     
  5. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Finally finished reading this. It answered a lot of questions I had. Thanks again, JC.
     
  6. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    It's been a few months since this thread have been active. After exchanging viewpoints with Devilsadvocate in another thread, his posts and the sites he shared made a bulb lit in my mind.
    What we concentrated on this thread was mainly in reaction to a Japanese attack on airfields in PI, specifically Clark Field. Now, what I am asking now is what if the Japanese attack on Clark was preempted by a US air attack on Japanese airfields on Formosa? Historically, Brereton had asked Macarthur's permission for an attack on Formosa but was turned down. But what if it had been approved?
    As the record show, Japanese aircraft were grounded and did not take off to attack Clark on schedule because of ground fog. So it's entirely possible for the US to catch the Japanese planes on the ground, just like what happened in Pearl and Clark historically. Of course, it's also entirely possible that the B-17's will not be able to bomb anything if by the time they arrived at Formosa the fog is still there.
    Also another question, are the 35 B-17s in Clark capable of putting a dent on the grounded Japanese aircraft in Formosa if Brereton's plan had been approved?
     
  7. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    In theory they could do a lot of damage. The variables are:

    A. How well trained were the US pilots and bombardiers?

    B. Were the Japanese planes dispersed or concentrated?

    C. Would the US have suprise?

    D. How deep was the fog. Often a ground fog can be dense enough at the surface to prevent visual take off or landing, but it is shallow enough that the ground can be seen from overhead.

    While we assume the Japanese aircraft would be ordinarily be dispersed we dont know if it was necessary to bring them to a single airfield for this mission, to provide the bombs or other technical reasons. In the case of the US the bombers had been concentrated at Clarks Field first because thats where the bombs were stored. Second because they had been aloft earlier that morning due to the belief the Japanese would attack at dawn. After several hours orbiting the island they were brought down at Clarks Field for refueling. There were susposed to be fighters aloft on patrol, but they were also low on fuel at the critical hour. There was also a breakdown in the command communications, so fighters were not scrambled when the radar crew reported incoming aircraft.

    While the Japanese had more operational experince than the US it is not impossible they could have made some miscalculations and been caught by suprise themselves. Then again the US bombers may have scattered the bulk of their bombs on empty airfields, or missed the enemy aircraft, or failed to locate the airfields due to fog or navigation errors, or been disrupted by fighters.
     
  8. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Hmmm, so the fog may hamper visibility on the ground but not from the air... that means it's within the realm of possibility that the Japanese planes could be caught on the ground. Thanks, Carl.
    Would the U.S. have surprise in Formosa if the strike was approved? I think this is possible because Japanese planes would've been grounded by the fog. ON the other hand, the attacking US planes could be spotted by Japanese ships at sea.

    I think I need to look into where exactly in Formosa (Taiwan) the Japanese strike came from and compare this with Brereton's proposed attack plan.
    Does anyone here have details of Brereton's plan on Formosa? I ask so that I can a starting point on where to look.
     
  9. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    You may not find it actually in the publsihed books, but those would be the place to start. Look in the bibliographys and there will be some clues in the sources those historians drew from. I'd start with John Costellos 'the Pacific War 1941-1945'. It is comprehensive, and recent. He also has a detailed chapter on the fiasco in the Phillpines air defense.

    I've seen the ground fog phenomenon several times from comercial airliners when taking off or landing. From 1000 feet you could see the ground just fine. But, at 100 feet things hazed out.

    In the Korean war a transport squadron encountered this when making a urgent delivery. When they decended to land the airfield was obscured and approach over the ridges impossible. The squadron commander polled his pilots for those with training/experince in ground/radar controled landings. he then directed those who responed to follow his instructions as he circled over the airfield. Those without experince were to watch and listen carefully then follow the others in. He got his entire squadron down safely
     
  10. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    Okay, I appreciate the lead. I'll look it up over the Halloween weekend. Happy Halloween, guys!
     
  11. syscom3

    syscom3 Member

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    Even if all of the B17's were intact on Dec 9th, there were some issues that were going to pop up.

    1) Trying to hit a moving ship at 10,000 feet is hard. Hitting the same ship at 20,000 is near impossible. End result .... dont count on the B17's to interdict Japanese shipping.

    2) As pointed out .... the logistics of supporting large air forces in the PI was iffy at best, and would be impossible once the fighting began. I would predict that sooner or later, the B17 force would have been a fraction of its Dec 8th size simply due to repair and damage issues.

