What went wrong with Operation Market Garden?

One thing about working of radiocommunications at Arnhem at local level ,maybe there was communication between english groups and to he americans at Nijmegen ,but between Polish and English were no communications at first at all . So one may seriously doubt if any of their radios were operative . Ive seen a dutch documentary about gen sosiabowski ,believe it was only on the second day he managed with great losses to get a few people over the water to establish some form of communication .

As there was already a german blocking force ready ,that gave the germans the time to get their block on the right spot in time ..with good communications that might have been different story , could have gotten the allies just that much extra time in which weather was clearing and more supplies and reinforcements might have been dropped etc..
I understood thats the reason too why Montgomery was upset about the poles as they couldn't achieve their orders, but it wasn't cowardry why Sosiabowski couldn't do it ,he took huge losses already just trying to make contact .

Offcourse its all Iffy history now , there wouldn't have been more gratefull people than the dutch if the operation had succeeded , as it would have meant the end of German occupation for a large part of the Netherlands immediately ...

What is upsetting is that our queen Wilhelmina after the war personally had ordered to decorate all Polish forces and Gen Sosiabowski too,
but that our gouvernment refused to do that because of very strong diplomatic pressure applied from London ...Those are facts that all came out quite recently after the dead of prince Bernhard and many official documents became public . Dont know if the official english viewpoint on that case has been changed today ,but it might explain why english sources have a different view about these first days .
BTW ..I think allied historians seem to underestimate the seriousness of what the 'England Spiel' reveals ..there has been an open leak directly from Bernhards quarters and SOE
to german intel for years , reveiling not just Market garden but many more ops .
Started from 1942 onwards till the end of the war .
Amazed so little people here seem to know about it ..



This article mentions some things related to market garden too :
Special Operations Executive, Series 1, Parts 1 to 5

 

Here is a pretty good seven page article from World War II magazine on Operation Market-Garden:

See:

Operation Market Garden Reconsidered » HistoryNet

 

Op Comet Revised as Op Market Garden AKA A Bridge to Far, had bad weather, logistical and supply problems.
To assume your going to reach certain objectives by the allotted time as underestimating your opponents capabilities
or resistance was some of the reasons things went so horribly wrong.

Op Market Garden lacked C3, command, control and communications, as the key to a successful operation.
As trying to bite off more then you can chew.

 

Spaniard has it in one...No plan ever survives initial contact, or seldom in any.
Over confidence in planning and command usually will lead to that.
The radio net plan was thought sufficient for the overall operation and indeed probably would have been, had the initial movements aka the original plan had succeeded.

However, even with perfect communications, 2 para main were at the bridge when Kraft held up another battalion on the move...the last battalion were on their own way according to the initial plan. If they had been brought down to assist even good radio network would not have forced kraft away from his position in those first few hours...and why would Urquhart even if in contact with all his 3 para bns, even think of ordering the other battalion down when the one in contact with kraaft should have been sufficient..Which general in the dark on contact to advance even today would order his last spare battalion of the day, already on march to its target off its path on the account of a contact by another battalion on route to their objective?
No the problem was with the initial plan, no radio contact would have got all 3 bns needed to the bridge on night one. Generals dont just order changes to their plans on the first contact basis without proper evaluation by which time even then with or without radios the battle was lost on night one.

 

Hello Heinrich,

two things in your forwardings I do not understand.

1. In what way did OMG in September cause a hungerwinter ?

2. unfortunatley he is no more alive, (He used to cut my hair real nice) but this gentleman was a Feld or Oberfeldwebel in the German paras. When we used to talk to him about OMG (I think he was around Eindhoven) he never gave the impression that they knew about this coming operation.

Regards
Kruska

 

I always thought the operation failed because of the fact that two Panzer divisions getting some R&R as well VG Units were in the direct vicinity of the landings.

 

The difficulty is that command and control are not possible without communication and in 1944 infantry companies frequently
lost touch with their battalion headquarters and each other. Quite apart from casualties to platoon and company signals sections,
the back-packed No. 18 set was subject to interference and frequent failures.


It's correct two units did have Com's but it wasn't on a regular bases.


As for the narrow roads that were cluttered with Troops++++++ for miles made advancing very difficult.

Like it was stated it would be "bad form" if the Calvary got to there objectives on time or ahead of Schedule. What arrogance!


