What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?

OTOH,.... MG could not have been initiated earlier.

IMHO,MG was a reasonable try to finish the war in 1944;it failed,mainly not because of allied mistakes,but,because of the Germans ,who were already to strong in the Arnhem sector .

I don't see that there existed a serious alternative for MG,that could have finished the war in 1944.

 

I took part in operation Market garden, and am, or was, a member of the market garden association. 69 years on there have been some quite wild stories of what took place.
Let me state very firmly, there was nothing wrong with the operation Market garden.... Absolutely nothing. We had beaten the living daylights out of the enemy with the final slaughter of the Falaise trap. The great chase across France Belgium and Holland. Before us now lay the "Seven Bridges to Arnhem"

We took on the Escaut canal crossing under heavy fire ,and it was a nightmare, at one in the morning. Now before us lay the greatest assault that promised to pay monstrous dividends, if we could pull it off. We took all the bridges, except the last. Now for many years through the USA film depictions, a picture has been painted of tardy British forces, and stopping for tea...It is plain BULLSHIT. And believing these American films is to destroy[y the heroism of those that gave their lives in the endeavour.
Now let me put the matter right, once and for all. Firstly I went over Nijmegen bridge just after it was captured. There were infantrymen in the girder work, armed with rifles and brens To take out enemy sea mines that were being floated down the river, in the hope that one would connect with the bridge and put it out of action.
So now we are on the edge of the island that led to Arnhem. Let us put it into perspective. Before us now lay the golden chance to break out into the northern plains of Germany where our air force and our superior tank numbers, would have created absolute mayhem.... There in front of us was this ONE GOLDEN CHANCE

IT was a long odds chance But the rewards?

The war over by Christmas.
Thousands of young men's lives saved
We would be in Berlin long before the Russians.
We would have been in the position to stop the V2 attacks on our home land.
Access to the Northern plains would have resulted in great slaughter of the Enemy forces.

The way Market garden has been depicted, is that having got to Nijmegen we should have sat on our collective hands.... For what? There was a war to be won, and the brave won the damn thing ..... Was it a long chance? Too damned true it was. Was it a failure? No! we took 6 bridges all in one mighty swoop.

The end shows us that we lost that gamble ..But only just, had fortune gone with us?????

Now imagine, you have to take that momentous decision. In your hands lay the lives of thousands of young lives. You can stop the slaughter of our civilians by the V" three months to end the war and in Berlin first.... You chances of pulling it odd are about 40/60. Now do you go for that Huge Golden prize? Or do you sit on your hands and wait for God knows what?
Sapper

 

Actually, A Bridge Too Far was a UK/US production, with a British director (Sir Richard Attenborough) based on a book by Cornelius Ryan, a correspondent for the Daily Telegraph.

The scene you speak of (I think) is where the American Major played by Robert Redford, berates a XXX Corps commander for not pushing on into Arnhem. I think it was just included as a sort of amalgam of various recriminations between the US and Brits following the battle. Why didn't XXX Corps push on - because their infantry was tied up in Nijmegen. So, why didn't the 82nd take Nijmegen on time?

There are no answers to such questions. Most of it is just bad luck.

 

The thing that went wrong with Op market Garden was that the Germans were not at the point of collapse. The only rationale for Op market Garden was as a psychological blow to convert the disaster in France into a surrender. An unlikely scenario? It happened in 1918, and in 1944 the German Generals had already revolted once.

The objectives have to be psychological rather than geographic. The westerh allies were not strong enough to occupy Germany in September 1944. Even a 100% successful Op Market Garden would have left an insignificant force across the Rhine. What forces were going to drive on the Berlin or the Ruhr? On 1st September they had only C 40 divisions in Europe, less than half their strength in March 1945. They had nothing like the supply base needed to attack. So this has to have been an attempted coup de main.

I don't this this was an unreasonable gamble. The only way to test German resolve was to launch the operation. Photos of tanks under trees says nothing of the willingness of their crews to fight. Even though the odds may not have been favourable, the benefots of ending the war in 1944 made it worth a try. .

(There may have been another unstated objective to force the German evacuation of Holland and eliminate the V2 threat to Britain. This may have explained the switch in planning from an Easterly attack to a Northern one which brushed the Isselmeer before turning East)

 

The scene in question I believe was supposed to be the future Archbishiop of Canterbury...His recollection of this is somewhat different from that depicted. Or Martin may put me right on this.

This goes forward, to Band of Brothers, and the British tank commander on road with Easy company in trouble..Maybe its what some of the allies want to depict of Brits.

I'd rather go with the you tube in my signature.

 

And to end all the Dunkirk what ifs and Sealions....3.14 of that vid gives the answer to em all...I'm sure the Germans would have liked to see this prevented in 1940 and not have to face the day of Reckoning.

 

I think you Brits may be too sensitive about that scene. The tank commander is absolutely correct that they can't move forward without infantry. What's left unsaid or maybe could have been better said, is that the British infantry shouldn't have been tied up in Nijmegen since the 82nd was supposed to have secured it before they got there. The scene is included to show the finger pointing, rather than show any real faults.