    3) Regardless of what happened in Luzon, the Japanese still had the Visaya's and Mindoro wide open for their attack and could easily move northwards and strangle Luzon.

    4) US Subs? LOL!!!!!! They couldnt due s**t untill the autumn of 1943, so why would they be expected to do anything important in 1942/1942?

    My conclusion is this: An intact US airforce would only slowly delay the inevitable success of the Japanese. They had neither the doctrine, training or logistics to maintain sustained air raids that would make a strategic difference.
     
  12. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    This is very true when ships are under way and able to maneuver at sea, but much less so when anchored off an invasion beach like that at Lingayan Gulf. And the beach itself is even more vulnerable when packed with troops, landing craft, and supplies. B-17's would have been very effective if they had been brought to bear against the main Japanese invasion force early on December 22. The Japanese themselves believed that they could not mount a successful invasion of the islands until MacArthur's air assets had been substantially destroyed.

    Again, largely true. That is why MacArthur's best tactic would have been to keep his B-17's and first-line fighters in reserve beyond the reach of the Japanese planes, as a "force in being". They should have been used to repulse the main landings on northern Luzon. I believe half of Mac's B-17's were moved to Del Monte on Mindanao before the Japanes attack, but then were squandered in piece-meal attacks.

    MacArthur never had enough forces to defend all of the Philippine islands, and in any case, Luzon was the key island that had to be defended. Both MacArthur and the Japanese realized this.

    This, of course, is a myth. Between December 7, 1941, and December 30, 1942, US subs sank 19 Japanese naval vessels for 55,541 tons, and 145 merchant vessels for 611,909 tons. The truth of the matter is that the subs in the US Asiatic Fleet were poorly deployed, and allowed the Japanese invasion fleet to slip by them into Lingayan Gulf where they could do little to damage it because of extremely shallow water. They were further hampered, but not rendered completely impotent, by defective torpedoes, poor operating doctrine, and lack of experience. Had the US Subs been properly deployed off Lingayan Gulf, they might have been able to sink enough ships to give the defenders a chance of disrupting the landings, especially if MacArthur had been able to attack the beachhead by massing his surviving B-17's.

    Probably true. But the longer MacArthur could keep his air assets intact, the longer the Japanese would have to delay the invasion of Luzon. And that, in turn, would have given Mac longer to prepare his defenses, mobilize and equip his troops, and properly deploy his naval assets. A sufficient delay might have made it possible for Bataan (if Mac paid attention to his orders) to hold out for six or eight months, and thrown the whole Japanese time-table off. Conceivably this might have had far-reaching consequences in other areas of the Pacific. But this is all speculation and may not have had any strategic consequence at all.
     
  13. syscom3

    syscom3 Member

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    1) For the subs .... JANAC gives them credit for 181 ships sunk from Dec 8th 1941 to Dec 31 1942. That's pathetic. A little over 10 ships per month. And as events proved through out the first 18 months of the war, untill the torpedo's were fixed, it didnt matter what the subs did for tactics and strategy. But then this doesnt really matter for this scenario since the sub force WAS a non factor in SE Asia and adjacent waters.

    2) The B17 force would have made life complicated at times for the Japanese, but ultimatly, the numbers would dwindle on a daily basis just from operational mishaps. Eventually, large formations that could effect the battle would become less and less infrequent.

    3) Staging the bombers from Del Monte is a good idea on paper, but its at the cost of having the ability to hit targets on a flexable basis and also to sustain operations.

    4) While Luzon was the big prize for the Japanese, once they invaded the NEI and landed forces in the Visaya's, then the game was over. The only way for the PI to hold out was to have a well developed logistics pipeline back to Australia (which didnt exist). The IJN made sure there was a blockade to the PI, thus MacArthur was slowly strangling from the lack of supplies.

    5) The B17's were never known for precision bombing (regardless of what you have been told) and there is little reason to believe they could hit a stationary ship from 15,000 ft or even 20,000 ft.
     
  14. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    I arrived at my numbers by listing the ships sunk by US submarines on this site HyperWar: Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II Whatever the actual number, US subs proved they could sink ships and their performance was a serious threat to the Japanese in the first year of the war. Just claiming that US subs were not a factor in the defense of the Philippines, while true, does not prove they couldn't have been, if properly deployed. Even with defective torpedoes, US subs DID sink a significant number of ships in 1942 and proved that, properly deployed and handled, they could inflict serious damage on the Japanese merchant and naval shipping.