Now a Little trivia, in the film "A Bridge To Far" The US crossed the river on boats in day light with Robert Redford and
Cliff Clavin from Cheers to attack the bridge on both sides, which is incorrect.

Which Regiment crossed the River and attacked the Bridge from the rear?

 

Courtesy of Suzy with the link to the e version of Montgomery's memoirs Internet Archive: Free Download: THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD - MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN , K,G,
he says on page 265 - 267:

"There were many reasons why we did not gain complete success
at Arnhem. The following in my view were the main ones.

First. ​

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The operation was not regarded at Supreme Headquarters as​

the ​

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spearhead of a major Allied movement on the northern flank​

designed ​

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to isolate, and finally to occupy, the Ruhr the one objective​

in ​

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the West which the Germans could not afford to lose. There is no
doubt in my mind that Eisenhower always wanted to give priority
to the northern thrust and to scale down the southern one. He ordered​

this ​

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to be done, and he thought that it was being done. It was not​

being ​

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done. We now know from Bradley s book (A Soldiers Story),​

page ​

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412, that in the middle of September, there was parity of logistic​

resources ​

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between the First and Third American Armies in 12 Army​

Group.

Eisenhower ​

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is a thoroughly genuine person; he is the very incar​

nation ​

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of sincerity and he trusts others to do as he asks. But in this​

instance ​

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his intentions were not carried out. The following quotation​

from page ​

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531 of The Struggle for Europe by Chester Wilmot is of​

interest:​

"If ​

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he [Eisenhower] had kept Patton halted on the Meuse, and​

had ​

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given full logistic support to Hodges and Dempsey after the
capture of Brussels, the operations in Holland could have been an
overwhelming triumph, for First U.S. Army could have mounted​

a ​

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formidable diversion, if not a successful offensive, at Aachen,​

and Second ​

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British Army could have attacked sooner, on a wider​

front ​

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and in much greater strength.**​

Second. ​

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The airborne forces at Arnhem were dropped too far away​

from ​

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the vital objective the bridge. It was some hours before they
reached it. I take the blame for this mistake. I should have ordered​

Second ​

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Army and i Airborne Corps to arrange that at least one​

complete Parachute Brigade ​

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was dropped quite close to the bridge,​

so ​

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that it could have been captured in a matter of minutes and​

its ​

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defence soundly organised with time to spare. I did not do so.​

Third. ​

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The weather. This turned against us after the first day and​

we ​

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could not carry out much of the later airborne programme. But​

weather ​

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is always an uncertain factor, in war and in peace. This​

uncertainty ​

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we all accepted. It could only have been offset, and the
operation made a certainty, by allotting additional resources to the​

project, ​

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so that it became an Allied and not merely a British project.​

Fourth. ​

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The 2nd S.S. Panzer Corps was refitting in the Arnhem​

area, ​

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having limped up there after its mauling in Normandy. We knew​

it ​

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was there. But we were wrong in supposing that it could not fight​

effectively; ​

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its battle state was far beyond our expectation. It was​

quickly ​

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brought into action against the ist Airborne Division.​

As ​

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after Normandy, so again after Arnhem, I was bitterly disap​

pointed. ​

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It was my second attempt to try to capture the Ruhr quickly.​

Bill ​

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Williams used to tell me that the Germans could not carry on the​

war ​

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for more than about three months after they lost the Ruhr. But​

we ​

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still hadn't got it​

And ​

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here I must admit a bad mistake on my part I underestimated​

the ​

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difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we​

could ​

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get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army​

could ​

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do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong.​

I will close ​

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this chapter with a final quotation on the battle from​

Chester ​

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Wilmot (The Struggle for Europe, page 528). This what he​

wrote about ​

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​

it:​

"It ​

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was most unfortunate that the two major weaknesses of the​

Allied High Command-the British caution about casualties and

the ​

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American reluctance to concentrateshould both have exerted​

their ​

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baneful influence on this operation, which should, andcould,​

have ​

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been the decisive blow of the campaign in the West. This​

was no ​

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time to count the cost, or to consider the prestige of rival​

commanders. ​

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The prize at issue was no less than the chance of​

capturing the ​

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Ruhr and ending the war quickly with all that​

meant ​

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for the future of Europe.**"​

In ​

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my prejudiced view, if the operation had been properly backed​

from ​

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its inception, and given the aircraft, ground forces, and admin​

istrative ​

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resources necessary for the job it would have succeeded​

in ​

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spite of my mistakes, or the adverse weather, or the presence of​

the ​

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2nd S.S. Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. I remain MARKET​

GARDEN'S unrepentant advocate."