A few minutes later, all the US and UK commanders are together (in the film - probably never actually happened that way) and they each have a different reason for the failure - it was Nijmegen, it was the single road, the comms, the weather in England, this, that, something else.

Ryan didn't come to any conclusion in the book, he just laid it out as those concerned saw it. Attenborough, to his credit, does the same in the film. And that, to me, is why it is such a great film. The watcher, like the reader in the Ryan book, is left to form his own conclusions.

 

I think we are sensative on that scene mate...We have reason to be...it was thought a good idea to repeat something similar in Band of Brothers with another tank commander in a scene. I've over the years come across so many of your fellow countrymen, not on here, that have perpetuated the myth from that scene as history and taken it as a rod to bash the British Tommy with.

 

I don't think you need worry about that with anyone here, since we actually know something about the war.

 

I agree.

I can understand the frustration of the American paratroops, having just carried out the heroic assault river crossing, and to discover the Grenadiers weren't keen to press on must have been the last straw. However, Carrington was with the lead troop of tanks, isolated on the enemy side of the river with a bridge still to be cleared of infantry behind them. The invitation to charge up the road to Arnhem at the behest of the US paras would be lunacy.

There is a different perspective. Carrington and the Guards may have been ordered not to push on. There may have been a decision not to risk losses to the Guards in order to push on the Frost's bridge.

A friend of mine took a Ww2 Guards Division veteran to Arnhem and Nijmegen. The veteran had been the driver to one of the commanders. He said that there had been a conference in the power station at Nijmegen overlooking the assult crossing. He had overheard the commanders agreeing that the operation had little chance of overall success and would not take un necessary risks with their men. This is gossip rather than reliably sourced, but it fits.

One of the under documented aspects of command in WW2 was the discussions that went on about how much effort a commander would demand of his troops for a particular operation. You cannot ask soldiers to give 100% effort all the time, whether it is peace time or war time. Commanders often make an unofficial deal with their subordinates to the effect that "I'll protect you from the most asinine orders, if you get everyone to deliver 100% when I ask you to." I am familiar with this from post war British Army and I heard Lord Carver talk about this in WW2.

Airborne troops are trained to carry out high intensity operations and then withdraw and prepare for the next show. They approach military operations as sprinter approaches an event. Armoured and line infantry are long distance runners. They cannot afford to take the same risks or losses accepted by airborne forces. The Guards armoured division started op Market Garden 25% under strength in infantry. There were no more boxes of guardsmen. Pushing on in the dark against an unknown number of Germans was a risky activity. The Germans were very capable of mauling the in cautious - as the 7th Armoured Div discovered at Villers Bocage and the 4th Canadian Armd Div discovered when Worthington force got lost on "Pt 145 "

The decision not to push on isn't part of a heroic narrative, but real life isn't scripted by Holly wood. By the time the Nijmegen bridge had been taken it may have been clear that Op market Garden was unlikely to end the war in 1944. My 2p.

P.S There is an analysis of Op market Garden using the unofficial, scatological terminology here. http://www.arrse.co.uk/staff-college-staff-officers/166064-new-mission-verbs.html Please be aware that this exercise in the use of unofficial military terminology explores the subtle nuances of meaning that can be expressed in a common profanity freely used within a military environment. Do not follow this link if easily offended

 

Our cousins may be a little bemused by arrse mate....

 

A small amount of exposure to British military culture will not do much lasting harm...

 

There is nothing quite like being there. The idea that we could not run amok over the northern plains of Germany? Where ever did you get that from? later we did just that.... I think also that far too many readers here, are not aware that the drive North to Arnhem, was a two pronged affair The other drive north took off on a loop to the east and North, and that is where I was. In that operation, we got cut off, they got in behind us, and we had to live on captured German food. We lost all our cigarettes and life was bloody miserable.
At that time I was ordered to get a DR bike and get onto the island towards Arnhem, as far as I could, to find a Company harbour area for the company to move later. That is when I crossed Nijmegen bridge, with the infantry up in the girder work with brens and rifles. I got straight onto the island and went as far as I could, until the shelling was straddling the roads. I found what was an area with a concrete standing am not sure, but the name Schmit comes to mind.. I made notes about the area, and set off back quite pleased with myself. Only to find when I got back no one was interested, orders had changed, and we set off in an easterly direction towards Overloon and Venraij and my last days. I did not know it but my luck was due to run out...And did....It may be interesting to know that the roads in Holland slowly and surely vanished and the mud underneath, came to the top.
Now you can believe that or not. What is so odd is that time and again I have been disbelieved as genuine. That makes me wonder did the public think that WW2 was fought by mythical beings, and not ordinary Dorset men like myself, and my mates...All that is different is that I have a great memory.

 

I have to say I've never been able to judge whether a successful Market Garden would have genuinely been a springboard for a final offensive.

One thing I am quite sure of, though, is that if it had been a success, it wouldn't have been considered a brilliant or daring victory - it would have been seen as just another Allied success due to "material superiority" and "weakened opposition" in the same manner as Cobra, the Great Swan, Varsity etc.

Which is to say it would be just another example of the hypocrisy of the military historians - the only remarkable victories are German ones.