    We are in agreement on this point, as far as it goes. However, MacArthur's B-17'S, carefully protected, and judiciously used, could have imposed significant delays on the Japanese time table due to their need to achieve the destruction of Mac's air assets before they could launch the main invasion of Luzon.

    But far from impossible. Mac didn't need to hit targets on a "flexible basis", whatever that means. He needed to keep the Japanese from landing their main forces on Luzon. Out numbered and out-gunned as he was, he would have eventually succumbed, but as delay was his objective, he could certainly have maintained his air assets as a force in being a lot longer than he did, historically.

    This is questionable. The Japanese didn't invade the NEI until early February, and did not put forces ashore on Sumatra until mid-February. Part of the reason for this is that the logistical shipping necessary for the conquest of the Philippines was also to be used in trhe later invasion of the NEI. The Visaya's were not critical to the defense of Luzon. Had MacArthur managed to keep his air force intact longer, the Japanese would have had to slow down the whole process of the SWPA. That would have meant that the Allies would have had more time to organize and reinforce their defenses. It's entirely possible that a slower Japanese conquest of the South Pacific area would have alowed the US to send reinforements and resupply to the Philippines. I'm not claiming this is certain, but it's certainly a possibility.

    Regardless of what you've been told, B-17's could, and did, hit stationary ships during WW II from all altitudes. More importantly, the Japanese believed MacArthur's air assets were a threat to their landing operation in Lingayan Gulf, and would have delayed that operation until they could be sure they would not suffer heavy air attack. This would have been the most important effect of maintaining the B-17's as a viable force for as long as possible.
     
  15. brndirt1

    brndirt1 Saddle Tramp

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    I have found some interesting things concerning Formosa (Taiwan) and the American maps of same.

    "The duty officer at U.S. Asiatic Fleet headquarters in Manila first received word of the Pearl Harbor attack at 0230 on 8 December 1941, but a full hour passed before Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, MacArthur's chief of staff, heard the news from commercial broadcasts. He immediately notified MacArthur and all commanders that a state of war now existed with Japan. MacArthur ordered his troops to battle stations."

    "Despite this warning, when the Japanese pilots of the 11th Air Fleet attacked Clark Field nine hours later, they caught two squadrons of B-17s lined up on the field and a number of American fighters just preparing to take off. The first wave of twenty-seven Japanese twin-engine bombers achieved complete tactical surprise and destroyed most of the American heavy bombers. A second bomber strike followed while Zero fighters strafed the field.

    "Only three P-40s managed to take off. A simultaneous attack on Iba Field in northwest Luzon was also successful: all but two of the 3d Squadron's P-40s were destroyed. The Far East Air Force lost fully half its planes the first day of the war."

    "The Japanese success in the Philippines hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor has sparked controversy with much finger-pointing that has endured to this day. General Brereton later wrote that he repeatedly sought permission before the attack to launch his B-17s against the Japanese aircraft in Formosa, but General Sutherland denied his requests and also denied him access to MacArthur."

    "MacArthur later insisted that he was unaware of Brereton's request, adding that such a move would have been ill conceived anyway because USAFFE lacked intelligence concerning likely targets. For his part Sutherland claimed that he had ordered Brereton to transfer his bombers away from Clark Field to the relative safety of Mindanao to the south; Brereton countered that he could not have fully complied with the order because of the impending arrival of a new bombardment group from Hawaii."

    "Officers stationed at Clark Field later disagreed about whether their installation had even received warning of the approaching aircraft as the attack was about to start."

    From:

    Philippine Islands


    When the Japanese attacked the Philippines nine hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was delayed by the fog on Taiwan (Formosa), and our reconnisence of the area was not started to look for the Japanese because WE (MacArthur) didn’t have maps of the dang place worth relying on.

    "The "Taiwan Folders" in fact had scarcely been disturbed since the island was ceded to Japan in 1895."

    "There was a map of Keelung harbor, sent over from the Navy files, dated 1894, and a few photographs of Keelung taken before 1914. We had the standard hydrographic charts available to all navigators and a set of Japanese Imperial Land Survey maps which could be bought at any large stationers in Tokyo. We had a set of topographic maps prepared by the Imperial Japanese Army. The most interesting item in the Army's "Formosa File" was a report on Japan's alleged plan to use Formosa as a base for a push southward into Indochina. This was based on a newspaper series, in French, which had been published at Paris in 1905."