 

Other than a few hints the only description of the German sucess at counter intelligence in the Netherlands I've seen is in Marks 'Between Silk and Cyanide' As a communications officer in the SOE Marks was very aware of the security failure of the Special Operations in Holland and Northern Belgium. He was not aware of the events or failures in the "Bernhard side of events. The Dutch Government ran its own connections and intelligence operations that were seperated to various degrees from SOE operations.

Marks makes it clear that SOE leadership, except for a few individuals, and higher British leaders had by the winter of 1942-43 realized their entire SOE operation in the Netherlands was taken over by the Germans & they had been 'played'. Marks further describes how the SOE leaders came to suspect a much wider problem with Allied covert operations in the Netherlands. But, Marks was not in a position during the war, nor later, to learn anything important about the security failures in the Dutch government run operations.

The destruction of the SOE operations in the Low Countries and subsequent difficulties & distrust in setting up new operations seems to have influenced the British intelligence analysis preperatory for Market Garden. That is they were unsure if they could trust any information they were receiving from the Dutch sources. Hence the dismissal of important information.

One other point Marks makes was the slowness of the SOE leaders in 1942 to recognize their operations had been nuetralized. Had SOE paid attention to proper validation of their agents identity and actions they probablly would have understood what the German counter intelligence had accomplished as soon as each agent was compromised. Remedial action could have been taken imeadiatly in mid 1942, rather than in 1943 after the damage had gone to the foundation of Allied covert operations in the Low Countries.

 

What that text suggests to me is Montgomery either lacked critical information for, or was ignoring that information, of the Allied supply transportation problem. Specificaly who was allocated what did not mean much since delivery was not practical. The logistics plan for Overlord revolved around two critical transportation aspect, first securing several major groups of ports, and second the use of the railroads.

By September the Allied armys did not control enough ports to take in all the supply needed. In theory Antwerp as one of Europes 'super ports' should have satisfied that requirement. Unfortunatly the Scheldt waterway remained under German control through October.

The Allied advance in August completely outran the ability of the transportation operations people to rebuild the wrecked French & Belgian railroads. Despite vast numbers the Allied automotive transport could not deliver even a fraction of what was required for sucessfull offensive operations to the Rhine and beyond. The 35 to 40 divisions of Bradleys and Montys two army groups, required some 350,000 tons of supply PER DAY to keep full pressure on the Germans. Thats mostly fuel, ammunition, and replacement equipment/parts. By September truck transport running from the supply dumps in Normandy to the forward Allied corps were burning more fuel making the round trip than supply delivered. They were also breaking down from overuse faster than they could be replaced or repaired. to keep a single corps supplied for the Market Garden attack 21st Army Group had to immobilize the rest of its corps. This was not because the supplies did not exist. There were suffcient supplies of fuels and artillery ammo in British calibers in Normandy, but because it could not be delivered without a functional railroad system.

 

These were only the remnants of 2 PD(Hohenstaufen and Frundsberg ),but airborne troops are very vulnerable :the Germans had the experience at Rotterdam and Crete

 

One thing could probably have made it work, seizing the key bridges at the outset. How they could expect to capture such obvious targets intact several hours after landing is beyond me. Colonel Chatterton, commander of the British Glider Pilot Regiment, suggested and offered to lead a coup-de-main at Arnhem bridge, 5-6 gliders, similar to Pegasus Bridge in Normandy, but his idea was rejected.

The available information suggests that such attacks could have succeeded. The one direct attack on a bridge during Market-Garden, at Grave by a company of the 82nd, succeeded. Even attacking overland as they did, about half the bridges were captured. Son bridge and Arnhem railroad bridge were blown in the faces of approaching troops, hours after the initial landings. Frost's men approaching Arnhem railroad bridge actually saw a German on the bridge, apparently setting the charges. So while no speculation is certain, the likelihood is that the most important bridges could have been secured by half a dozen company sized forces simultaneously with the initial landings.