    See: G. H. Kerr, "The Kodama Report: Plan for Conquest," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XIV, No. 14 (N.Y., July 18, 1945), pp- 185-190. Original text in L'Echo de Paris (Paris), January 11-13, 1905. Full translation of the original issued in mimeograph form by the Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1945.
     
  16. Devilsadvocate

    Devilsadvocate Ace

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    Some interesting information. I have read a document which contains a statement by a Japanese fighter pilot who was stationed on Formosa (Taiwan) just prior to the war, that American PBY's frequently flew over the Japanese bases on Formosa, apparently photographing the aircraft and air fields there. The Japanese pilot claimed that the American pilots were so adept at darting in and out of the clouds which usually prevailed over the island, that though they went up again and again to intercept the intruders, they never managed to shoot down a single American aircraft. I don't know whether this is true or not, but why would the pilot claim something like that if it wasn't true?

    As for MacArthur, it seems incredible to me that he would request B-17's be sent to him for defensive purposes, and then fail to carry out reconnaissance missions the nearest enemy bases which would be potential targets in the event of war. But then again, it's MacArthur, so maybe not.
     
  17. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    John Costellos 'The Pacific War 1941-45' has a chapter that is a excellent summary of events on Luzon 8 December. Here are a few additional points from memory.



    Aside from the message from Oahu and the offcial Japanese government announcement of Radio Tokyo there were messages from Wake and Guam that they had recived air raids shortly after sunrise. A little later two auxillary airfields in northern Luzon were bombed by a small number of Japanese aircraft. These may have been reconissance missions looking for the US aircraft at the dispersal airfields.

    Shortly after dawn all aircraft were preped for imeadiate takeoff and the first flights of the standing air patrol were launched. Approximatly 10:00 a radaar contact was interpreted as inbound aircraft from the west. All aircraft including the B17s were launched. The radar contacts proved false. After some two hours orbiting well away from Manila the bombers were recalled to Clarks Field. They were sent there as it was the only location they could take on bombs that day. A combination of fatigue, miscommunications, and other delays had prevented a fresh set of fighter planes from launching on time, before the current patrol landed.

    The radar station identified another probable contact inbound from the west. Their warning phone call reached the CP, but the people there were unable to contact anyone to pass it to. It was noon, just about everyone had been awake since 03:00 hours and had missed breakfast and the mess halls had started serving food around 11:30...

    There had been a earlier warning of incoming aircraft from the radar station, there had been the warning when the auxillary airfields had been bombed, and a warning issued just before dawn, and some false reports from the fighter patrols. The real problem was not a lack of warning, but a trained and diciplined air defense command to properly analyze and act on the warnings. The radar, the communications, the CP, the radios for vectoring the fighters, the aircraft, all existed. But the various players had not been trained to used the equipment or system effectively.


    Bereton lost control of his command, which considering the lack of training and familarity with the war plans was somewhat understandable. tho not excusable. MacAurthurs inability to communicate with his subordinates, or respond to the requests for guidance from Bereton, and others, was equally inexcusable.
     
  18. Falcon Jun

    Falcon Jun Ace

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    From what have been posted here, the basic tools for an effective defense and holding action against the Japanese were available in the Philippines.
    If only the US had adopted a network similar or close the what the British had, then it's within the realm of possibility that US air assets could survive longer.
    Taking the Guadalcanal as an example, the Cactus Air Force was nearly annihilated several times. They were down to just a few planes and was nearly out of fuel when their fuel dump was hit. They were resupplied and reequipped by bringing in needed gear, personnel and supplies by bits and pieces.
    The difference, though, with the situation in the Philippines and Guadalcanal is this: by the time of Guadalcanal, the Allies had been able to consolidate their remaining forces and were already augmenting these with new ones, albeit slowly. In the Philippines, the Japanese enjoyed the advantage of having the initiative while Allied forces were still scattered. This was compounded by the shock and disbelief in the senior Allied commanders who mostly underestimated Japanese capability.