Had this been done, and using the historical timeline, Guards Armoured would have reached and crossed Son Bridge starting around 1900 on Sept 18, the second day. I doubt they would proceed beyond the 101st's perimeter in darkness, although they would probably send reconnaissance forces and liaison officers forward to the 82nd. Starting at first light they would reach the 82nd at Grave in an hour an the Nijmegen bridges an hour after that. They would be in position to strike from Nijmegen to Arnhem on the morning of the 19th, day 3. At that point the Germans still had few troops, tanks, or guns in "the island" to contest the linkup with 1 Airbourne Division.

Although attention focusses on Arnhem highway bridge, the railroad bridge might have been more useful for crossing the Rhine. The highway bridge led right into town and the surrounding urban area would have to be cleared to make use of it. The railroad bridge led right into 1 A/B's perimeter and would allow armour to advance over relatively open ground and envelope the town.

 

the hunger winter was half a retalliation for resistance activities in the west of holland that were to support market garden (believe they blew up some important railway tracks etc ) and half preparations for the final retreat of german troops stealing all foods and goods like bicycles etc they could find for transport to germany after the finishing of OMG . Germans blasted a few dikes as punishment and set large parts of north and south holland under water (the two larger coastal provinces where most big cities are ) making transports difficult and loosing all local harvest etc. Imagine an area with say 4 million people left with no foodsupplies at all ..
What followed was a bitter winter killing thousands from pure starvation . If you talk to people who been there you'll hear about the most horrifying survival stories ..kids walking to the other side of the country carring family jewelry for possible food trading with farmers up north , eating of flower bulbs , leather , grass you name they done it . In Dutch history is desribed as the hungerwinter .
Hongerwinter - Wikipedia




Wether average troops knew i cant say , but Model , Rauter and Gieskes knew about it .Agent after agent new info came straight to them ..al they had to is wait for the drop and pick some poor fellow up at landing and force him to continue doing his thing under SD control .

There seems to be a modern Historic tendency stating SOE was the gameplayer here..(thus deliberately offering all these agents) .. but the old skool resistance fighters here dont buy that theory too .The explanation that the SOE played the SD is only based upon a testimony of a mr Marks then head SOE cryptology , and like many times everyone is quoting from the most political correct official source ..well , if that is true then over 60 dutch SOE trained agents were sent to their deaths on purpose for nothing .. If it was a counter intel SOE game then it failed completely.

Then the explanation Dr Lou de Jong (our most 'official' historian ) states in his official standard work 'Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden 'that it was sheer amateurism why SOE failed to pick up lacking of error codes in the transmissions from agents behind enemy lines is much more believeable ..
Another thing that makes a germany-game unbelieveable is the fact that all these agents had their instructions to prepare the dutch resistance for the coming OMG . After capturing so many the whole picture of what was coming was already clear to the SD at least ! Question to them was only where it would come en when ..nijmegen or arnhem ?? Offcourse none of these agents knew the full plan but from the information forced out of all these agentsseparately the SD perfectly well knew something big was coming on Dutch soil , and knowing Ami troops needed to cross the rhine there were only a few possible locations ..If you also know resistance did repeatedly radioed london a few days before OMG there were a lot of troops in the area incl panzers and london still chose to ignore that info too then OMG was already sold before it started . (Even without all the logistic and weather problems ) I understood there were even air pictures taken from aereal recon planes showing the panzers in the woods. Combine all this and its clear what england spiel has meant in relation to OMG .
I suppose if you're interested in what SD knew about OMG one needs to look at german sources about Operation Nordpol , the german name for Englandspiel as we call it ,Kruska .I can only refer to official documentation done by dr Lou de Jong and public independent documentalists working for NPS ,( the dutch 'BBC')
There is a good dutch spoken documentary made in 2003 and it should be visible on line here :Englandspiel / Germanygame - Andere Tijden - /Geschiedenis under the link video ..
(Publieke Omroep: Generieke Mediaplayer)

(doesnt start when I click to play it though , might be just my laptop settings or down temporarily )
Theres also a text extract there readable by using googles translation thingy .

another thing : when looking at the london leak (read Christiaan Lindemans) at dutch HQ , then keep in mind our royal family is involved ..If you follow Prince Bernhards lifestory you'll quickly find out he was a highly controversial person both before , in ,and after ww2 and its proven many times our official historians covered his tracks more than once with smokescreens that later were proven to be lies ! I have no doubt this story will be rewritten now that after his death some archives are opening up being kept tightly closed for 70 years .Time will tell .

 

First of all, I do not believe Market-Garden was compromised. Why would you defend vital objectives against an imminent attack by resting and refitting? The Germans created no Kampfgruppe to fight well after the British touched down. Model fled from his HQ. They were not prepared.

About the failures of the Market-Garden plan: The airborne part of the offensive was poorly orchestrated and the XXX Corps failed to reach the projected start-line before the operation started. The airborne attack lacked sufficient transport planes; elements had to be delivered in two separate flights over two days, thereby losing the element of surprise. The paratroops dropped too far from their objectives giving the Germans time to react. As noted, the paratroopers also suffered from poor comms. equipment. The force commander got surrounded by German troops when trying to personally rally his unit and hid in an attic for one day.

The Operation also suffered from bad luck as a whole. The paratroopers were minutes away from being on the bridge before the Germans blew it for five times.

R. Weigley, by no means a Monty fan, said the Operation was very close to success and its promise justified the risks. Unfortunately the risks became reality.

 

From what I know at present, I would fully agree with Triple C. The Bridges and therefore the objective of OMG (entering straight into Germany) would then have been known to the Germans and they could not have afforded the allies to succeed -which besides Arnhem they did.

Arnhem was a damn close call - basically the British were almost on the Bridge on both sides. I can't imagine that the Germans would or could have taken such an operation as unprepared in numbers and equipment and loosing all but one bridge If they had really known - that there is a planed strike right into the heart of the Ruhr.
Or as posted, placing units at the expected target - which however as history also prooves were totally inadequate to counter OMG.

The plans found in that glider IIRC were not taken seriously by the German HQ. It was some batallion or brigade commander who trusted those documents and occupied some (not all) drop zones only around Arnhem.

Is this more of a theory Heinrich? or is there solid evidence for this such as Model's records or pre OMG orders refering to an allied landing in mid of September?

Take Stalin for example who was indeed informed about the date and had a nice copy of Barbarossa in his hands. - he simply didn't believe it (maybe that was the case too for the Germans?).

As such there was no alarm, or German units set in alert and stationed at known objectives of OMG.

Regards
Kruska

 

This link pretty accurately covers both operation MARKET and operation GARDEN. The airborne MARKET and the supposedly co-ordingated, supporting ground attack under the code name GARDEN.

See:

Operation MARKET-GARDEN

 

No its not my theory Krusk ..like I said dutch historians have a very different opinion about it as the english historians do ,you'dd have to look for operation Nordpol files to find out . England spiel was a key factor for OMG . Theres a standard work wich covers it to , written by Dr Lou de Jong wich is seen as our key historian ..called 'Koninkrijk der Nederlanden' .He's still mild in his formulations
shortened it .. maybe better

 

Hello Heinrich,

I am not taking a hit at you - not at all.

I am sure there is a lot in our history books regarding WWII, which might not stand up to the real facts.

I am not disputing (at least I don't find it hard to believe) that OMG information leaked to the Germans.

What I find difficult to believe is that due to this leaking - the Germans had prepared for OMG.
There were IMHO no German units of real hitting power or capable of stopping the Brit/US advance on OMG - besides the road/Deich problem and a bit of a messy Arnheim recon recognition.

Regards
Kruska

 

NP Andy ..
Mixed up two stories because they were so closely related but not fully the same thing .
Its Lindemans who did get details OMG from london directly to his superiors who didnt believe him ..just found it here at Institue of for Dutch history
Lindemans, Christiaan Antonius (1912-1946)

Problem is its in dutch ..
And it doesnt go into what german SD did with the info they received from him but confirms the london leak was real .

Another source is Oresto Pinto's book Friend or Foe
Who Oresto Pinto was can be found on wiki

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,818692-1,00.html
A time review about the book London Calling northpole

And another article wich ends with a note..
http://www.fpp.co.uk/History/General/SOEHolland.html

Lindemans was still active and in London when the spiel collapsed .. when combining all info that was gathered from the dropped agents from the spiel (whom he personally knew many of ) ,and Lindemans personal conformations of a coming OMG later back behind enemy lines in Holland , how could SD not have known ? When even wiki states C.L. reported the plans to his superiors were talking the same SD staff who ran the spiel and had his wife in custody .. after all C.L. was a valuable and proven source to the SD so not someone to be taken lightly... especially while they were fully aware where C.L. remained and near who.

All very fuzzy ..and kept very fuzzy too .
( No guys .. i now understand why the name David Irving fell , i never read his Churchills war..only just found out in the last link he wrote about it too ....)