    I've looked at several websites about the Japanese air assets in Formosa at the time of Pearl Harbor. One I found useful as an overview was this Philippine Air Force website http://www.paf.mil.ph/digest/d43/d43_3.htm

    This analysis was included in the article contained in the website above:

    THE EARLY TRIUMPH - SUCCESS FACTORS
    The Japanese decision to go to war were bolstered by the following strategic reasons: the signing of a non-aggression pact with Russia thereby eliminating the threat of a southward invasion which tied a large air force in the north, and; the rapid shift in the course of the war in Europe. Japan had expected Germany to defeat Britain and Russia in a short period of time leaving America isolated. The European war deprived the Far East of western forces, so that by 1941 it became obvious that the balance of forces would favor Japan, and that a swift and decisive military blow could be struck that might persuade America to accept Japanese imperialism.[8]
    At the start of the Pacific War, Japan enjoyed superiority in first line aircraft, carriers and combat experience of aircrew. The Japanese Army and Navy air forces had a combined strength of 3,000 first line aircraft compared to 668 for the Allied forces. The navy had 3,500 first line pilots while the Army had 2,500 with an average of 500-600 flying hours. Japanese Navy had more aircraft carriers than the US Navy, ten to three. The Japanese had superiority over the air forces of the three Allied nations at the start of the war, so that within five months Japan had neutralized the American, British and the Dutch forces in the Far East. It captured two allied strongholds, Corregidor “Rock” of the Philippines and Singapore. The early Japanese successes were due to several factors.
    The first of these was the lack of information and western intelligence of Japanese capabilities. The Allies had little idea of the Japanese aircraft design,[9] and regarded Japanese pilots as inferior compared to their Allied counter part and were believed as fifth rate, myopic, night blind, poor at dive bombing and accident prone. On the contrary, the Zero fighters showed its superiority to any American aircraft and were fully appreciated at the Pearl Harbor attack. It was looked upon as nearly invincible because of its speed and maneuverability.[10] Japan, at that time, had already reached, if not exceeded, the aviation technology of the western powers. Japan disclosed little details of the advances made during the 1930’s, displaying only obsolete and obsolescent weaponry and equipment to the public. It has also inculcated among its people that ‘every foreigner is a spy.’ [11]
    Secondly, the element of surprise and Allied preoccupation in Europe contributed to the Japanese success. Europe enjoyed massive allied forces and resources, while the Far East had low priority. They failed to appreciate the capability of Japanese carriers to project air power as far as Hawaii, and thought that the range of Japanese bombers were limited to 320 miles, which led them to believe that Clark Air Base in the Philippines was beyond reach. The Allied losses were practically due to their unpreparedness. Provisions for air defenses such as the lack of radars for early warning of air attack was the greatest blunder.[12] Despite the early indication of Japan as an emerging military threat in the Far East, the U.S. Army was starved of funds, with only 2% of the budget allocated for research and development.[13]
    The third factor was the Japanese air power training. In the early 1930’s, Japan’s war with China and Manchuria provided its Army and Navy pilots with valuable combat experience, especially in developing air tactics and in organizing the air force to achieve its maximum effect.[14] The use of bombers and dive-bombers on both land and sea targets were improved. In mid 1930s, proficiency in night flying and carrier flying operation were likewise increased. Japanese aircrew carried out long distance transoceanic bombing raids, sometimes in poor weather condition, from bases in Japan and Formosa against targets around Shanghai, Nankin, and Hanchow, giving them a good training for their future air attack campaign in Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines.[15] The mandatory 300 hours of flying training before a Japanese pilot was posted is another factor compared to the US Army Air Corp’s 200 hours of basic training.
    Fourthly, the Japanese had good intelligence, carefully planned and attained tactical superiority. They made use of the aircraft in the overall plan, and worked to ensure a smooth working relationship between the navy air force and ground forces. The air forces provided the preliminary air strikes, protection for fleet and transport movements, air cover over the battlefield and fighter protection for bomber aircraft.[16]
     
  19. Carl W Schwamberger

    Carl W Schwamberger Ace

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    The short answer is something very similar to the British system had been adopted. The problem was the leaders had not time to train to use it effectively. ie: The radar and radio equipment had only been manufactored a few months earlier and just delivered. Think of the situation as like a new computer network delivered and instaled in the office just yesterday. But no one has any user time on it yet.

    A other difference is that delivery of new aircraft had nearly tripled between the autum of 1941 and the summer of 1942. Pilots completing training in the US had significantly increased in numbers. Ditto for infantry, artillery, cargo ships... The battle in the Southwest pacific was fought with the equipment and men that could have been delivered to the Phillpines later in the winter and early sumer had Japan not attacked.
     
    Falcon Jun likes this.
  20. mac_bolan00

    mac_bolan00 Member

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    it took japan's best pilots more than 4 months to learn how to take on a b-17. imagine how much damage the clark bombers would have done.
     

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